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1Overview of the 
US Legal System
Who Makes the Law
In What Subject Areas
How Courts Are Organized
JS 103 Courts and Society
Margaret Stevenson
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2Who makes “the law”?
3 branches of government:
Legislative
Executive
Judicial
Each branch makes a form of “the law”
Federal (national) branches and 
State branches
We will focus on California law.  However, each state is different 
in making its own law.
Who makes “the law”?
FEDERAL 
branches of government 
The US Constitution 
outlines the federal
branches and their 
duties.
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3Who makes “the law”?
FEDERAL 
Article I:  Legislative branch 
The Legislature (Congress) makes 
federal laws in the form of statutes.
Congress is made up of the Senate and 
House of Representatives.  
Law made by the Legislative branch is the 
US Code, of which there are 50 Titles set 
out by subject (e.g., labor, highways, 
immigration)
Who makes “the law”?
FEDERAL 
Article II: Executive branch 
The Executive branch executes
(administers) the statutes that Congress 
passes.  
It issues 
• regulations, 
• Executive Orders, and 
• administrative agency decisions.
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4Who makes “the law”?
FEDERAL 
Article II: Executive branch 
Made up of the 
President
the President’s Cabinet members 
e.g., Secretary of State, Attorney 
General, Director of the CIA 
Agencies
Administrative Law judges
e.g., Immigration judges, Tax 
Court judges
Who makes “the law”?
FEDERAL 
Article III: Judicial branch 
Courts interpret federal laws and US 
Constitution
US Supreme Court  
Federal appeals courts 
Federal trial (“US District Courts”)
Courts “make law” in judicial decisions 
(also referred to as “case law”).
Courts are not expected to “make law” but to 
interpret law that other branches make.  
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5Who makes “the law”?
STATE  
State branches of 
government usually 
similar to the federal 
branches
States have their own 
state Constitutions. 
Who makes “the law”?
Legislative: 
Senate and Assembly
Legislature passes statutes 
that appear in 29 Codes 
e.g., California Penal Code, 
California Education Code
STATE
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6Who makes “the law”?
Executive:
Governor
State agencies 
e.g., California Insurance 
Commission, California Lottery
Municipal level
County, city
STATE
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7Who makes “the law”?
Judicial:  
California Supreme Court   
State appeals courts 
Trial (“Superior”) courts
comparable to the appellate and 
trial courts in the federal 
judiciary
STATE
Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
Federalism:  relationship of the federal (national) 
government and the individual state governments.
FEDERAL 
The US Constitution sets out certain areas that the federal 
government will govern.  Art I, § 8:
Immigration
Army
Banks
Bankruptcies
Post office
Coin money
Patents
All other areas reserved for the state governments.
Federal law is “supreme” on issues of national concern (Art. 
IV, cl 2). 
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8Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
STATE
State law governs on matters of state 
concern. 
States promote the “public welfare” 
Given “police powers” to do so
E.g.,  Family
Housing  (except federal housing 
programs, like Section 8, public 
housing)
Education
Insurance 
State elections
Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
STATE
Municipalities (cities, counties) 
Pass “ordinances” 
Cannot  conflict with state law
Zoning 
Historic preservation
Regulation of local business 
e.g., local business licensing
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9Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
FEDERAL & STATE
Federal courts try violations of federal law  
State courts try violations of state law
Both hear both civil and criminal cases.  
Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
FEDERAL & STATE
Criminal cases
brought by the prosecutor 
representing the People 
either of the state or of the US 
regarding violations of state or federal criminal laws
Civil cases
brought by private parties 
regarding violations of either state or federal civil laws
Determine liability or protect rights between individuals 
(or groups of individuals) or the government.  
Civil cases do not involve determinations of “guilt” or “innocence”
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Who makes the law about 
which subject areas?
A single action – such as bank 
robbery – may violate both state 
and federal laws.  
Both jurisdictions could try the 
same a bank, but with violation 
of different laws.
Who makes “the law”?
Judicial:  
California Supreme Court   
State appeals courts 
Trial (“Superior”) courts
comparable to the appellate and 
trial courts in the federal 
judiciary
STATE
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How Courts Are Set Up
Adversary system in theory:
*  Two equally matched parties 
*  Neutral decision-maker
*  Present opposing views & evidence
Court rules and statutes govern permissible 
evidence and how the parties and neutral 
decision-maker conduct proceedings
Note: This model presumes equal resources 
on both sides and a neutral decision-maker
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12
How Courts Are Set Up
Trial courts
One judge hears cases at the trial level.  
A jury may determine facts, but always a judge to control proceedings.
Trial process:
(1) Determine the facts from admissible evidence, e.g., 
Sometimes facts not in dispute, but is only matter of law
(2) Determine applicable law, e.g.,
Other court decisions (precedent), statutes, regulations and / or the 
Constitution.
(3)   Apply the facts to the applicable law and come to a decision.
How Courts Are Set Up
Limited time to appeal or trial decision becomes final
Parties have the right to appeal 
Right to only one appeal – to the intermediate appellate court 
Appeal to highest court is by permission of that court only
Review matters of law (facts determined at trial)
Appellate courts
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How Courts Are Set Up
If purely matter of state law, then state Supreme Court is the final authority
If federal law or federal Constitutional issue, then US Supreme Court can 
overrule state Supreme court decision, since:
– federal courts decide federal law 
-- federal law is “supreme”
Supreme courts
016
14
• Congress passes a law stating that people in same‐sex 
marriages are not entitled to the same federal benefits as 
people in heterosexual marriages.  
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
• A state provides inadequate living areas and health services in 
its prisons.
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
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• A city passes an ordinance prohibiting people from soliciting 
work on city sidewalks
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
• The federal Dept of Justice attempts to confiscate the patch of 
anyone displaying Mongols Brotherhood Motorcycle Club logo
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
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• A state legislature requires police to investigate the status of 
persons suspected of being in US unlawfully and detain those 
who can’t verify that they are authorized to be in US.
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
• A city council bans tattoo parlors from operating within its 
boundaries.
• In which branch did the issue originate?  
legislative, executive or judicial
• What jurisdiction?
federal or state
• What branch is your best chance for success?
legislative, executive or judicial
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Overview of US Legal System 
 
We examine: 
A. Who makes “the law” and where the courts fit in   
B. Who makes the law regarding what 
C. How courts are set up 
 
 
A. Who makes “the law”? 
 
There are 3 branches of government, each of which makes a form of “the law” 
These branches occur at both the federal (national) level and the state.  When we talk about state 
law, we will focus on California law.  However, each state is different in making its own law. 
 
Federal branches of government  
The branches and their duties are outlined by the US Constitution. 
 
 Article I:   
 
Legislative branch – The Legislature (Congress) makes federal laws in the form 
of statutes. 
 
Congress is made up of the Senate and House of Representatives.   
 
Law made by the Legislative branch is the US Code, of which there are 50 Titles 
set out by subject (e.g., labor, highways, immigration) 
      
Article II:   
 
Executive branch – The Executive branch executes (administers) the statutes that 
Congress passes.  It does so by issuing regulations, Executive Orders, and 
administrative agency decisions. 
 
The executive branch is made up of the President; the President‟s Cabinet 
members such as the Secretaries of the various executive departments like 
Treasury, State, Labor are heads of the federal executive branch of government. 
    
Federal regulations are published in the Code of Federal Regulations.  Samples of 
other administrative “law” are posted in the folder “Where „the Law‟ Comes 
From.” 
 
Since regulations carry out (execute) the terms of statutes, they usually are 
detailed, technical material.  That is because in executing the law, the government 
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relies on the expertise of the administrative office in a specific substantive area 
(e.g., drug approval, consumer safety, aviation standards). 
 
 Article III:    
Judicial  branch – The judicial branch – the courts -- interprets federal laws and 
Constitution 
   
The highest court in the judicial branch is the US Supreme Court.  Federal appeals 
courts and federal trial (“US District Courts”) also are part of the judicial branch. 
 
  The courts make law in judicial decisions (also referred to as “case law”). 
  
Article III is the shortest article in the Constitutional of the three articles that 
describe the branches of government. It has been called the “least dangerous 
branch” since it is expected to do only passive, neutral interpreting of statutes, 
regulations and the Constitution.  The courts are not expected to “make law” but 
to interpret law that others make.   
 
We focus on the judicial branch in class, but since it interacts with the other two 
branches all the time, we need to understand their functions as well. 
 
State branches of government  
 
In California (and most states) the state branches of government are similar to the federal 
branches, outlined above.  States have their own state Constitutions.   
  
Legislative: In California the legislature is made up of the Senate and Assembly. They 
pass statutes that appear in 29 Codes (e.g., California Penal Code, California Education 
Code). 
 
Executive:  The executive branch is led by the Governor.  There are state agencies in the 
executive branch (e.g., California Insurance Commission, California Lottery). 
 
Judicial:  The state judiciary is led by the California Supreme Court.  There are state 
appeals courts and trial (“Superior”) courts, comparable to the appellate and trial courts in 
the federal judiciary. 
   
 
B. Who makes the law about which subject areas? 
 
The concept of federalism concerns the relationship of the federal (national) government and the 
individual state governments. 
 
The US Constitution governs both federal and state governments.  It sets out certain areas that 
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the federal government will govern.  The federal government “trumps” state laws, unless the 
state laws treat matters of only state concern.  This is based on the “supremacy” clause of the US 
(federal) Constitution.   
 
Among those listed in Art I, § 8 are:   
 Immigration 
 Army 
 Banks 
 Bankruptcies 
 Post office 
 Coin money 
 Patents 
  
All other areas reserved for the state governments. 
States are charged with promoting the “public welfare” for their residents.  They are 
given “police powers,” meaning the states can take government action to protect 
residents‟ health, safety and welfare. 
 
States can make rules for residents that do not conflict with the supremacy of the federal 
government (Art. IV, cl 2).  Among areas in which the state usually governs (and the 
federal government does not) are: 
 
  Family 
  Housing  (except federal housing programs, like Section 8, public housing) 
  Education 
  Insurance  
Elections  
      
Municipalities (cities, counties) can make laws (usually called “ordinances”) that do not 
conflict with state law.  Some areas in which municipalities govern are: 
 Zoning  
 Historic preservation 
 Regulation of local business (e.g., local business licensing) 
 
 
Both federal and state courts hear both civil and criminal cases.   
 
Criminal cases are brought by the prosecutor representing the People of the state or US to 
determine violations of either state or federal criminal laws.   
 State courts try violations of state law; federal courts try violations of federal law.   
  
A single action – such as bank robbery – may violate both state and federal laws.  
Both jurisdictions could try the same defendant for the same act of robbing a 
bank, but with violation of different laws. 
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Civil cases are brought by a plaintiff to determine liability or protect rights between 
individuals (or groups of individuals) or the government.  They do not involve 
determinations of guilt or innocence for crimes. 
 
 
C. How courts are set up 
 
US courts use the adversary system: 
 
 Two equally matched parties will present opposing views to a neutral decision-maker 
 
Rules to promote fairness govern what evidence may be presented and how the parties 
and neutral decision-maker conduct proceedings. 
 
This model presumes equal resources on both sides and a neutral decision-maker.  As we 
go through the class, we will be examining how often that model is followed, and the 
consequences when it is not.   
 
Trial courts 
One judge hears cases at the trial level.  (There may be a jury to determine facts, but there 
will always be a judge to control the proceedings.) 
 
The first step is to determine the facts. 
The finder-of-fact (jury or judge) decides cases based on facts presented through 
admissible evidence.  Evidence is most commonly: 
Witness testimony (expert and percipient (that is, with personal knowledge 
of the fact testified about) and  
 
Documentary evidence (authenticated and admissible). 
    some times only look at law (ie facts not in dispute) 
 
The next step is to determine applicable law.  
 
Law generally is in the form of other court decisions (precedent), statutes, 
regulations and / or the Constitution. 
    
 The final step is to apply the facts determine to the applicable law and come to a decision. 
 
Appellate courts 
  
Once the trial court has ruled, the parties have the right to appeal, within a limited period of time.  
Otherwise the decision becomes final.  The vast majority of cases end at the trial level. 
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There is only the right to one appeal – to the intermediate appellate court.  After the one appeal is 
taken, appeal to a higher court is only by permission of that court. 
 
 
 Intermediate appellate courts 
 
Intermediate appellate courts are composed of panels of judges, three being the 
most common.    
  
Appellate courts review matters of law.  They generally determine whether, given 
the facts as found at trial, the trial court interpreted and applied the law correctly.   
 
(In addition to hearing appeals from trial courts, intermediate 
appeals courts also hear appeals of administrative agency 
decisions.  Administrative agency decisions are like trials, only 
they are held by administrative law judges.  Example: 
unemployment appeals, Food and Drug Administration appeals.) 
 
Almost all appeals are based on the facts as set in the record of the trial; 
generally no new evidence is allowed. 
 
 Thus appellate courts might consider: 
 
   - What the legislature meant when it wrote a law  
     
- What the Constitution means by prohibiting “cruel and unusual 
punishment” 
 
- Whether the administrative agency‟s regulation is consistent with 
the statute that it is executing 
 
 Highest court: Supreme Court 
 
There are nine Justices on the US Supreme Court.  There are seven Justices on the 
California Supreme Court. 
 
Appeals in each court system (federal or state) go to the appellate courts in that 
system.   
   
Once a case is decided by a state Supreme Court, that is the final decision 
unless there is an issue of federal law involved.  Since federal law is 
supreme over state law, state courts cannot decide anything contrary to 
federal law and the US Supreme Court may decide to hear a case.   
 
024
  Permission to appeal:   
 
For the US Supreme Court to hear a case requires a vote of 4 justices to 
grant “certiorari”  
   
For the California Supreme Court to hear a case also requires a vote of 4 
justices to grant “certification” 
 
 
We will spend the rest of the semester filling in the picture outlined above. 
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From United States Courts http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-
informed/federal-court-basics/why-two-courts-systems.aspx 
Why Two Court Systems? 
The Judicial Branch has two court systems: federal and state. While each hears certain types of cases, neither is 
completely independent of the other. The two systems often interact and share the goal of fairly handling legal issues. 
The U.S. Constitution created a governmental structure known as federalism that calls for the sharing of powers 
between the national and state governments. The Constitution gives certain powers to the federal government and 
reserves the rest for the states.  
The federal court system deals with legal issues expressly or implicitly granted to it by the U.S. Constitution. The 
state court systems deal with their respective state constitutions and the legal issues that the U.S. Constitution did not 
give to the federal government or explicitly deny to the states. 
For example, because the Constitution gives Congress sole authority to make uniform laws concerning bankruptcies, 
a state court would lack jurisdiction. Likewise, since the Constitution does not give the federal government authority in 
most family law matters, a federal court would lack jurisdiction in a divorce case. 
Comparing State & Federal Courts 
Discover the differences in structure, judicial selection, and cases heard in each system. 
The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land in the United States. It creates a federal system of government 
in which power is shared between the federal government and the state governments. Due to federalism, both the 
federal government and each of the state governments have their own court systems. 
The Federal Court System The State Court System 
STRUCTURE 
• Article III of the Constitution invests the 
judicial power of the United States in the 
federal court system. Article III, Section 1 
specifically creates the U.S. Supreme Court 
and gives Congress the authority to create 
the lower federal courts.  
• The Constitution and laws of each state 
establish the state courts. A court of last 
resort, often known as a Supreme Court, is 
usually the highest court. Some states also 
have an intermediate Court of Appeals. 
Below these appeals courts are the state trial 
courts. Some are referred to as Circuit or 
District Courts.  
• Congress has used this power to establish 
the 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals, the 94 U.S. 
• States also usually have courts that handle 
specific legal matters, e.g., probate court 
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District Courts, the U.S. Court of Claims, and 
the U.S. Court of International Trade. U.S. 
Bankruptcy Courts handle bankruptcy cases. 
Magistrate Judges handle some District 
Court matters.  
(wills and estates); juvenile court; family 
court; etc.  
• Parties dissatisfied with a decision of a U.S. 
District Court, the U.S. Court of Claims, 
and/or the U.S. Court of International Trade 
may appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals.  
• Parties dissatisfied with the decision of the 
trial court may take their case to the 
intermediate Court of Appeals.  
• A party may ask the U.S. Supreme Court to 
review a decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, but the Supreme Court usually is 
under no obligation to do so. The U.S. 
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of federal 
constitutional questions.  
• Parties have the option to ask the highest 
state court to hear the case.  
  • Only certain cases are eligible for review by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  
SELECTION OF JUDGES  
The Constitution states that federal judges are to be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.  
They hold office during good behavior, typically, for life. 
Through Congressional impeachment proceedings, 
federal judges may be removed from office for 
misbehavior. 
State court judges are selected in a variety of ways, 
including 
• election,  
• appointment for a given number of years,  
• appointment for life, and  
• combinations of these methods, e.g., 
appointment followed by election.  
TYPES OF CASES HEARD 
• Cases that deal with the constitutionality of a 
law  
• Cases involving the laws and treaties of the 
U.S.  
• Ambassadors and public ministers  
• Disputes between two or more states  
• Admiralty law, and  
• Most criminal cases, probate (involving wills 
and estates)  
• Most contract cases, tort cases (personal 
injuries), family law (marriages, divorces, 
adoptions), etc.  
State courts are the final arbiters of state laws and 
constitutions. Their interpretation of federal law or the 
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• Bankruptcy.  U.S. Constitution may be appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court may choose to hear or not to 
hear such cases. 
ARTICLE I COURTS  
Congress has created several Article I or legislative 
courts that do not have full judicial power. Judicial 
power is the authority to be the final decider in all 
questions of Constitutional law and all questions of federal 
law, and to hear claims at the core of habeas corpus 
issues. 
• Article I courts are U.S. Court of Veterans' 
Appeals, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, 
and the U.S. Tax Court.  
  
 
Cases in Federal and State Courts 
Find out what types of cases are heard in federal courts and state courts. How are they different? How are they 
similar? 
State Courts Federal Courts State or Federal Courts 
Crimes under state legislation. 
State constitutional issues and cases 
involving state laws or regulations. 
Family law issues. 
Real property issues. 
Most private contract disputes (except 
those resolved under bankruptcy law). 
Most issues involving the regulation of 
trades and professions. 
Most professional malpractice issues. 
Most issues involving the internal 
governance of business associations 
Crimes under statuses enacted by 
Congress. 
Most cases involving federal laws or 
regulations (for example: tax, Social 
Security, broadcasting, civil rights). 
Matters involving interstate and 
international commerce, including 
airline and railroad regulation. 
Cases involving securities and 
commodities regulation, including 
takeover of publicly held corporations. 
Admiralty cases. 
Crimes punishable under both federal 
and state law. 
Federal constitutional issues. 
Certain civil rights claims. 
"Class action" cases. 
Environmental regulations. 
Certain disputes involving federal law. 
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such as partnerships and 
corporations. 
Most personal injury lawsuits. 
Most workers' injury claims. 
Probate and inheritance matters. 
Most traffic violations and registration 
of motor vehicles. 
International trade law matters. 
Patent, copyright, and other 
intellectual property issues. 
Cases involving rights under treaties, 
foreign states, and foreign nationals. 
State law disputes when "diversity of 
citizenship" exists. 
Bankruptcy matters. 
Disputes between states. 
Habeas corpus actions. 
Traffic violations and other 
misdemeanors occurring on certain 
federal property. 
 
 Structure of  Federal Courts 
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About California Courts
Overview
California’s court system is the largest in the world and serves a population of more than 38 million people—
about 12 percent of the total U.S. population—and more than 2,000 judicial officers and approximately 
19,000 
court employees statewide address the full range of cases heard each year. 
The vast majority of cases in the California courts begin in one of the 58 superior, or trial, courts, which 
reside in each of the state’s 58 counties. With more than 500 court buildings throughout the state, these 
courts hear both civil and criminal cases as well as family, probate, mental health, juvenile, and traffic cases.
The next level of judicial authority resides with 
the Courts of Appeal. Most cases before the 
Courts of Appeal involve the review of a 
superior court decision being contested by a 
party to the case. The Legislature divided the 
state geographically into six appellate 
districts.
The state Supreme Court serves as the 
highest court in the state and has discretion to review decisions of the Courts of Appeal in order to settle 
important questions of law and to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Appeal. The court also must review 
the appeal in any case in which a trial court has imposed a judgment of death.
California Courts at a Glance
Population served: more than 38 million—12.1 percent of the United States population
Total court system filings: almost 7.7 million cases in fiscal year 2012–2013 
Total authorized judicial officer positions (including commissioners and referees): 2,024 
Court levels: Two—trial and appellate 
Trial courts: 58—one in each county 
Court of Appeal districts: 6 in 9 locations 
Highest court: California Supreme Court  
close this page
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Judicial branch budget as a share of the total state budget: 2.1 percent 
Court employees statewide: nearly 19,000
Jury Service
Jury pay: $15/day starting with second day of service and 34 cents per mile, one way 
Number of Californians summoned to jury service in fiscal year 2011–12: 8,458,231* 
Number of Californians summoned to jury service who completed service in fiscal year 2011–12: 
3,012,385* 
Number of Californians sworn in to serve as jurors in fiscal year 2011–12: 164,508*
* Numbers are based on 53 of the 58 (93%) superior courts reporting
Court Interpreters
Languages spoken in California—200 in the state, over 120 in the courts 
Languages certified for court interpreters: 15 (Arabic, Eastern Armenian, Western Armenian, 
Cantonese, Japanese, Khmer, Korean, Mandarin, Portuguese, Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, 
Tagalog, Vietnamese, and American Sign Language.) 
Total number of court interpreter service days provided in the California Courts from 2004 to 2008: 
Over 1,000,000 
Percent of interpreter services provided in Spanish: 83
Family and Juvenile 
Family: filings for dissolution, legal separation and nullity of marriage: 140,180 
Family: filings for child support, domestic violence and other: 248,907 
Juvenile delinquency filings: 52,732 
Juvenile dependency filings: 44,882
California Supreme Court
Justices: 1 Chief Justice, 6 Associate Justices 
Filings: 7,813 
94 written opinions
Courts of Appeal
035
Justices: 105 
Filings: 20,391 
Dispositions: 22,092
Superior Courts
2,024 judicial officers (Assessed need = 2,286) 
Filings: 7,726,025 
Dispositions: 6,617,606
More statistics for fiscal year 2012–2013 may be found in the Court Statistics Report.
| | | | | | © 2014 Judicial Council of California
036
US Constitution – Selected Provisions 
Article I 
Section 1. 
All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.  … 
Section 8. 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all 
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes; 
To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States; 
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights 
and measures; 
To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United 
States; 
To establish post offices and post roads; 
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; 
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; 
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the 
law of nations; 
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land 
and water; 
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term 
than two years; 
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To provide and maintain a navy; 
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; 
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections 
and repel invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of 
them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, 
the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the 
discipline prescribed by Congress; 
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten 
miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the 
seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places 
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the 
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And 
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing 
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, 
or in any department or officer thereof.  … 
Article II 
Section 1. 
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold 
his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the 
same term, be elected, as follows: 
[Description of electoral college omitted] 
Section 2. 
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may 
require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon 
any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant 
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may 
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by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the 
Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. 
Section 3. 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and 
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he 
may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of 
disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to 
such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he 
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the 
United States. 
Section 4. 
The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. 
Article III 
Section 1. 
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of 
the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at 
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their continuance in office. 
Section 2. 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--
to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to 
controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state;--
between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under 
grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens 
or subjects. 
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state 
shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before 
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mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with 
such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be 
held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed 
within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have 
directed.  … 
Bill of Rights 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
Amendment II 
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.  … 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment VII 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Amendment VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
Amendment IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
Amendment X 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.  … 
Amendment XIII 
Section 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
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Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  … 
Amendment XV 
Section 1. 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
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2Categories of crime
Conceptually helpful to categorize crimes as we consider how we 
treat defendants and victims.  Some crimes fit in more than one 
category
Crimes against property
Examples:    theft offenses (larceny, embezzlement, burglary);  vandalism, 
arson
Crimes against the person
Examples:   homicide, assault, battery, sex offenses, robbery, kidnapping / 
false imprisonment
3
Categories of crime
Crimes against public standards/morality
Examples:  disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, prostitution, obscenity, 
pornography
Crimes against government/ “political crimes”
Examples: obstruction of justice, perjury, bribery, treason
Consensual / “victimless” crimes
Examples: drug offenses, prostitution, gambling
4
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3Criminal intent + act
Most crimes require both a criminal intent and a 
criminal act 
Criminal intent (mens rea = guilty mind) means that the person 
intended to commit the criminal act.  
A criminal act (actus reas = wrongful act)means that there must 
be some act by the defendant before the law charges him or 
her with a crime.  
5
Criminal intent + act
Cal. Penal Code § 484. (a):
Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, 
or drive away the personal property of another, or who 
shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been 
entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and 
designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or 
pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or 
real or personal property, or … obtains credit and thereby 
fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or 
property or obtains the labor or service of another, is 
guilty of theft. 
6
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4Criminal intent + act
Violation of PC § 484?
I take someone’s briefcase thinking it is my own.  
I love my roommate’s leather jacket and plan to 
wear it when he is out of town.
7
Criminal intent + act
Cal. Penal Code § 602:
… [E]very person who willfully commits a 
trespass by any of the following acts is guilty of 
a misdemeanor: … 
(m) Entering and occupying real property or 
structures of any kind without the consent of 
the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in 
lawful possession.
8
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5Criminal intent + act
[E]very person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the 
following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: … (m) Entering and 
occupying real property or structures of any kind without the 
consent of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful 
possession.
Violation of PC § 602(m)?
I am hiking in a park.  The park boundary is unmarked, and I 
end up hiking on private property without knowing it.
Students decide to get together on a Saturday night on the 
fifth floor of MacQuarrie Hall.
9
Criminal intent + act
In some cases the law will impute intention to find 
criminal responsibility 
Conspiracy:  Imputing the intent of others to a participant
Example:  Co‐conspirators are held responsible for the actions of the other co‐
conspirators.
Recklessness:  It is not necessary that the person intend the 
specific result in order to be guilty of a crime.
Example: Defendant can be charged with homicide if she shot a loaded gun 
into a crowded room, even if she did not specifically intend to kill 
someone.  
Felony murder:  Participants in a non‐homicidal felony can be held 
liable for murder if someone dies in the course of committing a 
dangerous felony (e.g., arson)
10
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6Criminal intent + act
In some cases the law will impute intention to find 
criminal responsibility (cont’d)
Willful ignorance can be construed as “intent”
Example:    I decide not to read the back of my parking 
ticket so I am unaware of my court date
In some cases intent is not required: strict liability
Example: Statutory rape: lack of awareness of age of 
underage partner is no defense
11
Criminal intent + act
Failing to do something that is required can be 
construed as an “act”
Example:     A person involved in a traffic accident 
failing to stop
A parent failing to care for a child
12
048
7Criminal intent + act: defenses
Legal responsibility:  the law does not hold 
someone criminally responsible under certain 
circumstances
Justification: 
person knew what she did, but was justified in 
doing it
Example: Self‐defense. person is not criminally 
responsible for reasonable actions taken to 
prevent harm to one’s self or others in the 
face of an imminent threat of great bodily 
harm or death
13
Criminal intent + act: defenses
California Jury Instructions regarding self‐defense:
The defendant is not guilty of [a crime] if (he/she) used force 
against the other person in lawful self‐defense or defense of 
another. 
The defendant acted in lawful self‐defense or defense of another 
if:
1.  The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ or 
someone else) was in imminent danger of suffering bodily 
injury;
2.  The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use 
of force was necessary to defend against that danger; AND
3.  The defendant used no more force than was reasonably 
necessary to defend against that danger.
Cal. Crim. Jury Instruction 3470 (non‐homicide) (some editing added)
14
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8Criminal intent + act: defenses
Legal responsibility:  the law does not hold 
someone criminally responsible under certain 
circumstances (cont’d)
Excuse:  person did not know what she was doing
Insanity defense: a person is not guilty if she is 
incapable of forming criminal intent .  
Someone who cannot distinguish right from wrong 
lacks criminal intent.
Example:  A person is not guilty of shoplifting if she thought 
she was picking a flower when she really took a 
necklace from a store. 
15
Criminal intent + act: defenses
Other defenses: 
duress (pressure from others) 
intoxication (involuntary consumption)
entrapment (deception by government actor 
enticing person to commit a  crime)
The defendant bears the burden of proving 
defenses.
16
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9Participants in a criminal case
Attorneys—attorneys are not parties – attorneys 
represent parties
Two main roles for attorneys in criminal cases
‐ Prosecutor, representing “The People” or other governmental entity
‐ Defense counsel, representing the defendant
What the attorneys are called in different courts:
Fed:  US Attorneys   Public Defender or private 
counsel
State: Attorney General PD “
County: District Attorney PD “
City: City Attorney
17
Participants in a criminal case
The victim
Is the victim a party to the case?
no
Who represents the victim?
must hire own attorney if wants representation
18
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Criminal procedure: backdrop
Adversary system
Through two equally matched adversaries presenting arguments 
to a neutral decision‐maker (judge or jury), the truth will emerge
Prosecution has the burden of proof
In criminal cases the burden of proof is that the prosecution 
must prove its case “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
Presumption of innocence
Not specifically in the US Constitution but since a US Supreme 
Court decision from 1895, it has been seen as imbedded in 
the Bill of Rights
Coffin v. US 156 US 432 (1895)
19
Criminal procedure: Event
Potentially criminal act
Police cite or arrest person
If arrest, police take person to jail
Bail determination
* Person posts bond and released upon condition to 
return
* Person remains in custody
Police write a report
Give report to District Attorney
20
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Criminal procedure: Bail
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.
US Constitution, 8th Amendment
21
Criminal procedure: Bail
In setting, reducing, or denying bail, the judge or 
magistrate shall take into consideration 
• the protection of the public 
• the seriousness of the offense charged 
• the previous criminal record of the defendant, and 
• the probability of his or her appearing at trial or hearing of 
the case
“The public safety shall be the primary 
consideration.”
Cal. Penal Code § 1275; see also Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 12 
22
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Criminal procedure: Bail
While there has not been a lot of research done, some 
results:
• non‐Whites were less likely than Whites to receive bail 
amounts below the guidelines
• African Americans and Latinos were required more 
often than Whites to post cash or surety bonds
• African Americans and American Indians are less likely 
than Whites to be released on their own recognizance
C. Spohn and C Hemmens, Courts 2e p 306
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Criminal procedure: Bail
Each county sets a uniform bail schedule
Q: Why a uniform schedule?
Uniform schedule is based on 
offense and 
defendant’s history 
enhancements added for multiple offenses
Individual circumstances: defendant’s income
Judge can adjust bail up or down, depending 
on defendant’s income
24
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Criminal procedure: Bail
Some examples: 
Manufacture controlled substance ‐ 44 pounds /105 
gallons  (HS 11379.8 (a)(4))
Robbery (PC 211)
Bribing judge, juror (PC 92)
Manure storage (Morgan Hill Muni Code 6.36.220)
25
Criminal procedure: Bail
Bail is not available for some offenses, as set by 
statute
E.g., murder (PC 187), train wrecking (PC 219)
Some offenses require a judge to hold a court 
hearing, with notice to District Attorney, before 
bail can be set:
E.g., stalking (PC 646.9),  spousal abuse (PC 273.5)
26
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Criminal procedure: Charging
(following police sending report of incident to District Attorney (DA) )
DA exercises discretion in deciding 
1) Whether to send the case to the grand jury 
Generally cases where the prosecutor wants external review, 
such as:  
government misconduct cases
gang cases
fatal officer‐involved shootings
Prosecutor presents evidence to grand jury
Defense counsel, defendant not present
Grand jury decides whether enough evidence to bring charges, 
and if so, issues an indictment
Need not be unanimous
Criminal procedure: Charging
If the DA does not send to a grand jury, 
DA decides:
2) Whether to file charges or release suspect
3) If filing, what charges to file
056
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Criminal procedure: Charging
DA will consider whether he/she can meet the burden of proof of 
each element of the crime with admissible evidence, and whether 
the defendant can prove a defense.
Burden of proof:
That the defendant is guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt
Prosecution bears the burden of proof of guilt
Proving  each element of the crime:
Elements of the crime are set by law 
statutes, rules, case law, Constitution
Admissible evidence:
Evidentiary rules are set by law
Can the potential defendant prove a defense?
Defendant has the burden of proving a defense by admissible evidence
E.g., George Zimmerman:  self‐defense, Stand Your Ground
Criminal procedure: Charging
In deciding whether and/or what to charge, prosecutors 
keep in mind the purposes of the criminal proceedings 
Federal guidelines outline the following purposes of 
sentencing
• Punishment
• Deterrence
• Incapacitation/protection of society
• Rehabilitation
US Sentencing Commission; 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)
30
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Criminal procedure: Charging
California Rules of Court outline the following 
purposes of sentencing
• Protect society
• Prevent future commission of crimes by confining 
defendant
• Punish
• Rehabilitate
• Deterrence
• Restitution
• Uniformity in sentencing
Cal. Rules Court 4.410
31
Criminal procedure: Charging (example)
In deciding when to exercise discretion and file specific charges, also 
take into account effect on the public:
Santa Clara County prosecutors charged a San Bruno father on 
Thursday [August 22, 2013] with vehicular manslaughter after he 
nodded off while driving home from an all‐night shopping trip, 
killing his two daughters in a crash on Highway 101.
Despite the tragic loss of his two children, Arvind Tandel, 48, broke 
too many rules and put too many other lives at risk for there to be 
no legal consequences, said Santa Clara County Deputy District 
Attorney Cindy Hendrickson.
With just a few hours sleep, Tandel got behind the wheel of his 
Lexus SUV early Nov. 23 and overlooked the fact his four children 
were sitting in a row of seats with safety belts for only three, she 
said. 
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Criminal procedure: Charging (example cont’d)
In deciding when to exercise discretion and file specific charges, take into 
account effect on the public:
Defense attorney Daniel Barton said his client made everyday errors 
and has already paid a high price. 
"I don't think it's necessary to file criminal charges against someone 
who makes a mundane mistake that causes the loss of his closest 
loved ones," Barton said. "The shame and the guilt are never‐ending 
for Arvind Tandel." 
But Hendrickson said Tandel's behavior was something many other 
people had done without consequence, but there was a difference 
here. 
"It's because what he did is not OK. What he did was not evil," she 
said. "But it was conduct that led to a tragedy and could have lead 
to an even worse tragedy, and we simply cannot ignore that." 
http://www.mercurynews.com/san‐mateo‐county‐news/ci_23921058/palo‐alto‐san‐bruno‐father‐
charged‐manslaughter‐crash?IADID=Search‐www.mercurynews.com‐www.mercurynews.com
Criminal procedure: Charging (example cont’d)
Q:  Do these additional facts make a difference?  If so, why?
Daughters who died were 21 and 24
Daughters who survived were 12 and 22
The family was returning from a shopping trip to Gilroy on 
Black Friday in part to prepare for the 24‐year‐old daughter’s 
upcoming wedding.
The Tandels' SUV flipped after hitting a CHP cruiser stopped 
on the side of the freeway. The officer was talking to the 
driver of a pick‐up truck who had a flat tire, when the SUV 
struck at about 65 mph. The California Highway Patrol officer 
was seriously injured in the crash.
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Criminal procedure: Charging (example cont’d)
Cal. Penal Code § 192. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice. It is of three kinds: … (c) Vehicular –
(1) [Except in cases where the person was driving while intoxicated], driving 
a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, 
and with gross negligence; 
or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might 
produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. 
(2)  Driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to 
felony, but without gross negligence; or 
driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.  …
What is “gross negligence”?  
35
Criminal procedure: Charging (example cont’d)
What is “gross negligence”?  
Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, 
inattention, or mistake in judgment.  A person acts with gross 
negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death 
or great bodily injury;   AND
2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way 
would create such a risk.
In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way 
he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person 
would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to 
disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that 
act.
California Criminal Jury Instructions, pp. 352‐356 36
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You decide: prosecute or not?
Facts:
Father took care of kids till 2 a.m. while wife worked new job delivering pizza
Got up at 6 a.m., got his two other school‐age children ready for school and baby for 
in‐home day care.
Routine was to take the two older children to school and drop the baby off with a 
babysitter on Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays, but due to his wife’s job, he planned 
to drop the baby off with the sitter on Wednesday before going to work.
Shortly after 8 a.m., he got the three children in the SUV, his high school daughter in 
the front seat and his middle school son in the back seat with the baby in a car seat. 
He dropped off the older children at their schools, then drove toward the babysitter’s 
home and his place of work.
Father was a truck driver for a vending machine firm and would park his car at his 
employer’s home, drive the truck to make deliveries and return at the end of the 
workday. He drove to the employer’s residence that morning but forgot about the 
baby, who was asleep. 
At 6:30 p.m., believing he had left the infant with the sitter, he asked a co‐worker if 
they could swing by to pick up the boy at the sitter’s house. 
When he realized he’d forgotten baby, He called 911, but baby had died of heatstroke 
after being inside the hot car all day.
Father was “distraught and remorseful,” cooperated with police in the investigation.
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Legal standards
Cal. Penal Code 192
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice. It is of three kinds: (a) Voluntary‐‐upon a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (b) Involuntary‐‐in the 
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; 
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and 
circumspection [vehicular manslaughter omitted]
Cal. Penal Code 270
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful 
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or 
medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her 
child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor …
38
061
20
Legal standards
Cal. Penal Code 273a  
(a) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce 
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to 
suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental 
suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or 
permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully 
causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or 
her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state 
prison for two, four, or six years.
(b)  Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those 
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or 
permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical 
pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, 
willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be 
injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a 
situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor.
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Criminal procedure: Complaint
When case goes forward: 
• District Attorney files criminal complaint (criminal “charges”) 
frequently with several “counts”
or
• Grand jury issues criminal indictment
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Criminal procedure: Arraignment
Within 48 or 72 hours of arrest, defendant appears in 
court and charges are read
An attorney (Public Defender) is appointed if the 
defendant cannot afford one
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall  … 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution  
“No person shall be .. deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law…”  
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution  
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Criminal procedure: Arraignment
Should public defenders appear on behalf of 
defendants at arraignments?  Or can the 
defendant ask for one, and wait to have an 
attorney appointed later?
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall  
… have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”
Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution  
“No person shall be .. deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law…”  
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution  
42
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Criminal procedure: Arraignment
The defendant pleads guilty, not guilty, no 
contest (“nolo contendere”)
Bail is set or defendant released with order to 
appear in court later or defendant who can’t 
afford bail is placed in custody
43
Criminal procedure: Discovery
Discovery: process of gathering information 
before trial  
– Determine what facts each side can prove or not 
prove
– Assess settlement / plea
44
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Criminal procedure: Discovery
Prosecution must give defense a “discovery 
packet” with information regarding 
• charges against the defendant 
• witness statements 
• confessions
• identifications
• forensic evidence, etc.
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Criminal procedure: Discovery
Prosecution must include potentially exculpatory 
information
Exculpatory evidence: evidence which may justify or 
excuse an accused defendant's actions, and which will 
tend to show the defendant is not guilty of crime charged
Defense does NOT have an obligation to provide any 
information to the prosecution
If defense will use alibi, then needs to provide info
Prosecution must provide opportunity for defense to 
examine physical evidence
46
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Criminal procedure: Pretrial / 
resolution conference
Prosecution and defense discuss status of case (investigation, 
preparation) and intended motions, if any, before the judge
Prosecutor may exercise discretion to offer a plea bargain to 
attempt to end the case
If an agreement reached, the defendant enters a plea and a 
date is set for sentencing
(in Santa Clara County): 
If case not resolved at pretrial conference:
Misdemeanors get set for trial
Felonies go to preliminary hearing
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Criminal procedure: Preliminary 
hearing
In Santa Clara County, felony cases have a preliminary 
hearing
Burden of proof: prosecution must establish probable 
cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime 
charged
At trial, burden of proof will be that prosecution must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime charged
Note: Approximately 90 % of felony convictions are a result of 
guilty pleas in plea bargains, usually at this stage.
48
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Criminal procedure: Motions
Requests for a court order before trial
Moving party demonstrates 
– factual basis and 
– legal right “authority” 
entitling party to what the motion asks court to 
order 
Written briefs to document the facts and cite 
relevant law
49
Criminal procedure: Motions
Dispositive motions 
Decide entire case, leaving little at issue at trial  
Examples:
• Motion to suppress evidence
– if evidence is admitted, defendant likely to lose
– If evidence is excluded, prosecution may need to dismiss case
• Motion for summary judgment
– Agreed upon facts, legal argument regarding what result the 
law requires
– if granted, party in whose favor is likely to win
– If denied, case usually goes forward toward trial
50
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Criminal procedure: Settlement
Plea bargain: 95 % of cases settle
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial…
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution  
51
Trial:  Voir dire (jury trials)
Process of picking unbiased, impartial trier of fact
Parties eliminate prospective jurors from the jury 
through challenges to prospective jurors
• For cause challenges: 
reason to believe that the juror will not be impartial
knowing someone in case
having pre‐formed beliefs about issues, etc.
• Peremptory challenges: 
do not need to give a reason to exclude a juror
but cannot be based on race
usually limited number
52
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Trial:  Opening statements
• party with the burden of proof goes first
• explains what happened (event) and what the 
trier of fact will hear at trial
• facts only
– legal argument is improper in opening statements 
– attorneys use factual statements to persuade trier
of fact of merits of case
53
Trial: Closing statements
• Same order as opening statements: party with 
burden goes first
• Summarize evidence that trier of fact heard, saw 
at trial
– Organize facts
– Highlight helpful evidence
– Minimize harmful evidence
• Argue the law requires desired results
• Note that because attorneys are not witnesses, 
they cannot “testify”
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Trial: Decision
• Bench trials 
– Judge can take “under submission” or decide from 
the bench
• Jury trials:
– jury deliberates until reaches decision or is 
“hung”
Decision or verdict becomes final unless 
appealed within permitted time
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Trial: Sentencing
• Sentencing is by the judge
– “guidelines” and statutes set out sentences
• In California, juries determine sentence in life 
without parole, advise in death penalty cases
– Otherwise, jury’s duty is done when it determines 
the facts (“trier of fact”)
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Special ethical rules for criminal law
Excerpt from Justice Byron White in US v. Wade: 
Law enforcement officers have the 
obligation to convict the guilty and to make 
sure they do not convict the innocent.  They 
must be dedicated to making the criminal 
trial a procedure for the ascertainment of 
the true facts surrounding the commission 
of the crime.  To this extent, our so‐called 
adversary system is not adversary at all; nor 
should it be. 
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Special ethical rules for criminal law
Excerpt from Justice Byron White in US v. Wade: 
But defense counsel has no comparable 
obligation to ascertain or present the truth. 
Our system assigns him a different mission. 
He must be and is interested in preventing 
the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a 
voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that 
he defend his client whether he is innocent 
or guilty. 
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Special ethical rules for criminal law
(cont’d)
The State has the obligation to present the 
evidence.  Defense counsel need present nothing, 
even if he knows what the truth is.  He need not 
furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any 
confidences of his client, or furnish any other 
information to help the prosecution's case. If he can 
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him 
appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that 
will be his normal course.  Our interest in not 
convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the 
State to its proof, to put the State's case in the 
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or 
knows to be the truth. 
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Special ethical rules for criminal law
(cont’d)
Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense 
counsel must observe but more often than not, 
defense counsel will cross‐examine a prosecution 
witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he 
thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will 
attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. 
In this respect, as part of our modified adversary 
system and as part of the duty imposed on the 
most honorable defense counsel, we countenance 
or require conduct which in many instances has 
little, if any, relation to the search for truth. 
Excerpt from US v. Wade, 388 US 218, 256‐57 (1967) 
J. White (dissenting in part, concurring in part) (footnotes omitted, paragraphs inserted)
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From :  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/ho
w_courts_work/casediagram.html 
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Excerpt from US v. Wade, 388 US 218, 256-57 (1967)  
J. White (dissenting in part, concurring in part) (footnotes omitted, paragraphs inserted) 
 
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make 
sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the 
criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the 
commission of the crime.  To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not 
adversary at all; nor should it be.  
 
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. 
Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and is interested in 
preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, 
we also insist that he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty.  
 
The State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present 
nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to 
the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information 
to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or 
make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal 
course.  Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State 
to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he 
thinks or knows to be the truth.  
 
Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must observe but more 
often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and 
impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he 
will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying.  
 
In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the duty 
imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require 
conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.  
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American Bar Association Standards - Prosecution Function 
 
Standard 3- 1.2 The Function of the Prosecutor  
   (a) The office of prosecutor is charged with responsibility for prosecutions in its jurisdiction. 
   (b) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court; the 
prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions. 
   (c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 
   (d) It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the 
administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or 
procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for remedial 
action. 
   (e) It is the duty of the prosecutor to know and be guided by the standards of professional 
conduct as defined by applicable professional traditions, ethical codes, and law in the 
prosecutor's jurisdiction. The prosecutor should make use of the guidance afforded by an 
advisory council of the kind described in standard 4-1.5. 
 
 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_
blk.html#5.3 
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Courts & Society
Civil law and procedure
Margaret Stevenson
1
8.17.15
Agenda
Categories of civil law
Claim of civil harm
event
defenses
remedies
Civil procedure
filing a Complaint 
filing an Answer
representation 
pretrial
Trial 
Civil attorneys
2
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2Civil law claims: backdrop
Parties
Plaintiff and Defendant
The government can be a party in a civil suit
Third parties
Often others will be brought into suit (usually by defendant) 
to share the responsibility for any liability found
Example:    Homeowner sues the builder of a deck 
when the floorboards rot
The builder sues the lumber company, 
charging it with providing rotten wood
Attorneys
Attorneys are not parties – they represent parties 
Two main roles for attorneys in civil cases: plaintiff’s 
counsel and defense counsel
3
Civil law claims: backdrop
Burden of proof  
The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant unlawfully 
caused him/her harm
“More likely than not”
51% of the evidence
Compare to criminal law:
The People (or other government entity) bring a case against a 
defendant, charging a violation of criminal law, which it must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt
4
079
3Categories of civil law
Common law
Began in Middle Ages in England, for centuries written decisions 
by judges applying commonly shared principles and rules were 
law
Common law is judge‐made law (i.e., written decisions, not 
statutes); decision‐making based on case precedent
American colonies adopted much of common law, until 
Declaration of Independence and US Constitution started new 
set of laws
5
Categories of civil law
Contract
Contracts are legal agreements between parties in which each 
side offers something of value (called “consideration”) to the 
other in exchange for the other side’s promise to perform 
his/her portion of the contract.
Examples:  employment agreements
agreements for sale of a car 
credit card agreements
Contracts can be written or oral.
6
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4Categories of civil law
Tort
A tort is an injury or harm done by one party to another
Examples: personal injury
medical malpractice 
defamation (slander and libel)
Basis of most torts: negligence (carelessness)
Failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise in similar circumstances
• Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty 
• Defendant breached that duty 
• Defendant’s breach caused plaintiff harm
7
Categories of civil law
Property
Property law involves … property.  
Property can be
• “real” (= land)
• personal (things) or 
• intellectual (ideas)
Examples:  water rights 
wills and estates (how property passes 
from one generation to the next) 
patent law
8
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5Categories of civil law
Family
Historically, from property law
Now busiest area of law in courts
Examples:   marriage
divorce
child custody
Other civil law 
essentially anything that is in court and not criminal law
often involve elements of tort, contract or property law
Examples: employment law, consumer law, 
entertainment law
9
Categories of civil law
Strict liability
Plaintiff does not need to prove fault – only underlying facts 
that something happened
Usually involves inherently dangerous activity
Example:   Owner of dangerous animals is strictly liable 
for any harm they cause
Blasting company liable for explosions
10
082
6Categories of civil law
Common law
Many common law principles still apply, but have been 
“codified” (i.e., written into legislation)
Common law doctrine adapted to apply similar principles to 
current legal issues
Torts: Instead of hunting accident = doctrine of negligence, 
now:  car accident or chemical poisoning 
Contract: Instead of sale of cow that turns out to be barren = doctrine 
of mistake of fact, 
now:  retail purchase for advertised item
11
Categories of civil law
Common law (cont’d)
Property:  Instead of pigs knocking neighbor’s fence and 
damaging crops = doctrine of trespass, 
now:  pollution from nearby factory
(criminal) Offences:
Instead of criminal offenses of unlawful homicide by 
spring‐gun, 
now:   remote camera surveillance and alarm to stop 
trespassers 
12
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7Claim of civil harm: event
Plaintiff alleges that defendant caused him/her legally 
recognized harm
Failing to do something that is required can be construed as 
an “act” (“omission”)
Example:    A neighbor failing to maintain a tree 
A doctor failing to meet the standards of medical 
care
13
Claim of civil harm: habitability example
Cal. Civil Code § 1941.1(a) 
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable … if it substantially 
lacks … (1) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of 
roof and exterior walls, including unbroken windows and 
doors. (2) Plumbing or gas facilities that conformed to 
applicable law in effect at the time of installation, maintained 
in good working order… (4) Heating facilities that conformed 
with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in 
good working order, …(6) Building, grounds … and all areas 
under control of the landlord, kept in every part clean, 
sanitary, and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, 
rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin.  …
14
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8Claim of civil harm: habitability example
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable … if it substantially lacks … (1) 
Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior walls, 
including unbroken windows and doors. (2) Plumbing or gas facilities that 
conformed to applicable law in effect at the time of installation, maintained in 
good working order… (4) Heating facilities that conformed with applicable law 
at the time of installation, maintained in good working order …(6) Building, 
grounds … and all areas under control of the landlord, kept in every part 
clean, sanitary, and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, 
garbage, rodents, and vermin.  …
Violation of Civ.C § 1941.1(a)?
My landlord says that I don’t need a heater because I can heat my 
apartment using the oven.  
There are rats living in the parking area of the apartment complex where 
I live.
15
Claim of civil harm: defenses
Legal responsibility:  the law does not hold someone civilly 
responsible under certain circumstances
Some examples of defenses follow (other defenses exist)
Self‐defense
Any necessary force may be used to protect from wrongful injury the 
person or property of oneself, or of a wife, husband, child, parent, or 
other relative, or member of one's family, or of a ward, servant, 
master, or guest. 
Cal. Civil Code § 50; see also Cal. CACI civil jury instructions 1304: Self‐defense/defense of others to assault and 
battery http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2013_edition.pdf
Necessity
A person is entitled to use another’s property when risk of harm is 
greater than potential damage to property
Example: taking moored boat in a storm to prevent 
drowning
16
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9Claim of civil harm: defenses
Some examples of defenses in tort cases (cont’d):
Assumption of the risk: 
injured party knew of risks and voluntarily went 
forward with activity
Contributory negligence:
plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the harm 
plaintiff suffered
17
Claim of civil harm: defenses
Examples of defenses in tort cases (cont’d):
“Unclean hands”:
party seeking remedy has engaged in unethical or 
unlawful conduct
Lack of legal capacity:
party is underage (must be age 18 or older)
18
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Claim of civil harm: defenses
Examples of defenses in tort cases (cont’d):
Immunity from suit: 
party is immune from suit
Example:  
District Attorney is immune from suit for discretionary 
decisions
Ambassadors are not under US court jurisdiction (“diplomatic 
immunity”)
Good Samaritan rule:
People who give reasonable assistance to those who are injured, 
ill, in peril, or otherwise incapacitated are protected from being 
sued for consequent unintentional injury or wrongful death.  
The public policy promoted by the rule is to reduce bystanders' 
hesitation to assist people at risk of serious injury.
19
Claim of civil harm: defenses
Good Samaritan rule codified in California:
(b) (1) It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage … individuals 
to volunteer, without compensation, to assist others in need during 
an emergency, while ensuring that those volunteers who provide 
care or assistance act responsibly. 
(2) Except for [medical, law enforcement, and emergency 
personnel], no person who in good faith, and not for compensation, 
renders emergency medical or nonmedical care or assistance at the 
scene of an emergency shall be liable for civil damages resulting 
from any act or omission other than an act or omission constituting 
gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.   [Emergency 
departments and other places where medical care is usually offered 
are excluded.]
California Health & Safety Code 1799.102(a)
20
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Claim of civil harm: remedies
The law sets out what legal remedies are 
available in what types of cases  
If a law does not provide for a particular remedy, it 
may be unavailable
Example: For permanent disability caused by an workplace 
injury, the workers’ compensation laws permit 
compensation for loss of future earnings only
Law does not compensate for pain and suffering or emotional 
distress
21
Claim of civil harm: remedies
Damages: payment for harm done
• Compensatory damages 
funds to compensate the plaintiff for the harm 
caused by the defendant
Examples:  
repairs to car from accident
psychological counseling following sexual harassment
clean‐up costs from defendant’s pollution
22
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Claim of civil harm: remedies
Damages: payment for harm done (cont’d)
• Punitive (also called “exemplary”) damages 
defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff money to 
o punish the defendant, and 
o set an example to others to avoid conduct such as 
the defendant’s
awarded in cases where the defendant’s conduct was 
outrageous, reckless and egregious
can be in addition to compensatory damages 
23
Claim of civil harm: remedies
Damages: payment for harm done (cont’d)
• Punitive (“exemplary”) damages 
based on the defendant’s resources 
wealthy defendants pay more in punitive 
damages than less wealthy defendants, even 
though the harm to the plaintiff is the same
24
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Claim of civil harm: remedies
Damages: payment for harm done (cont’d)
• Statutory damages 
an amount identified in a statute as due for 
violations of the law
Examples:  
If an employer willfully fails to pay…any wages 
of an employee who is discharged or who quits, 
the wages of the employee shall continue as a 
penalty from the due date thereof at the same 
rate until paid or until an action therefor is 
commenced; but the wages shall not continue 
for more than 30 days.
Labor Code §203. (a)
25
Claim of civil harm: remedies
Damages: payment for harm done (cont’d)
• Statutory damages 
An investigative consumer reporting agency or 
user of information that fails to comply with 
[this law] is liable to the consumer who is the 
subject of the [investigative] report in an 
amount equal to the sum of all the following: 
(1) Any actual damages sustained by the 
consumer as a result of the failure or, except in 
the case of class actions, ten thousand dollars 
($10,000), whichever sum is greater.
Civil Code § 1786.50(a) 
26
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Claim of civil harm: remedies
Injunctions: court order directed at a party
Injunctions order a party to 
o do something that he/she is required by law to 
do, or 
o stop doing something illegal
Injunctions typically do not involve payment
Though an injunction can order someone to 
return money that he/she received illegally
27
Claim of civil harm: remedies
Injunctions may start as temporary orders
if needed to prevent irreparable harm 
Temporary restraining orders (TROs) 
Examples: 
Order to remain 300 feet away from someone 
Order not to chop down a tree   
TROs usually given ex parte
Ex parte:  other side does not get notice of hearing 
ahead of time; judge hears case with only one party 
present
28
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Claim of civil harm: remedies
Injunctions can become permanent
Once a judge issues a TRO, or 
If no irreparable harm exists,
A hearing is set for a few weeks away to decide 
whether to make the injunction (order) permanent
Notice of hearing gives the other party a chance to 
get an attorney, prepare papers and appear in 
court
29
Civil procedure: filing a Complaint
Plaintiff must prove:
 each element of the violation
Elements of the event establishing liability are set by law 
statutes, rules, case law, Constitution
 by a preponderance of (= applicable burden of proof)
 admissible evidence
Evidentiary rules are set by law
 for which the potential defendant cannot prove a defense
Defendant has the burden of proving a defense by admissible 
evidence
 for which the law provides a legal remedy
30
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Civil procedure: filing a Complaint
Time limits apply following the harm = “statutes of 
limitation”
Examples: 
libel, slander, false imprisonment 
breach of written contract 
breach of oral contract 
assault, battery, wrongful death  
trespass 
damages resulting from domestic violence
claim against government
31
Civil procedure: filing a Complaint
Plaintiff files Complaint in court
Court issues a Summons
Plaintiff’s representative “serves” defendant
o “Service” is “notice”: lets people know that an action has 
been started against them in court
o Usually must be “personal service”
o Sometimes “substituted service” is permitted by statute 
when personal service cannot be accomplished
o Without effective service, the court does not have 
jurisdiction over the defendant
32
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Civil procedure: filing an Answer
Following effective service of a complaint, the 
defendant
• files an Answer in civil court, or
• challenges service
Time limits apply to filing Answer 
If defendant does not file Answer within time 
allowed, plaintiff can enter a default judgment
even if default judgment, plaintiff must still 
prove legal entitlement to remedy requested
33
Civil procedure: representation
Parties have right to represent self
Called “pro se” or “in pro per” 
• both mean person is representing him/herself
In Small Claims Court, parties MUST represent 
selves (attorneys not permitted) 
• unless party is a corporation
34
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Civil procedure: representation
Right to counsel in criminal cases if unable to 
afford attorney
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
No right to counsel in civil cases
“Civil Gideon” movement
Remember foundation of adversary system: 
equally matched adversaries presenting parties’ 
interests before neutral decision‐maker
35
Civil procedure: representation
To get an attorney:
1) Hire an attorney
2) Contingency fee attorney
• attorney takes a specified percentage of any 
recovery
• means the case must involve significant 
damages and be relatively inexpensive to prove
• mainly tort cases
36
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Civil procedure: representation
To get an attorney (cont’d)
3) Free services
• Students
E.g., SJSU Record Clearance Project, other law school clinics 
• Pro bono work by attorneys
In exchange for their professional license that excludes 
other representatives from the courtroom, attorneys have 
recognized an obligation to provide free legal services for 
low‐income people
American Bar Association suggests 50 hours / year
Santa Clara County Bar Association suggests  60 hours / year
37
Civil procedure: representation
To get an attorney (cont’d)
3) Free services
• Legal aid offices
civil representation of low‐income population
o inadequate funding means 1 legal aid lawyer 
for every 8,361 eligible clients in California
o areas of representation limited by politics of 
Congress / Legal Services Corporation: e.g., 
no busing, undocumented immigrants, class 
actions
38
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Civil procedure: representation
To get an attorney (cont’d)
3) Free services
• Non‐profit legal organizations
generally organized around issues
o Usually represent plaintiffs with intent to 
challenge precedent
Examples: 
o Civil liberties = American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU)
o environmental protection = EarthJustice
o Latino issues = Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Education Fund
39
Civil procedure: pretrial discovery
Discovery
Process of gathering evidence in preparation for trial
unless otherwise excludable, such as if it is hearsay
Common forms of discovery in civil cases:
• Depositions
• Interrogatories
• Requests for production of documents
• Requests for admissions
097
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Civil procedure: pretrial discovery
Depositions
Sworn testimony of a witness, recorded by a 
court reporter  
– records spontaneous answers 
– permits rapid follow‐up
– allows the parties to evaluate a witness and how 
he or she may come across at trial
Civil procedure: pretrial discovery
Interrogatories  
Written questions that one party can send to the 
other.
Two types:
Form  ‐‐ pre‐printed
Example: form interrogatories for landlord – tenant case:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ud106.pdf
Special interrogatories – party makes up its own 
questions
Example: special interrogatories for  tort case 
http://www.justice.org/NLD_docs/ESAN0040.pdf
098
22
Civil procedure: pretrial discovery
Requests for production of documents
to understand the documents at issue
to clarify what version of a document a party 
will rely on at trial
Requests for admissions
narrows issues in dispute by identifying what 
parties agree on and what is for court to 
resolve
Civil procedure: pretrial motions
Motions
Requests for a court order before trial
Moving party demonstrates 
– factual basis and 
– legal right (“authority”) entitling party to what the 
motion asks court to order 
Written briefs to document the facts and cite 
relevant law
099
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Settlement – ADR
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes: 
mediation
arbitration
court settlement hearings
Settlement can happen at any time 
Court decisions on motions, discovery results, 
change in law, change in parties’ circumstances all 
can affect settlement 
(more on ADR in upcoming class)
Trial
Voir dire (jury trials)
Opening statements
Closing statements
Decision
bench trials, jury trials
result: “liability” in civil cases 
compare: “guilt/innocence” in criminal cases
one action can be basis for both civil and criminal 
cases 
Example: wrongful death case (civil) and homicide 
(criminal)
(more on Trial in upcoming classes)
46
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Trespass example
• Compare civil and criminal trespass in 
following example
• Look at the elements that define each
47
Claim of legal harm: trespass example
Civil Trespass: 
To establish a claim of civil trespass, plaintiff must prove 
all of the following:
1. That plaintiff owned the property;
2.  That defendant intentionally, recklessly, or 
negligently entered plaintiff’s property;
3.  That plaintiff did not give permission for the entry;
4.  That plaintiff was actually harmed; and 
5. That defendant’s entry was a substantial factor in 
causing plaintiff’s harm.
CACI Civil Jury Instructions 2000 Trespass (edited)
48
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Claim of legal harm: trespass example
Civil Trespass:  To establish a claim of civil trespass, plaintiff must 
prove all of the following:
1. That plaintiff owned the property;
2.  That defendant intentionally, recklessly, or negligently entered 
plaintiff’s property;
3.  That plaintiff did not give permission for the entry;
4.  That plaintiff was actually harmed; and 
5. That defendant’s entry was a substantial factor in causing 
plaintiff’s harm.
CACI Civil Jury Instructions 2000 Trespass (edited)
Compare to criminal trespass:
[E]very person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the 
following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: … Entering and 
occupying real property or structures of any kind without the 
consent of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in 
lawful possession.
Cal. Penal Code § 602(m) 49
Civil attorneys
What civil lawyers do in California
Litigation
in courtrooms
the most visible role for civil attorneys 
in administrative agencies
like  courtroom litigation; usually specialized areas of law.  Examples:
• unpaid wages hearings before the California Labor Commissioner 
• professional licensing hearings before the various boards that 
issue state professional licenses
• industrial injuries before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals 
Board
50
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Civil attorneys
What civil lawyers do in California (cont’d)
In‐house counsel to businesses
Help businesses comply with legal requirements. Examples:
• In‐house counsel to a newspaper will be expert on First 
Amendment rights (freedom of press)
• In‐house counsel to a chemical company might be expert on toxic 
waste or patents
51
Civil attorneys
What civil lawyers do in California  (cont’d)
Transactional attorneys
Help people with legal transactions.  
Examples:
• real estate sales or leases
• drafting or negotiating a contract
• drafting a will or estate plan
• registering a patent or intellectual property
52
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Civil attorneys
What civil lawyers do in California  (cont’d)
Transactional v. litigating attorneys
If problems develop with a transaction, case may end up in 
court.  At that point, most people hire a litigator.   
Example:
Landlord L hires transactional attorney to write a 
commercial lease.  
Tenant T does not pay rent.  
L hires a litigator to evict T. 
53
Civil attorneys
Government attorneys
Many elected officials and those staffing legislative and 
executive offices are attorneys.  
Legal background helps in drafting legislation and regulations 
that will be lawful and upheld in court, if challenged.
54
104
1JS 103
Courts & Society
Attorneys and ethics
Margaret Stevenson
7.20.16
Agenda
• Professional licensing of attorneys
• Ethical obligations: applicable law
– Rules and statutes
– Substantive requirements:
• Confidentiality
• Competent representation 
• Not misleading the court
• Avoiding conflicts of interest with clients
– Pro bono
• Special ethical rules in criminal law
‐ Rules applying to the prosecution
‐ Duty to “seek justice, not merely to convict”
‐ Duty to turn over exculpatory evidence
‐ Rules applying to defense counsel
• US v. Wade
2
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2Professional licensing of attorneys
Attorneys are licensed by the court in which they practice
Usually:
• educational requirement 
o law school
o In California, can become attorney by apprenticeship 
“reading the law”; legal apprenticeship for 4 years under lawyer’s or 
judge’s supervision
Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.29
• pass licensing exam (“bar exam”)
o students at unaccredited law schools and apprentices must also take 
“baby bar” after first year
• pass ethics exam (“MPRE” = multistate professional responsibility 
exam)
3
Professional licensing of attorneys
Attorneys are licensed by the court in which they practice
(cont’d)
Each state has own requirements for law licensing
• some states have reciprocity with others
then don’t need to take separate bar exam
• some administrative agencies’ rules allow attorneys admitted 
anywhere to practice before the agency
e.g., immigration court
Usually federal courts accept the state credentials for attorneys
e.g., Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepts attorneys 
admitted to practice in California as admitted to practice 
before it
Practicing law without a license is a misdemeanor in California
Cal.  Business & Professions Code § 6126(a)
4
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3Attorney licensing includes ethical obligations: 
applicable law
California ethical rules for attorneys are at:
• Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct
http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/Rules/RulesofProfessionalConduct.aspx
• Cal.  Business & Professions Code § 6068 
American Bar Association has proposed Model Rules
“Model Rules” = recommendations from the national 
organization for attorneys 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publi
cations/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html 
5
Attorney licensing includes ethical obligations: 
applicable law
Licensing requirements include observing ethical rules
If attorneys do not comply with ethical rules, licensing board 
can discipline them
Examples of possible discipline: 
private reprimand
public discipline
suspending license
disbarment
www.calbar.ca.gov : can look up licensed California attorneys to 
see if they have been disciplined
6
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4Ethical obligations of attorneys: law
Most ethical rules apply to both criminal and civil law
Rules require attorneys to provide: 
• confidentiality
It is the duty of an attorney to …  maintain inviolate 
the confidence, and at every peril to himself or 
herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.
Cal.  Business & Professions Code § 6068 (e)(1)
The client decides what information to make public in court.
Cal. Rule Prof. Responsibility 3‐110 Confidential Information of Client
7
Ethical obligations of attorneys: law
Rules require attorneys to provide: (cont’d)
• competent representation of clients
(A) A member [of the bar] shall not intentionally, 
recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal 
services with competence. 
(B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal 
service shall mean to apply the 1) diligence, 2) 
learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional, and 
physical ability reasonably necessary for the 
performance of such service. 
Cal. Rule Prof. Responsibility 3‐110 Failing to Act Competently (emphasis added)
8
108
5Ethical obligations of attorneys: rules
Rules require attorneys to provide: (cont’d)
• truthful information to court
attorneys cannot put on testimony they know to 
be false
It is the duty of an attorney to …  employ… those means 
only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to 
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or 
false statement of fact or law. 
Cal.  Business & Professions Code § 6068(d)
9
Ethical obligations of attorneys: rules
Rules require attorneys to: (cont’d)
• avoid conflicts of interest
separate counsel required for joint defendants
A member shall not, without the informed written consent of 
each client:
(1)  Accept representation of more than one client in a 
matter in which the interests of the clients potentially 
conflict; or
(2)  Accept or continue representation of more than one 
client in a matter in which the interests of the clients 
actually conflict… 
Cal. Rule Prof. Responsibility 3‐110 (c) Avoiding the Representation of Adverse Interests
10
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6Ethical obligations of attorneys: pro bono
Adversary system is built on having equally matched 
representation for all parties
It is the duty of an attorney … Never to reject, for any 
consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the 
defenseless or the oppressed. 
Cal. Business & Professions Code § 6068(h)
Pro bono 
pro bono publico = free legal services to low‐income people
Note: in criminal cases where a person might be deprived of liberty, 
he/she has the right to have an attorney appointed if he/she cannot 
afford to hire one.  
Gideon v. Wainwright
11
Ethical obligations of attorneys: pro bono
Pro bono (cont’d)
In exchange for their professional license that excludes other 
representatives from the courtroom, attorneys have recognized 
an obligation to provide free legal services for low‐income 
people
• American Bar Association suggests 50 hours/year
• Santa Clara County Bar Association suggests  60 hours/year
• NY requires 50 hours of pro bono service before people can be 
admitted to practice as attorneys
Q:  Should licensing rules require pro bono service from 
attorneys?
12
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7Special ethical rules for criminal law:
the prosecution
The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice – Function of the Prosecutor  3.1.2 (c)
Ordinarily attorneys are supposed to work toward achieving their 
clients’ goals in court.
Q: What if various people (“The People” = the prosecution’s 
client) have different ideas of what “justice” is?   
Is the prosecution less bound by ethical rules regarding 
avoiding conflicts of interest and requiring competence to 
achieve (within legal and ethical bounds) what its client –
“The People” – want?
Q: What is the effect of prosecutors being elected?
13
Special ethical rules for criminal law: 
the prosecution
The prosecution has a duty to turn over exculpatory evidence
to defendant
Prosecutors in Maryland charged Brady and Boblit with 
murder.  Boblit confessed, but the prosecution did not tell 
Brady about Boblit’s confession.  Brady was convicted of 
murder.
US Supreme Court held that the prosecution has a 
constitutional duty to disclose evidence favorable to defense 
before trial: nondisclosure of potentially helpful evidence 
violates defendant’s right to due process of law.  
Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence means the “state 
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial 
which, in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a 
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court 
and jury …”
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83
14
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8Special ethical rules for criminal law:
the prosecution
If the prosecutor does not disclose exculpatory evidence, 
• the prosecuting attorney faces ethics charges  
• convictions can be overturned
Example: 
In 2010, Santa Clara County prosecutor Ben Field intentionally 
withheld a witness’s statement that was favorable to the 
defense regarding sexual assault, withheld a defendant’s 
statement favorable to co‐defendants in a murder case, among 
other violations.  
The California Bar suspended attorney Field’s license to practice 
law for four years.
15
Special ethical rules for criminal law:
defense counsel
General ethics obligations have specific provisions for 
criminal defense:
It is the duty of an attorney to… counsel or maintain those 
actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him or 
her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with 
a public offense. 
Cal. Business & Professions Code § 6068(c) (emphasis added)
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous… .  A lawyer for the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding … may nevertheless so 
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of 
the case be established.
ABA Model Rule 3.1 (emphasis added) 16
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9Special ethical rules for criminal law:
defense counsel
Excerpt from US Supreme Court Justice Byron White in 
US v. Wade: 
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to 
convict the guilty and to make sure they do not 
convict the innocent.  They must be dedicated 
to making the criminal trial a procedure for the 
ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the 
commission of the crime.  To this extent, our so‐
called adversary system is not adversary at all; 
nor should it be.
17
Special ethical rules for criminal law:
defense counsel
Excerpt from Justice White in US v. Wade (cont’d):
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to 
ascertain or present the truth.  Our system assigns him 
a different mission.  He must be and is interested in 
preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent 
a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend 
his client whether he is innocent or guilty. 
18
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10
Special ethical rules for criminal law
defense counsel
Excerpt from Justice White in US v. Wade (cont’d):
The State has the obligation to present the evidence. 
Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he 
knows what the truth is.  He need not furnish any 
witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his 
client, or furnish any other information to help the 
prosecution's case. 
19
Special ethical rules for criminal law
defense counsel
Excerpt from Justice White in US v. Wade (cont’d):
If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make 
him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that 
will be his normal course.  
Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits 
counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's 
case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he 
thinks or knows to be the truth. 
20
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11
Special ethical rules for criminal law:
defense counsel
Excerpt from Justice White in US v. Wade (cont’d):
Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense 
counsel must observe but more often than not, defense 
counsel will cross‐examine a prosecution witness, and 
impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is 
telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a 
witness who he thinks is lying. 
In this respect, as part of our modified adversary 
system and as part of the duty imposed on the most 
honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require 
conduct which in many instances has little, if any, 
relation to the search for truth. 
Excerpt from US v. Wade, 388 US 218, 256‐57 (1967) 
J. White (dissenting in part, concurring in part)
21
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2Jurisdiction: the courts
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
Article III, US Constitution
Jurisdiction = the “judicial power” and authority of a 
court to hear a case and issue a decision  
Without proper jurisdiction, the court cannot render a 
legally effective decision – it would lack the power and 
authority to do so
3
Jurisdiction: the courts
The jurisdiction of the courts is established initially by the 
US Constitution
US Constitution designates other entities as having 
power to confer jurisdiction to courts
Example:   Congress shall have Power … To 
establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization, …
Art I, sec 8
Under this Constitutional authority, Congress enacted Title 8 
of the United States Code (USC) to govern immigration 
proceedings.  
By statute, Congress established the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review to hold immigration hearings. 
4
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3Jurisdiction: categories
Courts need all of the following types of 
jurisdiction in order to decide a case or 
controversy:
• personal jurisdiction
• subject matter jurisdiction
• venue (‘geographical’ jurisdiction)
5
Jurisdiction: personal
– power to bring a person under a court’s 
authority
– accomplished through proper service of 
papers, as specified by law
Example:  
A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy 
of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be 
served.  …  In lieu of personal delivery… a summons may 
be served by leaving a copy of the summons and 
complaint during usual office hours in his or her office or 
… [other methods, as specified]
Cal. Code Civil Procedure sections 415.10, 415.20
6
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4Jurisdiction: subject matter
Statutes, Constitution establish what types of “cases 
and controversies” (Art. III) that courts can decide
Example: 
federal courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy, Social 
Security benefits, immigration
state courts have jurisdiction over small claims courts, local 
traffic laws, local zoning
If a court has jurisdiction, 
• federal courts can decide issues of state law
• state courts can decide issues of federal law
Each court follows the laws and precedent of the other jurisdiction 
in deciding issues.
7
Jurisdiction: federal court
Federal court jurisdiction is limited to:
– Federal issues 
• Federal courts have the authority to hear federal “cases and 
controversies”  (Art. III)
• E.g., matters involving federal Constitution, statutes, regulations, 
federal case precedent
– Diversity jurisdiction (note: “diversity” here means 
geographical diversity)
• cases that involve people from different states or cases involving 
US citizens v. persons from a different country
and
• involve $ 75,000 or more
Amount is set by Congress
8
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5Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Law and fairness require a connection between where the 
lawsuit is filed and where the event(s) leading to the lawsuit took 
place
Depending on the type of case, a court may have jurisdiction 
where 
• real property at issue is located 
• the defendant lives
• an accident occurred 
• a marriage was licensed
• a contract was entered into
See Cal. Code Civil Procedure sections 392, 395
or other geographical connection
9
Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Suing a company based on something it posts on the 
internet.  
Q: Does it matter whether:
1) a company has actively marketed its product in a 
jurisdiction?
2) a website is interactive, encouraging people to do business 
on the internet?
3) a website posts information but no action is solicited from 
those reading the information?
See Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp.1119 (W.D.Pa.1997) where 
the court suggested that in 1 and 2 above, there would be jurisdiction in a state 
where a buyer responded to a website. However, there would not be jurisdiction to 
sue when the website only passively provided information for readers 10
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6Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
You are in a car accident where Driver D rear‐ends the car that 
you are driving  while you are stopped at a red light in Los 
Angeles County.  
• You live in Santa Clara County.
• Accident is in Los Angeles County.
• D lives in Riverside County. 
Q: Where can you file your lawsuit?
See complaint forms for motor vehicle accidents at
http://courts.ca.gov/documents/pldpi001.pdf 
http://courts.ca.gov/documents/pldpi0011.pdf
11
Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Change of venue motion:
Filed by the defense to move case from the court where 
the plaintiff filed, alleging  that a fair trial not possible, or 
court where filed is inadequate
Considerations:
– fairness: pretrial publicity, bias, political atmosphere, 
demographic characteristics
– space: adequate courtroom space for news media, 
security requirements,  capacity for juror 
sequestration, detention facility attached to or near 
the courthouse, witness security / accessibility
Cal. Code Civil Procedure § 396(b), Cal. Penal Code § 1033
12
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7Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Some change of venue cases:
Oscar Grant trial
• BART officer Johannes Mehserle was accused of the homicide 
of Oscar Grant in Oakland (Alameda County) on New Years 
Day 2009.
• His attorney sought to move case out of county, presenting a 
survey that “70% of potential jurors have prejudged 
defendant’s guilt or innocence already.”
• Over prosecutors’ objections, the judge agreed to change of 
venue and the case was tried in Los Angeles.
• A LA jury found Mehserle guilty of involuntary manslaughter 
and not guilty of second‐degree murder or voluntary 
manslaughter.
13
Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Some change of venue cases:
Officers’ beating of Rodney King trial
• Following a high‐speed chase, LA PD officers beat African‐
American Rodney King; their assault was filmed.  King suffered 
a fractured facial bone, broken ankle, and multiple bruises 
and lacerations.  King sued the city and won $3.8 million.
• LA prosecuted the officers, charging excessive force and 
supervisor with failure to stop unlawful assault.
• Due to media coverage, venue was changed from LA County 
to Ventura County.  A jury of 10 whites, 1 Latino, 1 Asian 
acquitted 3 officers, hung on 4th.
Note:  In later federal civil rights trial, two officers were found 
guilty and imprisoned.
14
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8Jurisdiction: venue (‘geographical’)
Some change of venue cases:
Scott Peterson trial
• Scott Peterson was accused of murdering his wife Laci and 
unborn child in 2002 in Modesto (Stanislaus County).  His 
attorney sought to move case out of county. 
• Prosecutors argued that there was no point in moving trial, 
given that news coverage of the case was nation‐wide.
• Judge moved case to San Mateo where jury convicted  
Peterson of murder and recommended death, which judge 
imposed.
For your amusement: Venue Order in Smith v. Penn Ins, posted on 
Canvas website
15
Jurisdiction
Extraterritorial jurisdiction
Countries can exercise jurisdiction outside of national 
boundaries
Can be created by federal statute, treaty, contract
For United States:
Permits US to prosecute crimes by US nationals for actions 
that are legal in other foreign country  
e.g., child sex crimes
Permits US to prosecute crimes against US nationals in other 
countries  
e.g., foreign travel Costa Concordia Italian shipwreck
16
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9Jurisdiction
“Universal jurisdiction”
Covers “universal” crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
crimes against humanity, torture
Jurisdiction established by treaty, membership in United 
Nations, convention, other agreement
International tribunals can be decision‐making bodies
E.g., International Criminal Court in The Hague
17
Jurisdiction: Indian courts
Indian / Tribal courts
Congress shall have the power to regulate Commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes…
Art. I § 8
Indian nations have jurisdiction over their lands
e.g., can set up casinos in states where gambling is illegal
18
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10
Jurisdiction: Indian courts
Justice O’Connor article states:
Tribal courts may employ inclusive discussion and 
creative problem‐solving.  The focus on traditional 
values in contemporary circumstances has permitted 
tribal courts to conceive of alternatives to 
conventional adversarial processes.
Many of the issues which come most frequently to 
tribal courts lend themselves to alternative methods 
of resolution.  For example, vital issues touching on 
domestic relations, child custody, probate, tort and 
criminal prosecutions, may be solved more 
satisfactorily using a non‐adversarial method.
19
Jurisdiction: Indian courts
Justice O’Connor article:
Limited areas in which the US and state courts have no
jurisdiction.  Usually these involve exclusively Indian 
parties regarding events on Indian tribal land.
Some areas where there is overlapping jurisdiction between 
tribal courts and federal / state jurisdiction.
• But see Indian/non‐Indian custody disputes
Indian parent v. non‐Indian adoptive parent custody 
disputes are heard in state (not tribal) court.  See “Baby 
Veronica” case – from 2013 US Supreme Court term (5‐
4 decision said that Indian Child Welfare Act did not 
apply when the Indian parent does not have custody.)
20
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11
Parties
• Criminal:
– “The People,” “The United States” 
– Defendant
• Civil:
– Plaintiff
– Defendant
– Third parties:  can be included in civil cases if have 
direct legal interest in disputed matter
21
Parties: standing
Plaintiffs must have standing to appear in court
Standing is a real, personal, substantial interest at stake so 
that the courts and parties have a real issue to resolve
A person has standing “only if he can show that he himself 
has suffered or will suffer injury, whether economic or 
otherwise”
Justice Scalia: The “What’s it to you?” test
If a party asserts no individualized harm, it lacks standing
22
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12
Parties: class actions
Class actions  
Efficient means of litigation when the parties are too 
numerous and / or have too little individually at stake to make 
litigation of their individual cases worthwhile.  
28 USC § 1332(d), Cal B & P § 17200
Class representatives are chosen from the class to represent 
the interests of the entire class 
– WalMart sex discrimination suit charging women earned 
less, promoted less than men in Dukes v. Wal‐Mart.
23
Parties: “John Doe” & “Jane Roe”
Parties do not need to be named publically when 
• Avoid embarrassment
o Highly sensitive, personal nature (e.g., wants to have an 
abortion, was victim of abuse, young age, criminal 
background)
• Unknown to plaintiff at outset of litigation 
o Enables the plaintiff to sue them later when identify is 
learned
24
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13
Issue: mootness
US Constitution requires that courts adjudicate “cases” or 
“controversies”
Art. III § 2
Mootness
Courts will not hear cases that are moot, i.e., where a real 
issue (“controversy”) no longer exists
25
Issue: mootness
Example:
• Organization sued saying that the military’s Don’t Ask 
Don’t Tell (DADT) policy unconstitutionally violated 
rights of LGBT in military
• Trial court invalidated DADT
• Government appealed
• Congress repealed the DADT policy while case on 
appeal
• Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed case as moot
Log Cabin Republicans v. US, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011)
26
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Issue: ripeness
US Constitution requires “cases” or “controversies” (cont’d)
Art. III § 2
Issue must be ready – “ripe” – for determination by court
Example:
• Hermosa Beach passed ban on tattoo parlors in City
• Tattoo artist Johnny Anderson sued to challenge 
Hermosa Beach ban
• Trial court said issue was not ripe:  
– Johnny Anderson needed to have applied for a tattoo parlor permit 
and been turned down before jurisdiction proper
27
Issue: political questions
Political questions
Courts should not decide cases that are “purely political and 
meant for the political branches of government”
E.g., international treaties, rules for impeachment.  
Areas off‐limits to the courts under the political question 
doctrine have been shrinking over the last 50 years
The doctrine raises interesting questions as to what areas of 
government should be “off limits” to courts
and what areas do we need courts to be involved … 
28
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Courts & Society
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR), Plea 
Bargaining and Negotiations
Margaret Stevenson
7.20.16
Settlement and negotiations
Some cases are difficult to settle, such as when:
• Suit is based on principle
• Cost is irrelevant
• Parties have motives other than judicial resolution
• Counsel misleads litigants or is incompetent
Most cases do settle, with negotiations based on:
facts gathered through pretrial procedures, plus
law determined by legal research, as informed by pre‐trial 
rulings on motions
2
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2Settlement and negotiations
Cases can settle at any time before final verdict / decision
• can settle before defendant files an Answer
• can settle while a jury is deliberating
• parties must inform court of settlement if case settles before 
final judgment or verdict or while on appeal
During pre‐trial process settlement options change, based on
• court decisions on motions 
e.g., what evidence is deemed admissible, whether a 
defense will be allowed
• discovery results 
e.g., what facts can be proved
• change in law
e.g., what precedent or statute applies
• change in parties’ circumstances
e.g., financial resources, willingness to continue
3
Negotiations
Negotiations usually begin shortly after the event (harm, crime) 
that is the basis for case
civil:    “demand letter” lays out facts and law, offers 
settlement
criminal: DA offers terms of potential plea
4
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3Negotiations: assessing facts
Through discovery, investigations, etc. parties learn what each 
side can prove, and assess related strengths of each side
Witnesses
• Who they are
• What they have to say
• How they say it
Documents   e.g.,
• Letters
• Contracts
• Employment agreements
Scientific evidence    E.g.,
• Blood
• Bullet trajectories
• Skid marks of tires
5
Negotiations: assessing law
Through legal research and pretrial motions, parties assess the 
relevant
statutes
regulations
precedent
6
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4Negotiations: assessing the 
decision‐maker
Parties assess and negotiate regarding the perceived inclinations 
of the judge or juries in the jurisdiction
• In federal court, same judge has case for entire time 
• In state court, the parties usually don’t know the judge until 
day of trial 
In some types of cases or in smaller counties, it may be 
easier to predict who the judge will be
7
Settlement
Parties negotiate based on their evaluations of how the 
facts and law combine, against the backdrop of the 
decision‐maker, to provide a likely outcome at trial
Judge must approve the settlement (to avoid one side 
taking advantage of the other)  
If judge approves settlement, judge takes the case off 
of the trial calendar 
– either dismisses it, or 
– retains jurisdiction to monitor for compliance 
with the settlement
8
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5Settlement
Parties put it in writing, judge makes it an order of the court
If the parties change their mind later:
very hard to undo a settlement or withdraw a plea 
bargain
usually is permitted only in cases of misrepresentation,  
serious error or new evidence affecting the terms
9
Settlement – ADR
If negotiations are unsuccessful:
settlement negotiations are confidential
Cal. Evidence Code § 1152(a)
parties cannot introduce material discussed during 
settlement to prove liability
encourages the parties to be open and willing to make 
concessions
10
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6Settlement – ADR     Civil
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): 
Various processes in which a neutral person attempts to help 
parties who cannot agree to resolve their dispute
• Mediation
• Arbitration
– Binding
– Nonbinding
• Pretrial Settlement Conference
11
Settlement – ADR     Civil  mediation
Mediation: non‐binding process in which a neutral person 
(“mediator”) attempts to help the parties reach agreement on 
their own
The mediator helps the parties to:
• explore legal and practical settlement options, and 
• reach an acceptable solution of the problem
The mediator does not decide the solution to the dispute
Helps to ensure compliance with the agreement since it is the 
parties’ own decision 
Mediation is particularly useful when the parties have an on‐
going relationship
12
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7Settlement – ADR     Civil  arbitration
Arbitration is like trial but less formal and faster
Arbitrator (like a judge):
• hears parties’ evidence and arguments, then 
• issues a written decision
compare to mediation where parties reach agreement (or don’t)
Many contracts have mandatory arbitration clauses 
• common in sports and union disputes
• require disputes go to binding arbitration 
• some courts have found these nonnegotiable clauses 
invalidly deprive people of their right to trial
13
Settlement – ADR     Civil  arbitration
Usually in arbitration, parties can agree to
• what issues they want the arbitrator to decide
• how they want the arbitrator to make the decision
• how long to take
• whether it should be binding or non‐binding arbitration, 
• other terms
o In binding arbitration the arbitrator's decision is final and 
completely resolves the case, without the opportunity for 
appeal
o In non‐binding arbitration, the arbitrator's decision could 
resolve the case, without the opportunity of appeal, unless a 
party timely rejects the arbitrator's decision (usually, there’s a 
limit of 30 days to object) and requests a trial
14
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8Settlement – ADR     Civil  
court pretrial settlement conference
Most courts require parties to attend a pretrial settlement 
conference in court, usually shortly before trial
A judge other than the one who will be hearing the case 
encourages parties to settle
If unsuccessful, case goes to trial
15
Settlement – ADR     Civil settlement terms
Monetary terms
Parties negotiate to come up with a mutually acceptable 
amount 
o Factoring in costs of going to trial
o Set a payment plan – if $ not transferred, then 
settlement is voided and the parties start over
16
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9Settlement – ADR     Civil settlement terms
Non‐monetary settlement terms
• Individual cases might involve letter of apology, extension 
of benefits as settlement terms
• Class actions/impact litigation seek to change policy.  
Settlements in those cases may involve 
o stopping challenged practice, for example:
o change in terms of lending agreements from banks
o promise to maintain housing in safe condition
o beginning reformed practice
o increased hiring of people of color
o greater protection of environment
Or other promised actions plaintiffs hope will repair the 
harm and avoid future problems
17
Settlement – ADR: criminal
Plea bargain: 95 % of cases settle
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial…
Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution  
Defendant can waive right to speedy trial
Waiver of rights must be knowing and intelligent
– Otherwise plea can be subject to attack on appeal
It often appears that defendants don’t understand (and aren’t 
told) all that they are giving up in accepting a plea bargain
– e.g.,  consequences of having a conviction on record in terms of 
job, housing, student aid, etc.
18
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10
Settlement – ADR    Criminal 
Q:   What should courts do in cases where lawyer’s 
incompetence causes client to reject a favorable plea 
bargain?
Pair of US Supreme Court cases decided in 2012
• Missouri v. Frye:
– Defendant charged with driving without license
– Plea offered: 90‐day sentence
– Lawyer didn’t tell client of plea offer
– Judge sentenced defendant to 3 years 
19
Settlement – ADR    Criminal 
• Lafler v. Cooper:
– Defendant shot woman 
– Lawyer incorrectly told him that because all shots were 
below the victim’s waist, he could not be convicted of 
assault with intent to murder
– Defendant rejected plea bargain of 4‐7 years
– Defendant convicted, sentenced to 15‐30 years
20
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11
Settlement – ADR      Criminal 
US Supreme Court ruled 5‐4 that the right to competent counsel 
includes pleas:
“Criminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.” 
“The right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be 
defined or enforced without taking account of the central 
role plea bargaining takes in securing convictions and 
determining sentences.”
21
Settlement – ADR
Need to balance:
• administrative and financial incentive to resolve cases 
early and expeditiously 
with
• protection of parties’ rights to just resolution on the 
merits of the case
Q: How do we assure that the pressure to settle for low‐
income clients (with their generally greater need for 
prompt economic resolution of disputes) does not 
result in “cheapened” justice for those who cannot 
afford to litigate?
22
149
Mediation  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_
work/mediation.htmlMediation 
Mediation gives people a quick, inexpensive way to work out their differences while addressing 
everyone’s needs and interests. Decisions reached in mediation are created by the people who 
are in conflict, not imposed on them by a judge. Mediation: 
• encourages direct communication between the parties 
• helps people decide for themselves 
• allows for the expression of emotions 
• defuses anger 
• explores creative means of solving problems 
• promotes cooperation 
• preserves the strengths of an ongoing relationship 
• helps people accept the consequences of their own decisions 
• develops a model for resolution of future conflicts 
Click on the links below for more information on this particular subject area. Main subject areas 
for the "How Courts Work" section are linked at the bottom of these pages. 
What Is Mediation? 
Mediation brings people in conflict together with a neutral third person who assists them in 
reaching a voluntary agreement. The mediator helps them clarify the issues, consider options, 
and reach a workable settlement that fits their needs. 
Here’s a classic example of how mediation works. The kitchen has one orange, and two cooks 
need it. One cook wants orange juice for a fruit drink and the other needs orange rind for cake 
icing. The mediator helps them discover their real interests (orange juice and orange rind) as 
opposed to their stated needs (the orange). The problem can be reframed into “who gets the 
orange at what time.” If the second cook gets the orange after the juice has been squeezed out, 
both can satisfy their real interests. 
What Is the Relationship between Mediation and the Law? 
Mediation doesn’t rely on specific points of law. People solve their own problems by looking to 
the future instead of finding fault or blame. In contrast, the courts make judgments based upon 
the law, and rules limit what can be considered. Courts may be unable to address the genuine 
issues or causes of a dispute and may not focus on individual circumstances. If you want one of 
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the benefits of court procedure - enforceability - your mediation agreement can be written 
saying that it is intended to be legally binding and then be filed in court. 
What Are the Advantages to Mediation? 
You get to decide: The responsibility and authority for coming to an agreement remain with the 
people who have the conflict. The dispute is viewed as a problem to be solved. The mediator 
doesn’t make the decisions, and you don’t need to “take your chances” in the courtroom. Many 
individuals prefer making their own choices when there are complex tradeoffs, rather than 
giving that power to a judge. You need to understand your legal rights so that you can make 
decisions that are in your own best interests. 
The focus is on needs and interests: Mediation examines the underlying causes of the problem 
and looks at what solutions best suit your unique needs and satisfy your interests. 
For a continuing relationship: Neighbors, divorcing parents, supervisors and their employees, 
business partners, and family members have to continue to deal with each other cooperatively. 
Going to court can divide people and increase hostility. Mediation looks to the future. It helps 
end the problem, not the relationship. 
Mediation deals with feelings: Each person is encouraged to tell his own story in his own way. 
Acknowledging emotions promotes movement towards settlement. Discussing both legal and 
personal issues can help you develop a new understanding of yourself and the other person. 
Higher satisfaction: Participants in mediation report higher satisfaction rates than people who 
go to court. Because of their active involvement, they have a higher commitment to upholding 
the settlement than people who have a judge decide for them. Mediations end in agreement 70 
to 80% of the time and have high rates of compliance. 
Informality: Mediation can be a less intimidating process than going to court. Since there are 
no strict rules of procedure, this flexibility allows the people involved to find the best path to 
agreement. Mediation can deal with multiple parties and a variety of issues at one time. In 
family mediation, for example, two children, Mom, Dad and Grandma might be involved. They 
may need to talk about chores, school performance, curfew, allowances, discipline, and the use 
of the kitchen. 
Faster than going to court: Years may pass before a case comes to trial, while a mediated 
agreement may be obtained in a couple of hours or in sessions over a few weeks. 
Lower cost: The court process is expensive, and costs can exceed benefits. It may be more 
important to apply that money to solving the problem, to repairing damages, or to paying 
someone back. Mediation services are available at low cost for some types of cases. If you can’t 
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agree, other legal options are still possible. Even a partial settlement can lessen later litigation 
fees. 
Privacy: Unlike most court cases, which are matters of public record, most mediations are 
confidential. 
What Are the Processes Involved? 
Mediation comes in many styles, but most mediators follow the same process, including: 
• Intake Interview 
• Introduction Stage 
• Identifying the Issues 
• Exploring Solutions 
• Caucus 
• Writing an Agreement 
In What Cases Might Mediation Be Used? 
The types of cases appropriate for mediation include: 
Business: Collective bargaining between labor unions and management is one of the most 
familiar models of mediation. Workplace disputes between business partners, co-workers, or 
supervisor and employee can be mediated to correct particular problems and continue 
productive relationships. Contract disagreements, insurance claims, real estate disputes, 
construction conflicts, and cases between landlord and tenant, consumer and merchant, and 
farmer and lender are common. 
Community: Representatives of interest groups, businesses, and several layers of government 
can come together to negotiate agreements on public policy development. Cases concerning 
the environment, land use planning, parking, zoning, and nuisance complaints are often 
mediated. 
Small Claims: Civil cases involving smaller amounts of money or neighborhood disagreements 
are often sent to mediation. 
Divorce and Child Custody: Mediation offers a couple the chance to define what is most 
workable for their particular situation and to tailor an agreement that reflects their own 
circumstances. It can enable future joint decision-making. Visitation, property division, alimony, 
and unique circumstances such as relations with grandparents or stepfamilies can be included. 
Child custody disputes are automatically sent to mediation in some jurisdictions. Custody and 
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visitation issues are evaluated in terms of the child’s best interests and the parents’ shared 
concerns. The privacy of mediation can make it easier for people to discuss emotional matters. 
Interpersonal: Arguments between individuals may not necessarily involve a legal claim. 
Roommate and family conflicts are often well-served by mediation. 
School or University: Students from elementary school to college have been taught to 
successfully mediate disputes among their peers. Courts in Florida and California refer some 
truancy and disciplinary cases to mediation between parents, students and school personnel. 
Some school districts mediate controversies with parents of handicapped students over their 
plans for meeting the child’s educational needs. 
Criminal: Mediation of minor non-violent crimes can help unclog the courts and bring about 
restitution. Direct communication between victim and offender can be beneficial to both, and 
can make it easier to deal with the defendant in the future. Cases often go to mediation after 
the person has been found guilty of the crime. Vandalism, passing bad checks, theft, and 
juvenile cases are the sorts sent to mediation. 
How Can I Choose a Mediator? 
Able mediators come from a wide variety of professions and employ different styles. Important 
factors in the choice of a mediator include experience, reputation, educational credentials, 
mediation training, apprenticeships, gender, age, cultural background, knowledge of a 
particular field, and accreditation by mediation organizations. You should think about your own 
expectations and goals for the mediation and the mediator style with which you would be 
comfortable. Do you want a mediator who suggest options, or do you want one who resists 
offering opinions so that the parties feel responsible for the agreement? As a negotiator for 
your own interests, what support do you need from a mediator? Many mediators can help you 
understand what services might be best for your dispute. You may wish to interview the 
mediator. 
A good place to start looking for a mediator is in the telephone book under “Mediation 
Services.” That will guide you to agencies and individuals in the field. Other sources for 
mediators include community and private mediation centers, therapists, small claims or District 
courts, attorneys, social service agencies such as United Way, and business organizations such 
as the Better Business Bureau. Local or state bar associations may give you names of mediators 
or may administer mediation programs. The Martindale-Hubbell Dispute Resolution Directory 
lists mediators in every state, and should be available for reference at a law library. National 
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dispute resolution associations are listed in the following section, and, as noted, some will send 
you names of mediators in your area. 
The American Bar Association has available a videotape about mediation and a companion 
facilitator’s guide. For more information, contact the ABA Service Center, 541 N. Fairbanks 
Court, Chicago, Illinois 60611-3314, telephone 1-800-285-2221. Reference PC# 468-0050. 
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Agenda
• The Innocence Project
• Getting ready for trial
• Advocacy considerations at trial
• Opening statements
• Presentation of evidence
– Witnesses
– Documents, physical evidence
• Judging credibility
• Rules of Evidence
• Judicial notice
• Closing statements
• Decision
• Directed verdicts
• Enforcing the judgment (civil)
2
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2The Innocence Project/
Exoneration Registry
1,851 people exonerated by all causes, as reported by the 
Exoneration Registry (as of July 2016)
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
342 people exonerated by Innocence Project using DNA 
evidence (as of July 2016)
www.innocenceproject.org
3
The Innocence Project/
Exoneration Registry
According to the Innocence Project records:
• Number innocent people who had been sentenced to 
death:
20 people
• Average sentence served by DNA exonerees:
14 years 
• Percent of those exonerated by DNA testing who are people 
of color:
over 70 percent
4
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3The Innocence Project/
Exoneration registry
Most common causes of wrongful convictions:
• Eyewitness Misidentification
• Improper Forensic Science
• False Confessions / Admissions
• Government Misconduct
• Incentivized Informants (“Snitches”)
• Bad Lawyering
5
Innocence Project
6
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4Eyewitness misidentification: 77 % cases 
Suggested reforms
In over three‐quarters of DNA exonerations, convictions were 
based on eyewitness misidentifications.  The Innocence Project 
suggests the following reforms:
Blind administration: Research and experience have shown 
that the risk of misidentification is sharply reduced if the 
police officer administering a photo or live lineup is not 
aware of who the suspect is.
7
Eyewitness misidentification: 77 % cases 
Suggested reforms
Lineup composition: “Fillers” (the non‐suspects included 
in a lineup) should resemble the eyewitness’ description of 
the perpetrator. 
The suspect should not stand out (for example, he should not 
be the only member of his race in the lineup, or the only one 
with facial hair). 
Eyewitnesses should not view multiple lineups with the 
same suspect.
Instructions: The person viewing a lineup should be told 
• the perpetrator may not be in the lineup 
• the investigation will continue regardless of the lineup 
result
• not to look to the administrator for guidance
8
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5Eyewitness misidentification: 77 % cases 
Suggested reforms
Confidence statements: Immediately following the 
lineup, witness should provide a statement, in his own 
words, articulating his the level of confidence in the 
identification
Recording: Identification procedures should be 
videotaped.
protects innocent suspects from any misconduct by the lineup 
administrator
helps the prosecution by showing a jury that the procedure was 
legitimate
Innocence Project – watch videos at link on website
9
From: The Innocence Project  
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/FSBreakdownDiscipline.pdf
Improper Forensics: 52 % of cases
10
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6False confessions: 23 % of cases
• Mentally impaired, young, and easily led are pressed into 
falsely confessing.  
• “Confessing to Crime But Innocent” article 
One man states he was “pressed beyond endurance” 
during questioning, so he “confessed” and hoped that he 
would later correct the statement.   
This “correction” happened – after he had been in prison 
for 10 years, convicted of a rape he didn’t commit.
11
Getting to trial:
Pre‐trial procedural steps (review)
Civil and criminal
• Event/Crime
• Complaint
• Answer/Plea
• Pretrial discovery & motions
• Settlement attempts / ADR / Plea bargaining
12
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7Getting ready for trial:  
Planning and preparation
Attorneys on both sides: 
• Plan presentation of own case
o the “story”: how to explain what happened
• Evaluate other side’s case
• Decide whether a judge or jury as trier of fact
• What considerations might influence this decision?
• If jury  [next slide]
13
Getting ready for trial
If jury: prepare for voir dire
Attorneys prepare to pick unbiased, impartial trier of fact, 
eliminating prospective jurors from the jury through 
challenges: 
for cause – stating a reason to dismiss potential juror
and 
peremptory – not stating a reason to dismiss potential 
juror
Means of examining potential jurors’ possible bias:
written questionnaire
questioning by judge
questioning by counsel
14
161
8Getting ready for trial
If jury: prepare for voir dire
Jury consultants: Runaway Jury
Mock jury for big cases
find juror characteristics helpful to case
Q: If we have a trial by jury of our peers, why should there be 
any peremptory challenges?
recall difference between peremptory and for cause 
objections to jurors on voir dire
15
Getting ready for trial
Attorneys on both sides (cont’d): 
Evaluate evidence from discovery 
o strength, admissibility
o how to prove each element of case
o any more evidence needed?
Evidence chart of elements on which party bears burden 
of proof  [in two slides]
16
Party with burden of proof must prove each element of 
a case.
162
9Getting ready for trial: habitability example
You represent tenant T who has complained to her landlord L about a 
leaking ceiling, no heat and debris in the common areas of the 
building.  After sending a letter to L and getting no response, last 
month T didn’t pay rent and L started an eviction case against her.
Cal. Civil Code § 1941.1(a) A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable … if it 
substantially lacks … 
(1) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior 
walls, including unbroken windows and doors.  …
(4) Heating facilities that conformed with applicable law at the time of 
installation, maintained in good working order …
(6) Building, grounds … and all areas under control of the landlord, kept 
in every part clean, sanitary, and free from all accumulations of 
debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin.  …
17
Getting ready for trial: habitability example
18
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Exercise:  What are the elements?
Cal. Penal Code § 211: Robbery is the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate 
presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:
1.  The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own;
2.  The property was taken from another person’s possession and immediate presence;
3.  The property was taken against that person’s will;
4.  The defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent the person from 
resisting; AND
5. When the defendant used force or fear to take the property, (he/she) intended (to 
deprive the owner of it permanently/ [or] to remove it from the owner’s possession 
for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major 
portion of the value or enjoyment of the property).
Cal. Crim. Jury Instructions 1600 
19
Getting ready for trial
Attorneys on both sides: (cont’d)
• File any new motions needed to request court order before trial
• Narrow issues for determination with other side
o Prepare stipulations (agreed‐upon facts or applicable law) 
where no proof or argument is required in court
o Prepare requests for judicial notice
• Exchange final witness lists
• Subpoena  witnesses
• Issue subpoena duces tecum to require documents to be 
delivered
If documents are properly authenticated (sealed), do not need a 
person to appear in court to identify documents
20
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Getting ready for trial
Attorneys on both sides: (cont’d)
• Prepare witnesses
o Draft questions for own witnesses
o percipient  (see slides 25‐26)
o expert
o Prepare questions for other side’s witnesses
• Continue settlement negotiations 
21
Opening statements
• party with the burden of proof goes first
• attorney explains what happened (event) and what the 
trier of fact will hear at trial
• only facts presented in opening statements
– Example: “You will hear a neighbor testify that she was 
awakened by shouting on the night of May 14, 2013”
• legal argument is improper in opening statements 
– but attorneys use factual statements to persuade trier of fact 
of merits of case
22
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses: percipient
percipient witness
• personal knowledge; perceived the events themselves 
with their own senses
• evidence rules do not allow hearsay (statement not 
heard directly)
23
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses: experts
expert witness
• has expertise to testify about things that are out of 
common knowledge and experience of the trier of fact 
(judge or jury)
expert witness possesses the education, training, skill 
or experience sufficient to qualify him/her to offer 
scientific, technical, or other opinion
Cal. Evidence Code §§ 802, 801
• each side typically has its own experts
• each side has taken the deposition of other side’s expert
24
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses: experts
Compare testimony of expert as opposed to percipient witness
E.g., in a car accident case
• Forensics expert witness can testify as to 
impact, speed, direction of vehicles
– use expertise to provide information to trier of fact
• Percipient witness who was present can testify to 
what she saw, heard, conditions    
– use personal observation to provide information to trier of 
fact
25
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses: experts
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. Rule of Civil Procedure 702
26
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
A party questions its own witnesses through direct examination
– Open question form:
Tell the court what happened after you went to the store
Tell the jury what you saw when you got to the car
– Leading questions are not permitted 
• Leading questions suggest the answer in the question
You didn’t mean to bring the knife, did you?
You clearly saw your assailant’s face, didn’t you?
Cal. Evid. Code § 767(a)
27
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Direct examination (cont’d)
If own witness becomes “hostile” then attorney can ask judge for 
permission to ask leading questions
– A witness is “hostile” when, on direct exam questions
• He/she fails to answer questions
• He/she repeatedly claims a lack of memory
– Then court can grant permission to treat witness as 
“hostile”
• Once “hostile,” can ask leading questions
You called 911 on December 21, isn’t that right?
You told the dispatcher that your boyfriend was kicking you, 
correct?
28
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Cross‐exam:
• Used with 
• opposing party’s witnesses, or 
• hostile witness
• Controls testimony
• Used to point out weakness in direct testimony
• Leading questions are appropriate
Not required to cross‐exam other side’s witnesses
Cross‐exam is frequently poorly done
Witness ends up repeating testimony from direct exam
29
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Cross‐exam (cont’d)
• Leading questions are structured to elicit response desired
Yes or no, agree or not
• Pose as statement, in narrative form
o On Tuesday Ms. B told you her boss was “hitting on 
her,” right?
o Ms. B had complained about her boss harassing her 
previously, correct?
o Last week you told Ms. B that she had complained “one 
too many times”?
o You fired her the next day, correct?
30
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Cross‐exam (cont’d)
Attorneys ask questions that either they
• can prove the answer 
E.g., witness answered statement in deposition, so you 
can bring this up if the witness answers differently at 
trial, 
or
• don’t care what answer is since any answer will help the 
case
E.g., You knew that employers must pay overtime after 
40 hours of work in a week, correct?
31
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Party with burden of proof goes first (plaintiff or prosecution)
• Calls first witness
– Direct exam
– Cross exam
– Re‐direct exam only to clarify issues on cross
– Re‐cross only to clarify issues on re‐direct
– Repeat questioning only on issues in previous exam 
(“pyramid”)
• Witness is excused
• Next witness is called
• Process repeated until all evidence presented
• Party rests case 32
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Opposing party (defendant) can present evidence – or not
If plaintiff/prosecution has failed to prove each element of the 
case, defendant need not put on any evidence and can call for 
• a directed verdict (jury), or
• dismissal of the case (judge)
Defendant has right to protect against self‐incrimination (Fifth 
Amendment), so need not testify
• if testifies, opens self up to cross‐examination
• if given immunity from prosecution, cannot rely on Fifth 
Amendment
33
Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Usually, opposing party presents its own version of facts through 
its own witnesses
Similar pyramid as for plaintiff/prosecution: 
direct exam, cross‐exam, re‐direct, re‐cross …
• Witness is excused
• Next witness is called
• Process repeated until all evidence presented
• Opposing party rests case
34
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Presentation of evidence
Examination of witnesses
Party raising a defense (defendant) bears the burden of proving 
the defense
Examples:
• insanity (therefore not criminally responsible)
• necessity (took boat because otherwise would drown)
35
Presentation of evidence
Documents, Physical Evidence
Identification and authentication of 
documents
physical evidence
Party offering document must establish its authenticity either 
through witnesses or as result of subpoena duces tecum
* chain of custody
* acknowledging signatures, etc.
Without testimony to establish authenticity, the proffered 
evidence is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible
36
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Presentation of evidence
Documents, Physical Evidence
Introducing exhibits: process
• Show to other side 
gives the opposing party opportunity to object
• Witness testifies regarding the exhibit to establish 
relevance of exhibit
• Party asks the court to admit the document into evidence
• If judge agrees, exhibit becomes part of the record
record can be considered by trier of fact, appeals 
court in making determinations
37
Judging credibility
Reliability v. credibility
Reliability: witness believes what he/she is saying
role of advocate is to support / undermine the basis of the 
witness’ sincerely held belief
Evaluate witness’:
• opportunity to observe
• ability to observe
• validity of conclusions drawn
• ability to recollect what observed
38
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Judging credibility
Reliability v. credibility (cont’d)
Credibility: evaluation of a witness who may or may not 
be telling the truth
What do we think helps us assess credibility?
• verbal 
o what witness says amount of detail, consistency
• nonverbal 
o eye contact (lack of eye contact is #1 sign of lying, according 
to study)
o facial expression 
o intuition of fact‐finder (inverse relationship to truth)
• vocal 
o voice pitch, delivery
39
Judging credibility
Training and experience do not improve accuracy in detecting 
lying
Judges, police investigators, forensic psychiatrists, CIA, FBI and NSA 
agents all perform as poorly as the lay public
Memory is distorted after misinformation is supplied
Loftus article: misinformation most easily supplants memory when:
• long intervals between time of perception and memory of it 
• lack of warning that may be misinformed
• children & those over 65 years old
People can believe distorted memories as strongly as genuine 
memories
Lie detector tests are unreliable and inadmissible in court
40
174
21
Judging credibility
Cultural issues influence credibility assessments
There are cultural aspects to body language, eye contact, 
actions at events
Things that increase accuracy in determining credibility: 
• small face movements (how well can a jury detect them?) 
• reading a transcript rather than observing (uncommon in 
courtrooms)
See “Cultural Difference: New Defense Tactic?” article
41
Judging credibility
Q:  What do you think of the following post on a law school faculty listserve
regarding credibility determinations?  
From an Immigration Judge’s decision on a visa petition filed by a couple; US 
citizen and immigrant spouse.  In reference to his wife the Notice said:
During the course of the interview you displayed signs of extreme 
nervousness.  Specifically your hands and voice trembled and you, in 
fact, stated that you were very nervous.  
Additionally it was noted that your husband was educated as a 
physician and even though he speaks English as a second language 
he is articulate and correct in his use of the language.   You, on the 
other hand, are highly inarticulate and do not speak grammatically 
correct English.  
Your inordinate nervousness raised the level of suspicion as to your 
candor and the obvious great difference in the levels of yours and 
your husband's educational levels creates a question as to the 
validity of your marital relationship. 42
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Judging credibility
In sum:
• We are not good at judging credibility, even if we 
think we are and even if we do it ‐‐ or try to – a lot.
• We look for external supporting evidence
• We are careful with what evidence we consider
Rules of evidence at trial 
43
Rules of Evidence
Evidence rules govern what evidence can be admitted in court
Sources of evidentiary rules:
Constitution, statutes, rules govern what evidence can be introduced
Federal Rules of Evidence (federal courts)
California Evidence Code (each state has its own rules)
Attorneys frequently object to evidence being introduced
if violates evidence rules
judge may ask attorney to state basis of objection 
Judge makes evidentiary rulings at trial
either sustain the objection  evidence is excluded
overrule the objection  evidence may be admitted in 
court (and form part of official “record”)
44
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Rules of Evidence
The “record” is all evidence (testimony, physical evidence, 
judicial notice) that is admissible
Party can be found liable/convicted only based on admissible 
evidence
Many evidence rules are intended to make it easier to find the 
truth
e.g., excluding hearsay, requiring percipient witness testimony
Other rules are intended to promote fair processes
e.g., excluding illegally obtained physical evidence, testimony
45
Rules of Evidence: relevance
Evidence must be relevant
Evidence is relevant if:
a) It has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence; 
and 
b) The fact is of consequence in determining the 
action.
Fed. Rule 401
46
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Rules of Evidence: relevance
Evidence must be relevant – BUT:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence. 
Fed. Rule 403
47
Rules of Evidence: relevance
You be the judge: admissible or not?
Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the 
action,” but evidence can be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.
• In identify theft case, fact that Victim has 3.0 GPA
• In drug case, evidence of cocaine of similar grade to the 
cocaine found in defendant’s trunk
48
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Rules of Evidence: relevance
You be the judge: admissible or not?
Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the 
action,” but evidence can be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.
• 25 bloody photos of accident scene when defendant has 
confessed to vehicular manslaughter in jury trial
• 25 bloody photos of traffic accident in civil jury case when 
plaintiff’s pain & suffering is at issue?
49
Rules of Evidence: Character evidence
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or 
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character or trait.  …
Fed. Rule 404(a)
Examples:
Evidence of quickness to anger to prove guilt in battery  
case
Evidence of victim’s chastity to prove lack of consent in 
rape case
50
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Rules of Evidence: Character evidence
Dangers of character evidence:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and 
may be very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier 
of fact from the main question of what actually 
happened on the particular occasion. 
It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good 
man to punish the bad man because of their 
respective characters despite what the evidence in 
the case shows actually happened.
California Law Revision Commission (1964)
51
Rules of Evidence: Hearsay
Hearsay is inadmissible
"Hearsay evidence" is evidence of a statement that was 
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing 
and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. 
Cal. Evidence Code 1200(a)
Admissible?
My neighbor said that the defendant told her that he took the 
money.
I overheard my coworker say that she took the money.
There are many exceptions to the hearsay rule
52
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Rules of Evidence: Privileges
Evidence rules permit witness to assert that a communication 
was privileged, and refuse to testify regarding it
Among privileges recognized by California Evidence Code:
• Attorney‐client
• Priest‐penitent
• Physician‐patient
• Reporter‐source
• Spousal privilege
• Sexual Assault Counselor‐Victim Privilege
• Domestic Violence Counselor‐Victim Privilege 
• Human Trafficking Caseworker‐Victim Privilege 
Cal. Evidence Code §§ 911, 912
53
Rules of Evidence: other provisions
Offers to settle, negotiations, pleas, plea discussions 
generally are inadmissible
Sex offenses have separate, detailed rules regarding the 
activities of the victim
Religious Beliefs or Opinions
Evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not 
admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility.
54
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Rules of Evidence: exclusionary rule
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.
US Constitution  4th Amendment
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Rules of Evidence: exclusionary rule
Courts do not allow “fruit of the poisonous tree” evidence: 
if evidence was collected unlawfully, then even if it is 
probative of guilt, the evidence must be excluded
There are exceptions for evidence discovered independent 
of the unlawful means; also for a ‘good faith’ belief by law 
enforcement that they had authority for search
Note the tension between adversary nature of system and 
the “truth” of innocence or guilt.  
We have decided to limit methods we use to prove guilt.
56
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Rules of Evidence: exclusionary rule
Reasons behind excluding evidence seized in violation of 4th
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures:
• to keep law enforcement within constitutional 
bounds
• inappropriate to convict people of acting illegally 
with evidence that is gathered illegally
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Judicial notice
Matters of common knowledge do not need to be proved 
through a witness
Examples:
dates: January 1, 2013 was a Tuesday
geographical facts: Yosemite National Park is in California
historical facts: President Obama is the 44th president of the 
United States
meteorological facts:   It rained 1 inch in 3 hours in San José 
on Saturday, September 21.
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Trial: Closing statements
• Same order as opening statements: party with burden goes 
first
• Summarize evidence that trier of fact heard, saw at trial
– Organize facts
– Highlight helpful evidence to remind trier of fact
– Explain, minimize harmful evidence
Note: attorneys do not testify – they are not witnesses
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Trial: Decision
Once evidence is submitted and final arguments made, the 
finder of fact makes decision
Jury trials:
– Judge instructs the jury using standard jury instructions, 
regarding:
• Process of deliberation
• Legal guidance when applicable in case (e.g., what 
constitutes “intent to permanently deprive” person of 
property for robbery, what constitutes “necessity” as a 
defense in tort case)
– Jury deliberates until reaches decision or is “hung”
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Trial: Decision
If the verdict is not based on the evidence or inaccurate 
legal conclusion, a party may file a motion asking for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict
Examples:  where party with the burden of proof 
did not offer evidence on an element of 
the case
where admitted evidence is contrary to 
the determination of the jury
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Trial: Decision
Jury nullification: where the jury disregards the law and comes 
to its own determination
generally in cases where the jury believes the defendant is 
innocent though law requires a determination of guilt
Examples: 
draft dodgers in 1960s burning draft cards
white juries in South acquitting white 
defendants of murder when victim was black
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Trial: Decision
Jury nullification:
California Supreme Court held in People v. Williams (2001) 
that the judge was correct in excluding a juror during 
deliberations for saying he could not convict a defendant of 
statutory rape, despite the law
Q: What is function of trial by jury of our peers?   
What are competing interests in following the law?
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Trial: Decision
Bench trials 
– Judge can issue decision from the bench or take “under 
submission” and issue later
– Most cases at trial level judges do not issue written 
decisions: the clerk records the verdict or judgment in 
“minute orders” (court records)
• Judge Walker in Perry same‐sex marriage case
Decision or verdict becomes final unless appealed within 
permitted time
64
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Enforcing the judgment (civil trials)
Various ways of enforcing the verdict / judgment
Example:  wage garnishment, lien on property
When a party seeks injunctive relief, often the court will retain 
jurisdiction so that it has the power to enforce or monitor a 
settlement
Example:  class actions settlements that include monitoring 
of defendant’s actions to assure compliance with settlement
65
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Confessing to Crime, but Innocent
By JOHN SCHWARTZ
KANSAS CITY, Mo. — Eddie Lowery lost 10 years of his life for a crime he did not 
commit. There was no physical evidence at his trial for rape, but one 
overwhelming factor put him away: he confessed. 
At trial, the jury heard details that prosecutors insisted only the rapist could have 
known, including the fact that the rapist hit the 75-year-old victim in the head 
with the handle of a silver table knife he found in the house. DNA evidence would 
later show that another man committed the crime. But that vindication would 
come only years after Mr. Lowery had served his sentence and was paroled in 
1991. 
“I beat myself up a lot” about having confessed, Mr. Lowery said in a recent 
interview. “I thought I was the only dummy who did that.” 
But more than 40 others have given confessions since 1976 that DNA evidence 
later showed were false, according to records compiled by Brandon L. Garrett, a 
professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. Experts have long known 
that some kinds of people — including the mentally impaired, the mentally ill, the 
young and the easily led — are the likeliest to be induced to confess. There are also 
people like Mr. Lowery, who says he was just pressed beyond endurance by 
persistent interrogators. 
New research shows how people who were apparently uninvolved in a crime could 
provide such a detailed account of what occurred, allowing prosecutors to claim 
that only the defendant could have committed the crime. 
Page 1 of 4Confessing to Crime, but Innocent - The New York Times
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An article by Professor Garrett draws on trial transcripts, recorded confessions 
and other background materials to show how incriminating facts got into those 
confessions — by police introducing important facts about the case, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, during the interrogation. 
To defense lawyers, the new research is eye opening. “In the past, if somebody 
confessed, that was the end,” said Peter J. Neufeld, a founder of the Innocence 
Project, an organization based in Manhattan. “You couldn’t imagine going 
forward.” 
The notion that such detailed confessions might be deemed voluntary because the 
defendants were not beaten or coerced suggests that courts should not simply look 
at whether confessions are voluntary, Mr. Neufeld said. “They should look at 
whether they are reliable.” 
Professor Garrett said he was surprised by the complexity of the confessions he 
studied. “I expected, and think people intuitively think, that a false confession 
would look flimsy,” like someone saying simply, “I did it,” he said. 
Instead, he said, “almost all of these confessions looked uncannily reliable,” rich 
in telling detail that almost inevitably had to come from the police. “I had known 
that in a couple of these cases, contamination could have occurred,” he said, using 
a term in police circles for introducing facts into the interrogation process. “I 
didn’t expect to see that almost all of them had been contaminated.” 
Of the exonerated defendants in the Garrett study, 26 — more than half — were 
“mentally disabled,” under 18 at the time or both. Most were subjected to lengthy, 
high-pressure interrogations, and none had a lawyer present. Thirteen of them 
were taken to the crime scene. 
Mr. Lowery’s case shows how contamination occurs. He had come under 
suspicion, he now believes, because he had been partying and ran his car into a 
parked car the night of the rape, generating a police report. Officers grilled him for 
more than seven hours, insisting from the start that he had committed the crime. 
Mr. Lowery took a lie detector test to prove he was innocent, but the officers told 
him that he had failed it. 
Page 2 of 4Confessing to Crime, but Innocent - The New York Times
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“I didn’t know any way out of that, except to tell them what they wanted to hear,” 
he recalled. “And then get a lawyer to prove my innocence.” 
Proving innocence after a confession, however, is rare. Eight of the defendants in 
Professor Garrett’s study had actually been cleared by DNA evidence before trial, 
but the courts convicted them anyway. 
In one such case involving Jeffrey Deskovic, who spent 16 years in prison for a 
murder in Poughkeepsie, prosecutors argued that the victim may have been 
sexually active and so the DNA evidence may have come from another liaison she 
had. The prosecutors asked the jury to focus on Mr. Deskovic’s highly detailed 
confession and convict him. 
While Professor Garrett suggests that leaking facts during interrogations is 
sometimes unintentional, Mr. Lowery said that the contamination of his 
questioning was clearly intentional. 
After his initial confession, he said, the interrogators went over the crime with him 
in detail — asking how he did it, but correcting him when he got the facts wrong. 
How did he get in? “I said, ‘I kicked in the front door.’ ” But the rapist had used 
the back door, so he admitted to having gone around to the back. “They fed me the 
answers,” he recalled. 
Some defendants’ confessions even include mistakes fed by the police. Earl 
Washington Jr., a mentally impaired man who spent 18 years in prison and came 
within hours of being executed for a murder he did not commit, stated in his 
confession that the victim had worn a halter top. In fact, she had worn a sundress, 
but an initial police report had stated that she wore a halter top. 
Steven A. Drizin, the director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at the 
Northwestern University School of Law, said the significance of contamination 
could not be understated. While errors might lead to wrongful arrest, “it’s 
contamination that is the primary factor in wrongful convictions,” he said. “Juries 
demand details from the suspect that make the confession appear to be reliable — 
that’s where these cases go south.” 
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Jim Trainum, a former policeman who now advises police departments on 
training officers to avoid false confessions, explained that few of them intend to 
contaminate an interrogation or convict the innocent. 
“You become so fixated on ‘This is the right person, this is the guilty person’ that 
you tend to ignore everything else,” he said. The problem with false confessions, 
he said, is “the wrong person is still out there, and he’s able to reoffend.” 
Mr. Trainum has become an advocate of videotaping entire interrogations. 
Requirements for recording confessions vary widely across the country. Ten states 
require videotaping of at least some interrogations, like those in crimes that carry 
the death penalty, and seven state supreme courts have required or strongly 
encouraged recording. 
These days Mr. Lowery, 51, lives in suburban Kansas City, in a house he is 
renovating with some of the $7.5 million in settlement money he received, along 
with apologies from officials in Riley County, Kan., where he was arrested and 
interrogated. 
He has trouble putting the past behind him. “I was embarrassed,” he said. “You 
run in to so many people who say, ‘I would never confess to a crime.’ ” 
He does not argue with them, because he knows they did not experience what he 
went through. “You’ve never been in a situation so intense, and you’re naïve about 
your rights,” he said. “You don’t know what you’ll say to get out of that situation.” 
Copyright 2011 The New York Times Company Home Privacy 
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The Causes of Wrongful Conviction   
As the pace of DNA exonerations has grown across the country in recent years, wrongful convictions have revealed 
disturbing fissures and trends in our criminal justice system. Together, these cases show us how the criminal justice 
system is broken – and how urgently it needs to be fixed. 
 
We should learn from the system’s failures. In each case where DNA has proven innocence beyond doubt, an 
overlapping array of causes has emerged – from mistakes to misconduct to factors of race and class. 
 
Countless cases 
Those exonerated by DNA testing aren’t the only people who have been wrongfully convicted in recent decades. For 
every case that involves DNA, there are thousands that do not. 
 
Only a fraction of criminal cases involve biological evidence that can be subjected to DNA testing, and even when 
such evidence exists, it is often lost or destroyed after a conviction. Since they don’t have access to a definitive test 
like DNA, many wrongfully convicted people have a slim chance of ever proving their innocence. 
Common Causes 
Here you will find further information about seven of the most common causes of wrongful convictions: 
 Eyewitness Misidentification 
 Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science 
 False Confessions / Admissions 
 Government Misconduct 
 Informants or Snitches 
 Bad Lawyering 
These factors are not the only causes of wrongful conviction. Each case is unique and many include a combination of 
the above issues. Review our case profiles to learn how the common causes of wrongful convictions have affected 
real cases and how these injustices could have been prevented. 
 
To stop these wrongful convictions from continuing, we must fix the criminal justice system. Click here to learn about 
Innocence Commissions, a reform that can help identify and address the fundamental flaws in the criminal justice 
system that lead to wrongful convictions. 
The chart below represents contributing causes confirmed through Innocence Project research. Actual numbers may 
be higher, and other causes of wrongful convictions include government misconduct and bad lawyering. 
  
 
Click for previous examination of cases based on other criteria. 
From The Innocence Project website: 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ 
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November 28, 2011
The Certainty of Memory Has Its Day in
Court
By LAURA BEIL
Witness testimony has been the gold standard of the criminal justice system, revered in 
courtrooms and crime dramas as the evidence that clinches a case. 
Yet scientists have long cautioned that the brain is not a filing cabinet, storing memories in a 
way that they can be pulled out, consulted and returned intact. Memory is not so much a 
record of the past as a rough sketch that can be modified even by the simple act of telling the 
story. 
For scientists, memory has been on trial for decades, and courts and public opinion are only 
now catching up with the verdict. It has come as little surprise to researchers that about 75 
percent of DNA-based exonerations have come in cases where witnesses got it wrong. 
This month, the Supreme Court heard its first oral arguments in more than three decades 
that question the validity of using witness testimony, in a case involving a New Hampshire 
man convicted of theft, accused by a woman who saw him from a distance in the dead of 
night.
And in August the New Jersey Supreme Court set new rules to cope with failings in witness
accounts, during an appeal by a man picked from a photo lineup, and convicted of 
manslaughter and weapons possession in a 2003 fatal shooting.
Rather than the centerpiece of prosecution, witness testimony should be viewed more like 
trace evidence, scientists say, with the same fragility and vulnerability to contamination. 
Why is a witness’s account so often unreliable? Partly because the brain does not have a 
knack for retaining many specifics and is highly susceptible to suggestion. “Memory is weak 
in eyewitness situations because it’s overloaded,” said Barbara Tversky, a psychology
professor at Columbia University’s Teachers College in New York. “An event happens so fast, 
and when the police question you, you probably weren’t concentrating on the details they’re 
asking about.” 
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Hundreds of studies have cataloged a long list of circumstances that can affect how 
memories are recorded and replayed, including the emotion at the time of the event, the 
social pressures that taint its reconstruction, even flourishes unknowingly added after the 
fact. 
While most of us tend to think memory works like a video recorder, it is actually more like a 
grainy slide show. Lost details, including imaginary ones, often are added later. One of the 
earliest and more famous experiments to demonstrate that memories are malleable was 
conducted by Elizabeth Loftus, a psychology professor at the University of California, Irvine, 
and an early pioneer of witness memory research. 
In a 1974 study published in The Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, she asked 
participants to view films of fender-benders in which no car windows or headlights were 
broken. Later, the subjects who were asked how fast the cars were going when they 
“smashed” into each other — as opposed to “hit” — were more likely to report speeding and 
describe shattered glass they never actually saw. 
In another experiment, conducted in Scotland, participants were four times as likely to
report a memory of a nonexistent event — in this case, a nurse removing a skin sample from 
their little finger — if they had been asked to imagine it just one week before. Others in the 
experiment read a description, but were not asked to picture it happening. 
Even the process of police questioning and prepping for trial can crystallize a person’s own 
faulty reconstruction. In 2000, Dr. Tversky published a series of experiments conducted at 
Stanford University in the journal Cognitive Psychology. In one, volunteers read profiles of 
fictitious roommates with both charming and annoying habits; they were then asked to write 
either a letter of recommendation or letter making a case for a replacement. 
When later asked to repeat the original description, the volunteers’ recollections were 
skewed by the type of letter they had written. Their minds had shed qualities that didn’t
match the first draft of their own recall and had embellished those that did.
“When we don’t remember, we make inferences,” Dr. Tversky said. 
Sometimes we miss details because we weren’t paying attention, but sometimes we are 
concentrating too hard on something else. Nothing is as obvious as it seems. 
Few experiments have demonstrated this more notably than one published in 1999 by 
researchers at Harvard. Participants watched a video of people dressed in either black or 
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white passing a basketball. The subjects were told to count the number of passes made by 
players in white. 
During the test, a woman in a gorilla suit strolled through the players. She was unnoticed by 
about half the people who took the test, the researchers found. Distraction is not unique to 
the eyes. During a meeting of the Psychonomic Society this month, Polly Dalton and 
colleagues at the University of London presented the audio version of the gorilla test, a 69-
second recording of two men and two women preparing for a party. Almost all of the study 
participants instructed to listen to the women did not hear a third man repeating “I’m a 
gorilla” for 19 seconds midway through the conversation.
The editing of the past occurs without a person’s realizing what has been forgotten. In court, 
witnesses are asked to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. They think they do. Whether 
in a story told in a courtroom or at a dinner table, the mind is sometimes prone to blur the
distinction between reality and fantasy. Brain scans taken as people “recall” something they 
did not actually see have many similarities to the brain dwelling on an actual memory. 
“That’s one of the striking findings of the studies,” said Daniel Schacter, a psychology 
professor at Harvard. Whether an event is real or imagined, “many structures involved in the
coding and retrieving are the same.” 
All this makes sense, he said, when you consider the purpose of memory. He and his
colleagues believe that memory is designed not just to keep track of what has happened, but 
to offer a script for something that might. 
Evidence for this also comes from brain scans. Just as the “recall” of a bogus event lights up 
the brain’s memory centers, so does thinking about something that might occur. 
Because the brain uses memories for mental dress rehearsal, we are not wired to retain every 
facet of an event, scientists say. We don’t have to. A general framework is all that’s necessary 
to keep from getting lost, or find food, or know what to do when a storm is coming. 
One 1979 study asked a small group of people to pick out a penny from a series of 15 similar 
drawings. Less than half chose correctly, because no one needs to know whether Lincoln
faces left or right to pay the cashier. Yet witnesses often are asked to remember with similar 
levels of precision, often about scenes and faces spotted fleetingly. 
When selective attention combines with fear, “you have a very strong memory for a few 
details,” said Elizabeth Phelps, a psychology professor at New York University. “Emotion 
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gives us confidence more than it gives us accuracy.” 
The problem comes when witnesses bring that certainty to the entire memory. In crimes that 
involve a weapon, Dr. Loftus and other scientists have found that witnesses will fixate on the 
gun barrel or knife blade but will fail to notice other details as clearly. Yet because they so 
starkly remember particulars of the weapon and may have the accuracy of parts of their 
memory affirmed by police officers and prosecutors, witnesses carry an air of assurance into 
the courtroom. 
“Many people think if someone is confident, they must be right,” said Dr. Loftus. 
Rather than discount witnesses, researchers are trying to use their findings to make trials 
fairer and testimony more reliable, particularly in the case of suspect lineups, a police staple 
at the heart of many wrong convictions. In September, Gary Wells, a psychology professor at 
Iowa State University, released a new report comparing whether the accuracy of lineups 
improves when the possible suspects are presented to witnesses in sequence, rather than all 
at once in the traditional lineup. 
In studies involving actual cases, Dr. Wells’s team found that the likelihood of choosing a 
stand-in “filler” instead of the suspect fell to 12 percent, from 18 percent, when faces were 
presented sequentially. The downfall of side-by-side lineups, Dr. Wells said, is that “if the 
real perpetrator is not in there, there is still someone who looks more like him than the 
others.” 
Lineups also may improve when some uncertainties are made clear to witnesses and jurors. 
Dr. Wells and others recommend changes like making sure a witness knows the perpetrator 
may not be in the group, and having lineups administered by someone who does not know 
which photograph is the suspect. 
Dr. Wells also believes witnesses should give a statement at the time of the lineup
documenting how confident they are in their choice — because once the trial comes around, 
the witnesses will believe they were always sure. 
It may be that witnesses in police stations and courtrooms are being asked the wrong 
question to begin with — that telling witnesses to pick out a perpetrator, or state exactly 
what they saw or heard, implies they really can when science suggests that they may well be 
unable to do so. 
“My view is that people should be asked to pick out someone who looks similar to who you 
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saw, or sounds similar to what you heard, and leave it to the jury to decide,” said Donald 
Thomson, a psychology professor at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. 
Pressing witnesses with questions that appear to have precise answers enhances the 
likelihood that the innocent will be prosecuted and the guilty will escape, Dr. Thomson said. 
“It forces people to pick someone and say, ‘This is the person,’ ” he said. “Two months down 
the track, they go into the witness box and say they are absolutely sure.”
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When A Lie Becomes Memory's Truth:
Memory Distortion After Exposure to
Misinformation^
Elizabeth F. Loftus
What happens when people wit-
ness an event, say, a crime or acci-
dent, and are later exposed to new
information about that event? Two
decades of research have been de-
voted to the influence of new infor-
mation on the recollections of such
witnesses. An all-too-common find-
Ing is that after receipt of new infor-
mation that is misleading in some
way, people make errors when they
report what they saw. New,
postevent information often be-
comes incorporated into a recollec-
tion, supplementing or altering it,
sometimes in dramatic ways. New
information invades us, like a Trojan
horse, precisely because we do not
detect its influence. Understanding
how we become tricked by revised
data about a witnessed event is a
central goal of this research.
Current research showing how
memory can become skewed when
peopie assimilate new data utilizes a
simple paradigm. Participants first
witness a complex event, such as a
simulated violent crime or automo-
bile accident. Subsequently, half the
participants receive new, mislead-
ing information about the event. The
other half do not get any misinfor-
Elizabeth F. Loftus is Professor of
Psychology at the University of
Washington. Her most recent book
is Witness for the Defense: The Ac-
cused, the Eyewitness, and the Ex-
pert Who Puts Memory on Trial,
coauthored with K. Ketcham (St.
Martin's Press, 1991). Address
correspondence to E. Loftus, De-
partment of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Washington, Seattle, WA
98195; e-mail: eloftusCamilton.
u.Washington.edu.
mation. Finally, all participants at-
tempt to recall the original event. In
a typical example of a study using
this paradigm, participants saw a
simulated traffic accident. They then
received written information about
the accident, but some people were
misled about what they saw. A stop
sign, for instance, was referred to as
a yield sign. When asked whether
they originally saw a stop or a yield
sign, participants given the phony
information tended to adopt it as
their memory; they said they saw a
yield sign."^  In these and many other
experiments, people who had not
received the phony information had
much more accurate memories. In
some experiments, the deficits in
memory performance following re-
ceipt of misinformation have been
dramatic, with performance differ-
ences as large as 30% or 40%.
This degree of distorted reporting
has been found in scores of studies,
involving a wide variety of materi-
als. People have recalled seeing
nonexistent items, such as broken
glass, tape recorders, and even
something as large and conspicuous
as a barn (in a bucolic scene that
contained no buildings at all), and
have recalled incorrect traits for
items they did see, such that a clean-
shaven man developed a mustache,
straight hair became curly, a stop
sign became a yield sign, and a
hammer became a screwdriver, in
short, misleading postevent informa-
tion can alter a person's recollection
in a powerful, even predictable,
manner.
The change in report arising after
receipt of misinformation is often re-
ferred to as the misinformation ef-
fect.'' Four questions about the mis-
information effect have occupied the
attention of researchers:
1. When are people particularly
susceptible to the damaging in-
fluence on recollection of mis-
leading information, and when
are people particularly resistant?
2. What groups of people are par-
ticularly prone to having their
recollections be modified, and
what groups are resistant?
3. Does misinformation actually im-
pair a person's ability to remem-
ber details of an event? Put an-
other way, what happens to the
original memory after exposure
to misinformation?
4. Do people genuinely believe in
the misinformation?
WHEN ARE PEOPLE
SUSCEPTIBLE TO
MISINFORMATION?
A growing body of studies reveals
the conditions that make people par-
ticularly susceptible to the influence
of misinformation. For example,
people are particularly prone to hav-
ing their memories modified when
the passage of time allows the orig-
inal memory to fade. Put another
way, with a long interval between
the event and the misinformation,
the injection of misinformation be-
comes relatively easy. In its weak-
ened condition, memory—like the
disease-ridden body—becomes es-
pecially vulnerable to repeated as-
saults on its very essence. This find-
ing leads us to a principle, the
discrepancy detection principle, for
determining when changes in recol-
lection will occur:
Recollections are more likely to
change if a person does not immediately
detect discrepancies between postevent
information and memory for the original
event.
Other lines of research fit well
with the discrepancy detection prin-
ciple. For example, if people are ex-
posed to misinformation that is sub-
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tie, they are more likely to be
influenced than if the misinforma-
tion is not subtle. Consider the sim-
ple interrogative sentence "Was the
mustache worn by the tall intruder
light or dark brown?" This sentence
not so subtly suggests the existence
of a mustache. By comparison, "Did
the intruder who was tail and had a
mustache say anything to the profes-
sor?" is more subtle in its suggestion
of the mustache, having embedded
this idea in a relative clause. People
are more likely to falsely claim that
they saw a mustache when exposed
to the more subtle version.
Another line of research that fits
well with the discrepancy detection
principle involves explicit warnings.
If people are warned prior to a
postevent narrative that the narrative
may be misleading, they are better
able to resist its influence than if they
are not warned. In these various
lines of research, the subject's detec-
tion of discrepancies between the
original memory and the postevent
passage (or failure to detect discrep-
ancies) appears to be crucial. With a
long interval between event and
misinformation, and with misinfor-
mation that is subtly embedded, the
ability of subjects to detect a dis-
crepancy is minimized. !n contrast,
when subjects are warned about the
likelihood of incorrect information,
they scrutinize the postevent infor-
mation, and the likelihood of detec-
tion of a discrepancy is enhanced. It is
also true that people are particularly
susceptible if they can be induced to
repeat the misinformation as fact.
WHO IS SUSCEPTIBLE
TO MISINFORMATION?
The majority of the studies of the
misinformation effect have been
conducted with college students,
and few individual difference vari-
ables have emerged. Where group
differences do emerge is in misinfor-
mation studies using children as sub-
jects. It is common (although not
universal) to find that young children
are especially susceptible to these
manipulations.'^
The largest study of individual dif-
ferences was recently conducted
with nearly 2,000 people who were
attending a science museum in San
Francisco.^ The experiment was one
of the interactive exhibits at the mu-
seum, which means that subjects
provided data for the experiment
while learning from the exhibit. All
subjects watched a short film clip
and later answered a series of ques-
tions about it. Some subjects were
exposed to misleading questions but
others were not, so that the impact
of misinformation could be as-
sessed. The most important demo-
graphic variable was the age of the
subject, which varied between 5
and 75. Memory performance rose
as a function of age up to the 20s,
leveled off, and then fell sharply for
subjects over age 65. Moreover, the
youngest and the oldest groups
showed large misinformation ef-
fects. Put another way, the very
young and the elderly were signifi-
cantly more accurate when not mis-
informed than when misinformed, a
result that is consistent with other
age effects in the literature on epi-
sodic memory. The article describ-
ing the study also reviews relevant
literature on individual differences
in susceptibility to misinformation.^
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE
ORIGINAL MEMORY?
An important issue that has been
debated is whether misinformation
actually impairs a person's ability to
remember details of an event. Put
another way, are memory traces al-
tered by postevent misinformation?
There are several ways in which mis-
information could impair memory.
First, misinformation could cause
trace impairment; that is, it could
update or alter the previously
formed memory. New information
could combine with earlier traces to
change the representation. Second,
misinformation could cause retrieval
impairment; that is, misinformation
could make the original memory
trace less accessible without altering
it.^ Impairment of some sort is im-
plied by either the trace impair-
ment or the retrieval impairment
mechanism.
Some theorists have rejected the
notion that misinformation impairs
memory. McCloskey and Zaragoza^
disagreed with the idea that the mis-
information effect is due to recoding
processes or updating of previously
stored memories or arises because
inhibition or suppression renders the
older memory less accessible. Mc-
Closkey and Zaragoza argued in-
stead that the misinformation does
not affect memory at all, but merely
influences the reports of subjects
who have never encoded (or do not
recall} the original event. Instead of
guessing blindly, these subjects use
the misinformation to decide what to
report as their memory. Misinforma-
tion effects could also be obtained if
subjects remember both sources of
information but select the mislead-
ing information because they con-
clude it must be correct.
Several lines of evidence support
the notion that misinformation occa-
sionally does impair the ability to re-
member original details, however.
One kind of evidence involves stud-
ies using tests that do not permit the
misinformation option. Say a subject
originally saw a stop sign, but it was
later referred to as a yield sign. Sup-
pose we now give the subject a test
that does not permit the selection of
the yield sign (e.g., the choice is be-
tween a stop sign and a no-parking
sign). If the misinformation has im-
paired memory for the stop sign,
then the misinformed subjects
would be less likely to remember the
stop sign than the control subjects. If
there has been no memory impair-
ment due to misinformation, then
misled subjects would be expected
to be as accurate as control subjects
on a test of this type. Although some
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studies do show equal performance,
there are several published demon-
strations of deficits in performance
with this restrictive type of test. One
study"* presented preschool children
with stories and found impairment
following misinformation. Another
study** presented adult subjects with
visual scenes (e.g., nature scenes in-
cluding ponds, flowers, mountains)
and then provided similar visual
scenes as postevent information.
Subjects who received misinforma-
tion were less able than control sub-
jects to discriminate the original
scenes from novel distractors.
A second line of work supporting
a memory impairment interpretation
involves the use of a yes-no test.'*
Belli showed subjects a simulated
crime via slides and then fed them
some misinformation via a postevent
narrative that they read under a pre-
tense. Finally, subjects were pre-
sented with a series of statements,
each dealing with a critical item
from the crime. Subjects said "yes"
if they saw the item in the slides and
"no" otherwise. Compared with
memories for control items, there
was a large reduction in accurate
memory for the items about which
subjects had received misinforma-
tion. The large reduction was not
offset by the small improvement in
memory for completely novel items.
Other lines of research that are
consistent with memory impairment
involve implicit memory testing'"
and logic-of-opposition procedures
(described in the next section). Al-
though any of these findings might
be readily explained by alternative
interpretations, taken together, these
studies support the idea that misin-
formation can impair a subject's
ability to remember original details.
DO PEOPIE GENUINELY
BELIEVE IN
THE MISINFORMATION?
One reason to think that subjects
truly believe in their misinformation
memories is that they often express
these memories with a great deal of
confidence. But how can we rule
out the possibility that subjects re-
port misinformation memories to ap-
pear observant or prove they are
"good" subjects?
The logic-of-opposition para-
digm, developed by Jacoby and ap-
plied to the study of misleading sug-
gestions by Lindsay," provides an
ideal means of assessing what sub-
jects really believe. By instructing
his subjects that any information
contained in the postevent narrative
was wrong and should not be re-
ported on the test, Lindsay set the
tendency to report suggested details
in opposition to the ability to re-
member the details from the
postevent narrative. Put another
way, he tried to offset subjects' ten-
dency to want to report an item they
remembered reading by harshly
warning the subjects not to report
anything they remembered from the
reading. If subjects continued to
base their test responses on sug-
gested items, despite explicit in-
structions against doing so, Lindsay
could conclude that misled subjects
truly believe that they saw the sug-
gested details at the time of the ini-
tial event. In fact, Lindsay obtained
such results. He first showed an
event via slides, and later provided
misinformation about some items.
Misinformed subjects who saw the
slides and read the narrative in the
same session claimed to have seen
the misinformation in the slides 27%
of the time, compared with 9%
for subjects who had not been
misinformed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Misleading information can turn a
lie into memory's truth. It can cause
people to believe that they saw
things that never really existed, or
that they saw things differently from
the way things actually were. It can
make people confident about these
false memories and also, apparently,
impair earlier recollections. Once
adopted, the newly created memo-
ries can be believed as strongly as
genuine memories. If handled skill-
fully, the power of misinformation is
so enormous and sufficiently con-
trollable that a colleague and I re-
cently postulated a not-too-distant
"brave new world" in which misin-
formation researchers would be able
to proclaim: " 'Give us a dozen
healthy memories . . . and our own
specified world to handle them in.
And we'll guarantee to take any one
at random and train it to become any
type of memory that we might select
. . . regardless of its origin or the
brain that holds it.' "^^ The implica-
tions of these findings for the legal
field, for advertising, for political
persuasion, and for clinical settings
are far-reaching.
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Tuesday, May 8, 2001 
Justices Say Jurors May Not Vote 
Conscience  
 Ruling: The law must be followed even if panelists believe the result 
will be unjust, state's highest court finds.  
 
By MAURA DOLAN, Times Legal Affairs Writer 
 
 
     SAN FRANCISCO--Jurors must follow the law--not their 
consciences--even when they strongly believe the law will produce an 
unjust result, the California Supreme Court ruled Monday.  
     The court rejected a centuries-old doctrine called "jury nullification," 
which gives jurors the power to follow their convictions rather than the 
law.  
     "A nullifying jury is essentially a lawless jury," Chief Justice Ronald 
M. George wrote for a unanimous court.  
     Nullification, a doctrine rooted in old English law, has been debated 
by judges, lawyers and legal scholars for decades. In recent years, 
advocates of nullification have seen it as a weapon against unpopular tax 
laws and increasingly harsh criminal sentences.  
     Monday's ruling was the first in which the state high court directly 
confronted the principle. The court held that a judge properly excused a 
juror who said he could not convict an 18-year-old man of unlawful sex 
with a minor--the defendant's 16-year-old former girlfriend.  
     "Encouraging a jury to nullify a law it finds unjust or to act as the 
'conscience of the community' by disregarding the court's instructions 
may sound lofty," George wrote, "but such unchecked and unreviewable 
power can lead to verdicts based upon bigotry and racism."  
     The court acknowledged that in criminal cases, juries may continue to 
nullify the law unless the judge discovers it before a verdict. Although a 
judge can throw out a guilty verdict if it was not supported by the 
evidence, a jurist has no authority to override a verdict that favors a 
defendant.  
     Monday's decision, however, is likely to deter nullification because a 
new jury instruction requires jurors to inform the judge whenever a 
fellow panelist appears to be deciding a case based on his or her dislike 
of a law, said Deputy Atty. Gen. Karl S. Mayer.  
     Mayer, who represented the prosecution in the case before the high 
court, called the court's decision a "clear rejection" of jury nullification. 
     "If it comes to the attention of the court, this should stop it," Mayer 
said.  
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     University of Santa Clara law professor Gerald Uelmen said the 
ruling is particularly timely because the new jury instruction will 
increasingly force judges to decide whether to remove jurors for 
nullification.  
     Even with the instruction, nullification probably will persist, he said. 
In most cases, "jury nullification is not explicit," Uelmen said. "It is 
almost subliminal. The jury applies a higher standard of reasonable doubt 
because they don't like the law."  
     Nullification's history in the United State is long and broad: Northern 
jurors used it to protect runaway slaves prior to the Civil War and, 
conversely, some juries in the South refused to convict whites who killed 
or assaulted blacks or civil rights activists.  
     More recently, juries have spared draft resisters and marijuana users. 
Juries also have refused to find some defendants guilty because they 
believe sentences under the three-strikes law are too harsh.  
     American courts that have considered nullification have generally 
ruled against it. On the other hand, the constitutions of three states--
Georgia, Indiana and Maryland--say that jurors should judge questions of 
law as well as fact.  
     Judicial decisions in those states have "essentially nullified" the 
constitutional provisions, George noted in Monday's ruling.  
     Until this week, the California Supreme Court had not clearly 
confronted jury nullification because the practice is generally hidden 
from a court's scrutiny, lawyers said. Most jurors do not admit that they 
are basing their decisions on disagreement with the law.  
     Lawyers said the court also might have been more inclined to take on 
the subject now because of debate about jury nullification in the wake of 
such highly publicized cases as the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Once 
considered an arcane subject, jury nullification is frequently debated in 
scholarly circles and in the news media.  
     In ruling against nullification, the court considered the Santa Clara 
County case of Arasheik Wesley Williams, who was charged with raping 
his former girlfriend. To find that a rape had occurred, the jury also had 
to find that the defendant illegally had sex with a minor.  
     Williams had admitted he had sex with the teenager but said it was 
consensual. On the first day of juror deliberations, the foreperson 
informed the judge that one of the jurors refused to follow instructions 
on statutory rape because he believed the law was wrong.  
     Superior Court Judge Paul R. Teilh questioned the juror. "It's been 
reported to me that you refuse to follow my instructions on the law in 
regard to rape and unlawful sexual intercourse, that you believe the law 
to be wrong, and therefore, you will not hear any discussion on that 
subject. Is that correct?" the judge asked.  
     "Pretty much, yes," the juror replied.  
     A few minutes later, the juror told the judge: "I've been told [statutory 
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rape] is a misdemeanor. I still don't see--if it were a $10 fine, I just don't 
see convicting a man and staining his record for the rest of his life. I 
think that is wrong. I'm sorry, judge."  
     The judge, over the defendant's objections, replaced the man with an 
alternate juror. Williams was convicted of assault, false imprisonment 
and torture and sentenced to six years in prison.  
     He appealed on the grounds that the juror should have been allowed 
to remain on the panel because jury nullification is acceptable. The 
attorney for the defendant in the case could not be reached for comment. 
     While rejecting Williams' appeal, the court noted that juries still have 
the capability to nullify the law in criminal cases because of double 
jeopardy protection for defendants. A defendant who has been acquitted 
of a charge cannot be charged a second time with it, even if the court 
later learns jury nullification played a role in the verdict.  
     But these jury powers do not "diminish the trial court's authority to 
discharge a juror, who, the court learns, is unable or unwilling to follow 
the court's instructions," George wrote.  
     In a footnote, he said the court was expressing no view on whether a 
judge can instruct a jury specifically that it has no power, as opposed to 
right, to render a verdict contrary to the law.  
     By leaving the question unanswered, defense attorneys may try to 
inform juries that even though they are not supposed to nullify, they do 
have that power, McGeorge School of Law professor J. Clark Kelso said. 
 
     "Suppose defense counsel says, 'Jury, you have no right to make up 
the law, but you do have the power to do it.' Would that be improper? I 
don't know," Kelso said.  
     Even with that possible opening, the ruling in People vs. Williams, 
S066106, will be helpful to prosecutors, Kelso said. "It gives the 
prosecutor another tool in closing arguments," the law professor said.  
     In a separate decision Monday, the court overturned a Los Angeles 
robbery conviction on the grounds that the judge had improperly 
dismissed a holdout juror. Superior Court Judge Richard R. Romero 
replaced the juror with an alternate after fellow jurors complained that he 
was refusing to deliberate.  
     The state high court ruled that the evidence did not support the 
finding. "The juror simply viewed the evidence differently from the way 
the rest of the jury viewed it," George wrote.  
     The dismissed juror may have "employed faulty logic and reached an 
'incorrect result,' but it cannot properly be said that he refused to 
deliberate," George said in People vs. Cleveland, S078537.  
 
Copyright 2001 Los Angeles Times  
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Agenda
Administrative agency decision‐making
Specialized judicial courts
Therapeutic courts
Restorative justice
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2Administrative agency decision‐making
Administrative agencies have special judges 
Administrative Law Judges = ALJs
ALJs hold hearings like trials:
ALJs determine facts, apply law, issue decisions
Examples:
eligibility for Social Security benefits
approvals of new prescription drugs
fines, punishment for violation of water safety laws
immigrants’ eligibility for political asylum
If a party at the proceedings disagrees, can appeal
3
Administrative agency decision‐making
Agencies have specialized, limited subject matter
Administrative agency processes for both federal and state 
governments
Administrative agency processes differ from judicial 
decision‐making
4
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3Common legislative design for review 
of administrative decisions
Administrative 
agency hearing
Administrative 
agency appeal
Legislative Executive Judicial
Trial level 
/ fact 
finding
Intermediate 
appellate 
review
Highest level 
review
Court review of 
administrative 
rulings
Supreme Court 
review of 
administrative 
rulings 5
Administrative agency decision‐making
Examples of federal agencies with ALJs:
Immigration court
Tax court
Social Security disability hearings
Patent court
Right to appeal:
Usually to an administrative appellate board first
e.g., Board of Immigration Appeals, Social Security 
Appeals Council
Then to US Circuit Court of Appeals
sometimes appeal directly to court from an administrative 
agency decision
6
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4Administrative agency decision‐making
Similar to federal government, state legislatures create state 
agencies
California Administrative Procedure Act 
Govt. Code §§ 11340 et seq. 
Examples of state agencies with ALJs:
Unemployment benefits
Driver’s licenses
Parole board
State bar disciplinary board
7
Administrative agency decision‐making: 
example: courts martial
Article I §8 of the Constitution: 
“The Congress shall have Power....To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
forces.“
Using that power, Congress established military courts
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC  §§ 801 et seq.  (1951)
Adjudicate military offenses and civilian offenses committed 
by military personnel
Separate rules
E.g.,: only 2/3 of panel needed in order for finding of 
guilt in “special” (=misdemeanor) cases
8
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5Administrative agency decision‐making
Example: At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 
Claimant C is seeking unemployment benefits.
Facts:
• C, 5’2”, worked as security guard at card room
• When fight broke out, C stands in front of group of people with his 
arms out so they don’t move forward
• Card room fired C for failing to break up the fight
Procedure:
• C applies for unemployment benefits
• Employment Development Department (EDD) denies C unemployment 
benefits because it believes that employer fired him for misconduct in 
his refusing to do his job
• C asks for a hearing
9
Administrative agency decision‐making
Law:
Unemployment benefits are available if worker was fired from 
job, but not for misconduct (and is otherwise eligible)
An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation 
benefits if … he or she has been discharged for misconduct 
connected with his or her most recent work. 
Cal. Unemployment Insurance Code § 1256 (emphasis added)
10
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6Administrative agency decision‐making
For a claimant's act to be misconduct, the following four 
elements must be present:
1. The claimant owes a … duty to the employer under 
the contract of employment.
2. There is a substantial breach of that duty. 
3. The breach is a wilful or wanton disregard of that 
duty. 
4. The breach disregards the employer's interests
and injures or tends to injure the employer's 
interests.
California Code of Regulations Title 22, Section 1256‐30(b) (emphasis added)
11
Administrative agency decision‐making
Four elements of ‘misconduct’ :
1. The claimant owes a … duty to the employer.
2. There is a substantial breach of that duty. 
3. The breach is a wilful or wanton disregard of that duty. 
4. The breach disregards the employer's interests and injures or tends to injure the 
employer's interests.
Hearing before the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board:
C testifies that he could not physically break up the fight, had 
called for back‐up, was trying to prevent other people from 
becoming involved
You be the ALJ.  What do you decide & why?
Because C did not intentionally (wilfully) disregard duty to 
employer; C did not disregard employer’s interests and injure 
employer, ‐> C is eligible for unemployment benefits. 12
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7Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
Juvenile court: corrections court for youth
• Understanding that youth are different from adults, and 
should be treated differently by the courts in most situations
• Based on the idea of rehabilitation, reformation of young 
offenders, with the goal of helping them develop into 
responsible adults
• When should youth be tried as adults?  A current issue, 
looking to social science, biological science research
13
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
In re Gault, US Supreme Court (1967)
• Gerald Francis Gault (G), age 15, allegedly makes obscene 
phone call to neighbor N  
• Probation officer speaks to N once, over the phone, re events
• Police take G into custody
– do not inform G’s parents (who are at work)
– G tells police that he and a friend made the call, but said 
that it was friend, not him (G) who made the more serious 
lewd comments
14
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8Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
In re Gault, US Supreme Court (1967) (cont’d)
• At juvenile court hearing, N is not present
• G’s mother asks judge to require N to attend so can 
ask how she knew which boy made the lewd 
comments
• Judge says N does not have to attend
15
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
In re Gault, US Supreme Court (1967) (cont’d)
Arizona statutes provide that:
• A person who “in the presence or hearing of any woman or 
child … uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor …”  
– Penalty for adult is fine from $ 5 to $ 50, or imprisonment 
for not more than two months
• A “delinquent child” is one who is “habitually involved in 
immoral matters”  
– G was on probation two years earlier because he had 
allegedly stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied 
to police about it
16
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9Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.
14th Amendment § 1, US Constitution
17
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
… to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
6th Amendment § 1, US Constitution
18
213
10
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
You are the attorney for the Gaults.  What do you argue?
Facts recap:
• Probation officer speaks to N once, over the phone, re events
• Police take G, age 15, into custody
– do not inform G’s parents (who are at work)
– G tells police that he and a friend made the call, but said that it was 
friend, not him (G) who made the more serious lewd comments
• At juvenile court hearing, N is not present
• G’s mother asks judge to require N to attend so can ask how she 
knew which boy made the lewd comments
• Judge says N does not have to attend
19
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
As attorney for the Gaults:
• Juvenile court procedures deprived G of liberty without due 
process of law
• Contrary to 14th amendment and 6th amendment rights
Decision:  The juvenile court judge committed G to the state 
industrial school until he reached age 21
20
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Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
Appealed to the US Supreme Court
Decided:
– juvenile court unconstitutionally deprived G of his 
liberty without due process of law
– due process requires:
• adequate notice of charges, 
• notification of parents and the child of the 
juvenile’s right to counsel, 
• opportunity for confrontation and cross‐
examination of witnesses against him at the 
hearing, and
• adequate safeguards against self‐incrimination
21
Specialized judicial courts: juvenile
22
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Specialized judicial courts
Other specialized courts in Santa Clara County:
offer efficiency, understanding by judges, routine 
handling: find facts, apply law
• Small Claims
• Family 
o domestic violence restraining order court
o non‐domestic relationship restraining order court
• Juvenile (adjudicating alleged offenses by people under 18 
years old)
• Dependency (parents of children charged with exposing them 
to abuse or neglect)
23
Therapeutic courts
Q:  What are pros and cons of specialized courts?
Focus on population, legal area, issue
Consider the purposes of courts: 
To find the facts and apply the law
24
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Therapeutic courts
What if courts focus on preventing future problems?
law is the backdrop and facts set context for problem‐solving
Judge Jacobs‐May in her “Quiet Revolution” article:
The goal of the traditional adjudication is to determine the 
facts from the evidence presented, apply the law, and 
determine a legal outcome‐ guilt, liability, etc. 
The aim of the collaborative approach is to address the 
problems that brought the case to us, using the authority of 
the court, but in collaboration with the parties and their 
attorneys, and often outside agencies, in order to come up 
with the best possible outcome.
25
Therapeutic courts
Judge Jacobs‐May, “Quiet Revolution” (cont’d)
The Court partners with public agencies and 
community‐based organizations …  The judge serves as 
the central figure or facilitator of this team approach, 
using a system of sanctions and incentives to overcome 
the problems being encountered. Cultural competency, 
interdisciplinary education, and a deep commitment by 
all [are necessary.]
26
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Therapeutic courts
Also referred to as “problem‐solving courts” 
Goal is to change from adversarial nature of courts to focus on 
prevention of future problems
Examples:
Opportunity court (drug‐involved youth)
Drug treatment courts
Veterans courts
Outreach courts (for homeless)
Mental health courts
Foster youth court
Truancy court
27
Therapeutic courts
Personnel: 
• involve social workers, counselors, understanding social 
science, addressing needs to avoid repetition of future 
problem
Techniques:
• frequent check‐ins, reinforcement for achievements, 
progress reports for continuity, accountability, immediate 
sanctions
28
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Therapeutic courts
Example: Family Wellness Court (FWC) ‐‐ experimental form of 
Dependency Court
• Targeted at children from 0‐3 years old born into families with 
addiction issues
• Provides a range of services from various professionals –
attorneys, social workers, agencies, representatives of child 
involved
• FWC provides acute services to the family to keep it together 
and hopes to avoid future harm
• FWC evaluations show lower recidivism, cost savings in 
keeping families together when possible
29
Therapeutic courts
Restorative justice
Goal of restorative justice programs or approaches: 
repair the harm caused by offender’s actions to the victim
help keep offender from re‐offending 
counseling, treatment, resources, supervision, support
Example:
Youth courts as alternative to juvenile courts
• Sentences geared to help youth reflect on and understand 
consequences of actions 
– Essay writing, community service related to offense, jury duty
• Determination by jury of peers (other youth)
• Youth advocates (former offenders)
30
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Therapeutic courts
Process involves: 
– Enabling victim, those affected by offender’s actions, to 
express the dimensions of harm done
– Helping the offender understand the harm
• E.g., personal relationships, consequences of actions
– Determining how offender can make amends, make up for 
harm done 
• E.g., repainting graffiti, returning item taken
– Healing to enable the offender to be forgiven, have a way 
back into society once harm has been repaired as best can 
be done
31
Specialized courts
In sum, consider purposes of courts and how to 
achieve those purposes
What does achieving justice mean?
What are strengths – and limitations – of traditional 
courts?
How can we maximize justice by creating courts that 
specialize by area of law, population?  
How much should courts try to resolve legal problems 
by offering social services to avoid future problems?
32
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Margaret Stevenson 
JS 103 Courts and Society 
 
Specialized Courts   
Should courts specialize by type of law, type of party involved, type of function?   
If courts should specialize, when should they do so? 
We look at what courts are doing now in terms of specializing, and how well they achieve their 
purposes 
federal courts – not specialized 
state courts – specialized (e.g., criminal, civil, Family Wellness Court, drug court, 
juvenile, family, traffic, small claims),  
administrative courts – specialized (e.g., military, unemployment, workers’ comp, tax, 
immigration) 
Keep in mind the concept of courts as collaborative, problem-solving courts as outlined in 
posted article by Judge Jacobs-May, and as carried out in Family Wellness Court (see 
information posted on website) 
I. JURISDICTION OF COURTS 
Jurisdiction of courts (“judicial power”) set out by Constitutions 
 Federal Constitution: Article III 
Section 1.  The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.  
 California Constitution:   ARTICLE 6  JUDICIAL 
SEC. 1.  The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of 
appeal, and superior courts, all of which are courts of record. 
 
II. FEDERAL COURTS 
Federal courts do not specialize:  federal judges hear both civil and criminal, all types of 
cases 
 Is that because of the lower volume of cases in federal courts? 
  About 25,000 cases in 2008 in federal court in California 
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About 9.5 million cases filed in California state courts in 2007  -> 38 times as 
many cases as federal courts in California   
III. STATE COURTS 
 State courts in California DO specialize except in smaller counties  
by type of proceeding  
 small claims court – handle lots of cases quickly for low cost 
 traffic – handle same types of minor offense 
 
or type of individuals involved  
 youth 
 drug addicts 
 veterans 
 
State judges rotate through various assignments.  Usually asked to rate their 
preferences, presiding judge assigns    
    
A. Juvenile Court – a common example of a specialized court 
Juvenile court: corrections court for young people.   Juvenile courts are based on the idea of 
rehabilitation, reformation of young offenders, with the goal of helping them develop into 
responsible adults. 
Understanding that youth are different from adults, and should be treated differently by 
the courts in most situations. 
When should youth be tried as adults?  A current issue, social science research is 
investigating. 
Data illustrate specific ways of assisting youth:   
Example:  Fresh Lifeline for Youth statistics:  of the 13,000 youth cited for offenses in 
Santa Clara County each year, 91 percent do not have a positive adult role model. 
Therefore -> provide positive role models and other support and avoid 
recidivism. 
A US Supreme Court case from 1967 -- In re Gault -- provides an example of revised procedures 
in juvenile court.  Prior to In re Gault, court procedures were much more strict for youth than 
for adults. 
Police took Gerald Francis Gault, age 15, into custody for allegedly making an obscene 
phone call to a neighbor, Ms. Cook.  The police did not inform Gerald’s parents, who 
were at work when their son was arrested.  Gerald admitted to the police that he and a 
222
friend had made the call, but stated that he (Gerald) did not make any of the more 
serious lewd comments. 
Ms. Cook was not present at the juvenile court hearing.  The only person to have talked 
to Ms. Cook was the probation officer who had spoken with her once, over the phone. 
Ms. Gault asked the judge to require Ms. Cook to attend so that she could be asked 
about how she knew which boy was responsible for the lewd comments.  The juvenile 
court judge said that Ms. Cook did not have to be present.   
The juvenile court judge found Gerald violated an Arizona statute that provides a person 
who “in the presence or hearing of any woman or child … uses vulgar, abusive or 
obscene language, is guilty of a misdemeanor …”   
In determining the disposition, the judge applied another statute, finding that Gerald 
was a “delinquent child” since he was “habitually involved in immoral matters.”  Gerald 
had previously been placed on probation when, two years earlier, a “referral” was made 
because he had allegedly stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to police 
about it. 
The penalty in the Criminal Code for an adult is a fine from $ 5 to $ 50, or imprisonment 
for not more than two months.  The juvenile court judge committed Gerald to the state 
industrial school until he reached age 21. 
The Gaults challenged the juvenile court procedures as unconstitutionally depriving 
Gerald of liberty without due process of law.  The US Supreme Court found that the 
juvenile court failed to comply with Constitutional requirements of due process.  Due 
process required adequate notice of charges, notification of parents and the child of the 
juvenile’s right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses against him at the hearing, and adequate safeguards against self-
incrimination.   
Subsequently we have seen cases where courts recognize different developmental state of 
youth, and different needs and purposes for the courts in dealing with them. 
 Juvenile Court Compared to Adult Criminal Court 
 Adult Juvenile 
Hearings Public (unless exception) Private 
Bail Yes  No 
Jury Yes (in most cases) No 
Sentencing Punishment & rehabilitation Rehabilitation  
Pro se? Yes No 
Violation  Crime Offense 
Result “Convicted”  “Delinquent / Offended” 
In re Gault: 
gave youth 
Rt to notice of charges Rt to notice of charges 
Rt to counsel Rt to counsel 
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same due 
process rights 
as adults, e.g.: 
Rt to confront witnesses Rt to confront witnesses 
Privilege v. self-incrimination Privilege v. self-incrimination 
Rt to transcripts Rt to transcripts 
Rt to appellate review Rt to appellate review 
 
B. Dependency Court  -- an example: Family Wellness Court  
When a child is abused or neglected, state can remove child from home.  Dependency courts 
ultimately can terminate parental rights. 
Children are sent to foster care or group homes if parents / guardian can’t care for them 
Data show lower recidivism, cost savings to keep families together when possible (see 
Fact Sheet on Family Wellness Court on website) 
Family Wellness Court (FWC) -- experimental form of Dependency court 
 Targeted at children from 0-3 years old born into families with addiction issues 
 Provides a range of services from various professionals – attorneys, social workers, 
agencies, representatives of child involved 
FWC provides acute services to the family to keep it together and hopes to avoid future 
harm 
FWC is being evaluated now after first few years; results are very promising in terms of 
avoiding recidivism and keeping families together 
C. Family Court 
After Small Claims Court, Family Court has the largest volume of cases in US civil courts 
Large percent of cases involve a pro se (= self-represented) party 
Main Family Court issues:  Child custody and child support, Divorce, Domestic violence  
1. Child custody and child support 
 Court decides child custody issues 
The court relies on mediators, social workers to make recommendations to the court 
regarding what is in the best interests of the child. 
The court usually does not have younger children testify in court, but has a social worker 
or child advocate express the child’s interests. 
Expertise on child development, family counseling and related areas is valuable is 
determining custody arrangements and working out conflict. 
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A parent is required to support a child until the child reaches age 18. 
  Paternity tests can be required.   
Payment of child support is determined by review of income of parents. 
2. Divorce 
With “no-fault divorce,” divorce is not usually complicated, unless 
children are involved.   
The couple files papers, list their income and prospective earning 
power.  Court determines who pays alimony to whom.  
3. Domestic violence 
Process:  In domestic violence cases, there is generally a two-step process 
in which the court issues an injunction: 
  First: TRO – temporary restraining order.   
   Issued “ex parte” – with only one side present 
 
Second (approximately three weeks later):  Permanent 
injunction 
Both parties can be present.  Makes the terms of 
the injunction permanent, or else dissolves the 
injunction.   
Legal requirements:  
• Current or former domestic relationship. 
Distinguish civil harassment cases where there is 
harassment but no domestic relationship (such as between 
neighbors or co-workers) 
• Violence or threat of violence 
  Verbal and physical violence included 
Understanding of the cycle of domestic violence helpful in understanding 
dynamics involved.  Again, participation of mediators and social workers 
can aid the court. 
D. Other specialized courts in Santa Clara County:  Drug Court, Adult & 
Juvenile Mental Health, Veterans, Outreach (homeless) Courts 
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Recognition that people often commit crimes as a result of drug addiction or mental illness,  
experiences resulting from military service during wartime, or as a result of homelessness (e.g., 
trespassing). 
Courts recognize that treatment of addiction, illness, underlying trauma can lead to avoiding 
future crime and recidivism. 
Methodology based again on social workers, counselors: 
Drug court: reinforcement for achievements, maintaining progress reports, checking in 
with managing addiction, understanding shared experiences with others 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:  Executive branch courts, both federal and state 
  A. Jurisdiction  
 Legislatures pass statutes that require agencies to hear specific types of cases 
 Federal and state legislatures have set out agencies in specialized areas 
  Federal administrative agencies:  e.g., tax, immigration, EEOC, Social Security 
State administrative agencies:  e.g., UI, worker’s comp, state employment 
discrimination 
B. Procedure 
Administrative Law Judges hold hearings.  Hearings are like trials, except not in court. 
A party may appeal to the administrative law boards – like appeals courts 
The agencies develop a body of written administrative decisions – like case law from 
courts. 
 Further appeal from the administrative law boards often is to appellate level in courts.   
The facts have already been determined by the Administrative Law Judge, and 
the law reviewed.  The legislatures often want to have a court review what the 
administrative agencies are doing, but it is rare for an appeals court to overturn 
an administrative agency decision.  
C. An example of an administrative law court: Courts Martial 
Using its power from Article I of the Constitution, Congress established military courts 
and gave them powers defined by statute. 
Courts martial have worldwide jurisdiction over US armed forces and people connected 
with the military.   
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Each branch of the services has its own procedure, reviewed by the US Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces.  Five civilian judges are appointed for 15-year terms by the 
President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.   
Offenses covered are both military offenses and civilian offenses committed by military 
personnel.   Different levels and procedures according to the severity of the offense: 
Summary – minor offenses by enlisted servicemembers 
Special – misdemeanors; right to appointed counsel; only 2/3 of panel need find 
guilt 
Note this is different from non-military criminal courts, which require 
unanimous verdict to meet “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of 
proving guilt 
General – most serious; right to appointed counsel; pretrial hearing (like grand 
jury or preliminary hearing);  
Post-trial review: can suspend or decrease sentence 
Right to appeal 
SUMMARY 
We recognize that courts are dealing with complex problems and issues in all facets of society.   
Federal courts do not specialize; administrative law courts and many state courts do specialize.   
Judge Jacobs-May in her “Quiet Revolution” article describes collaborative, problem-solving 
courts as the way of courts in the future, and adversarial, winner-loser litigation as the way of 
the past.  Judge Jacobs-May lists examples in Santa Clara County where courts use new 
information, techniques and procedures to improve delivery of justice in specialized delivery.   
In resolving legal problems, we should consider whether it is helpful to have  
 - expertise from the decision-maker (e.g., Administrative Law Judges in agencies) 
 - focus on specific populations (e.g., military, youth, Veterans) 
- resources in court with additional specialized knowledge and training(e.g., mediators, 
social workers, counselors, physicians)  
Or, on the other hand, when is a breadth of experience from a range of cases the best pathway 
to justice? 
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Hon. Jamie Jacobs-May, Presiding Judge 
Daily Journal, April 13, 2010 
 
 
The Quiet Revolution Sweeping the Judicial System 
 
     Courtroom trials make good drama. Many of us were inspired to enter the field of law, 
influenced by movies and television shows depicting trial work. The truth is that while 
adjudicating disputes through an adversary system is entertaining, we are learning that it is not 
the best way to resolve many issues that are before us in the court system.  
        Across the nation, a revolution in the way we approach cases is taking place. This new way 
of doing business goes by different names. Sometimes it is called "problem-solving". It is also 
called "therapeutic justice". In California, the name "collaborative justice" has been widely 
adopted. 
        What is so different? The goal of the traditional adjudication is to determine the facts from 
the evidence presented, apply the law, and determine a legal outcome- guilt, liability, etc. The 
aim of the collaborative approach is to address the problems that brought the case to us, using 
the authority of the court, but in collaboration with the parties and their attorneys, and often 
outside agencies, in order to come up with the best possible outcome. 
        Problems faced by collaborative courts include drug addiction, domestic violence, mental 
health issues, poverty and the wide array of other social issues. The Court partners with public 
agencies and community-based organizations to increase the availability of services which are 
then integrated with the justice system, including treatment and rehabilitation. Under this 
model, it is essential to monitor compliance on a frequent basis. The judge serves as the central 
figure or facilitator of this team approach, using a system of sanctions and incentives to 
overcome the problems being encountered. Cultural competency, interdisciplinary education, 
and a deep commitment by all are hallmarks of a successful collaborative justice approach.  
        I am very proud that Santa Clara judges have been at the forefront of this revolution. Judge 
Stephen Manley is the state's most recognized drug court leader, and he frequently advises and 
consults with other courts and legislators about effective approaches to drug and mental health 
issues. Judge Manley recently started the first Veteran's Court in the state, as well as the first 
Parolee Reentry Court. In 1996, Judge Thomas Edwards founded the Juvenile Treatment Court. 
Judge Eugene Hyman started the first Juvenile Domestic Violence Court in the nation more than 
10 years ago. In 2001, Judge Raymond Davilla started the first Juvenile Mental Health Court.  
        These programs began as a collaborative effort with the Probation Department, District 
Attorney's Office and Public Defender's Office, and Department of Alcohol and Drug Services. 
We learned a lot. We learned about dual diagnoses, and the need to bring in the County's 
Mental Health Department, and other community-based organizations devoted to youth law. 
We rely on multidisciplinary team screenings and reviews. We are very grateful to the Board of 
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Supervisors and many County agencies that help us, and in turn, we provide assistance to other 
counties and states wishing to start programs in their jurisdictions. 
        In Dependency Court, Judge Yew presides over the Family Wellness Court, a program 
designed for pregnant women and parents with children three years of age and younger, whose 
use of methamphetamine and other substances have placed their children in or at risk for out 
of home placement. Intensive services are offered through collaboration with many 
community-based organizations and public agencies, with financial support through First 5 and 
a grant from the National Children's Bureau. We recently celebrated our two year anniversary 
and are pleased to report that we served over 250 children and their parents. This program has 
achieved remarkable success, where 80% of participants successfully regain and retain custody 
of their children and remain drug free.  
        Also in Dependency Court, Judge Shawna Schwarz handles our innovative Teen Court 
where she has a calendar dedicated to high risk teenagers in the foster care system that will 
"age out" and never be returned home before the age of 18. She ensures placement stability, 
school attendance, drug and alcohol interventions and emancipation planning in order to 
support their transition to adulthood and deter behavior that would be self-destructive. CASA, 
Legal Advocates for Children and Youth, the County Department of Family and Children's 
Services are a few of the supportive community collaborators to our Teen Court. 
        In 2002, we began the Family Law Treatment Court, a voluntary drug treatment program in 
the Family Division. We recently won the Kleps Award, a coveted award for innovation, for our 
partnership with the local First 5 Commission to provide a Family Law Treatment Court 
Coordinator to link participants with children under six with treatment services, provide parent 
and family support and monitor and reports family progress in Family Law Treatment Court.  
        Why does collaborative justice work? The words of a parent in the Family Law Treatment 
Court to Judge Susan Bernardini explain it best, "As you know when I first entered FTC my faith 
in the judicial system and Family Court was near zero...I (now) feel lucky to be in a county that 
has a program like Family Treatment Court. This is a program that allows people like myself to 
show that we can turn our lives around, and the FTC program affords us the ability to earn 
credibility...[Y]our wisdom and caring has impressed me. During the FTC hearings I watched the 
way you dealt with not only myself but the other members. I often think of how this program 
and people like yourself have positively impacted many families and children. I believe the 
ripple effect of this positive impact will be felt for generations in families such as mine. In 
closing, I also feel blessed to have had the opportunity to get to know you."  
        Judge L. Michael Clark, who now presides over Family Law Treatment Court, reports on 
common threads: people entering the program are bitter from prolonged litigation, they enter 
the program to regain unsupervised contact with their children, they find recovery hard, but as 
they progress, they "all display a similar peaceful and calm demeanor characteristic of persons 
advanced in their recovery, and all expressed their heartfelt appreciation for Family Law 
Treatment Court."  
229
        Clearly, the success of these programs is due to in large part to very dedicated people and 
the positive and supportive energy they generate. The condition of the buildings they occupy (I 
do not think these renovated locations merit the appellation "courthouse") impede their work. 
We are very grateful to the Santa Clara County Bar Association for the support for our plans to 
build a Family Justice Center Courthouse. By creating adequate space, and having our public 
and community based partners in the new courthouse, we believe we will be able to take our 
collaborative justice program to the next level. We hope to create an atmosphere that gives 
people hope, that allows them to envision possibilities, and provides the tools to allow them to 
achieve their highest potential. 
        For those of you who practice other fields of law, I hasten to add that the collaborative, 
problem-solving approach is reaching you as well. The human condition, and the anger, 
jealousy, fear, shame and other feelings and emotions associated with our existence, are the 
underpinnings of all disputes. Whether the issue is a partnership dissolution, employment 
dispute, or theft of trade secrets, people are involved and so are their feelings. Increasingly, we 
are turning to non-adversarial problem-solving approaches. In the civil division, we offer 
voluntary early mediation with a judge, as well other types of alternative dispute resolution 
programs.  
        As judges engaged in this ADR process, we seek to be active listeners, to understand both 
the stated and unstated factors underlying a dispute, and to help the parties generate potential 
options. Your assistance is critical. The legal profession plays a key role in the paradigm shift 
from adversarial role where there are winners and losers, to one where we all engage in 
collaborative problem-solving, seeking the input of other disciplines and expertise if necessary, 
and focusing on broader and sometimes extralegal solutions.  
        The revolution is here, and the Beatles would be happy to know that "it's gonna be better 
than all right." 
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1
 Codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941.
2
 Rules of procedure and rules of evidence for courts-martial are established by the President as
authorized by Art. 36, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 836).  
3
 Each military service supplements the MCM to meet its individual needs.  The Army has Army
Regulation 27-10; the Navy and Marine Corps have the Manual for the Judge Advocate General;
and the Air Force has Air Force Instructions.   
Congressional Research Service { The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21850
May 26, 2004
Military Courts-Martial: An Overview
Estela I. Velez Pollack
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Summary
The recent reports of abuse of prisoners held by the military in Iraq have raised
questions about how the armed forces discipline and punish those who commit crimes
or violate the rules and regulations of the military.  Congress, under the authorities
vested in it, enacted a code of military laws, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).  The President, by Executive Order, has, in turn, established standards and
procedures for prosecuting violators of the UCMJ and certain other laws.  Military
criminal courts are known as courts-martial.  This report provides an overview of
military courts-martial: who can be tried, potential punishments, and the appeals
process.
Background
Under Article I, sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and
support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining
them.  Under this authority, the Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ),1 the code of military criminal laws applicable to all military members
worldwide.  The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM), which was prescribed by Executive Order 12473 (April 13, 1984).  The Manual
for Courts-Martial contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of
Evidence (MRE),2 and the UCMJ  The MCM covers almost all aspects of military law.3
Military criminal trial courts are known as courts-martial.  Military courts are not
considered Article III courts but instead are established pursuant to Article I of the
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CRS-2
4
 Article III of the U.S. Constitution addresses the judicial powers of the United States and
contains certain requirements such as life tenure for judges.  Article I of the U.S. Constitution
addresses the legislative powers of the United States which are vested in the Congress.  Article
I courts are not subject to all the structural and procedural requirements that pertain to Article III
courts.
5
 Nonjudicial punishment allows  military commanders to discipline servicemembers for minor
offenses without having to face a court-martial.  It is frequently referred to as “Article 15's,”
because of the relevant UCMJ article.  Art. 15, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 815.
6 See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987).
7
 Art. 2, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MCM (2002 ed.); 10 U.S.C. § 802. 
8
  The punitive articles run from Arts. 77 through 134 of the UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934.
9
 Military specific offenses include mutiny or sedition (Art. 94, UCMJ); insubordinate conduct
(Art. 91, UCMJ); failure to obey an order (Art. 92, UCMJ); cruelty and maltreatment (Art. 93,
UCMJ); and misconduct as a prisoner (Art. 105, UCMJ).
10
  Art. 56, UCMJ;10 U.S.C. § 856.
11
 10 U.S.C. § 934.
Constitution.4   This report provides an overview of military courts-martial.  It does not
cover administrative disciplinary options such as nonjudicial punishments.5
Jurisdiction
In order to be tried by a court-martial, the court-martial must have jurisdiction over
the person.  Jurisdiction of a court-martial does not depend on where the offense was
committed.  Rather, it depends solely on the status of the accused as a member of the
armed forces on active duty, whether in the regular or reserve component.6  In addition
to servicemembers, several other categories of individuals may be tried by courts-martial
including retired members of a regular component of the armed forces entitled to pay;
retired members of a reserve component who are hospitalized in a military hospital;
persons in custody of the military serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial; members
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Public Health Service and
other organizations, when assigned to serve with the military; enemy prisoners of war in
custody of the military; and persons with or accompanying the military in the field during
“times of war,” limited to declared wars.7
Types of Offenses
Courts-martial try “military offenses,” which are listed in the punitive articles of the
UCMJ and are codified in 10 U.S.C. 877 et seq.8  Some “military offenses” have a civilian
analog, but a number of “military offenses” are specific to the military.9  The President
is authorized to prescribe the punishments which a court-martial may impose within the
limits established by Congress.10  In addition, a servicemember may be tried at a court-
martial for offenses not specifically covered by the UCMJ  Article 134–General Article11
states that all “crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter
may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-
martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense.”  This means that any state or
federal offense for which there is no analogous crime in the UCMJ may be assimilated
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12
 RCM 303.
13
 Administrative action can include separation from the military.  See 10 U.SC. §§ 1161 et seq.
14
 RCM 306(c).
15
 A specification is a plain and concise statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.  RCM 307(c)(3).
16
 Any person subject to the UCMJ may prefer charges as the accuser.  RCM 307(a).
17
 RCM 307(b).
18
 Referral is the order that states that charges against an accused will be tried by a specific court-
martial.  RCM 601.
19 See RCM 401(c).
20
 RCM 504.
21
 RCM 103(6).
and tried at a court-martial.  The potential punishments for violations of Article 134 are
the same as the punishments applicable to the corresponding civilian offense.
Investigation
When a servicemember has reportedly committed an offense, the accused’s
immediate commander will conduct an inquiry into the alleged offense.12  This inquiry
will vary according to the offense(s) alleged and the complexity of the case.  It may range
from an examination of the charges and an investigative report or summary of expected
evidence to a more extensive investigation.  The investigation may be conducted by
members of the command or, in more complex cases, military and civilian law
enforcement officials. Once evidence has been gathered and the inquiry is complete, the
commander can choose to dispose of the charges by (1) taking no action, (2) initiating
administrative action,13 (3) imposing nonjudicial punishment, (4) preferring charges, or
(5) forwarding to a higher authority for preferral of charges.14  Preferral of charges is the
first formal step in a court-martial.  Preferral of charges consists of drafting a charge sheet
containing the charges and specifications15 against the accused.  The charge sheet must
be signed by the accuser16 under oath before  a commissioned officer authorized to
administer oaths.17  Once charges have been preferred they may be referred18 to one of
three types of courts-martial: summary, special or general.19  The seriousness of the
offenses alleged generally determines the type of court-martial.  The court-martial must
be convened by the convening authority,20 who will generally be the commissioned
officer, or successor, in command of the unit the accused is attached to.21
Types of Courts-Martial
Summary Courts-Martial.  The summary court-martial can adjudicate minor
offenses allegedly committed by enlisted servicemembers.  It can adjudge maximum
punishments of thirty days confinement, hard labor without confinement for 45 days,
restriction to specified limits for 45 days, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for one
month, and reduction to the lowest pay grade.  In the case of enlisted members above pay
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22
 Paygrade E-4 consists of corporals or specialists (Army), petty officers 3rd class (Navy),
corporals (Marine Corps), and senior airman (Air Force).
23
  RCM 1301; Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 820.
24
 Art. 16, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 816.
25
 Art. 20, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 820.
26
 Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1970).
27
  Arts. 16 & 19, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 819; RCM 201(f)(2)(A). 
28
 Members in the military justice system are the equivalent of jurors and are generally composed
of officers from the accused’s command.
29
 The accused has the right to choose the composition of the court-martial or whether he or she
chooses to be tried by a military judge alone, a military judge and members or a panel of
members.  Enlisted servicemembers have the choice to request that the member’s panel include
enlisted members.  RCM 903.
30
 RCM 921(c).  The same is applicable to general courts-martial with the exception of offenses
where the death penalty is mandatory, which require a unanimous verdict.  Art. 52, UCMJ; 10
U.S.C. § 852.
31
 Art. 19, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 819; RCM 201(f)(2)(B).  A bad-conduct discharge, confinement
for more than six months, or forfeiture of pay for more than six months, may only be adjudged
if a complete record of the proceedings and testimony has been made, defense counsel was
appointed, and a military judge presided over the court-martial.  If a military judge could not be
appointed, a detailed written statement stating the reasons  why must be submitted by the
commander who convened the court-martial.
32
 Art. 27, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 827.
grade E-4,22 the summary court-martial may not adjudge confinement or hard labor
without confinement and can only reduce them to the next lower pay grade.23 Summary
courts-martial are composed of one commissioned officer who need not be a lawyer.24
The accused must consent to the proceedings25 and normally is not entitled to a lawyer.26
Special Courts-Martial.  The special court-martial can try any servicemember for
any noncapital offense or, under presidential regulation, capital offenses.27  This court-
martial can be composed of a military judge alone, three members,28 or a military judge
and three members.29  Contrary to civilian criminal trials, only two-thirds of the members
of a court-martial need to agree as to the guilt of the accused for the accused to be found
guilty.  Otherwise, the accused is acquitted.30  There are no “hung juries” in courts-
martial.  
Regardless of the offenses tried, the maximum punishment allowed at a special
court-martial is confinement for one year, hard labor without confinement for up to three
months, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for up to one year, reduction in pay grade
and a bad-conduct discharge.31  Most often special courts-martial will try offenses
considered misdemeanors.  The accused is entitled to an appointed military attorney, a
military counsel of his or her selection, or he or she can hire a  civilian counsel at no
expense to the government.32
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33
 Art. 16, UCMJ  The accused has the right to choose who he or she will be tried by with the
exception of capital cases where members are required.  See note 29, supra. and RCM
201(f)(1)(C).
34
  RCM 1003.  It must be noted that there are restrictions on allowable punishments depending
on a person’s status as an officer or an enlisted servicemember.
35
 Art. 32, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 832.
36
 RCM 405(d)(1).
37
 Art. 32(b)-(c), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 832(b)-(c); RCM 405(f).
38
 Art. 32(d), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 823(d); RCM 405(e).
39
 Art. 33-35, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. §§ 833-835; RCM 407.
General Courts-Martial.  A general court-martial is the highest trial level in
military law and is usually used for the most serious offenses.  It is composed of a military
judge sitting alone, or five members and a military judge.33  It can adjudge, within the
limits prescribed for each offense, a wide range of punishments to include confinement,
reprimand, forfeitures of up to all pay and allowances, reduction to the lowest enlisted
paygrade, punitive discharge (bad conduct discharge, dishonorable discharge or
dismissal), restriction, fines and, for certain offenses, death.34  The accused is entitled to
an appointed military attorney or a military counsel of his or her selection, or the accused
can hire a  civilian counsel at no expense to the government.
Prior to the convening of a general court-martial, a pretrial investigation, more
commonly known as the Article 32 hearing, must be conducted.  The Article 32 hearing
is the equivalent of a civilian grand jury, meant to assess the truth of the charges to ensure
that there is a basis for prosecution.35 An investigating officer, who must be a
commissioned officer,36 presides, and the accused has the same entitlements to counsel
as in a special courts-martial.  However, unlike in a civilian grand jury investigation
where the accused has no access to the proceedings, the accused is afforded the
opportunity to examine the evidence presented against him, cross-examine witnesses and
present his own arguments.37  If during the course of the investigation evidence surfaces
that the accused committed an offense not charged, the investigating officer can
recommend that more charges be brought against the accused.38  Likewise, if the
investigating officer believes that there is not enough evidence to support a charge, he can
recommend that it be dismissed.
Once the Article 32 investigation is complete, the investigating officer will make
recommendations to the convening authority (CA) via the CA’s legal advisor.  The legal
advisor in turn, provides the CA with a formal written advice, known as the Article 34,
UCMJ advice, as to the disposition of charges.  The CA then determines whether to
convene a court-martial or dismiss the charges.39
Post-Trial Review
One of the unique aspects of the military justice system is the post-trial review by the
CA.  For convictions at a general or special court-martial that include a punitive
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40
 There are two kinds of punitive discharges: bad-conduct discharge and dishonorable discharge.
41
 United States v. Davis, 58 M.J. 100, 102 (2003).
42
 Art. 60, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 860; RCM 1107.
43
 There are three service appellate courts: the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals,
the Army Court of Criminal Appeals and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.  A service
appellate court will have jurisdiction in cases where the sentence includes confinement for one
year or more, a bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge, death, or a dismissal from service in the
case of a commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman.  Art. 66, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866.
44
 Art. 64, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 864; RCM 1111, 1112 and 1306.  
45
  Art. 64, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 864; .RCM 1112.
46
 Art. 64(c)(3), UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 864(c)(3); RCM 1112.
47
 Military appellate courts are required to review cases over which they have jurisdiction unless
the appellant waives his or her right to appeal.  An appellant may not waive his right to appeal
when the sentence includes death.  RCM 1110.
48
 Art. 66, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 866.
49
 See Art. 67, UCMJ;   10 U.S.C. § 867.  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)
is a civilian court composed of five civilian judges appointed by the President.
50
 Congress did not grant the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over decisions of the CAAF until
1984.  Military Justice Act of 1983, P.L. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 28 U.S.C. § 1259.
discharge,40 the process starts with the review, the staff judge advocate (SJA), and a
recommendation to the CA as to what action to take on the case.  This is recognized as
the accused’s best hope for relief as the CA has broad powers to act on the case.41  Upon
review of the record of trial and the SJA’s recommendation, the CA may, among other
remedies, suspend all or part of the sentence, disapprove a finding or conviction or lower
the sentence.42  The CA may not increase the sentence.  Once the CA takes action on the
case, the conviction is ripe for an appeal.
In the case of summary court-martial or a court-martial where the service appellate
courts do not have jurisdiction,43 convictions will be reviewed by a judge advocate44 to
determine if the findings and sentence, as approved by the CA, are correct in law and
fact.45  If those criteria are met, the conviction is final.  If not, the judge advocate will
forward the case to a general court-martial CA for corrective action.46  If the CA refuses
to take corrective action, the case is referred to the Judge Advocate General for review.
Appellate Review
Convictions by a special or general court-martial are subject to an automatic 47 appeal
to a service Court of Criminal Appeals if the sentence includes confinement for one year
or more, a bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge, death, or a dismissal in the case of a
commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman.48  Appeal is mandatory when the sentence
includes death.  If the conviction is affirmed by the service court, the appellant may
request review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces49 and ultimately the U.S.
Supreme Court.50  Review by these courts is discretionary.
236
 1
Talking Points for Family Wellness Court 
3/14/08 Kick off 
 
 
• Santa Clara County has received $6.3 million to open up a second Dependency 
Drug Treatment Court.  This is a five year grant from the Federal Government with a 
match from FIRST 5 Santa Clara County.  SSA, DADS, Mental Health, Superior 
Court, DFCS, FIRST 5 Santa Clara County, Juvenile Defenders and the District 
Attorney’s Office have established an Oversight Committee to ensure that the Grant 
Objectives are met. 
 
• We are the only Court in California that is partnering with FIRST 5 to provide 
intervention to the Mother and the baby. 
 
• We may be the only Court in the Nation that has taken on this issue in this way.  We 
are modeling ourselves after Judge Cindy Liederman’s 0-3 Court in Florida.  Her 
focus however, was the child and the mother/child relationship, our court stands 
apart due to the drug treatment focus on the Mother simultaneously.  Other courts 
around the country have tried to accomplish what we are going to start here and they 
have been unable to get all their Stakeholders to collaborate in the manner that we 
have accomplished with FWC. 
 
• We are not only launching the FWC on March 14, 2008, but we have begun an entire 
systems change.  Strategic planning for this systems change is funded and was 
included in the grant. 
 
• We were considered a top grant applicant in a very competitive field of applicants.  
Gina Sessions, Jean McCorquodale, and Linda Carpenter wrote the grant on behalf 
of Santa Clara County with assistance from all of the stakeholders.  We applied in 
July of 2007 and were notified in October of 2007.  We got the grant because Santa 
Clara County has a history of collaboration among multi disciplinary agencies to 
provide the best outcomes to our community.  Case in point was the Greenbook 
grant that was administered by the Department of Health and Human Services over 
a five year period.  That grant was $3 million.  This grant is larger.  The Greenbook 
lasted from 2000 to 2006.  We have a final report of how it changed our community if 
you would like a copy.  The Greenbook focused on Domestic Violence and Child 
Abuse. 
 
• Santa Clara County Dependency Court is one of 31 Dependency Courts in the nation 
that is designated as a National Model Court.  Funding is made available through the 
Federal Government to support the Model Courts through the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges.  We receive technical support, training, materials, 
publications and attend National meetings that are all funded through this 
designation.  That is the only other Federal money that this court is receiving 
indirectly at this time, as far as we are aware. 
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• Through the FWC we can achieve an immediate response to a critical crisis in the 
life of a child and make a difference in the outcome of the entire family. 
 
• DDTC serves approximately 65 families at any one time.  This is meeting the needs 
of only a fraction of the population that we currently serve.  At any given time, there 
are about 450 families going through Family Reunification in Dependency Court.  
DDTC started ten years ago with Federal dollars and after that money ran out we 
have been supplemented only by State dollars that from CDCI (California Drug Court 
Initiative).  This money amounts to approximately $280,000 per year.  We also have 
a small Collaborative Justice Grant from the AOC.  We survive because of the 
stakeholder participation and the reallocation of resources within the individual 
County Departments with the support of the Board of Supervisors who decide the 
budget each year. 
 
• FWC will add a capacity of 100 families per year to our Dependency Drug Treatment 
intervention. 
 
• Our County has 1.8 million citizens, we get approximately 20,000 calls to the CPS 
hotline each year.  The calls result in approximately 14,000 investigations by DFCS.  
Those investigations result in approximately 1,000 dependency petitions filed with 
the Juvenile Court each year.  Approximately one-third of children in foster care in 
the County are age 5 and under. 
 
• National, state and local data indicate that 75 to 80% of child welfare cases are drug 
and alcohol related.  In Santa Clara County the drug of choice is methamphetamine.  
Data show the preference is around 64 to 67%. 
 
• This FWC is Santa Clara County Juvenile Court’s continuing commitment to best 
practices, collaboration and innovation.  We are working together to improve 
outcomes for children and families, in this case our babies.  The Stakeholders have 
written and agreed upon a values statement to achieve an entire Systems change at 
the end of the five year grant. 
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NY Times Opinionator - October 18, 2011, 8:15 pm  
Where Teenagers Find the Jury Isn’t Rigged 
By TINA ROSENBERG 
On Friday, [we] the Youth Court of the District of Columbia, a forum where first-time 
nonviolent teenage offenders are judged by others who have been in the same situation.   The 
D.C. Youth Court is one of the largest of some 1,000 youth courts around the country.   These 
courts are designed to help minor offenders avoid a criminal record and stay out of juvenile 
justice — traditionally an efficient production line for criminality. 
While most commenters praised youth courts for taking a humane approach, reader Beliavsky 
from Boston wrote, “Letting young criminals (excuse me, ‘troubled youths’) be judged by other 
young criminals does not seem right to me. There should be a real, non-criminal, adult, judge.” 
In youth court, teenagers hear disapproval of their behavior from people whose respect they 
crave the most: their peers.  
Beliavsky is assuming that Youth Court is the soft option.   It’s often not so.  As reader Andrew 
Rasmussen of New York (5) said:  “The appropriate comparison would be kids who do 
something and are taken home by the cops to their parents.” 
 
He is right — some of the teenagers in Youth Court would simply have been sent home by the 
police if youth court didn’t exist.   This was one of the original reasons that Edgar Cahn was 
interested in the idea to begin with: “Young people quickly get the message: ‘You get three 
freebies before anyone takes you seriously,’” he wrote in 2000.  
While Youth Court is a far cheaper alternative to the formal juvenile justice system, it is 
obviously more expensive than simply driving a teenager home to mom.  In DC it is $444 more 
expensive, the cost of each case. 
But consider it an investment that leads to far greater savings in human and financial terms later 
(incarcerating a juvenile for a year can cost $80,000.)  We know youth courts do help steer 
teenagers on the right path.  An Urban Institute study of four youth courts compared teenagers 
who had committed the same crimes.   Those who went to youth court had less than half the one-
year recidivism rate of those who went to the formal juvenile justice system. 
Why does it work?  One theory is that anything would do better than the juvenile justice system, 
the worst place to send an angry or confused teenager.  Arthur Burnett, Sr., a superior court 
judge who was a founder of the D.C. Youth Court and is now its chairman of the board, said that 
when he was an active judge, he saw many cases of kids arrested for the crime of behaving like a 
teenager in a rough neighborhood.    “You’re dealing with the problem of the attitude of 
teenagers to resist authority,” he said.  “They get in tussles with the police because they were in 
the wrong place, and then they’re charged with resisting arrest — a 10-year felony.  The other 
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big problem we see in poverty communities is that kids have the attitude ‘here come the cops so 
let’s get out of here.’  There are lots of arrests for aiding and abetting where the kid at most may 
be guilty of not wanting to get involved — refusing to talk when the police want them to talk 
openly in the street.  They don’t want to be a snitch, so they end up running. These kids never 
should have been arrested.” 
There is evidence, however, that youth courts do more than simply divert teenagers from juvenile 
justice: they actively create pro-social behavior.  The Urban Institute study found a clue:  the 
courts that give the most autonomy to the teenagers themselves work best.  It helps if defendants 
see their peers as speaking for themselves rather than conveying a message from adults.   Also, 
the more courts are run by teenagers, the more authority and respect they enjoy.  In the roughest 
neighborhoods, respect goes to those who are most feared.  For some teenagers it is probably 
eye-opening to see their peers commanding respect for good behavior. 
Youth court is one of the few places where teenagers hear disapproval of their behavior from 
people whose respect they crave the most:  their peers.  Geraldine Martin, a teenage judge in the 
D.C. Youth Court, said that sometime she and a juror will sit for 15 or 20 minutes after a case, 
talking to the defendant.  “We’ll ask: ‘do you think what you did is right?  Disrespecting your 
mother, yelling, cursing — your younger brother or sister would see you doing it and think it’s 
O.K.’” A juror who is free to tell a defendant he is out of line would never say the same thing in 
school or on the street corner. 
“The most powerful factor is peer support for pro-social behavior,” said Jeffrey Butts, one of the 
authors of the Urban Institute study, who is now the director of the Research and Evaluation 
Center at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. “When a judge controls the room 
— that’s what their whole life is like.  That’s no different than high school.” 
Many teenage jurors also benefit from their service.  
The experience of jury service likely matters as well.  Angelyn Flowers, a professor of law at the 
University of the District of Columbia, studied teenagers’ attitudes and behavior at various times 
in their jury service.  She found it to be highly beneficial.  Over time, the jurors become more 
serious about school work and register very strong improvements in their abilities to set goals 
and achieve them, solve problems and make decisions, among other skills. 
In their two months or more of jury service, teenagers get a chance to sit in judgment on others 
just like them. They get a long-term experience of contributing something, of having their views 
treated as valuable and worthwhile.  They get a sense of belonging from a positive activity. 
Jury service also shifts teenagers from being a subject of the court process to an active 
participant.  Butts thinks this is very important, especially for minority youth; one reason racial 
discrimination is so toxic is that minority groups see the system as unfair.  “If it seems patently 
unfair, why should I play this game?  It’s rigged against me,” he said.  “That’s part of the reason 
you want them to come back as jurors. You’re more likely to believe in justice if you see it as 
fair and evenhanded.  Being on a jury helps communicate that.” 
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Former D.C. Youth Court jurors said that sometimes people understand their own lives better by 
looking at someone else.  “It lets people see their mistakes and see them in other people,” said 
Lamar Ramos-Peterson.  “You get to understand why they did it, and where their head is at.” He 
was sent to Youth Court for fighting in school — he says he had picked up a stapler to defend 
himself from a larger attacker.   After his jury service, he stayed to volunteer as a judge and as 
fill-in coordinator of the boys’ discussion group.  Now he is studying marketing at Delaware 
State University. 
Ramos-Peterson and other former Youth Court jurors said that the open derision that some 
defendants carry into youth court sometimes melts with jury service.  “They’re scared and try to 
show off,” said Ramos-Peterson.  “They may want to do it right but they act the fool because 
they don’t know how to do it right.” 
Geraldine Martin, the judge, said that once they get comfortable, some of these people become 
enthusiastic jurors.  “Some take it as a joke from the beginning,” she said.  “But when I come to 
court later on — well, look who’s volunteering.” 
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Agenda
Purposes of sentencing
Sentencing procedure
Alternative sentencing programs
Sentencing guidelines: 
advisory – Gall and Kimbrough cases
determinate – California
Cultural factors in sentencing
You be the judge … 
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2Purposes of sentencing
Federal guidelines outline the following 
purposes of sentencing
• Punishment
• Deterrence
• Incapacitation/protection of society
• Rehabilitation
US Sentencing Commission; 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)
3
Purposes of sentencing
California Rules of Court outline the following 
purposes of sentencing
• Protect society
• Prevent future commission of crimes by confining 
defendant
• Punish
• Rehabilitate
• Deterrence
• Restitution
• Uniformity in sentencing
Cal. Rules Court 4.410
4
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3Who decides sentences?
Judges sentence defendants at sentencing hearings
California state judges’ sentencing options are limited by 
other branches in sentencing guidelines
Limited exceptions: In California, the jury decides:
1. whether to impose the death penalty (judge has some 
power to overturn a jury death verdict) or
2. life without possibility of parole
The jury can recommend other sentences, but the judge is not bound to 
accept the jury’s recommendation.
5
Sentencing procedure
In Santa Clara County:
Probation Department prepares a Pre‐Sentence 
Investigation and Report for the sentencing hearing 
• summarizes the crime
• includes victim, victim’s families’ statements
• defendant's personal background
• defendant’s criminal history
Probation report recommends a sentence
Defendant submits letters, documentation, statements in 
support of leniency
6
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4Sentencing procedure
In Santa Clara County: 
Sentencing Hearing
California state judges have limited options in felony cases:
• Must order restitution to victims, or explain in detail 
why circumstances make it inappropriate
California Constitution requires restitution 
• Must apply sentencing guidelines in felony cases
California Rules of Court set standard, minimum and maximum term
• Options: more flexibility in misdemeanor cases 
Many statutes specify terms
7
Sentencing procedure
Some areas in which California judges have discretion in 
sentencing
Wobblers:  felony or misdemeanor 
Jail:   can serve as weekend work
Fines: range
Length of probation (misdemeanor cases): some statutes set 
length of probation (e.g., child endangerment 5 years)
Programs:  though some are required by statute (e.g., DV 
counseling, DUI classes)
8
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5Alternative sentencing programs
Aimed at avoiding harsh effects of sentence, usually 
have rehabilitative purpose
Deferred entry of judgment / drug diversion
drug treatment programs, subject to testing.  If defendant 
successfully completes sentence, then “the arrest and the 
conviction shall be deemed never to have occurred.”
Cal. Penal Code § 1201.1(e)(1)
Weekend work 
equivalent of jail, but instead of incarceration (and consequent loss 
of job, child care issues, etc.) work on weekends to make amends
Community service
placement in organizations, agencies to provide community 
service hours ordered by the court
9
Sentencing guidelines
Why have guidelines?
• Consistency:
similar crimes get similar sentences
• Allow for limited judicial discretion:
Within limits set by legislature and executive branch
10
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6Sentencing guidelines
Federal sentencing guidelines 
• promulgated by US Sentencing Commission, an 
independent judicial branch agency 
• table with 43 offense levels, 6 criminal history categories, 
and 4 sentencing zones
• guidelines calibrate type of conduct associated with 
offense, with defendant’s criminal history
Note: some federal offenses have mandatory minimums.
Generally drug and gun offenses.
11
12
Sentencing table considers:
Seriousness of offense & 
circumstances (offense level) 
(1‐43)
Criminal history of defendant 
(I‐VI)
Zones (A‐D) describe the type 
(probation, incarceration) and 
length of sentence
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7Sentencing guidelines: 
2 examples from federal courts
Gall v. US  
Facts: 
While in college Brian Gall was part of a group selling ecstasy.  
After 6 weeks of selling, he 
quit
moved out of state
started company
started a family
had no further problems with law
5 years later law enforcement found him, he admitted to offense 
and was sentenced
13
Sentencing guidelines: 
2 examples from federal courts
Gall v. US  
Sentencing:
Federal guidelines set minimum sentence at 30 months
You be the judge: what would you sentence & why?
What purposes of sentencing support your decision?
Judge explained his reasoning in detail
Prosecution (US Attorney) appealed
14
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8Kimbrough v. US
Facts:
Derrick Kimbrough plead guilty to distribution of powder and crack 
cocaine
Legal backdrop:  
Congress enacted sentencing policies for crack and powder cocaine 
with a 100‐to‐1 ratio of powder to crack cocaine 
US Sentencing Commission noted racial disparities as to cocaine 
usage and racially differential effect of sentencing:
“Sentences appear to be harsher and more severe for racial minorities 
than others as a result of this law. The current penalty structure 
results in a perception of unfairness and inconsistency.”
15
Sentencing guidelines: 
2 examples from federal courts
Kimbrough v. US  ‐ Sentencing:
If Kimbrough had distributed only powder cocaine, 
guidelines recommend 97 to 106 months (8 – 8.8 years)
Because Kimbrough distributed crack cocaine, guidelines 
recommend 228 to 270 months (19 – 22.5 years)
You be the judge: what would you sentence & why?
What purposes of sentencing support your decision?
The appeals court overturned the judge’s sentence, saying the 
judge needed to follow the sentencing guidelines.
16
Sentencing guidelines: 
2 examples from federal courts
249
9US Supreme Court in Gall and Kimbrough cases held that federal 
sentencing guidelines are advisory
• When trial judge does not follow guidelines, he / she must 
articulate reasoning in detail
• If reasonable, then sentence is upheld
17
Sentencing guidelines: 
2 examples from federal courts
California: Determinate sentencing
State statutes list a minimum, a standard and a 
maximum sentence for each crime
Rule of Court 4.420(a): the “sentencing judge must 
select the upper, middle or lower term on each count”
Section (b) talks about the judge’s “discretion in 
selecting one of the three authorized prison terms … “
California Rules of Court list aggravating and mitigating 
factors to help judges decide which of three terms
18
250
10
California: Determinate sentencing
Example:
Robbery is punishable as follows: 
(1) Robbery of the first degree is punishable as follows: 
[when from an inhabited dwelling with at least 2 
accomplices] by imprisonment in the state prison for 
three, six, or nine years. 
(B) In all cases other than that specified in subparagraph 
(A), by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, 
or six years. 
(2) Robbery of the second degree [not first degree 
robbery] is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison for two, three, or five years. 
Cal. Penal Code § 213 (a)
19
California: Determinate sentencing
Aggravating factors
• Factors related to the crime
e.g., the defendant was armed, the victim was 
vulnerable, the crime was particularly serious
• Factors related to the defendant 
e.g., defendant committed previous violent acts, 
was on probation or parole
20
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California: Determinate sentencing
Mitigating factors
• Factors related to the crime 
e.g., the defendant played a passive role, the 
victim contributed fault, the crime was motivated 
by need, the victim was someone who had abused 
the defendant
• Factors related to the defendant 
e.g., no serious previous record, suffered a mental 
or physical impairment, made restitution to the 
victim
21
Guidelines: advisory or mandatory?
Federal courts:  
guidelines are advisory recommendations
California courts:  
guidelines require judges to pick one of three
terms
Q:  which is better system?
22
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Proposed federal legislation
The Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015 would 
• cut the mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
nonviolent drug crimes, which currently stand at 5, 
10 and 20 years 
• give judges more discretion to sentence below the 
mandatory minimum in some cases, and 
• provide a chance at early release for thousands of 
inmates sentenced under an older law that 
disproportionately punished crack cocaine 
offenders
23
Purposes of sentencing
Review:
• Protect society
• Incapacitate; prevent future commission of 
crimes by confining defendant
• Punish
• Rehabilitate
• Deter others
• Provide restitution to victims
• Assure uniformity in sentencing
24
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Cultural factors in sentencing
In “Cultural Differences – A New Defense Tactic?” article, 
examples of cultural differences regarding culpability; 
regardless of whether cultural factors should be 
considered in guilt, should they be considered in 
sentencing?
• Mexican slur
• Albanian touching 
• Thai lack of emotion
Q:  Should the California Rules of Court address cultural 
background as part of sentencing?  If so, how?
25
Restorative justice
Restorative justice emphasizes repairing the harm caused by 
offense
Which purposes of sentencing are best served in restorative 
justice types of sentencing?
• Youth court
– Youth agree to be sentenced by peers, with typical sentences 
being letters of apology, community service targeted to the 
harm
• Indian tribal court
– Elders decide how offender makes amends
• New Zealand family group conferences
– Youthful offenders diverted from prosecution
– Family group meets, others invited, mediator present
26
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You be the judge …
NY Times article on Judge Denny Chin
• Police officer lies during grand jury investigation 
– Guidelines: 1.5‐2 years 
• Attorney hiding $ for drug leader
– Guidelines: 70‐87 months
• Passport fraud, faked own death in 9.11
– Guidelines: 2‐2.5 years
• Drug addict
• Scam artist 27
You be the judge …
NY Times article on New York federal judge Hon. Denny 
Chin
Trial judge for over 15 years
• Judge in Bernie Madoff case
– Sentence for Ponzi fraud scheme: 150 years
– Struggles with “how to balance punishment, rehabilitation, 
deterrence and compassion”
28
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You be the judge …
Marlo Kidd:
• Plead guilty as lookout for gunmen who robbed bank; 
one robber killed in shootout
• Raising 5 children ages 5‐13, including 14‐year‐old 
sister
– mother crack addict
• Children getting Bs and B+s, few absences at school
• Foster care system failing
Guidelines: up to 6 years in prison
29
You be the judge …
Patrick Regan:
• Regan, 36, former police officer, had been member of anti‐
crime unit.  During a grand jury investigation of police 
misconduct, Regan lied to protect others in the unit.
• Had been shot in line of duty, awarded Police Combat Cross 
(second most prestigious medal)
• Backdrop of police being shot on duty,  officer suicide
• Courtroom full of police officers, stood in unison when 
judge asked defendant to stand
Guidelines for perjury conviction: 1.5‐2 years 
30
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You be the judge …
Pat Stiso:
• Attorney guilty of narcotics conspiracy, obstructing 
justice by hiding $ for drug leader
– Accepted thousands of $ in grocery bags from sales of 
heroin
• Letters show Stiso as loving father, committed 
defense attorney
• Had done charitable work
• Appeared frequently in courthouse, Judge knew him
Guidelines: 70‐87 months
31
You be the judge …
Stephen Chin Leung:
• Defendant was facing passport fraud charges, then 
faked own death in 9/11
• Law enforcement resources diverted while bogus 
death claim investigated
• Convicted in 2002, year after 9/11
Guidelines: 2 – 2.5 years
32
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You be the judge …
Alethea Pierce:
• Drug addict, age 38, pleaded guilty to participating in 
drug trafficking ring
• Cooperated with prosecution, testified against ring’s 
leaders
• Completed drug treatment
• Sentenced to time served
• Year later she’s back with new drug charges
• Asks for leniency: “I’ve lived [the life of an addict.]  I 
like being clean.”
33
You be the judge …
Daniel Sangemino:
• Had drug problem, high pressure sales pitch to get $ 
149K from 79‐year‐old widow
• After initial sentence of 3+ years, back in court for 
harassment and drug possession
• Bright & articulate, sentenced to 8 months
• After 8 months, back in court again, charged with 
harassment again
34
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You be the judge …
Judge Denny Chin
• “A good judge has to care.  He has to want to make the 
world better.”
• Role of emotion in sentencing, according to Judge Chin:
“[An] interesting concept[] …is that the law lacks a 
soul. The law lacks tenderness. The law is objective 
and cold and inhumane. The law abhors emotion. I 
don’t think that’s true.
Every time I sentence a defendant, there is a lot of 
emotion. I think there is a lot of humanity in the law.”
• Rehabilitation, along with punishment, deterrence and 
healing victims, is legitimate goal of sentencing.  “I don’t 
like to give up on people.”
35
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An Overview of the
UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION
The United States Sentencing Commission is an independent agency in the judicial branch ofgovernment.  Its principal purposes are:  (1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for thefederal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity
of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and assist Congress and the
executive branch in the development of effective and efficient crime policy; and (3) to collect,
analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues,
serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive branch, the courts, criminal justice
practitioners, the academic community, and the public.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission was created by the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.  The sentencing guidelines established by the
Commission are designed to
 incorporate the purposes of sentencing (i.e., just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation);
 provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing by avoiding
unwarranted disparity among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of similar
criminal conduct, while permitting sufficient judicial flexibility to take into account relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors;
 reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in the knowledge of human behavior as it
relates to the criminal justice process.
The Commission is charged with the ongoing responsibilities of evaluating the effects of the
sentencing guidelines on the criminal justice system, recommending to Congress appropriate
modifications of substantive criminal law and sentencing procedures, and establishing a research and
development program on sentencing issues.
A Brief History of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Disparity in sentencing, certainty of punishment, and crime control have long been issues of
interest for Congress, the criminal justice community, and the public.  After more than a decade of
research and debate, Congress decided that (1) the previously unfettered sentencing discretion
accorded federal trial judges needed to be structured; (2) the administration of punishment needed
to be more certain; and (3) specific offenders (e.g., white collar and violent, repeat offenders) needed
to be targeted for more serious penalties.  Consequently, Congress created a permanent commission
charged with formulating national sentencing guidelines to define the parameters for federal trial
judges to follow in their sentencing decisions.
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The resulting sentencing guidelines went into effect November 1, 1987.  Shortly after
implementation of the guidelines, defendants began challenging the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) on the basis of improper legislative delegation and violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected these challenges on January 18,
1989, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and upheld the constitutionality of the
Commission as a judicial branch agency.  Since nationwide implementation in January 1989, federal
judges have sentenced more than 1,000,000 defendants under the guidelines.
In January of 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005).  The Booker decision addressed the question left unresolved by the Court’s decision in Blakely
v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004):  whether the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to
the federal sentencing guidelines.  In its substantive Booker opinion, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment applies to the federal sentencing guidelines.  In its remedial Booker opinion, the Court
severed and excised two statutory provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the federal
guidelines mandatory, and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), an appeals provision.  Under the approach set forth
by the Court, “district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing,” subject to review by the courts of appeal
for “unreasonableness.”  The Court also reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Commission and
maintained all of the Sentencing Commission’s statutory obligations under the Sentencing Reform
Act.  The subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), held
that courts of appeal may apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a sentence imposed
within the guideline sentencing range.  The Supreme Court continued to stress the importance of
the federal sentencing guidelines in its most recent sentencing-related cases. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency,
the Guidelines should be the starting point and initial benchmark” at sentencing); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (After Booker, “[a] district judge must include the Guidelines
range in the array of factors warranting consideration”).
How the Sentencing Guidelines Work
The sentencing guidelines provide
federal judges with fair and consistent
sentencing ranges to consult at sentencing. 
The guidelines take into account both the
seriousness of the criminal conduct and the
defendant’s criminal record.  Based on the
severity of the offense, the guidelines assign
most federal crimes to one of 43 “offense
levels.”  Each offender is also assigned to one
of six “criminal history categories” based upon
the extent and recency of his or her past misconduct.
Innovations Under the Sentencing Reform Act
 Structured judicial discretion
 Appellate review of sentences
 Reasons for sentences stated on the record
 Determinate or “real time” sentencing
 Abolition of parole
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The point at which the offense level and criminal history category intersect on the
Commission’s sentencing table determines an offender’s guideline range.  In order to provide
flexibility, the top of each guideline range exceeds the bottom by six months or 25 percent
(whichever is greater).  Judges are advised to choose a sentence from within the guideline range
unless the court identifies a factor that the Sentencing Commission failed to consider that should
result in a different sentence.  In these instances, the court may “depart” from the guideline range,
while still providing a “guideline” sentence.  Again, Booker held that federal courts, while not bound
to apply the guidelines, must consult them.
Organization of the Sentencing Commission
Unlike many special purpose “study” commissions within the executive branch, Congress
established the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an ongoing, independent agency within the judicial
branch.  The seven voting members on the Commission are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, and serve six-year terms.  At least three of the commissioners must be
federal judges and no more than four may belong to the same political party.  The Attorney General
is an ex officio member of the Commission, as is the chair of the U.S. Parole Commission.
The Commission staff of approximately 100 employees is divided into five offices with the
director of each office reporting to the staff director who in turn reports to the chair.  The five 
offices are — General Counsel, Education and Sentencing Practice, Research and Data, Legislative
and Public Affairs, and Administration.  The staff director supervises and coordinates all agency
functions.
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Information
Visitors to the Commission’s web site at www.ussc.gov can browse as well as download a wide
selection of Commission documents and materials.  The web site provides links to other federal
judicial agencies, and, among many selections, features information about federal sentencing statistics
by state and district, Commission meeting minutes and hearing transcripts, and state sentencing
commissions.
For additional information about the United States Sentencing Commission, contact:
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs
United States Sentencing Commission
One Columbus Circle, NE, Suite 2-500
Washington, DC  20002-8002
(202) 502-4500 # FAX:  (202) 502-4699 # E-mail:  pubaffairs@ussc.gov # www.ussc.gov
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SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category  (Criminal History Points)
Offense
Level
I
(0 or 1)
II
(2 or 3)
III
(4, 5, 6)
IV
(7, 8, 9)
V
(10, 11, 12)
VI
(13 or more)
Zone A
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
Zone D
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
November 1, 2012
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Rule 4.410. General objectives in sentencing 
(a) General objectives of sentencing include:  
(1) Protecting society; 
 
(2) Punishing the defendant; 
 
(3) Encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life in the future and deterring him or her from 
future offenses;  
(4) Deterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences; 
 
(5) Preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by isolating him or her for the period of 
incarceration;  
(6) Securing restitution for the victims of crime; and 
 
(7) Achieving uniformity in sentencing. 
 
(Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2007; previously amended effective July 1, 2003.) 
(b) Because in some instances these objectives may suggest inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing 
judge must consider which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case. The sentencing 
judge should be guided by statutory statements of policy, the criteria in these rules, and the facts and 
circumstances of the case.  
(Subd (b) lettered effective July 1, 2003; adopted as part of unlettered subd effective July 1, 1977; former 
subd (b) amended and relettered as part of subd (a) effective July 1, 2003.) 
Rule 4.410 amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted as rule 410 effective July 1, 1977; previously 
renumbered effective January 1, 2001; previously amended effective July 1, 2003. 
Advisory Committee Comment 
Statutory expressions of policy include:  
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1820 et seq., which provides partnership funding for county juvenile ranches, camps, or 
forestry camps.  
Section 1203(b)(3), which requires that eligible defendants be considered for probation and authorizes probation if 
circumstances in mitigation are found or justice would be served.  
Section 1170(a)(1), which expresses the policies of uniformity, proportionality of prison terms to the seriousness of the offense, 
and the use of imprisonment as punishment.  
California 
Rules of 
Court 
(Revised 
January 1, 
2011) 
 
Page 1 of 2
10/16/2011http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cms/rules/printfriendly.cfm
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Rule 4.420. Selection of term of imprisonment 
(a) When a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, or the execution of a sentence of imprisonment is 
ordered suspended, the sentencing judge must select the upper, middle, or lower term on each count 
for which the defendant has been convicted, as provided in section 1170(b) and these rules.  
(Subd (a) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 1991, 
and January 1, 2007.) 
(b) In exercising his or her discretion in selecting one of the three authorized prison terms referred to in 
section 1170(b), the sentencing judge may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and 
any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision. The relevant circumstances may be 
obtained from the case record, the probation officer's report, other reports and statements properly 
received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing.  
(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2008; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 
1991, January 1, 2007, and May 23, 2007.) 
(c) To comply with section 1170(b), a fact charged and found as an enhancement may be used as a 
reason for imposing the upper term only if the court has discretion to strike the punishment for the 
enhancement and does so. The use of a fact of an enhancement to impose the upper term of 
imprisonment is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of imprisonment, regardless of the 
effect on the total term.  
(Subd (c) adopted effective January 1, 1991.) 
(d) A fact that is an element of the crime upon which punishment is being imposed may not be used to 
impose a greater term.  
(Subd (d) amended effective January 1, 2008; adopted effective January 1, 1991; previously amended 
effective January 1, 2007, and May 23, 2007.) 
(e) The reasons for selecting one of the three authorized prison terms referred to in section 1170(b) must 
be stated orally on the record.  
(Subd (e) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended and relettered effective January 1, 1991; 
previously amended effective July 28, 1977, and January 1, 2007.) 
Rule 4.420 amended effective January 1, 2008; adopted as rule 439 effective July 1, 1977; previously 
amended and renumbered as rule 420 effective January 1, 1991; previously renumbered effective January 1, 
2001; previously amended effective July 28, 1977, January 1, 2007, and May 23, 2007. 
Advisory Committee Comment
California
Rules of 
Court 
(Revised 
January 1, 
2011) 
 
Page 1 of 2
10/16/2011http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cms/rules/printfriendly.cfm
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The 1990 amendments to this rule and the comment included the deletion of most section numbers. These changes 
recognize changing statutory section numbers and the fact that there are numerous additional code sections related to the 
rule, including numerous statutory enhancements enacted since the rule was originally adopted.  
Former subdivision (a)(4), concerning multiple victims, was deleted to avoid confusion; cases in which that possible 
circumstance in aggravation was relied on were frequently reversed on appeal because there was only a single victim in a 
particular count.  
Old age or youth of the victim may be circumstances in aggravation; see section 1170.85(b). Other statutory circumstances 
in aggravation are listed, for example, in sections 1170.7, 1170.71, 1170.75, 1170.8, and 1170.85.  
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Rule 4.421. Circumstances in aggravation 
Circumstances in aggravation include factors relating to the crime and factors relating to the defendant.  
(a) Factors relating to the crime  
Factors relating to the crime, whether or not charged or chargeable as enhancements include that:  
(1) The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts 
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness;  
(2) The defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime; 
 
(3) The victim was particularly vulnerable; 
 
(4) The defendant induced others to participate in the commission of the crime or occupied a 
position of leadership or dominance of other participants in its commission;  
(5) The defendant induced a minor to commit or assist in the commission of the crime; 
 
(6) The defendant threatened witnesses, unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses from 
testifying, suborned perjury, or in any other way illegally interfered with the judicial process;  
(7) The defendant was convicted of other crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been 
imposed but for which concurrent sentences are being imposed;  
(8) The manner in which the crime was carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or 
professionalism;  
(9) The crime involved an attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary value; 
 
(10) The crime involved a large quantity of contraband; and 
 
(11) The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense. 
 
(12) The crime constitutes a hate crime under section 422.55 and: 
 
(A) No hate crime enhancements under section 422.75 are imposed; and 
 
(B) The crime is not subject to sentencing under section 1170.8. 
 
(Subd (a) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, and January 1, 
2007.) 
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(b) Factors relating to the defendant  
Factors relating to the defendant include that:  
(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society; 
 
(2) The defendant's prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness;  
(3) The defendant has served a prior prison term; 
 
(4) The defendant was on probation or parole when the crime was committed; and 
 
(5) The defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory. 
 
(Subd (b) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, and January 1, 
2007.) 
(c) Other factors  
Any other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation.  
(Subd (c) amended effective May 23, 2007; adopted effective January 1, 1991; previously amended 
effective January 1, 2007.) 
Rule 4.421 amended effective May 23, 2007; adopted as rule 421 effective July 1, 1977; previously 
renumbered effective January 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, and January 1, 2007. 
Advisory Committee Comment 
Circumstances in aggravation may justify imposition of the upper of three possible prison terms. (Section 1170(b).)  
The list of circumstances in aggravation includes some facts that, if charged and found, may be used to enhance the 
sentence. The rule does not deal with the dual use of the facts; the statutory prohibition against dual use is included, in part, 
in rule 4.420.  
Conversely, such facts as infliction of bodily harm, being armed with or using a weapon, and a taking or loss of great value 
may be circumstances in aggravation even if not meeting the statutory definitions for enhancements.  
Facts concerning the defendant's prior record and personal history may be considered. By providing that the defendant's 
prior record and simultaneous convictions of other offenses may not be used both for enhancement and in aggravation, 
section 1170(b) indicates that these and other facts extrinsic to the commission of the crime may be considered in 
aggravation in appropriate cases. This resolves whatever ambiguity may arise from the phrase "circumstances in 
aggravation . . . of the crime." The phrase "circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime" necessarily alludes to 
extrinsic facts.  
Refusal to consider the personal characteristics of the defendant in imposing sentence would also raise serious 
constitutional questions. The California Supreme Court has held that sentencing decisions must take into account "the 
nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society." In re 
Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 654, quoting In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425. In In re Rodriguez the court released 
petitioner from further incarceration because "[I]t appears that neither the circumstances of his offense nor his personal 
characteristics establish a danger to society sufficient to justify such a prolonged period of imprisonment." (Id. at 655.) 
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added.) "For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires . . . that there be taken 
into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." (Pennsylvania v. 
Ashe (1937) 302 U.S. 51, 55, quoted with approval in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 189.)  
The scope of "circumstances in aggravation or mitigation" under section 1170(b) is, therefore, coextensive with the scope of 
inquiry under the similar phrase in section 1203. 
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The determinate sentencing law authorizes the court to select any of the three possible prison terms even though neither 
party has requested a particular term by formal motion or informal argument. Section 1170(b) vests the court with discretion 
to impose any of the three authorized prison terms and requires that the court state on the record the reasons for imposing 
that term.  
It is not clear whether the reasons stated by the judge for selecting a particular term qualify as "facts" for the purposes of the 
rule prohibition on dual use of facts. Until the issue is clarified, judges should avoid the use of reasons that may constitute an 
impermissible dual use of facts. For example, the court is not permitted to use a reason to impose a greater term if that 
reason also is either (1) the same as an enhancement that will be imposed, or (2) an element of the crime. The court should 
not use the same reason to impose a consecutive sentence as to impose an upper term of imprisonment. (People v. Avalos 
(1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.) It is not improper to use the same reason to deny probation and to impose the upper term. 
(People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 102, 106.)  
The rule makes it clear that a fact charged and found as an enhancement may, in the alternative, be used as a factor in 
aggravation.  
People v. Riolo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 223, 227 (and note 5 on 227) held that section 1170.1(a) does not require the judgment to 
state the base term (upper, middle, or lower) and enhancements, computed independently, on counts that are subject to 
automatic reduction under the one-third formula of section 1170.1(a).  
Even when sentencing is under section 1170.1, however, it is essential to determine the base term and specific 
enhancements for each count independently, in order to know which is the principal term count. The principal term count 
must be determined before any calculation is made using the one-third formula for subordinate terms.  
In addition, the base term (upper, middle, or lower) for each count must be determined to arrive at an informed decision 
whether to make terms consecutive or concurrent; and the base term for each count must be stated in the judgment when 
sentences are concurrent or are fully consecutive (i.e., not subject to the one-third rule of section 1170.1(a)). 
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Rule 4.423. Circumstances in mitigation 
Circumstances in mitigation include factors relating to the crime and factors relating to the defendant.  
(a) Factors relating to the crime  
Factors relating to the crime include that:  
(1) The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role in the crime; 
 
(2) The victim was an initiator of, willing participant in, or aggressor or provoker of the incident; 
 
(3) The crime was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation, that 
is unlikely to recur;  
(4) The defendant participated in the crime under circumstances of coercion or duress, or the 
criminal conduct was partially excusable for some other reason not amounting to a defense;  
(5) The defendant, with no apparent predisposition to do so, was induced by others to participate in 
the crime;  
(6) The defendant exercised caution to avoid harm to persons or damage to property, or the 
amounts of money or property taken were deliberately small, or no harm was done or 
threatened against the victim;  
(7) The defendant believed that he or she had a claim or right to the property taken, or for other 
reasons mistakenly believed that the conduct was legal;  
(8) The defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for his or her family or self; and 
 
(9) The defendant suffered from repeated or continuous physical, sexual, or psychological abuse 
inflicted by the victim of the crime, and the victim of the crime, who inflicted the abuse, was the 
defendant's spouse, intimate cohabitant, or parent of the defendant's child; and the abuse does 
not amount to a defense.  
(Subd (a) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, July 1, 1993, 
and January 1, 2007.) 
(b) Factors relating to the defendant  
Factors relating to the defendant include that:  
(1) The defendant has no prior record, or has an insignificant record of criminal conduct, considering
the recency and frequency of prior crimes;  
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(2) The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced 
culpability for the crime;  
(3) The defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage of the 
criminal process;  
(4) The defendant is ineligible for probation and but for that ineligibility would have been granted 
probation;  
(5) The defendant made restitution to the victim; and 
 
(6) The defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was satisfactory. 
 
(Subd (b) amended effective May 23, 2007; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, and January 1, 
2007.) 
Rule 4.423 amended effective May 23, 2007; adopted as rule 423 effective July 1, 1977; previously 
renumbered effective January 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 1991, July 1, 1993, and 
January 1, 2007. 
Advisory Committee Comment  
See comment to rule 4.421.  
This rule applies both to mitigation for purposes of motions under section 1170(b) and to circumstances in mitigation 
justifying the court in striking the additional punishment provided for an enhancement.  
Some listed circumstances can never apply to certain enhancements; for example, "the amounts taken were deliberately 
small" can never apply to an excessive taking under section 12022.6, and "no harm was done" can never apply to infliction 
of great bodily injury under section 12022.7. In any case, only the facts present may be considered for their possible effect in 
mitigation.  
See also rule 4.409; only relevant criteria need be considered.  
Since only the fact of restitution is considered relevant to mitigation, no reference to the defendant's financial ability is 
needed. The omission of a comparable factor from rule 4.421 as a circumstance in aggravation is deliberate. 
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California Penal Code  
 
211.  Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his 
person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
 
… 
 
213.   (a) Robbery is punishable as follows: 
 
  (1) Robbery of the first degree is punishable as follows: 
 
 (A) If the defendant, voluntarily acting in concert with two or more 
other persons, commits the robbery within an inhabited dwelling 
house … by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or nine 
years. 
 
(B) In all cases other than that specified in subparagraph (A), by 
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years.  
 
(2) Robbery of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison for two, three, or five years.  
 
… 
 
(emphasis added) 
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By SONJA B. STARR AUG. 10, 2014
ANN ARBOR, Mich. — IN a recent letter to the United States Sentencing Commission, Attorney General Eric
H. Holder Jr. sharply criticized the growing trend of evidence-based sentencing, in which courts use
data-driven predictions of defendants’ future crime risk to shape sentences. Mr. Holder is swimming against
a powerful current. At least 20 states have implemented this practice, including some that require risk scores
to be considered in every sentencing decision. Many more are considering it, as is Congress, in pending
sentencing-reform bills.
Risk-assessment advocates say it’s a no-brainer: Who could oppose “smarter” sentencing? But Mr.
Holder is right to pick this fight. As currently used, the practice is deeply unfair, and almost certainly
unconstitutional. It contravenes the principle that punishment should depend on what a defendant did, not
on who he is or how much money he has.
The basic problem is that the risk scores are not based on the defendant’s crime. They are primarily or
wholly based on prior characteristics: criminal history (a legitimate criterion), but also factors unrelated to
conduct. Specifics vary across states, but common factors include unemployment, marital status, age,
education, finances, neighborhood, and family background, including family members’ criminal history.
Such factors are usually considered inappropriate for sentencing; if anything, some might be mitigating
circumstances. But in the new, profiling-based sentencing regimen, markers of socioeconomic disadvantage
increase a defendant’s risk score, and most likely his sentence.
Advocates of punishment profiling argue that it gives sentencing a scientific foundation, allowing better
tailoring to crime-prevention goals. Many hope it can reduce incarceration by helping judges identify
offenders who can safely be diverted from prison.
While well intentioned, this approach is misguided. The United States inarguably has a
mass-incarceration crisis, but it is poor people and minorities who bear its brunt. Punishment profiling will
exacerbate these disparities — including racial disparities — because the risk assessments include many
race-correlated variables. Profiling sends the toxic message that the state considers certain groups of people
dangerous based on their identity. It also confirms the widespread impression that the criminal justice
system is rigged against the poor.
It is naïve to assume judges will use the scores only to reduce sentences. Judges, especially elected ones,
will face pressure to harshly sentence those labeled “high risk.” And even if risk scores were used only for
Sentencing, by the Numbers - The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/opinion/sentencing-by-the-numbers...
1 of 2 8/29/2015 8:56 AM
274
diversion from prison, it would still be wrong to base them on wealth and demographics, reserving diversion
for the relatively privileged.
Evidence-based sentencing also raises serious constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that otherwise-impermissible discrimination cannot be justified by statistical
generalizations about groups, even if those generalizations are on average accurate. People have a right to be
treated as individuals, and individuals often do not conform to group averages.
For example, in its 1983 decision in Bearden v. Georgia, the court unanimously rejected the state’s
contention that a defendant could have his probation revoked because his recent job loss increased his crime
risk. The court held that “lumping him together with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as
dangerous ... would be little more than punishing a person for his poverty.”
Litigation has been slow in coming, however. The risk-prediction instruments are not very transparent
(some are proprietary corporate products), and defendants may not understand the role of poverty and
personal characteristics. But challenges could be on the horizon. For example, I recently participated in
training the Michigan defense counsel on constitutional objections to evidence-based sentencing, in
preparation for the state’s impending implementation.
Of course, judges have always considered future crime risk informally, and it’s worth considering
whether actuarial methods can help make those predictions more accurate. The problem isn’t risk
assessment per se; it’s basing scores on demographics and socioeconomics. Instead, scores could be based on
past and present conduct, and perhaps other factors within the defendant’s control.
Data-driven predictions grounded in legitimate factors might be about as accurate as current profiling
schemes. There is no persuasive evidence that the current troubling variables add much predictive value,
once criminal conduct is already taken into account. But even if they do improve accuracy, this gain doesn’t
justify sacrificing fairness.
Criminal justice policy should be informed by data, but we should never allow the sterile language of
science to obscure questions of justice. I doubt many policy makers would publicly defend the claim that
people should be imprisoned longer because they are poor, for instance. Such judgments are less transparent
when they are embedded in a risk score. But they are no more defensible.
Sonja B. Starr is a professor of law at the University of Michigan.
A version of this op-ed appears in print on August 11, 2014, on page A17 of the New York edition with the headline: Sentencing, by the
Numbers.
© 2015 The New York Times Company
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Town of Greece v. Galloway deep dive
On May 5th, the Supreme Court decided a major Establishment Clause case. Check out our deep dive on the 
topic to find out more about the case.
GALL V. UNITED STATES
Case Basics
Docket No. 
06-7949
Petitioner 
Brian Michael Gall 
Respondent 
United States 
Decided By 
Roberts Court (2006-2009)
Opinion 
552 U.S. ___ (2007)
Granted 
Monday, June 11, 2007
Argued 
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Decided 
Monday, December 10, 2007
Advocates
Michael R. Dreeben
(on behalf of the Respondent)
Jeffrey T. Green
(on behalf of the Petitioner)
Term: 2000-2009 2007
Facts of the Case 
While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring 
distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily 
left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own 
business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he 
turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which 
was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the 
federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances 
in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and 
impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. 
Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the 
guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing 
down a reasonable sentence.)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines 
sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are 
not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range 
must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the 
guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger 
variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling 
justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using 
Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by 
underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the "extraordinary variance" 
was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit 
ordered a new sentence.
Question 
May Courts of Appeals apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences that fall outside the range in the 
federal sentencing guidelines, so that district courts must justify below-guidelines sentences with a finding of 
extraordinary circumstances?
Conclusion 
Decision: 7 votes for Gall, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3553
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 ruling, reversed the appellate court and held that, under Booker, federal courts have the 
authority to set any reasonable sentence as long as they explain their reasoning. The Court made clear that Booker
had removed the Guidelines from their earlier status as the primary determinate of a defendant's punishment, 
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reaffirming the Guidelines' advisory status. The opinion was penned by Justice Stevens, with Justices David Souter 
and Antonin Scalia filing opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito were the 
sole dissenters.
Roberts Stevens Scalia Kennedy Souter Ginsburg Breyer
GALL v. UNITED STATES. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 31 July 2014. 
<http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_7949>.
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Town of Greece v. Galloway deep dive
On May 5th, the Supreme Court decided a major Establishment Clause case. Check out our deep dive on the 
topic to find out more about the case.
KIMBROUGH V. UNITED STATES
Case Basics
Docket No. 
06-6330
Petitioner 
Derrick Kimbrough 
Respondent 
United States 
Decided By 
Roberts Court (2006-2009)
Opinion 
552 U.S. ___ (2007)
Granted 
Monday, June 11, 2007
Argued 
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Decided 
Monday, December 10, 2007
Advocates
Michael S. Nachmanoff
(on behalf of the Petitioner)
Michael R. Dreeben
(on behalf of the Respondent)
Term: 2000-2009 2007
Facts of the Case 
In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress 
enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine 
at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, 
the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted 
of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of 
dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-
to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led 
to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack 
cocaine, along with other drug- and firearm-related offenses. The federal 
sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but 
the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the 
Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 
ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, 
but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before 
handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-
guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges 
act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a 
disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot 
hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing 
disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Question 
When imposing a sentence for distributing crack cocaine, may a District Court judge consider the impact of the 100-
to-1 crack/powder ratio and the Sentencing Commission's view that the ratio leads to exaggerated sentences for 
crimes involving crack cocaine?
May a District Court judge, in an effort to avoid a sentencing disparity, impose a sentence that is below the range 
recommended by the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio in the Guidelines?
Conclusion 
Decision: 7 votes for Kimbrough, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3553
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the Court's 7-2 majority opinion reversing the Fourth Circuit and affirming the 
sentence handed down by the trial judge. Ginsburg noted that the drug trafficking statute still had some minimum 
sentencing requirements, and expressed the Court's confidence that district courts could maintain reasonably 
uniform approaches to cocaine sentencing. She also referred to the Court's assertion in Booker that, by making the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, the Court was willing to accept some non-uniformity in sentencing. Justices 
Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito dissented in the opinion.
Roberts Stevens Scalia Kennedy Souter Ginsburg Breyer
KIMBROUGH v. UNITED STATES. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 19 June 2014. 
<http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_6330>.
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Cultural differences: New defense tactic? 
By Diane Curtis 
Staff Writer 
A Mexican-American man is convicted of second-degree murder for shooting a poker 
companion who used an offensive slur about the defendant’s mother. A Muslim Albanian man 
in Texas loses his parental rights for touching his daughter’s genitals. A Thai man who shows 
no remorse or other emotion for his part in a Garden Grove robbery in which two people were 
killed receives the death penalty. 
All three were influenced in their actions by their native culture, says University 
of Southern California professor Alison Dundes Renteln, and that culture, she 
believes, should have been considered in each of those cases, an argument she 
makes in her chapter of the new book, “Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative 
Perspectives on the Cultural Defense,” which she co-edited with Marie-Claire 
Foblets of the University of Leuven in Belgium. 
“Cultural differences deserve to be considered in litigation because enculturation shapes 
individuals’ perceptions and influences their actions,” she writes in the book. She is calling for 
formal acceptance in the legal community of a cultural defense in which legal systems 
acknowledge “the influence of cultural imperatives” in illegal acts. 
A judge in fact did consider the Albanian man’s culture in which touching a child has no sexual 
meaning and is an accepted form of affection and comfort. The man was acquitted of child 
sexual abuse although he did lose his parental rights. Renteln says such consideration should 
be the rule rather than the exception, and she also questions whether the interests of the family 
were served by separating the father from his child. 
“Touching children in the genital area should probably be discouraged not only because 
parents will encounter difficulty with the law, but also because children caught between two 
cultures may feel uncomfortable if they realize it is considered inappropriate conduct in the 
larger society. But incarcerating parents or breaking up families are illegitimate means of 
inculcating new values,” she writes in “The Cultural Defense.” 
 
Renteln 
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Like an insanity plea 
The author is not, she emphasized in an interview with the Bar Journal, advocating leniency for 
all defendants whose culture may put them at odds with U.S. law. “I do think the courtroom 
door should be open to the consideration of culture. That doesn’t mean I think the argument 
should always prevail,” says the USC professor of political science and anthropology, who also 
has a law degree from USC and a Ph.D. in jurisprudence and social policy from UC Berkeley. 
But when culture has played any part in an illegal action, she does think the judge or jury 
should be made aware of the fact, whether or not it is a factor in their determination of guilt or 
innocence or influences the sentence. 
A cultural defense would be much like an insanity plea or taking into consideration such social 
attributes as gender and age, Renteln says. 
The Mexican-American man shot his poker companion after the card player used an 
expression considered the worst possible insult to someone’s mother in Mexico. The 
defendant’s lawyer did try to introduce evidence to show provocation — that the average 
Mexican would have been provoked by the phrase, much as a jealous husband can use a 
provocation defense if he attacks or kills his wife and/or her lover. The court decided the 
context of the defendant’s response was irrelevant. 
“By excluding the cultural evidence, the court effectively made it impossible for him to raise the 
provocation defense,” Renteln writes.  “The philosophical difficulty here is that a criminal 
defense, theoretically available to all, in reality cannot be used by individuals from other 
cultures because they are provoked by insults different from those that would offend the 
objective reasonable person.” 
Possibly surprising to some, Renteln opposes a provocation defense. “I think the law should 
expect people to have self-control,” she says. But if there is one, an individual’s culture should 
be allowed to be introduced to explain the provocation. 
The Thai man who was sentenced to death was holding to Thai tradition about enlarging “the 
circle of shame” when he refused to name the murderer. And in showing no emotion, he was 
adhering to a culture in which revealing no feelings, even under extreme stress, is valued. “His 
stoic demeanor did not mean he lacked remorse, something which U.S. juries often require if 
they are to spare a defendant’s life,” Renteln writes. The defendant may or may not have been 
spared the death penalty if more had been known about Thai culture, the author concludes, 
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“but at least the trial would have been more fair.” 
Currently, the tendency in courts, Renteln says, is to exclude any consideration of culture. She 
would be pleased if the mind-set alone would change but ultimately her goal is to write in 
cultural consideration as part of jury instructions and public policy. 
If and when that happens, she suggests a cultural defense test that courts could use to avoid 
misuse of the defense. 
She says courts should get satisfactory answers to three questions: 
1. Is the litigant a member of the ethnic group? 
2. Does the group have such a tradition [as the litigant claims]? 
3. Was the litigant influenced by the tradition when he or she acted? 
“Even if they can authenticate their claims, courts might still wish to reject the cultural defense,” 
she writes in the new book. “Where cultural traditions involve irreparable harm to vulnerable 
groups, the defense should not influence the disposition of cases. To prevent improper use of 
the cultural defense, one must ask first whether the claim is factually accurate as an empirical 
matter, but then go on to determine whether accepting the claim that the right to culture should 
permit the custom risks undermining other important human rights, such as the rights of women 
and children.” 
She is well aware she has to tread lightly in pushing her controversial agenda, not wanting to 
risk a backlash before she has had a chance to make herself heard and understood.  She 
wants the idea to sink into public  — or at least legal — consciousness before seeking a more 
formal policy.  “I just am trying to get people open to the idea,” she says. 
“When legislatures deal with culture on a policy level, they tend to ban the custom,” she adds. 
“Just after Hawaii had the first case on same-sex marriage, we ended up with a law. It’s called 
the Defense of Marriage Act.” 
Gaining acceptance 
Still, Renteln sees signs that her message is gaining a larger audience, both in readers of “The 
Cultural Defense,” and in increased invitations to speak to bar associations and at legal and 
social policy conferences around the world. “At least it’s on the radar now,” she says. 
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Her “thoughtful” opponent at some of these conferences, she says, is Duke University law 
professor Doriane Coleman. Coleman is far from arguing that country of origin should have no 
relevance at all. Yet she also believes that a crime is a crime. 
Like Renteln, Coleman says, “my position isn’t really simple. I don’t think there should be a 
fullblown cultural defense in the sense that I don’t think a defendant should be able to get away 
with a crime that clearly has been committed. In that sense I’m in a ‘when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do’ box.” 
Every country, she says, has a right to its own social norms. “Having said that, though, there 
are lots of cases where cultural evidence in my view is appropriately included,” such as in the 
case of the Albanian father whose touching had no sexual intent. 
Renteln welcomes further discussion and wants to be sure that possible abuses are 
addressed. But ultimately, she would like a formal recognition of the need to consider culture in 
trials. “It is imperative that the cultural defense be established as official policy,” she writes. “In 
order for this to be possible, policies must be formulated which ensure careful review of cultural 
claims … The right to culture is an important human right, but it should be protected only so 
long as it does not undermine other human rights.” 
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A Judge’s Education, a Sentence at a Time
By BENJAMIN WEISER
ON Feb. 2, 2004, Marlo Kidd awaited sentencing before Judge Denny Chin of Federal District Court 
in Manhattan. She had pleaded guilty to acting as a lookout for two masked gunmen who had 
robbed a bank in Yonkers, and under federal sentencing guidelines, she faced a prison term of up to 
six years. 
Her lawyer, though, was asking the judge to sentence her only to home confinement, because she 
was raising five children who ranged in age from 5 to 13, and also caring for her 14-year-old sister, 
as their own mother had been a crack-cocaine addict. He had said that sending Ms. Kidd to prison 
would almost certainly result in her children being placed in foster care, destroying what was left of 
the family. 
His arguments gave Judge Chin pause. Ms. Kidd had provided him with copies of the children’s 
report cards, which showed them receiving B’s and B-pluses, even a smattering of A’s, and very few 
absences from school. 
“The report cards had an impact on me,” Judge Chin recalled in a recent interview. “She was getting 
them out to school every day, and they were holding their own. I was impressed by this.” Ms. Kidd, 
who had also apologized for her crime in a letter to the judge, was “a decent mother,” he concluded. 
Moreover, one of his law clerks had shown him a news report on the terrible conditions in foster 
homes and facilities for children in New Jersey, where the children would most likely be sent. 
But the robbery had been violent, with one robber killed in a police shootout. And the judge was 
seldom persuaded to grant leniency because of family circumstances — it was, after all, the 
defendants’ crimes, not the sentence, that caused hardships for families. 
In the end, he decided that Ms. Kidd had to go to prison, but he imposed only a 30-month sentence. 
“I cared very much about the future of the children,” Judge Chin recalled, “but I was willing to take 
the risk that they would be sent to foster care, even with a shorter sentence.” His decision involved 
weighing conflicting concerns and interests, he said, “something we have to do all the time.” 
Judge Chin, 57, who last year was elevated by President Obama to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, after nearly 16 years on the trial bench, is best known 
for the 150-year sentence he gave Bernard L. Madoff, arguably the most prominent white-collar 
sentence in the history of American law. 
But it has been largely anonymous defendants like Ms. Kidd whose cases have influenced his 
thinking about how to balance punishment and rehabilitation, deterrence and compassion. 
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“There’s no doubt that all of these cases shaped me,” Judge Chin said, “and shaped the way I think, 
and the way I respond to things.” 
He took the bench in 1994 at age 40 with little experience in criminal law. He has since sentenced 
more than 1,100 defendants, including at least a dozen who received sentences of life or the 
equivalent, according to court statistics. He quickly learned, he said, that preparation was crucial 
and that he must not agonize over his decisions. One seasoned judge had advised: “Rule and roll.” 
Be decisive. Don’t second-guess yourself. 
In a series of interviews conducted in person and through e-mail over the past year, Judge Chin 
discussed his most challenging sentencing decisions, cases that became essential parts of his 
education as a judge. The interviews were unusual; judges rarely agree to discuss cases, even closed 
ones, like these, outside court. The exchanges provided a revealing look at how one judge 
approached the task of sentencing, which he called “the hardest thing” about being on the bench. 
“It is just not a natural or everyday thing to do,” Judge Chin explained, “to pass judgment on people, 
to send them to prison or not.” 
“I mean, there is so much at stake,” he added, “and there are so many different considerations that 
come into play.” 
IN March 1996, Patrick Regan, a former New York City police officer, became the first defendant 
Judge Chin sentenced who had been convicted in a trial at which he presided. 
The case had been bitterly fought: Mr. Regan, then 36, a highly decorated police veteran, was 
convicted of perjury. Prosecutors said he had lied during a grand-jury investigation of suspected 
misconduct by an anticrime unit of which he was a member. His lawyer, David S. Greenfield, 
contended that the government itself had engaged in misconduct, trying to catch the officer in a 
perjury trap, an argument Judge Chin had rejected before the trial. 
The government asked for a sentence within the guideline range of one-and-a-half to two years. But 
Mr. Greenfield, citing Mr. Regan’s valorous record, sought probation. His client had made or 
assisted in many felony arrests; had been shot in the line of duty; and had been awarded the Police 
Combat Cross, the department’s second most prestigious medal. The conviction and loss of his 
shield would be punishment enough, Mr. Greenfield argued. 
Judge Chin recalled that the sentencing came against the backdrop of several high-profile police 
tragedies, including the suicide of an off-duty officer and the funeral of an officer killed in a Bronx 
shootout. “I had already come to appreciate how hard it is to be a police officer,” he said. 
He noted that sentencing law recognized that individuals with different levels of culpability should 
be treated differently, and that some crimes were more evil than others. As always, he said, judges 
must also look at other factors, like a defendant’s history, background and motivation. 
“Where someone is guilty of lying to protect others, at least he is doing so not out of greed or to help 
himself,” he said. “This motivation doesn’t make the lying right, but at least it is understandable to 
some limited extent.” 
But he knew that prosecutors felt Mr. Regan had blatantly lied and interfered with a government 
investigation. 
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On the sentencing date, Judge Chin’s courtroom was packed with police officers, who rose in unison 
when he asked the defendant to stand. The judge, who recalled feeling a bit nervous because of the 
spotlight on the case, told Mr. Regan that no matter how much good he had done in the past, he was 
bound by oath to tell the truth. In the end, the judge departed from the guidelines and imposed a 
term of one year plus one day (a technicality that allows a defendant to be released slightly early for 
good behavior). 
“What did I learn?” Judge Chin recalled 15 years later. “I learned that this was going to be hard.” But 
he said he had gained confidence, and did not agonize over the decision. “I felt I had done the right 
thing.”
If Judge Chin believed that some defendants deserved leniency because of their otherwise 
unblemished history, in his eyes others forfeited their right to a break. 
Such was the case with Pat V. Stiso, a Bronx lawyer, who had pleaded guilty to narcotics conspiracy 
and obstructing justice after being accused of, among other things, hiding money for the leader of a 
drug gang. He faced a guideline range of 70 to 87 months, for a possible term of more than seven 
years.
At the sentencing, in March 1999, Judge Chin cited the many letters he had received depicting Mr. 
Stiso, then 38, as a loving father and committed defense lawyer who had also been involved in 
charitable work. But he said, “I cannot be compassionate.” 
He said Mr. Stiso’s supporters had not seen his other side, which had allowed him to accept “tens of 
thousands of dollars in cash in grocery bags, money that was earned from the sale of heroin.” 
Defense lawyers had to do their jobs, he said, “but this is not a case about the blurring of a line. This 
case doesn’t even come close.” He sentenced Mr. Stiso to 87 months. 
Looking back, Judge Chin said, the “mitigating factors did warrant leniency, and that’s why it was a 
struggle for me internally.” 
But he was keenly aware, he said, “of the seriousness of his crime.” It was also painful, Judge Chin 
said, to watch a lawyer he knew, a courthouse regular, “just fail as a human being.” 
“In a sense, he was like one of our own,” he said. 
LIKE most judges, Judge Chin faced defendants who promised to reform their ways. Some fulfilled 
that pledge; others let him down. He tried not to become jaded or cynical, he said, and retained 
hope that people who had made mistakes could turn their lives around. 
“A good judge has to care,” he said. “He has to want to make the world better.” He also believed that 
rehabilitation, along with punishment, deterrence and healing victims, was a legitimate goal of 
sentencing. As he put it, “I don’t like to give up on people.” 
But two cases showed how difficult that goal was to achieve. 
The first, in November 1998, involved Alethea Pierce, 38, a drug addict who had pleaded guilty to 
participating in a narcotics trafficking ring, and then had seemingly transformed her life. She had 
cooperated with prosecutors, testified against the ring’s leaders, and undergone drug treatment. 
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At sentencing, she said proudly that she was putting her life back together, reuniting with two of her 
children, finding housing and taking courses to find a job. “I just like who I am today,” she said. 
“Sentencing is often very hard,” Judge Chin observed, adding that her case would indeed be “an easy 
one.” He gave her time served — she was free to go. 
But a year later she was back before him, after a series of positive drug tests. Still, she made it clear 
that she wanted another chance. “What none of you all know in this courtroom is the life of the 
addict,” she said. 
“I’ve lived it,” she added, “and I like being clean.” 
“Doing it your way hasn’t worked,” Judge Chin responded, but he decided to take a chance, agreeing 
not to send her to prison and ending court supervision of her case. He said he had one request: “I 
want you to write me a letter in a few months telling me that you’re doing great.” 
He never heard from her again. 
Daniel Sangemino was a Queens resident who had used high-pressure telephone tactics to solicit 
money for sham investments. He had even persuaded a 79-year-old Utah widow to liquidate her 
savings and take out a loan in order to send him $149,000. 
In April 2001, Judge Chin sentenced Mr. Sangemino, 25, to just over three years, including 
additional time for exploiting a vulnerable victim. Mr. Sangemino served his time but could not stay 
out of trouble. In February 2004, after arrests for harassment and drug possession, he was back 
before Judge Chin for violating the terms of his release. 
He admitted to a longstanding drug problem. The judge told him he seemed bright and articulate. 
“If it’s the drugs, you really have to kick it,” he said. 
The judge imposed eight more months, and recommended drug treatment. Again Mr. Sangemino 
did the time, and again he was arrested after his release, for harassment. Judge Chin imposed an 
additional 16 months. “I don’t know what you are doing with yourself,” he said, adding, “This is 
really your last chance.” 
Mr. Sangemino, contacted recently, said that he had not returned to court and had worked hard to 
address his addiction issues. “I have lived a clean and sober life for five years,” he said. 
Now 36, he said he had held a steady job, obtained an associate’s degree and planned to attend 
Queens College next year. He has also been paying restitution. 
“I really don’t feel good about what I did in the past,” he said. He added that Judge Chin had treated 
him fairly. “I’ll never forget his expression. He wasn’t angry. He was, like, ‘C’mon.’ ” 
IN 2004, Judge Chin appeared on a bar association panel to discuss a new book called “The Myth of 
Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s Right.” The author, Thane Rosenbaum, a 
Fordham law professor, had known the judge for years. 
287
“One of the interesting concepts in Professor Rosenbaum’s book,” Judge Chin told the audience, “is 
that the law lacks a soul. The law lacks tenderness. The law is objective and cold and inhumane. The 
law abhors emotion. I don’t think that’s true. 
“Every time I sentence a defendant, there is a lot of emotion,” he said. “I think there is a lot of 
humanity in the law.” 
But in one 2002 sentencing, a lawyer protested that Judge Chin showed too much emotion. The 
defendant, Steven Chin Leung, facing passport fraud charges, had then tried to fake his own death 
in the 9/11 attacks. 
In court, Judge Chin called Mr. Leung’s actions despicable and selfish, and said his ruse had 
diverted critical law enforcement resources after 9/11 while the bogus claim was investigated. The 
guidelines called for a sentence of two to two-and-a-half years, but Judge Chin, acknowledging that 
there was “a lot of emotion involved,” went for a higher sentence, imposing four years. 
Mr. Leung’s lawyer asked Judge Chin to reconsider, saying that the sentence was “extreme” and that 
the judge had let his emotions weigh “more than they should.” 
Judge Chin disagreed. “Emotion comes into play in every sentencing decision,” he replied. 
“Obviously, however, you can’t let emotion cloud your judgment, and I don’t believe I have done 
that here.” 
IN discussing his decisions, Judge Chin acknowledged that he often wondered what happened to 
defendants who had appeared before him — if his ideal was to balance punishment and 
rehabilitation, how had it worked in the real world? To find out, The New York Times tracked down 
some of those people. 
Mr. Regan, now 52, said in an interview at his lawyer’s office that the support he received from 
fellow officers had never wavered. When the time came for him to surrender to the authorities, he 
said, a group of officers met him at his house in the Bronx and flew with him, at their expense, to 
Kentucky, where he served about eight months. Officers also met him at La Guardia Airport when 
he came back. 
Having lost his job and pension, Mr. Regan opened a contracting firm, remodeling apartments in 
Manhattan. He said he appreciated Judge Chin’s rejection of the government’s harsher sentencing 
request. He recalled returning to the courthouse one day, perhaps for his appeal, and standing 
outside with other officers when he saw Judge Chin leaving the building. The judge walked over, 
shook his hand and wished him luck, Mr. Regan recalled, saying, “He seemed like a guy with a great 
heart.”
Mr. Stiso, the former lawyer, spoke at his mother’s home in New Rochelle, N.Y. He recalled being 
shocked when Judge Chin imposed the top of the recommended range. “My knees buckled,” he said. 
But today, Mr. Stiso, 50, said he feels lucky. After serving more than five years in prison, he returned 
to the same house and loyal and loving family, he said. Although he lost his law license and thriving 
legal practice, he found work selling investments in life insurance policies and also consults with 
other white-collar defendants about what they will face in prison, he said. 
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“I have no problem with the sentence I received,” Mr. Stiso said. “The entire experience saved me.” 
He said it was not the amount of time that changed him; it was “having to go through” the process. 
THEN there is Ms. Kidd. Judge Chin had given her six weeks to surrender to begin her 30-month 
sentence, but she failed to appear at the appointed time. She was arrested again and given eight 
additional months by a different judge. Ms. Kidd, 37, said in an interview in June that she had been 
unable to find an acceptable caretaker for the children. “I could never bring myself to leave my 
kids,” she said. 
While she served her sentence, she said, her mother, who had addressed her own drug problem, and 
other relatives and friends came together to help care for the children. “I had people that stepped 
in,” Ms. Kidd said, including some she did not know well — “in such a great way,” she added. 
Since her release in 2007, she said, the family has held together. She works in retailing and is 
studying nursing, she said. 
“I feel like I got that second chance that everybody’s talking about,” she said, adding, “And I’m 
taking full advantage of that.” 
Judge Chin was pleased to hear about the progress the defendants had made. He had always felt Ms. 
Kidd “was doing something right,” he said. 
But, he added, they were only a small fraction of the defendants he had sentenced over the years; he 
would never learn what had happened to most. 
“That’s why it makes it so hard. You can’t predict the future. You don’t know what’s going to 
happen,” Judge Chin said. “You do what you think is best for the defendant, for society, and you 
hope it works out.” 
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: October 7, 2011
An earlier version of this article erroneously stated that the guideline range for Mr. Leung was two-and-a-half to three 
years.
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SundayReview |  OPINION
By STEFAN R. UNDERHILL JAN. 23, 2016
IN 2006, I sentenced a man to 18 years in prison. I have been wrestling with that
decision ever since.
As a federal district judge, Iâ€™ve sentenced hundreds of people, but Iâ€™ve
rarely agonized as much as I did over this manâ€™s fate.
He was the enforcer for a brutal gang of drug dealers in Bridgeport, Conn.,
known as the Terminators, and had sold heroin, assaulted rival dealers and
murdered a potential witness. But after a falling-out with the head of the gang, he
turned over a stash house to the police and fled the state. When captured in 2001, he
immediately confessed to the murder and later testified as a star witness for the
prosecution.
Thus arose my problem: He had committed horrible crimes, but he also seemed
to be making an unusually sincere effort to atone for them. So which man was I
sentencing? The murderer or the remorseful cooperator?
The prosecutor rewarded his cooperation by filing a so-called 5K motion, which
allowed me to ignore the mandatory life sentence he otherwise would have faced.
Still, after weighing the seriousness of his crimes, I sentenced him to 18 years, which
was more time than even the prosecutor wanted.
I gave a speech encouraging the defendant to make the most of his time in
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prison. He promised to work hard and ready himself to lead a productive life after
his release. But nearly everyone I sentence says something similar.
In the years that followed, I often wondered whether his remorse was strong
enough to overcome his past.
In 2012, I had the chance to find out. While attending a conference on
sentencing issues, I learned that he was serving time in a prison nearby. I wanted to
know whether he had become a better citizen or a better criminal. So I asked a
prison staffer if I could meet with him in private.
That the warden felt no need to post a guard was my first clue that he had
changed for the better. He was working in his first real job at the prison industries
factory and had been promoted to supervisor. He showed me recommendations
from prison employees for good jobs on the outside. He brought a folder full of
certificates he had earned for attending classes. He talked lovingly about his
girlfriend and daughter, with whom he planned to live as a family after his release.
The meeting made me proud of his accomplishments, but sad that I had not
been more confident in him. He still had several years left on his sentence, but it was
clear that he had served enough time.
After I returned to my office, I contacted the prosecutor and his lawyer and
encouraged them to find a way to get him released early. But they told me there was
no straightforward way to shorten a federal inmateâ€™s sentence, even if prison
officials acknowledge that more jail time is a waste of time and money. So he had to
stay in prison, at an annual cost of $30,000 to taxpayers.
The tragedy of mass incarceration has recently focused much attention on the
need to reform three-strikes laws, mandatory minimums and the federal-sentencing
guidelines, which often direct judges to impose excessive sentences. We also need a
mechanism for judges to re-evaluate the sentences theyâ€™ve imposed.
Itâ€™s true that federal prisoners can earn up to 15 percent off the length of
their sentences if they stay out of trouble. But this doesnâ€™t incentivize prisoners
to take advantage of work or study opportunities.
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Instead, Congress should enact legislation that would allow every sentenced
defendant one opportunity to petition his sentencing court for a reduction based on
extraordinarily good conduct and rehabilitation in prison.
This â€œsecond-look reviewâ€ should be available only to prisoners who are
supported by their wardens. To minimize the increased workload on busy federal
judges, each prisoner should be allowed only a single opportunity to seek early
release and do so only after serving at least half of the sentence imposed (or
two-thirds of a mandatory minimum sentence).
Factors in support of an early release should include more than just clean
disciplinary records in prison. Job readiness, success with drug treatment,
completion of vocational and educational training and extraordinary family or health
circumstances should count as well.
While the Bureau of Prisons has the authority under the existing
â€œcompassionate releaseâ€ program to do much of what I advocate, that program
has been used far too sparingly, in part because of bureaucratic hurdles. From 2008
to 2014, only 11 of the thousands of prisoners sentenced by federal courts in New
York have been released under this program. Most of them were terminally ill.
Compassionate release provides no realistic way out of prison. And prisoners with no
reason to hope have little reason to reform.
I donâ€™t advocate for a return to the flawed federal parole system that was
essentially abolished in the 1980s. In that system, a judge who believed that a
defendant should spend three years locked up would impose a nine-year sentence
because parole was likely to be granted after he served one-third of it. But if that
defendantâ€™s parole was delayed or denied, the judgeâ€™s original intent was
impeded. In contrast, my proposal would give the sentencing judge control. This
makes sense because judges know whether a particular defendant got a break at
sentencing or not and can best gauge the extent of positive change in a person.
The man I sentenced in 2006 will soon leave prison. Counting the time he
served in custody before sentencing and time off for good behavior, he is scheduled
to be released in April. In total, he will have served over 14 years. The last three years
of that sentence, if not more, were a waste of time.
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Upon his release, I will reach out to express my regret for rejecting the
prosecutorâ€™s request for leniency. And I will thank him for inciting my interest in
this reform.
A â€œsecond lookâ€ to adjust sentences would give inmates an incentive to
prepare themselves for productive lives on the outside, and allow judges like me to
correct sentences that turn out, in hindsight, to be unnecessarily long. This would
improve the fairness of our criminal justice system and increase the publicâ€™s
confidence in our courts.
Stefan R. Underhill is a federal judge for the District of Connecticut.
A version of this op-ed appears in print on January 24, 2016, on page SR4 of the New York edition with
the headline: A Judgeâ€™s Regret and a Killerâ€™s Remorse.
© 2016 The New York Times Company
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No. 326821 
Hillsdale Circuit Court 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
TRENITY D. HELLER, LC No. 14-383395- FH 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Before:  STEPHENS, P.J., and BECKERING and GLEICHER, JJ. 
PER CURIAM. 
Defendant Trenity D. Heller pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, MCL 
333.7403(2)(b)(i).  The trial court sentenced Heller by videoconference, with Heller located in 
the county jail.  Heller’s counsel was present in the courtroom but raised no objection to his 
client’s physical absence.  The sentence imposed departed substantially from the guidelines 
recommendation. 
Sentencing by videoconference plainly contravenes MCR 6.006, which identifies the 
criminal proceedings in which two-way interactive video technology may be used.  Felony 
sentencing is not one of them.  We remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
I 
The prosecutor charged Heller with operating or maintaining a methamphetamine 
laboratory, MCL 333.7401c; possession of methamphetamine; and possession of marijuana, 
MCL 333.7403.  Immediately after his videoconferenced arraignment from the jail, Heller 
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine.  . . . MCR 6.006(A) permits courts to 
use two-way interactive video technology during “initial arraignments on the warrant or 
complaint” and “pleas.”   
The trial court also conducted Heller’s sentencing by videoconference.  ...  Heller’s sentencing 
guideline score placed him in a minimum sentencing guidelines range of 0 to 17 months.  The trial 
court sentenced him to 30 to 120 months’ imprisonment, justifying the departure and its extent on 
Heller’s lengthy offense history, his engagement in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and his 
persistent drug abuse.  ...
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III 
Should Heller elect to be resentenced, he must be physically present in the courtroom. 
MCR 6.006(A) catalogs the proceedings in which two-way interactive video 
technology may be used in Michigan courts.  Listed are: “initial arraignments on the warrant 
or complaint, probable cause conferences, arraignments on the information, pretrial 
conferences, pleas, sentencings for misdemeanor offenses, show case hearings, waivers 
and adjournments of extradition, referrals for forensic determination of competency, and 
waivers and adjournments of preliminary examinations.”  Felony sentencing is not on the list.   ...
Why did the Supreme Court omit felony sentencings from MCR 6.006(A)?  Presumably 
because sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant has 
a constitutional right to be present,  People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 247; 365 NW2d 673 
(1984), and virtual appearance is not a suitable substitute for physical presence.  “The 
imposition of punishment in a criminal case affects the most fundamental human rights: 
life and liberty.”  United States v Villano, 816 F2d 1448, 1452 (CA 10, 1987) (en banc).  
Our court rules and common law invest sentencing with profound significance, for this grave 
moment in the criminal process often seals a defendant’s fate or dictates the contours of his 
future.  Individualized sentencing furthers the goal of rehabilitation by respecting the inherent 
dignity of each person the law deprives of freedom, civil rights, or property.  People v Triplett, 
407 Mich 510, 515; 287 NW2d 165 (1980).  A defendant’s right to allocute before sentence is 
passed—to look a judge in the eye in a public courtroom while making his plea—stems from our 
legal tradition’s centuries-old recognition of a defendant’s personhood, even at the moment he is 
condemned to prison.  Sentencing is “an intensely human process—after all, we are dealing not 
with machines and equipment, but with human lives.”  United States v Davern, 970 F2d 1490, 
1516 (CA 6, 1992) (JONES, J., dissenting).   
Undoubtedly, two-way interactive video technology saves courts money and time, and 
dramatically lessens security concerns.  But in the felony sentencing context, it is simply 
inconsistent with the intensely personal nature of the process.  After all, “[s]entencing is the 
point where the heart of the law—and its human face—is most clearly revealed.”  Weinstein, 
The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth 
Cardozo Lecture, 30 Cardozo L Rev 1, 179 (2008).  Sentencing by video dehumanizes the 
defendant who participates from a jail location, unable to privately communicate with his or her 
counsel and likely unable to visualize all the participants in the courtroom.  Moreover, a 
courtroom “is more than a location with seats for a judge, jury, witnesses, defendant, prosecutor, 
defense counsel and public observers[.]”  Estes v Texas, 381 US 532, 561; 85 S Ct 1628; 14 L 
Ed 2d 543 (1965) (WARREN, C.J., concurring).  The courtroom setting provides “a dignity 
essential” to the process of criminal adjudication.  Id.  Isolating a defendant from that setting 
during what may be the most decisive moment of his life clashes with the judge’s duty to 
acknowledge the humanity of even a convicted felon. ...
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The medium itself—here, videoconferencing from a jail—delivers content of its 
own.  That content, in turn, influences the perceptions of the participants.  Abundant 
social science research demonstrates that video conferencing “as a mediating 
technology” may color a viewer’s assessment of a person’s credibility, sincerity, and 
emotional depth.  Some studies suggest that “individuals who appear in court via video 
conferencing are at risk of receiving harsher treatment from judges or other 
adjudicators.”  Salyzyn, A New Lens: Reframing the Conversation about the Use of Video 
Conferencing in Civil Trials in Ontario,” 50 Osgoode Hall L J 429, 447 (2012).1  Courts, too, 
have recognized that “virtual reality is rarely a substitute for actual presence and . . . even in an 
age of advancing technology, watching an event on a screen remains less than the complete 
equivalent of actually attending it.”  United States v Lawrence, 248 F3d 300, 304 (CA 4, 2001).  
Alternatively phrased, “In the most important affairs of life, people approach each other in 
person, and television is no substitute for direct personal contact.  Videotape is still a picture, not 
a life . . . .”  Stoner v Sowders, 997 F2d 209, 213 (CA 6, 1993). 
Sentencing is more than a rote or mechanical application of numbers to a page.  
It involves a careful and thoughtful assessment of “the true moral fiber of another,” Del 
Piano v United States, 575 F2d 1066, 1069 (CA 3, 1978), a task made far more complex 
when the defendant speaks through a microphone from a remote location.  The trial judge who 
sentenced Heller never met or sat in the same room with him.  In our view, Heller’s 
absence from the sentencing nullified the dignity of the proceeding and its participants, 
rendering it fundamentally unfair.   
We remand for resentencing at Heller’s option.  We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens  
/s/ Jane M. Beckering  
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher  
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2Qualifications of a judge
Q: What qualities do we want in a judge?
What judges do:
– Find facts
– Apply law
• Fair / impartial
• Independent
• Patient
• Having legal experience / understanding
3
Qualifications of a judge: ABA
According to the American Bar Association (rates judicial 
nominees), judges should: 
• uphold the law
• be independent
• be impartial
• possess the appropriate temperament and character
• possess the appropriate capabilities and credentials
• have the confidence of the public
• be diverse and reflective of society
• be constrained to perform their duties in a manner that justifies 
public faith and confidence in the courts
4
298
3Qualifications of a judge: in California
According to the California Commission on Judicial Nominees 
Evaluation (rates judicial nominees for state courts in California), all 
judges should have the following qualities: 
• impartiality
• freedom from bias 
• industry
• integrity 
• honesty 
• legal experience
• professional skills 
5
• intellectual capacity 
• judgment
• community respect
• commitment to equal justice
• judicial temperament
• communication skills 
• job‐related health
Qualifications of a judge: in California
In addition to the previous, California Commission on Judicial 
Nominees Evaluation criteria also list:
Trial court candidates: 
• decisiveness 
• oral communication skills
• patience
Appellate court candidates: 
• collegiality
• writing ability
• scholarship 
6
Supreme Court Candidates: 
• collegiality 
• writing ability 
• scholarship
• distinction in the profession 
• breadth and depth of 
experience
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4Qualifications of a judge
• Importance of “life experience” ?
– Not included in California or ABA criteria for evaluating 
judges
• Consider how “life experience” might influence finding facts 
and applying the law and the judicial functions involved in 
each
7
Qualifications of a judge
How, if at all, does “life experience” contribute to: 
• Selection of unbiased jurors
• Credibility determinations
• Application of general legal terms
• Sentencing, to achieve sentencing goals
• Restorative justice solutions
• Encouragement of settlement
• Creating impression of fairness
8
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5Qualifications of a judge
Finding facts
What “life experience” helps judges to understand various 
factual situations?
Example:  to understand a litigant’s likely reactions when 
cases involve:
*   Dynamics of racial profiling 
*   Street fights
*   Language limitations
9
Qualifications of a judge
Does “life experience” affect interpreting and applying legal 
terms?
“…[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”   
US Constitution, 14th  Amendment
People may not be subjected to “cruel and unusual
punishments” 
US Constitution, 8th Amendment
A conviction in county jail may later be dismissed in the 
“interests of justice” 
Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4
10
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6What judges say about life experience and 
judging
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice US Supreme Court:
“I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of 
her experiences would more often than not reach a better 
conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.”
She later clarified, saying that while life experience shapes 
who one is, “ultimately and completely” a judge follows 
the law regardless of personal background
Later she said that she had never let her own life 
experiences or opinions influence her decisions
11
What judges say about life experience 
and judging
Hon. Tani Cantil‐Sakauye, Chief Justice
California Supreme Court
Said her background might lead her to approach 
the controversial issue [same‐sex marriage] with a 
different perspective:  
12
“Either as a woman, a Filipina, a 
mother, a 50‐year‐old woman in this 
society – that always has an influence 
on how I see the facts, [though not on 
how I apply the law].”  
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7What judges say about life experience 
and judging
Former US Supreme Court Justice John 
Paul Stevens said his experiences with his 
father, grandfather and uncle being falsely 
convicted affected him.
His uncle committed suicide before they 
were exonerated, and the serious 
consequences that the miscarriage of 
justice can carry stayed with Justice 
Stevens
13
Diversity on the bench
California population:
• 53 % non‐white/Caucasian
• 50 % men
Bench in California:
• 30 % non‐white/Caucasian
• 73 % men
14
Santa Clara County 
population: 
• 53 % non‐white/Caucasian
• 50 % men
Santa Clara County bench:
• 17 % non‐white/Caucasian
• 70 % men
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8Diversity on the bench
Is having a diverse, gender‐balanced bench important?  
If so, why?
• increases public confidence in judicial system 
• enhances respect for courts
• demonstrates fairness in recruitment and hiring
• improves community connection and understanding
• enriches decision‐making of all judges; assumptions 
questioned
• creates role models and mentors
15
Qualifications of a judge
Many cases involve controversial or political issues:
• Challenge to counting votes in Florida election
US Supreme Court found that vote recounts must stop so that 
delegates from Florida can be seated for the Electoral College  
Bush v. Gore, 2000
• Challenge to school that suspended students for wearing 
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War  
US Supreme Court found that the suspensions violated students’ 
First Amendment rights to free speech  
Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969
• Constitutionality of law limiting contributions from 
corporations for “electioneering materials”
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission; McCutcheon & 
Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission 2014
16
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9Qualifications of a judge
Many legal terms are general: 
“Unreasonable” searches and seizures are barred, search 
warrants can issue only upon “probable cause.”
US Constitution, 4th  Amendment
Is it an “unreasonable” search and seizure if, under an 
Arizona state law,  law enforcement must stop someone who 
is “reasonably suspicious” to ask for proof of lawful status 
and detain person if cannot give proof? 
US v. Arizona
17
Qualifications of a judge: when NOT to 
decide ‐‐ Political Question Doctrine
Courts should not decide cases that are “purely political 
and meant for the political branches of government”  
E.g., international treaties, rules for impeachment
Courts have been increasingly willing to venture into what 
could be seen as “purely political” arenas
How clear is the decision as to what is “purely political”?
18
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Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
To help promote image of fairness and avoid challenges of 
judicial subjectivity, rules govern judges’ conduct
Judicial Canons are designed to promote
appropriate judicial behavior, and
appearance of appropriate judicial behavior
Judges are subject to discipline if they violate the law.  
Judges must report to the Commission on Judicial Performance if they are 
charged with any judicial conduct or law violation 
Canon 3(D)
19
Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Judges should:
Avoid appearance of impropriety in all activities
Canon 2
Perform all duties diligently, hear all cases except when 
disqualified
Canon 3
Be patient, dignified, courteous and require the same of 
everyone in courtroom
Canon 3
20
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Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Judges should (cont’d):
Be fair, prompt, efficient
Canon 3 (e) 8
Judicial independence and impartiality should dictate the 
conduct of judges and candidates for judicial office.
Canon 5
21
Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Withdrawal from case (“recusal”)
A judge should withdraw from a case where:
• Doing so would “further the interest of justice,” or
• Judge “substantially doubts his or her capacity to be 
impartial,” or
• A reasonable person would doubt the judge’s ability to be 
impartial
Canon 3, Cal. Code Civil Procedure §§ 170‐170.6
22
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Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Parties can disqualify a judge by
* demonstrating a basis for disqualification
example: judge is related to a witness in the case, 
* filing a statement challenging the judge 
don’t need to give reason
can do so only once per case
Canon 3, Cal. Code Civil Procedure §§ 170‐170.6
23
Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Not commenting on current cases or issues
A judge shall not make any public comment about a 
pending or impending proceeding … and shall not 
make any nonpublic comment that might 
substantially interfere with a fair trial…
Canon 3 ¶(c)9
24
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Judges’ rules: the Judicial Canons
Judges should not worry about public approval
A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of 
partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism 
…. 
Canon 3 ¶2
25
When judges make unpopular 
decisions: example
Varnum v. O’Brien (2009 Iowa Supreme Court)
• court (unanimously) struck down ban against same‐sex 
marriage, finding ban unconstitutional
• judges are subject to retention elections in Iowa (like 
California)
• national organizations campaigned against the judges in 
Varnum decision
• In 2010, voters removed the 3 justices subject to retention 
vote
26
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When judges make unpopular 
decisions: example
Chief Justice Rose Bird court ouster  
(California Supreme Court in early 1980s)
• Court affirmed none of the 61 death penalty cases
• Court issued decision contrary to insurance companies
• In 1986, 3 Justices up for retention vote
• Campaign against them, citing failure to affirm death sentences
Commercials featured children of the victims of the murderers whose 
sentences Justices Bird, Reynoso and Grodin voted to reverse
• Voters recalled three justices
• Insurance companies had financed campaign against them
• From 1990‐95, California Supreme Court affirmed 97% of 
death penalty cases before it
27
Special role of courts
Other branches are political branches
• report to an electorate
• generally we look for different qualities in politicians than 
we do in judges
Special role of impartial judiciary to protect “political minority” 
interests
• courts often look more carefully at cases where the 
political branches have acted regarding issues affecting 
political minorities who don’t have representation at the 
ballot box
• will discuss in “Balance of Power” class
28
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So… to recap:
• Judges are required to be fair, not political
• We want a rule of law, uniformly and fairly applied
• Judges are evaluated by factors other than life experience 
(e.g., legal experience, reputation for fairness)
• Judges say their own life experiences affect their decision‐
making
– Though they follow “the law”
29
How should we select our judges?
Given that we want judges to be independent, what sort of 
accountability – if any – do we want them to have for their 
decisions?  
What protection for the public – if any – should there be 
from judges who are far out of the mainstream views?
Note the tension in wanting judges to be independent 
yet not wanting them to be too disconnected from their 
communities 
30
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How should we select our judges?
Examine different selection methods for:
• Federal judges
• State (California) judges
• Administrative law judges
31
How should we select our judges?
Selection of federal judges
Life tenure:
Will have their jobs with no reduction in salary during “good 
behavior”
Alexander Hamilton:  
Life tenure is “the best expedient which can be devised in 
any government” to protect judicial independence
32
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How should we select our judges?
Selection of federal judges
US Constitution provides that federal judges are
nominated by President 
confirmed by Senate 
hearings before Judiciary Committee, recommendation by 
Committee, vote by full Senate
Political issues: 
Presidents nominate judges who share political viewpoint
Interest groups express views regarding nominee’s likely 
decisions 
33
How should we select our judges?
Selection of California judges
Tenure:
Once seated, judges must be re‐confirmed by voters 
• every 6 years for trial judges
• every 12 years for appellate court judges
Retention elections:  judges’ names on ballot for voters to 
approve or reject
34
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How should we select our judges?
Selection of California judges
To become a California trial court judge:
• Run against incumbent judge in general election 
(infrequent), or
• Run for empty seat (e.g., when judge retires), or
• (If prior judge leaves in middle of term): appointed by 
governor and then voted on by public in next election 
(most common)
35
How should we select our judges?
How do we learn about judges’ opinions, who they are, if they 
can’t discuss political views?
• Proposed questionnaire in “Protections urged for judges” 
to ask judicial candidates to answer political questions from 
interest groups regarding controversial issues such as 
same‐sex marriage
• Two former California governors (Wilson and Davis) come 
to opposite conclusions about the value, propriety of 
questionnaire
Q: What are pros & cons of a questionnaire asking judges 
their views on controversial issues?
36
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How should we select our judges?
Republican Party of MN v. White (2002)
• The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct: a candidate for 
judicial office shall not “announce his or her views on 
disputed legal or political issues”
• Candidate for judge sent out flyer criticizing MN Supreme 
Court decisions on crime, welfare and abortion
• Ethics complaint filed
• Issue in case: Does First Amendment permit candidates for 
judicial office to criticize courts’ decisions, or does such 
criticism erode the impartiality of the judiciary?
– i.e., is the limitation on judicial candidates expressing their views re 
the bench, issues unconstitutional? 37
How should we select our judges?
Republican Party v. White (2002) (cont’d)
• Cross‐motions for summary judgment
– i.e., each side filed a motion stating facts are not in 
dispute, argument is that one side wins on the legal 
issue(s) involved; both sides said their position won
• District Court held that ethics rule prohibiting candidates’ 
comments does not violate the First Amendment
• Court of Appeals affirmed
38
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How should we select our judges?
In Republican Party v. White (2002), US Supreme Court (5‐
4) struck down Minnesota rule as violating the First 
Amendment guarantee of free speech
In dissent, Justice Stevens: the majority opinion obscures 
the line between campaigning for judicial office and 
political office  
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg: freedom of speech applies in 
elections for political office (executive and legislative) but 
not in judicial elections because judges are not political 
actors
39
How should we select our judges?
Florida judicial ethics rules prohibit candidates from 
personally soliciting contributions in seeking judicial office.
Lanell Williams‐Yulee ran for county judge in Florida
• Signed a fund‐raising letter mailed to voters
• Florida bar reprimanded her and ordered to pay $1,860 
in court costs
• Florida Supreme Court upheld the decision
• Williams‐Yulee challenged the reprimand and the 
constitutionality of the bar on seeking contributions 
US Supreme Court affirmed Florida’s rule (2015) saying 
courts must maintain public’s confidence in judicial 
integrity. 
Williams‐Yulee v. Florida Bar
40
316
21
How should we select our judges?
Selection of administrative judges
Remember: administrative judges are in executive not judicial 
branch 
Administrative agencies usually decide cases in process similar to 
courts: 
• determine facts  based on evidence at hearings
• hear arguments from adversaries (often one party is the 
agency itself in support of its administrative action, which an 
individual has challenged)
• Decide according to agency precedent
41
How should we select our judges?
Selection of administrative judges
Tenure: Set by civil service rules (which are designed to avoid 
political considerations or patronage)
Generally administrative law judges cannot be discharged 
except “for cause” (for good reason)
Selection process:  Through civil service application process: 
testing, ranking, interviews
42
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Passions, as we all know, can run to the extreme when 
the State tries one accused of a barbaric act against 
society, or one accused of a crime that – for whatever 
reason – inflames the community.  
Pressures on the government to secure a conviction, 
to “do something,” can overwhelm even those of good 
conscience.  When prosecutors and judges are 
elected, or when they harbor political ambitions, such 
pressures are particularly dangerous.
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 US 412, 459 (1984) J. Brennan, dissenting
43
When judges make unpopular 
decisions
When judges make unpopular 
decisions
Q: What are the pros & cons of each of the three types of 
selecting judges:
• Federal: President nominates, Senate confirms; life tenure
• California: Governor nominates or trial judges can run for 
open seat; retention votes every 6/12 years
• Administrative: civil service exam and interview; 
terminated only for “good cause”
44
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When judges make unpopular 
decisions
• Why do we have retention elections?
• What kind of accountability do we want judges to have to 
the public?
• Are elected judges’ obligations to the voters who 
confirmed them, or to the litigants before them?
45
When judges make unpopular 
decisions
Sometimes applying the law leads to unpopular results
• How much do we as a society want judges to be in sync 
with popular interests?
• If judges’ views and decisions are different from 
politically popular interests, what should the 
consequence for judges be?
46
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When judges make unpopular 
decisions
How can we hold judges in check if they are:
• making politically popular but legally suspect decisions?
• making politically unpopular but legally sound decisions?
– complaints to commissions on judicial performance
– appeals can be a means by which public asks the court to 
re‐examine precedent as outdated
47
Life experience and judging: 
Justice Sotomayor in Schuette v. BAMN
In Schuette v. BAMN case, voters in Michigan passed an initiative 
that made it illegal for public institutions of higher education to use 
race as a basis for admissions.  Proponents of affirmative action 
sued.
The US Supreme Court held that it was a matter for the voters to 
decide.  
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to 
carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not 
sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial 
inequality that exists in our society.  It is this view that 
works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what 
makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that 
race doesmatter. 
320
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Life experience and judging: Justice 
Sotomayor in Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
My colleagues are of the view that we should leave race out 
of the picture entirely and let the voters sort it out.  …
Race matters. Race matters in part because of the long history 
of racial minorities' being denied access to the political 
process.  …
Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality in 
society — inequality that cannot be ignored and that has 
produced stark socioeconomic disparities.  …
Life experience and judging: 
Justice Sotomayor in Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, 
that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot be 
wished away. 
Race matters to a young man's view of society when he 
spends his teenage years watching others tense up as he 
passes, no matter the neighborhood where he grew up. 
Race matters to a young woman's sense of self when she 
states her hometown, and then is pressed, "No, where are 
you really from?", regardless of how many generations her 
family has been in the country.
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Life experience and judging: 
Justice Sotomayor in Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
…Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the 
silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of 
thoughts: "I do not belong here." 
Q:  How have Justice Sotomayor’s own life experiences 
affected her opinion in Schuette?  
Are her perceptions relevant?  
Can other Justices benefit from them?  
Why has she put her thoughts into her dissenting opinion 
(along with charts of the effects of affirmative action and 
data)?
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Margaret Stevenson 
JS 103 Courts and Society 
 
Judges and Judging Class Notes 
 
A.  What qualities we want in judges deciding cases 
B. Judging – Filtering impartiality through “life experience” 
C. How we choose and keep judges 
 
 
A.  What qualities do we want in a judge?  
 
Note that the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the California Code of Civil Procedure (excerpts 
posted on website) outline ethical and legal rules for judges.  The Rules of Professional Conduct 
are ethical guidelines for attorneys; the Canons play a comparable role for judges. 
 
Some qualities that the California Bar Association and American Bar Association list in their 
criteria in determining judges’ qualifications are posted on website.   
 
1. Judicial qualities listed by evaluating organizations 
 
 * Fair / Impartial 
Have no financial, personal, political relationship with the parties or attorneys 
 
Must also maintain the appearance of being impartial 
 
If judges are not impartial, or cannot appear impartial, then they must “recuse” 
themselves (not hear any substantive aspect of the case). 
 
* Independent 
Resist pressure, consider the issues before them and not extraneous influence. 
This is particularly important in cases where judges’ role is to protect unpopular 
interests; they need to follow principles of law regardless of popular opinion 
 
 “A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests, public 
clamor, or fear of criticism ….”  Canon 3, para 2 
 
“Judicial independence and impartiality should dictate the conduct of judges 
and candidates for judicial office.”  Canon 5  
 
* Patient 
  
“A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, 
lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall 
require similar conduct of lawyers and of all court staff and personnel under the 
judge's direction and control.”  Canon 3 
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* Having legal experience / understanding 
 
Know legal principles and procedures.  In California, judges must have 10 years 
of experience as an attorney. 
 
2. One quality not listed: “life experience” 
 
Is life experience an important attribute for a judge?  Many non-attorneys believe that 
judges should understand the realities of the lives of the people whose cases come before 
them.  However, “life experience” is not cited as a requirement for being a good judge, 
according to California Bar Association and ABA.   
 
In identifying important attributes for judges, consider what judges are supposed to do: 
(a) find the facts and (b) apply the law. 
 
a. Finding the facts 
 
The Constitution provides the right to trial by a jury of one’s peers.  Trial 
by a jury of one’s peers is intended to give the parties the full benefit of 
broad community perspectives, from people who are similar to those 
whose rights are being adjudicated.  While being constrained by the terms 
of the law, the application of the law to the situation in a specific case is 
filtered through the eyes of peers. 
 
 Does life experience lead to better factual determinations? 
Judges don’t get better at determining credibility with experience 
 
What “life experience” helps judges to understand various factual 
situations? 
 
Example:  What life experience is needed for judge to understand a 
litigant’s likely reactions when critical case issues involve: 
  
 * Dynamics of being stopped by police / DWB? 
 * Addiction 
 * Street fights 
 * Language limitations 
 
Should advocates consider bringing an “expert witness” to explain 
dynamics of the situation to a judge (experts are now used 
frequently in gang prosecutions)? 
 
b. Applying the law 
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In addition to being a trier of fact in most trial-level cases, judges must 
interpret and apply the laws and Constitution at all levels, particularly 
appellate level. 
 
Many laws are not specific:  
 
“…[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”   (US 
Constitution, 14th  Amendment) 
 
“Unreasonable” searches and seizures are barred, search warrants 
can issue only upon “probable cause.” (US Constitution, 4th 
Amendment) 
  
People may not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishments” 
(US Constitution, 8th Amendment)  
 
A conviction in county jail may later be dismissed in the “interests 
of justice” (Cal. Penal Code section 1203.4) 
 
 How much does a judge need to know about a situation in order to rule?  
 
Consider the “Cultural Differences – New Defense Tactic?” article 
from Sentencing lecture 
 
Does “life experience” lead to better sentencing policies in helping 
to understand the motivations described in factors in sentencing? 
  
 
c. Consider what judges say regarding how their backgrounds and life 
experiences affect them 
 
•  Justice Sotomayor: “wise Latina” quote: “I would hope that a wise Latina 
woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach 
a better conclusion than a white male ho hasn’t lived that life.” 
 
She later clarified, saying that while life experience shapes who one is, 
“ultimately and completely” a judge follows the law regardless of personal 
background. 
 
Later she said that she had never let her own life experiences of opinions 
influence her decisions. 
 
• Tani Cantil-Sakauye (nominee for Chief Justice of Calif Supreme Court): 
(from posted article) 
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She said her background might lead her to approach the controversial 
issue [same-sex marriage] with a different perspective.  “Either as a 
woman, a Filipina, a mother, a 50-year-old woman in this society – that 
always has an influence on how I see the facts,” though not on how she 
applies the law, she said.”   
 
• Justice Stevens said his experiences with his father, grandfather and uncle 
being falsely convicted affected him.  His uncle committed suicide before they 
were exonerated, and the serious consequences that the miscarriage of justice 
can carry stayed with him. 
 
• Former California Supreme Court Justice Cruz Reynoso as a boy “thought it 
was unfair that his parents and neighbors had to trudge a mile into town to 
pick up their mail because the carrier's route ended just two blocks from their 
La Habra barrio. So Reynoso collected signatures and successfully petitioned 
the U.S. Postmaster General in Washington, D.C. for rural delivery.  That 
early success, he says now, helped fuel his determination to keep ‘doing 
things that needed to be done.’"  From “Former Justice to Receive Witkin 
Medal” article. 
 
3. Diversity on the bench 
  
While the Constitution entitles one to trial by a jury of one’s peers, when 
the trial is by a judge – as it is in 95 percent of cases – the odds are that the 
fact-finder will be a white male.   
 
i. The bench does not reflect population percentages by race or 
gender.  The article “Changing the Color of the California Bench” 
posted on website, plus charts excerpted from a State Bar Diversity 
Pipeline report, provide the numbers (approximated here).   
 
Of California population: 
53 percent of population in California is non-
white/Caucasian 
 
   About half men / women 
 
Of bench 
30 percent of bench is non-white/Caucasian 
 
    73 percent men 
 
  (The reports do not have data on LGBT or disabled judges.) 
 
“Diversity Pipeline” excerpts (see website) show results by county. 
 
   Santa Clara County population: 
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    55 percent non-white/caucasian 
 
   Santa Clara County bench: 
    17 percent non-white/Caucasian 
    30 percent women 
 
ii. Is having a diverse, gender-balanced bench important?  If so, why? 
 
Alameda County Superior Court Judge Brenda Harbin-Forte (in 
Changing the Color” article) says   
 
“If we don’t take steps now to address [diversity of the 
bench], people coming to the courts will lose respect for the 
justice system.” 
 
Justice at Stake, a nonprofit organization promoting “fair and 
impartial justice,” states: 
“In order to function effectively, every American must 
have the utmost confidence in their courts. However, a 
judiciary that does not reflect the population it serves 
undermines that confidence in creating a perceived or 
actual bias in judicial decision making. An ideal bench is 
representative of the larger community, including women, 
persons of color, members of the LGBT community, 
persons with disabilities and other underrepresented 
groups.” 
 
• Having a bench that reflects the population demonstrates fairness in 
recruitment and hiring in a justice system that is supposedly built on fairness.  
Public confidence increases when those judging reflect those being judged. 
 
• Improved community understanding, increasing public confidence in fairness.  
As people from all parts of the community know and interact with judges, 
public understanding of the roles and challenges of judging in the courts is 
enhanced. 
 
• Pluralism enriches decision-making.  Diverse members of the bench can 
contribute to improved understanding among all judges regarding community 
experiences, leading other judges to challenge their own lack of understanding 
resulting from lack of familiarity.  Unspoken assumptions are questioned, 
prejudices challenged.   
 
• Importance to have role models and mentors for new judges and those 
interested in becoming judges. 
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Oct 11, 2011: Doug Cole from Commission on judicial appointments in Arizona 
echoed the position that commissioners are charged with looking at the whole 
applicant, not just a narrow slice of their resume. He amused the audience with 
some responses that he has found most surprising to Question 64—the 
query found on the judicial application in merit-selection jurisdictions that 
requires applicants to describe their experience with diversity—again, a 
constitutional requirement. 
• “I am white and male.” (That was the complete response.) 
• “I have friends who are diverse.” (I shortened the actual response, 
but not by much.) 
• “Not applicable.” 
Cole said that such responses miss the point, because diversity and facing 
adversity may occur in anyone’s life. 
“The best applicants’ answers may be moving and touching, including life 
experiences and important turning points in people’s lives.” 
 
 
II. Judging – Filtering impartiality through “life experience” 
 
We have seen that judges say their experiences affect their actions on the bench.  We don’t use 
computers to decide cases. 
 
Yet our society is committed to fairness, treating similarly situated people similarly, regardless 
of their race, gender, class or situation in life.  Judges do their best to apply the law neutrally, 
without regard to legally irrelevant factors. 
 
A. The Judicial Canons  
 
Ethical rules -- judicial canons – promote fairness, impartiality, independence and other 
desirable judicial attributes 
 
Canons bar judges from being political and appearing political 
Part of what contributes to our ideas that judges are fair is the public perception of 
impartiality.  Canons require judges to refrain from inappropriate political 
activity: 
   
“Judicial independence and impartiality should dictate the conduct of 
judges and candidates for judicial office.”  Canon 5 of Canons of Judicial 
Ethics 
 
“A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism ….”  Canon 3, para 2 
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 Canons require judges must maintain the appearance of impartiality 
 
 B. Many cases involve controversial or political issues 
 
We know that cases judges will hear often involve political issues – all the more reason 
that we want to think of decisions on the merits, not based on politics 
 
• Challenge to school that suspended students for wearing black armbands to 
protest the Vietnam War.   
US Supreme Court found that the suspensions violated students’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech.  (Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969) 
 
• Challenge to counting votes in Florida election. 
US Supreme Court found that vote recounts must stop so that delegates 
from Florida can be seated for the Electoral College.  (Bush v. Gore, 2000) 
 
This year US Supreme Court’s docket includes GPS tracking (US v. Jones), 
broadcast decency standards (FCC v. Fox Television), rights of employees of 
religious groups (Hosanna-Tabor Church v. EEOC), legality of strip searches for 
minor offenses without individualized suspicion (Florence v. Board of 
Freeholders) (see article link in “News” section of website) 
 
  Last year’s term involved: 
 
• First Amendment protects protest speech near military funerals (Snyder v. 
Phelps)  
 
• Struck down law limiting contributions from corporations for “electioneering 
materials” as violating First Amendment (Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission) 
 
• First Amendment cannot bar sales of violent videos to minors (California law 
by State Sen. Yee struck down by Judge Whyte in San Jose federal 
courthouse; Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants)  
 
• Arizona law imposes harsher penalties on businesses that hire undocumented 
workers than federal law (Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting) 
 
• State-federal tensions regarding which jurisdiction can regulate issues like 
seat belts, vaccine safety, arbitration. 
 
Indeed, what issues do not have political aspects, where one’s personal political views don’t 
influence one’s outlook? 
 
Note: Political question doctrine :  
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In cases that are “purely political and meant for the political branches of government”, 
the “political question doctrine” says that the court should not decide those issues.   
 E.g., international treaties, rules for impeachment.   
 
The areas off-limits to the courts under the political question doctrine have been 
shrinking over the last 50 years, as the courts have been increasingly willing to venture 
into what could be seen as “purely political” arenas. 
 
The doctrine raises interesting questions as to what areas of government should be “off 
limits” to courts. 
 
 
Special role of courts: to protect political “minority” interests 
 
e.g., What likely to happen to politicians in Georgia before 1987 and 
Texas before 2003 who suggest repealing the sodomy crime statutes? 
 
Many politicians will stand up for what they think is right, even if 
politically unpopular.  But they do so at their peril since they may 
be voted out of office 
 
As we’ll see when talking about Balance of Power, when courts 
review other branch’s actions, courts often look more carefully at 
cases where the political branches have acted regarding issues 
affecting political minorities who don’t have representation at the 
ballot box. 
 
Generally, we look for different characteristics in judges than in politicians.  
 
 
III. Judicial independence v. accountability of judges 
 
Given that we want judges to be independent, what sort of accountability – if any – do we want 
them to have for their decisions?   
 
What protection for the public should there be from judges who are far out of the 
mainstream views? 
 
 Should there be any protection for the public from judges who are far out of the 
mainstream?   
 
There is a tension in wanting judges to be independent and wanting judges to be somewhat 
responsive to political pressures from the public. 
 
Note: if a judge is abusive or misuses his / her office, there is a complaint procedure for 
judicial misbehavior.  Judges can be reprimanded or even removed from office for 
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misbehavior.   This is distinguished here from reprisals for deciding cases according to 
politically unpopular views, actions which are not subject to professional discipline. 
 
 
IV. How we choose and keep judges 
 
Given what characteristics we want judges to have, how do we select them to most effectively 
assure those attributes?    
 We look here at selection of federal, California, other state and administrative judges 
 
Federal and state (California) systems select judges differently.  Both start with 
recommendations of judicial candidates by peers in merit reviews. 
 
Merit reviews 
In both federal and California judge selection processes, bar associations and 
commissions rate judicial candidates.   
 
They solicit attorneys’ and others’ views, review candidate’s record as an attorney 
and make a recommendation.   
 
In California the commission ranks candidates on a 4-level scale in California, 
ranging from not qualified to very well qualified.  Review of federal judicial 
candidates uses a 3-level scale. 
 
Selection of federal judges 
 
 Tenure:  Life appointment: have job with no reduction in salary during “good behavior” 
 
Alexander Hamilton:  Life tenure is “the best expedient which can be devised in 
any government” to protect judicial independence 
  
Selection process:  According to US Constitution, nominated by President, confirmed by 
Senate 
 
 Political issues: president wants to appoint someone who shares political viewpoint 
 
Interest groups express views before and at Senate committee confirmation 
hearings and vote 
 
  Clearly people know that judges are not apolitical or purely neutral 
 
Selection of California judges 
 Tenure:  Trial judges have 6-year terms; appellate judges have 12-year terms 
 
 Selection process: all subject to election  
Become judges by: 
1) Run against incumbent judge in general election or 
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2) Run for empty seat (e.g., when judge retires) or 
 
3) (If prior judge leaves in middle of term): appointment nominated by 
governor and then voted on by public in next election 
 
How do we learn about judges’ opinions, who they are, if they can’t discuss political 
views? 
 
See proposed questionnaire in “Protections urged for judges” in which two former 
California governors (Wilson and Davis) come to opposite conclusions about the value of 
having judges answer political questions from interest groups regarding controversial 
issues such as same-sex marriage. 
 
Compare Republican Party v. White (2002) in which the question was whether candidates 
for judicial office should be allowed to voice criticism of case decisions issued by the 
courts, or whether such criticism erodes the impartiality of the judiciary.  The Minnesota 
Code of Judicial Conduct said that candidates for judicial office shall not “announce his 
or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”  
 
The US Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision striking down the Minnesota rule as 
violating the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.  
  
In dissent, Justice Stevens said that the majority opinion obscured the line 
between campaigning for judicial and political office.  In another dissenting 
opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that freedom of speed applies in elections for 
political office (executive and legislative) but not in judicial elections because 
judges are not political actors. 
 
Although public votes on judges, remember the Canons of Judicial Ethics limit what 
judicial candidates can say in campaigning.  They cannot comment on political issues nor 
endorse political candidates for office (though they can endorse candidates for judicial 
office).  Canon 5 
 
Though note Republican Party v. Minnesota: affirming the right of judges to tell 
voters their positions on political and legal issues that might come before them on 
the bench. 
 
Selection of other state judges 
 Most states vote on judges 
 
 Note:  I’ve seen references saying that either 39 or 51 states elect their judges as 
opposed to appointing them for life.  See ABA handout. 
 
Retention rate of incumbent judges very high:  99% in 34-year period in 10 states 
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Selection of administrative judges 
  
Remember: administrative judges are not in the judicial branch but in the executive 
branch (deciding issues in administrative agencies). Administrative judges specialize in 
specific areas of law.   Administrative agencies usually use an adversarial system similar 
to courts: they hear arguments from adversaries (often one party is the agency itself in 
support of its administrative action, which an individual has challenged) and decide 
according to law, based on testimony at the hearings.  Some examples: 
 
 Federal administrative law judges hear cases in: immigration, bankruptcy, federal 
tax courts 
 
State administrative law judges hear cases in: workers’ compensation, 
unemployment benefits, state health and safety (CalOSHA) courts 
 
Tenure:  Set by civil service rules (which are designed to avoid political considerations or 
patronage).  Generally one can’t be discharged except “for cause” (for good reason) 
 
 Selection process:   Through civil service application process. 
 
See the Refugee Roulette article on the website.  It discusses a 3-year period 
several years ago when 31 Immigration Judges were not selected through civil 
service protections but put through a political litmus test.   
 
A review of their decisions in political asylum cases shows that more than half 
were more likely to deny applications for asylum than the other judges in their 
areas. 
 
Of 16 Immigration Judges who decided a statistically significant number 
of cases,  
9 rejected asylum applicants at significantly higher rate than other 
local immigration judges 
   4 the same 
   3 more lenient 
 
Study concluded that “the facts of the case may be less important in determining 
whether someone is deported than which judge hears the case.” 
 
 Compare this to the democratic principle of a government of laws, not of men 
(and women) 
 
An example of what can happen when elected judges adopt politically unpopular opinions: 
 
Iowa Supreme Court justices - Varnum .  As we’ll read, in a unanimous opinion in 2009, 
the Iowa Supreme Court struck down bans against same-sex marriage, finding them 
unconstitutional.   
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As the “Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions” NY Times article on the 
website mentions, national organizations are pouring money into Iowa to 
campaign against the judges who joined the Varnum decision.   
   
Troy Price, political director for One Iowa, a gay rights group, said Iowans would 
not have voted for same-sex marriage and would likely reject it today. “Our 
concern is the message it sends to judges around the country that if you have a 
case like ours come before you, you could very well lose your jobs over it,” Mr. 
Price said. “This is an effort to intimidate the courts in Iowa and intimidate courts 
all across the country.”  
 
Rose Bird court ouster 
In 1986 there was an election campaign against 3 Justices citing their failure to affirm 
any of 61 death penalty cases before them at court.  
 
Ran television commercials featuring the children of the victims of the murderers whose 
sentences Justices Bird, Reynoso and Grodin voted to reverse.  
 
Campaign was financed not by prosecutors or pro-death penalty people, but by big 
business & insurance – Justice Bird was ruling against their interests. 
The voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird and two associate justices from California 
Supreme Court.  
 
 Were they politically out of touch?  Effect of an emotionally charged campaign? 
Perhaps not so far out of touch with at least some other opinion on the death 
penalty:  
 
- 2 justices of the US Supreme Court consistently voted against the death 
penalty stating that it violated the 8th A prohibition of cruel & unusual 
punishment (Brennan & Marshall),  
- All western democracies have abolished the death penalty,  
- 12 states and the District of Columbia have no death penalty. 
 
- Justice Stevens says in the article posted that the death penalty is one 
area where he changed his mind  
 
 
Federal judges – with the safeguards of life tenure – are more likely to be independent of 
political will, and therefore less constrained to decide in favor of politically popular causes.  
 
If having judicial review of political minority rights is a key function of the courts, shouldn’t we 
decide in favor of life tenure for all judges?   
 Yet most states have some form of election for state judges. 
 
334
 13 
But what about the importance that judges be responsive to and understanding of public 
attitudes?   The value of a bench that is connected to the public?  The value of public confidence 
in the decisions that the bench makes?    
 
How can the bench be accountable while preserving the importance of judicial protection of 
political minority interests?  What system is the most effective in ensuring a fair, respected, 
effective judiciary? 
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http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/rules/Rules_Title7_JNE.pdf 
 
Rules and Procedures of the Commission on  
Judicial Nominees Evaluation  
 
 
MISSION STATEMENT  
The mission of the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation of the State Bar of California is 
to assist the Governor in the judicial selection process and thereby to promote a California 
judiciary of quality and integrity by providing independent, comprehensive, accurate, and fair 
evaluations of candidates for judicial appointment and nomination.  
 
… 
 
SECTION 6. Qualities/Factors For Consideration In Evaluating Candidates  
 
The commission seeks to find the following qualities in judicial candidates. However, the 
absence of any one factor on the lists below is not intended automatically to disqualify a 
candidate.  
 
a. Qualities for all judicial candidates: impartiality, freedom from bias, industry, 
integrity, honesty, legal experience, professional skills, intellectual capacity, 
judgment, community respect, commitment to equal justice, judicial 
temperament, communication skills, job-related health. In addition, for:  
 
b. Trial court candidates: decisiveness, oral communication skills, patience.  
 
c. Appellate court candidates: collegiality, writing ability, scholarship.  
 
d. Supreme Court Candidates: collegiality, writing ability, scholarship, distinction 
in the profession, breadth and depth of experience. 
336
American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century 
Judiciary 
 
PRINCIPLES AND CONCLUSIONS 
AUGUST 2003 
 
 
I. ENDURING PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Judges should uphold the law. 
B. Judges should be independent. 
C. Judges should be impartial. 
D. Judges should possess the appropriate temperament and character. 
E. Judges should possess the appropriate capabilities and credentials. 
F. Judges and the Judiciary should have the confidence of the public. 
G. The judicial system should be diverse and reflective of the society it serves. 
H. Judges should be constrained to perform their duties in a manner that justifies public 
faith and confidence in the courts. 
 
II. PRESERVING THE JUDICIARY'S INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Judicial Qualifications, Training and Evaluation 
 
• States should establish credible, neutral, non-partisan and diverse deliberative 
bodies to assess the qualifications of all judicial aspirants so as to limit the candidate 
pool to those who are well qualified. 
• The judicial branch should take primary responsibility for providing continuing judicial 
education, that continuing judicial education should be required for all judges, and 
that state appropriations should be sufficient to provide adequate funding for 
continuing judicial education programs. 
• Congress should fully fund the State Justice Institute. 
• States should fully fund the National Center for State Courts. 
• States should develop judicial evaluation programs to assess the performance of all 
sitting judges. 
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the “Wise Latina” comment 
The strongest criticism of President Obama’s nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor as an 
Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court came from conservatives and some Republican 
senators regarding a line that she used in some form in a number of her speeches and that became 
best known for its use in a 2001 lecture at UC Berkeley’s law school: "I would hope that a wise 
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a 
better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life.”  
During Judge Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing on July 13, 2009, she backed away from her 
"wise Latina" remark, declaring it "a rhetorical flourish that fell flat" and stating that "I do 
not believe that any ethnic, racial or gender group has an advantage in sound judgment.” 
 She also stated that, while life experience shapes who one is, "ultimately and completely" a 
judge follows the law regardless of personal background. 
Judge Sotomayor had made 
similar remarks in other speeches between 1994 and 2003.  
When Republican senators confronted her regarding other remarks from her past speeches, she 
pointed to her judicial record and said she had never let her own life experiences or opinions 
influence her decisions.  
The American Bar Association gave her a unanimous "well qualified” rating, its highest mark for 
professional qualification.  On July 28, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved Judge 
Sotomayor's nomination; the 13-6 vote was almost entirely along party lines, with no Democrats 
opposing her and only one Republican supporting her.  On August 6. 2009, Justice Sotomayor 
was confirmed by the full Senate by a vote of 68 to 31; voting was mostly along party lines.  
Justice Sotomayor is the third woman to serve on the Court.  Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg were the first and second. 
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Cantil-Sakauye confirmed by judicial panel; 
will be on the November ballot 
Tani Cantil-Sakauye will be on the November ballot after the Commission on 
Judicial Appointments last month unanimously confirmed her nomination to 
be the next chief justice of the California Supreme Court, paving the way for 
the Sacramento jurist to become the court’s first Filipina leader. 
Documents made public two days before the Aug. 25 confirmation showed 
that the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation rated Cantil-Sakauye 
“exceptionally well-qualified” to become chief justice, the top ranking the commission 
issues. In a letter to Chief Justice Ronald George, JNE chair Alice Salvo said the nominee 
has a “brilliant mind,” takes her duties seriously and “brings a sense of joyful enthusiasm to 
the performance of them.” Added Salvo, “She is always respectful and considerate toward 
colleagues, staff, attorneys, and litigants. She is immensely respected for her exceptional 
objectivity, her impartiality, her good judgment and lack of bias, her common sense and her 
decisiveness. She possesses the model judicial temperament.” 
The appointments commission, made up of George, Attorney General Jerry Brown and Joan 
Dempsey Klein, a Los Angeles appeals court justice, took testimony for two hours from 13 
people, all but two offering support. "She is the perfect person to assume the duties of the 
chief justice," said Justice Arthur Scotland, her colleague on the 3rd District Court of Appeal 
in Sacramento. 
Klein, long an advocate of more women on the bench, asked the nominee, "Do you realize 
the huge responsibility to yourself and your gender?” Cantil-Sakauye nodded, acknowledged 
Klein’s role as a pioneer for women judges and replied, “None of us got here alone.” 
Two opponents of Gov. Schwarzenegger’s choice to lead the high court criticized her, one for 
favoring women over men in child custody and domestic violence matters. A second critic, 
E.T. Snell, who described himself as a “clown community activist” said Cantil-Sakauye 
pursued “draconian criminal jurisprudence.” The nominee said she stood by her record and 
called her critics misinformed and misguided. 
 
Tani Cantil-
Sakauye 
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All seven Supreme Court justices attended the hearing, as well as Cantil-Sakauye’s mother, 
husband, the couple’s two daughters, colleagues from the Sacramento bench and members 
of the Filipino community. 
Cantil-Sakauye, 50, will be unopposed on the Nov. 2 ballot and if confirmed by voters, will 
begin a 12-year term in January, when George will step down. The daughter of immigrant 
farm workers, she will be the first Filipina to lead the Supreme Court, which will have a 
female majority. 
Cantil-Sakauye has been an associate justice for the 3rd District Court of Appeal in 
Sacramento since 2005 and has nearly 20 years of experience on the bench. She was first 
appointed to the municipal court in 1990 at the age of 31. She earlier worked in the 
Sacramento district attorney’s office and then served as deputy legal affairs secretary and 
then deputy legislative secretary to Gov. Deukmejian. George appointed her to the Judicial 
Council and named her chair of a key committee on financial accountability and efficiency, 
which oversees the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
After the hearing, Cantil-Sakauye ducked questions about same-sex marriage because, she 
said, related issues may again come before the court. But she said her background might 
lead her to approach the controversial issue with a different perspective. “Either as a 
woman, a Filipina, a mother, a 50-year-old woman in this society – that always has an 
influence on how I see the facts,” though not on how she applies the law, she said. 
“I like to fully know the facts before I make a decision,” she told reporters. “And so, in that 
way, I am probably inclusive and pretty collaborative. But I like to get to a decision.” 
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Changing the color of the California bench 
By Nancy McCarthy 
Staff Writer 
The release of figures last month that show a decidedly white male judiciary in California 
highlighted critics’ complaints in recent years about a lack of diversity on the bench. And 
although observers serve up a smorgasbord of reasons for the paucity of judges of color and 
female judges, and lay responsibility on different doorsteps, they agree the judiciary does not 
come close to mirroring California’s population. 
The data show that 70 percent of the state’s judges are white and almost 73 percent are male. 
Latino judges represent 6.3 percent of the bench and African-Americans and Asian-Americans 
make up 4.4 percent each. Since Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger took office in 2003, fewer than 
20 percent of his 211 judicial appointees have been minorities — 16 Latinos, 15 Asian-
Americans and 10 African-Americans. 
“I think it’s a huge problem,” said Alameda County Superior Court Judge 
Brenda Harbin-Forte, who chairs a panel that focuses on courts for the State 
Bar’s Diversity Pipeline Task Force. “If we don’t take steps now to address 
this issue, people coming to the courts will lose respect for the justice 
system.” 
The working group found that in all 58 counties in California, the number of 
white judges exceeds the white population of the county. In some counties 
with high ethnic minority populations, there are no judges of color. 
The panel said the principal barriers to change, both real and perceived, are: 
z An appointment process that is inherently political;  
z A candidate evaluation process that suffers from a lack of transparency and a 
perceived lack of accountability for the outcomes;  
z Screening committees used by the governor;  
(Click to Enlarge)
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z An overemphasis on trial experience; and  
z An apparent bias against the criminal defense bar.  
The end result of such barriers, Harbin-Forte said, is that minority attorneys “are just not going 
to bother” to apply for judgeships. 
Representatives of minority bar associations blame Schwarzenegger and past governors for 
failing to appoint more women and minorities to the bench. Schwarzenegger in particular drew 
criticism from minority bar associations last year when John Davies, his then-judicial 
appointments secretary, said the governor did not consider candidates’ race or ethnicity when 
making judicial selections. 
The complaints gained traction in the last legislative session when Assembly Speaker Fabian 
Nunez, in an effort to force the governor to try harder to recruit minority candidates, nearly 
derailed SB 56, a measure to create 50 new judgeships this year. 
Nunez allowed the bill to move forward after Schwarzenegger agreed to consider changes to 
the judicial application form and to make public the ethnicity and gender of applicants. (The 
Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation (JNE) and the Administrative Office of the Courts 
also are required to provide annual gender and ethnicity information about applicants and 
judges.) He did not agree to make public the secret county vetting committees that consider 
applicants and make recommendations for judgeships. 
Schwarzenegger has defended his record, saying that since taking office, his administration 
“has focused on expanding the pool of minority judicial candidates” and that the pool increased 
to 29 percent last year. 
In February, he appointed Sharon Majors-Lewis, an African-American 
woman who was chief deputy district attorney in San Diego County, as his 
new judicial appointments secretary. Majors-Lewis has spent her first few 
weeks on the job meeting with bar associations, the current JNE chair and 
others and said she’s optimistic that the various parties can work together. 
She also said Schwarzenegger is “committed to making our bench more 
diverse.” 
In particular, she disputed the often repeated criticism that, in making judicial 
appointments, Schwarzenegger tries to reflect the diversity of California’s lawyer population 
rather than the diversity of the state. “As a practical matter,” Majors-Lewis said, “we cannot go 
and get judges from the general population. The governor would love to have the California 
bench look like California. That is our ultimate goal and I think he’s working very hard at 
achieving that.” 
But Christopher Arriola, a deputy district attorney in Santa Clara County and past president of 
California La Raza Lawyers, said Schwarzenegger “is really not doing very well,” particularly 
since minority applicants are gaining qualified or better ratings from the JNE Commission. “It is 
a little frustrating to see there was a pool of very well qualified Hispanic applicants who just 
weren’t being appointed,” he said. 
Gary Farwell, president of the California Association of Black Lawyers, agreed that qualified 
applicants have not gotten the nod. “We believe there are plenty of attorneys of color who have 
applied and are not getting appointed,” Farwell said. “The ones who have applied are just as 
qualified as the ones who are appointed.” 
Harbin-Forte said the working group wants to figure out “where the bottleneck is” for minority 
applicants and cited several areas where they are at a disadvantage. Applicants with extensive 
jury experience, particularly as prosecutors or civil litigation lawyers, fare well, as do attorneys 
with political connections, she said. Attorneys from the minority community often practice in 
areas such as family law or probate that don’t entail vast trial experience. Many also work as 
public defenders or criminal defense attorneys, whom Harbin-Forte said are not appointed as 
often as prosecutors. 
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The small vetting committees in most counties that report privately to the governor can present 
a big obstacle to some applicants. “We understand the process is inherently political,” said 
Harbin-Forte, who emphasized the working group does not favor quotas or artificial caps. 
“We’re not talking about special treatment,” she said. “We just want the same opportunities.” 
She also thinks the JNE Commission, the group that evaluates every candidate submitted by 
the governor, gives many minority applicants a “qualified” (Q) rating, seldom awarding an 
“extremely well qualified” (EWQ) or “well qualified” (WQ) rating. 
“We don’t know why we can’t get a lot of people through JNE,” Harbin-Forte said. “Many 
minorities get rated only ‘qualified.’ That ought to be enough, but the governor’s office likes to 
appoint EWQs or WQs. If that’s what they want and minorities fall into the Q pool, that’s 
another barrier.” 
Nonsense, said several former JNE commissioners, who also took issue with an accusation 
last fall by Timothy Simon, a Schwarzenegger aide at the time, that JNE gave poor ratings to 
minority applicants he considered strong candidates for the bench. Simon, who no longer works 
for the governor, said “there is something wrong” with the JNE process and that he had been 
“shocked beyond tears” by the low ratings. 
Mark Schickman, a former JNE chair, said blaming the commission for the 
lack of minority appointments to the bench “is a transparently specious 
excuse . . . There’s nothing in the JNE process that’s stopping the governor 
from appointing more women or people of color if he or she wants to.” 
Schickman, a San Francisco labor lawyer, said he found it ironic that JNE 
has been accused in the past of being too liberal or bending over backwards 
in favor of people of color. “I would dispute that, because our system is 
designed for impartiality and both the last Democratic and Republican 
administrations have expressed that they do not want us weighing in on politics . . . or on 
anything but what’s in our rules.” 
He and other commissioners said JNE is well balanced, does exhaustive evaluations on a 
case-by-case basis and has numerous safeguards in place to assure that candidates receive a 
fair hearing. 
“The legal community as a whole still has a long way to go to reach equity when it comes to 
minorities and women,” said Helen Zukin, a Los Angeles lawyer and former JNE chair. “But it’s 
not a function of the JNE Commission. We just call it as we see it as to who is sent to us and 
only on professional qualifications. That’s the very limited role the JNE Commission is playing.” 
Last year, JNE evaluated 225 candidates sent by the governor’s office, of whom 52 stated they 
are minorities and 39 were classified as other or unknown. Among those who stated they are 
minorities, nine were rated not qualified, 24 received a qualified rating, 15 well qualified and 
four extremely well qualified. During the same time frame, Schwarzenegger named 21 
minorities to the bench, although some may have been evaluated in previous years. 
Harbin-Forte, Arriola and Farwell said despite their displeasure with the numbers, they are 
optimistic that Majors-Lewis will bring a new approach to the process. “I think the governor’s 
office is making an effort,” Harbin-Forte said, and she praised “the bipartisan way he 
approaches his appointments.” 
Majors-Lewis is reviewing the en-tire appointments process, meeting with interested parties 
and trying to connect with the legal community and the public. The application form now 
includes a revised question about prior experience, a response to complaints about the heavy 
emphasis on trial experience as a job requirement. The new question will allow applicants to 
demonstrate “other skill sets that would translate over to making a good judge,” Majors-Lewis 
said. 
She said the administration has no set policy about appointing applicants based on their rating 
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by the JNE Commission. “We consider every person individually, based on the total picture, the 
county they want to sit in, their expertise, their breadth of experience,” she said. “Just because 
they’re a Q (qualified rating) does not mean they could never get a judicial appointment.” 
She encouraged every lawyer who believes he or she is qualified to be a judge to apply. “I don’t 
want people to self-select themselves out of the process because they have a disability or are a 
Democrat or don’t know anyone,” Majors-Lewis said, adding she wants “to expand that whole 
group of people we can pull from. We’re going to take a look at everyone who’s applied.” 
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COUNTY
M F Filled M F Filled  VACANCIES
Alameda 48 18 66 69 3 11 5 16 16 0
Alpine 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Amador 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Butte 8 2 10 10 0 2 0 2 2 0
Calaveras 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Colusa 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Contra Costa 18 15 33 33 0 10 2 12 14 2
Del Norte 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
El Dorado 5 1 6 6 0 2 0 2 2 0
Fresno 32 4 36 36 0 4 4 8 9 1
Glenn 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Humboldt 6 1 7 7 0 0 1 1 1 0
Imperial 7 1 8 9 1 2 0 2 2 0
Inyo 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Kern 30 3 33 33 0 5 1 6 7 1
Kings 6 1 7 7 0 1 1 2 2 0
Lake 4 0 4 4 0 1 0 1 1 0
Lassen 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Los Angeles 300 126 426 429 3 96 36 132 135 3
Madera 6 1 7 7 0 0 1 1 2 1
Marin 7 3 10 10 0 3 1 4 5 1
Mariposa 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
Mendocino 7 1 8 8 0 1 0 1 2 1
Merced 6 0 6 6 0 4 0 4 4 0
Modoc 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mono 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Monterey 13 5 18 18 0 1 1 2 2 0
Napa 4 2 6 6 0 1 0 1 2 1
Nevada 5 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 1 1
Orange 82 27 109 109 0 30 3 33 35 2
Placer 7 2 9 9 0 2 2 4 4 0
GENDER DIVERSITY- SUPERIOR COURTS- AS OF MAY 2006- PRELIMINARY
JUDGES COMMISSIONERSTOTAL
AUTH'D
JUDGES VACANCIES
TOTAL
AUTH'D
COMMR'S
Source: Admin Ofc of Courts Records
Gender Diversity.Judges Commissioners (5/29/06) Judge B. Harbin-Forte  1 
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COUNTY
M F Filled M F Filled  VACANCIES
GENDER DIVERSITY- SUPERIOR COURTS- AS OF MAY 2006- PRELIMINARY
JUDGES COMMISSIONERSTOTAL
AUTH'D
JUDGES VACANCIES
TOTAL
AUTH'D
COMMR'S
Plumas 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 0
Riverside 40 9 49 49 0 15 5 20 20 0
Sacramento 38 13 51 52 1 3 3 6 8 2
San Benito 2 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 1
San Bernardino 46 14 60 63 3 10 2 12 12 0
San Diego 90 36 126 128 2 15 7 22 22 0
San Francisco 28 22 50 50 0 6 8 14 14 0
San Joaquin 18 8 26 26 0 3 1 4 4 0
San Luis Obispo 7 3 10 11 1 3 0 3 4 1
San Mateo 18 8 26 26 0 3 4 7 7 0
Santa Barbara 16 2 18 19 1 3 2 5 5 0
Santa Clara 58 21 79 79 0 4 5 9 10 1
Santa Cruz 7 1 8 10 2 2 1 3 3 0
Shasta 8 1 9 9 0 2 0 2 2 0
Sierra 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1
Siskiyou 3 1 4 4 0 0 1 1 1 0
Solano 13 2 15 16 1 2 3 5 6 1
Sonoma 13 3 16 16 0 2 4 6 6 0
Stanislaus 12 5 17 17 0 2 2 4 4 0
Sutter 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 1
Tehama 4 0 4 4 0 1 0 1 1 0
Trinity 2 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 0
Tulare 13 3 16 16 0 3 1 4 4 0
Tuolumne 3 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 1 1
Ventura 23 5 28 28 0 4 0 4 4 0
Yolo 6 3 9 9 0 2 1 3 3 0
Yuba 2 3 5 5 0 1 0 1 1
TOTALS 1,101 379 1,480 1,498 18 269 109 378 406 29
Percentages 74.4% 25.6% 100.0% 71.2% 28.8% 100.0%
Source: Admin Ofc of Courts Records
Gender Diversity.Judges Commissioners (5/29/06) Judge B. Harbin-Forte  2 
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From California Progress Report   
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/print/9430 
A More Inclusive and Diverse Judiciary 
Posted on 04 October 2011 
By Assemblymember Mike Davis 
California’s current pool of superior court judges does not reflect our state’s rich 
diversity.  It is for this reason I introduced Assembly Bill AB 126 to make our judicial 
selection process more fair and diverse.   
Currently, whites make up 73.6% of the state’s judiciary, compared to 5.2% for 
African Americans and 7.5% for Latinos. These numbers are significantly out of step with 
population statistics released by the 2010 Census. 
According to the US Census, whites make up 40.1% of California’s population, blacks 6.2%, 
Asians 13%, and Latinos 37.6%. As a result, minorities are under-represented in the judiciary, 
one of three equal branches of California’s government. 
Diversity on the bench can make a difference. Studies have shown a wide disparity in sentencing 
when it comes to race in the context of criminal justice. Often, when a judge has discretion in 
sentencing, African Americans and other minorities are given more prison time than whites for 
the same crime. 
For example, 2006 U.S. Department of Justice statistics on felony sentences imposed by states 
show higher average sentences for blacks over whites in almost every category and sub-category, 
including violent, drug, and property offenses. 
As a result, it is no surprise that minorities make up the overwhelming majority of California’s 
prisoners. According to the Public Policy Institute of California, African Americans (6.2% of 
total population) make up 29% of the state’s male prison population, Latinos 40% and Whites 
only 25%.   
Ryan S. King, policy analyst for The Sentencing Project states: "It’s hard to know how much of 
the disparity is explicable by discrimination, however, it would be naïve not to think that some 
portion of it is (based on) race.” 
Due to this disparity, it is imperative to consider diverse backgrounds when determining who 
should judge accused citizens. This does not mean that the majority of our judiciary does not 
serve with distinction, but it does underscore the need for diversity. As a long-time elected 
official and practitioner of public policy focused on issues relating to the judiciary and diversity, 
I can verify the abundance of minority lawyers qualified to be fine judges. 
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It is in the best interest of the state that qualified minority lawyers be examined fairly in the 
judicial appointment process.   
Assembly Bill 126 would require each member of the State Bar responsible for the evaluation of 
judicial candidates to complete a minimum two hours of mandatory training in the areas of 
fairness and bias in the judicial appointment process.   
The training, to be administered by the State Bar, will give the Governor’s judicial advisors the 
education necessary for making a prudent decision that is responsive to various cultures of our 
great state. 
The bill will also require the State Bar and Administrative Office of the Courts, in their annual 
reports, to use the ethnic and racial categories used by the 2010 U.S. Census.  The 
Administrative Office of the Courts annually releases demographic information, including race 
and gender on current judges while the State Bar releases demographic information on judicial 
applicants.   
Currently there are differences in the way ethnicities are categorized (example: Latino vs. 
Hispanic). This bill will standardize the information released by these reports, allowing us to 
more accurately judge California’s efforts towards diversity in the courts. 
Lastly, AB 126 encourages members of the judicial selection advisory committees to recommend 
candidates from diverse backgrounds and cultures reflecting the demographics of California.  
A diverse judiciary will help build a long lasting trust between judges and the public they serve. 
This bill goes well beyond fairness. Judges occupy a position of high prestige and honor, and the 
public should have an equally high degree of confidence in both their integrity and lack of bias 
as it pertains to their rulings. It is important that our children, our future leaders, have confidence 
in our system of jurisprudence as well as role models of their own background to show that with 
hard work and dedication, anything is possible in America.   
AB 126 (Davis) passed both the Assembly and Senate and is now on the Governor’s desk. I urge 
the Governor to sign AB 126, making the judicial selection process more fair and inclusive. 
 
MS note: The bill was signed into law on October 9, 2011, and is now part of Cal. Govt. 
Code section 12011.5. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Assemblyman Mike Davis was elected to serve the 48th Assembly District (Los Angeles County) 
in 2006.   
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http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf 
 
California Code of Judicial Ethics  
 
Canon 1.  A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF 
THE JUDICIARY.  
 
Canon 2.  A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF 
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE JUDGE’S ACTIVITIES.  
 
Canon 3.  A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE 
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY.  
 
Canon 4.  A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE JUDGE’S QUASI-JUDICIAL AND 
EXTRAJUDICIAL ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF 
CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS.  
 
Canon 5.  A JUDGE OR JUDICIAL CANDIDATE SHALL REFRAIN FROM 
INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY.  
 
Canon 6.  COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS.  
 
Note:   I have deleted material both from the Canons and from the Advisory Committee 
Commentaries.  In most cases I have not indicated that I have eliminated material.  If you 
have a particular question about a section, I suggest you look at it on-line to view the full 
rule and commentary.  – Margaret Stevenson 
 
CANON 1  
 
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY  
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY  
 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge 
should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, 
and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to 
further that objective.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the 
integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depend in 
turn upon their acting without fear or favor.  
 
Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law and the provisions 
of this Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the 
adherence of each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violations of this Code 
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diminish public confidence in the judiciary and thereby do injury to the system of 
government under law.  
The basic function of an independent and honorable judiciary is to maintain the utmost 
integrity in decision making, and this Code should be read and interpreted with that 
function in mind.  
 
CANON 2  
 
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE  
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL OF THE  
JUDGE'S ACTIVITIES  
 
A. Promoting Public Confidence  
 
A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by 
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must 
expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept 
restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by other 
members of the community and should do so freely and willingly.  
 
The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety 
applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. The test for the 
appearance of impropriety is whether a person aware of the facts might reasonably 
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to act with integrity, impartiality, and 
competence.  
 
B. Use of the Prestige of Judicial Office  
 
(1) A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence the 
judge’s judicial conduct or judgment, nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey 
the impression that any individual is in a special position to influence the judge.  
 
(2) A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office or use the judicial title in any 
manner, including any oral or written communication, to advance the pecuniary or 
personal interests of the judge or others. … 
  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
A strong judicial branch, based on the prestige which comes from effective and ethical 
performance, is essential to a system of government in which the judiciary functions 
independently of the executive and legislative branches. Judges should distinguish 
between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all of their activities.  
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A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for the advancement of the 
private interests of the judge or others. For example, a judge must not use the judicial 
position to gain advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge’s family; or use 
his or her position to gain deferential treatment when stopped by a police officer for a 
traffic offense.  
 
C. Membership in Organizations  
 
A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.    
 
This Canon does not apply to membership in a religious organization or an official military 
organization of the United States. So long as membership does not violate Canon 4A, this 
Canon does not bar membership in a nonprofit youth organization.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimination gives 
rise to a perception that the judge's impartiality is impaired. This Canon exempts 
membership in religious and military organizations and, subject to Canon 4A, does not 
bar membership in nonprofit youth organizations.  
 
These exemptions are necessary because membership in United States military 
organizations is subject to current valid military regulations, and religious beliefs are 
constitutionally protected. Membership in nonprofit youth organizations is not barred to 
accommodate individual rights of intimate association and free expression. 
 
 
CANON 3  
 
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL  
OFFICE IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY  
 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities  
 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide all matters assigned to the judge except those in which he 
or she is disqualified.  
 
(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law regardless of partisan interests, public clamor, or 
fear of criticism, and shall maintain professional competence in the law.  
 
(3) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.  
 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, 
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity, and shall require similar 
conduct of lawyers and of all court staff and personnel under the judge's direction and 
control.  
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(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the 
performance of judicial duties, engage in speech, gestures, or other conduct that would 
reasonably be perceived as (1) bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or 
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, 
or socioeconomic status, or (2) sexual harassment.  
 
 (6) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from 
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status against parties, witnesses, 
counsel, or others.  
 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that 
person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, 
or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding, except 
as follows: …  
 
(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communication when expressly 
authorized by law to do so.   
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes 
communications from lawyers, law professors, and other persons who are not 
participants in the proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted by the exceptions 
noted in Canon 3B(7).  
 
An appropriate and often desirable procedure for a court to obtain the advice of a 
disinterested expert on legal issues is to invite the expert to file an amicus curiae brief.  
A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the 
evidence presented, unless otherwise authorized by law. For example, a judge is 
statutorily authorized to investigate and consult witnesses informally in small claims 
cases.  
 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters fairly, promptly, and efficiently. A judge 
shall manage the courtroom in a manner that provides all litigants the opportunity to have 
their matters fairly adjudicated in accordance with the law.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
The obligation of a judge to dispose of matters promptly and efficiently must not take 
precedence over the judge’s obligation to dispose of the matters fairly and with patience.  
For example, when a litigant is self-represented, a judge has the discretion to take 
reasonable steps, appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the law and 
the canons, to enable the litigant to be heard. … 
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A judge should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel 
coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by the courts.  
  
(9) A judge shall not make any public comment about a pending or impending proceeding 
in any court, and shall not make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere 
with a fair trial or hearing. … 
 
 (10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than in a court 
order or opinion in a proceeding, but may express appreciation to jurors for their service 
to the judicial system and the community.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
Commending or criticizing jurors for their verdict may imply a judicial expectation in 
future cases and may impair a juror's ability to be fair and impartial in a subsequent 
case.  
 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities  
 
(1) Whenever a judge has reliable information that another judge has violated any 
provision of the Code of Judicial Ethics, the judge shall take or initiate appropriate 
corrective action, which may include reporting the violation to the appropriate authority.  
 
(2) Whenever a judge has personal knowledge that a lawyer has violated any provision of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the judge shall take appropriate corrective action.  
 
(3) A judge shall promptly report in writing to the Commission on Judicial Performance 
when he or she is charged in court by misdemeanor citation, prosecutorial complaint, 
information, or indictment, with any crime in the United States as specified below. … 
 
E. Disqualification  
 
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is 
required by law.  
 
(2) In all trial court proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the record information that is 
reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 170.1, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for disqualification.  
 
 (3) Ownership of a corporate bond issued by a party to a proceeding and having a fair 
market value exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars is disqualifying. Ownership of 
government bonds issued by a party to a proceeding is disqualifying only if the outcome of 
the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the judge’s bond. Ownership in a 
mutual or common investment fund that holds bonds is not a disqualifying financial 
interest.  
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 (4) An appellate justice shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding if for any 
reason:  
(a) the justice believes his or her recusal would further the interest of justice; or  
(b) the justice substantially doubts his or her capacity to be impartial; or  
(c) the circumstances are such that a reasonable person aware of the facts would 
doubt the justice’s ability to be impartial.  
 
(5) Disqualification of an appellate justice is also required in the following instances:  
(a) The appellate justice has appeared or otherwise served as a lawyer in the 
pending matter, or has appeared or served as a lawyer in any other matter involving 
any of the same parties if that other matter related to the same contested issues of 
fact and law as the present matter.  
 
(b) Within the last two years, (i) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or 
trustee thereof, either was a client of the justice when the justice was engaged in the 
private practice of law or was a client of a lawyer with whom the justice was 
associated in the private practice of law; or (ii) a lawyer in the proceeding was 
associated with the justice in the private practice of law. … 
 
(d) The appellate justice, or his or her spouse or registered domestic partner, or a 
minor child residing in the household, has a financial interest or is a fiduciary who 
has a financial interest in the proceeding, or is a director, advisor, or other active 
participant in the affairs of a party. …  
 
(f) The justice (i) served as the judge before whom the proceeding was tried or 
heard in the lower court, (ii) has a personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding, or (iii) has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party or a party’s lawyer.  
 
(h) The justice has a current arrangement concerning prospective employment or 
other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral or is participating in, or, 
within the last two years has participated in, discussions regarding prospective 
employment or service as a dispute resolution neutral, or has been engaged in such 
employment or service, and any of the following applies: … 
  
(i) The justice’s spouse or registered domestic partner or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to the justice or his or her spouse or registered domestic 
partner, or the person’s spouse or registered domestic partner, was a witness in the 
proceeding.  
 
CANON 4 
 
A JUDGE SHALL SO CONDUCT THE JUDGE'S  
QUASI-JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL  
ACTIVITIES AS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF  
CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS  
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A. Extrajudicial Activities in General  
 
A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extrajudicial activities so that they do not  
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially;  
(2) demean the judicial office; or  
(3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
Complete separation of a judge from extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; 
a judge should not become isolated from the community in which the judge lives.  
Expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge's judicial activities, 
may cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. 
Expressions which may do so include jokes or other remarks demeaning individuals on 
the basis of a classification such as their race, sex, religion, sexual orientation, or 
national origin. See Canon 2C and accompanying Commentary.  
 
B. Quasi-judicial and Avocational Activities  
 
A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in activities concerning legal and 
nonlegal subject matters, subject to the requirements of this Code. 
  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
… A judge must not engage in direct, individual solicitation of funds or memberships in 
person, in writing, or by telephone except in the following cases: (1) a judge may solicit 
other judges…   
 
In addition, a judge must also make reasonable efforts to ensure that the judge's staff, 
court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control do not solicit funds 
on the judge's behalf for any purpose, charitable or otherwise.  
 
D. Financial Activities  
 
(1) A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that  
(a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial position, or  
 
(b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships 
with lawyers or other persons likely to appear before the court on which the judge 
serves.  
 
 (2) A judge may, subject to the requirements of this Code, hold and manage investments of 
the judge and members of the judge's family, including real estate, and engage in other 
remunerative activities. … 
  
(5) Under no circumstance shall a judge accept a gift, bequest, or favor if the donor is a 
party whose interests have come or are reasonably likely to come before the judge. A judge 
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shall discourage members of the judge's family residing in the judge's household from 
accepting similar benefits from parties who have come or are reasonably likely to come 
before the judge.  
 
F. Service as Arbitrator or Mediator  
A judge shall not act as an arbitrator or mediator or otherwise perform judicial functions 
in a private capacity unless expressly authorized by law.  
 
G. Practice of Law  
A judge shall not practice law.  
 
CANON 5  
 
A JUDGE OR JUDICIAL CANDIDATE  
SHALL REFRAIN FROM INAPPROPRIATE  
POLITICAL ACTIVITY  
 
Judges are entitled to entertain their personal views on political questions. They are not 
required to surrender their rights or opinions as citizens. They shall, however, avoid 
political activity that may create the appearance of political bias or impropriety. Judicial 
independence and impartiality should dictate the conduct of judges and candidates for 
judicial office.  
 
A. Political Organizations  
 
Judges and candidates for judicial office shall not  
 
(1) act as leaders or hold any office in a political organization;  
 
(2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate for nonjudicial office or 
publicly endorse or publicly oppose a candidate for nonjudicial office; or  
 
(3) personally solicit funds for a political organization or nonjudicial candidate; or 
make contributions to a political party or political organization or to a nonjudicial 
candidate in excess of five hundred dollars in any calendar year per political party 
or political organization or candidate, or in excess of an aggregate of one thousand 
dollars in any calendar year for all political parties or political organizations or 
nonjudicial candidates.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
The term "political activity" should not be construed so narrowly as to prevent private 
comment.  
 
This provision does not prohibit a judge from signing a petition to qualify a measure for 
the ballot without the use of the judge's official title. 
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 In judicial elections, judges are neither required to shield themselves from campaign 
contributions nor are they prohibited from soliciting contributions from anyone including 
attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on judges facing election if the 
appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. Although it is improper for a judge to receive 
a gift from an attorney subject to exceptions noted in Canon 4D(6), a judge's campaign 
may receive attorney contributions.  
 
Although attendance at political gatherings is not prohibited, any such attendance should 
be restricted so that it would not constitute an express public endorsement of a 
nonjudicial candidate or a measure not directly affecting the administration of justice 
otherwise prohibited by this Canon.  
 
Under this Canon, a judge may publicly endorse another judicial candidate. Such 
endorsements are permitted because judicial officers have a special obligation to uphold 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and are in a unique position to know the 
qualifications necessary to serve as a competent judicial officer.  
 
Although members of the judge’s family are not subject to the provisions of this Code, a 
judge shall not avoid compliance with this Code by making contributions through a 
spouse or registered domestic partner or other family member.  
 
B. Conduct During Judicial Campaigns  
 
A candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not  
(1) make statements to the electorate or the appointing authority that commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before 
the courts, or  
 
(2) knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, misrepresent the identity, 
qualifications, present position, or any other fact concerning the candidate or his or 
her opponent.  
 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE COMMENTARY  
This code does not contain the “announce clause” that was the subject of the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002) 536 
U.S. 765. That opinion did not address the “commit clause,” which is contained in 
Canon 5B(1).  
 
C. Speaking at Political Gatherings  
 
Candidates for judicial office may speak to political gatherings only on their own behalf or 
on behalf of another candidate for judicial office.  
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CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 170-170.6
Following are excerpts from the statute regarding disqualification of California judges
in specific matters.  Please note the highlighted sections (my highlighting); you can
skim the rest.
170.  A judge has a duty to decide any proceeding in which he or she is not disqualified.
170.1.  (a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
   (1)  (A) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
 (B) A judge shall be deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this
paragraph if the judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree
of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is to the judge's
knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
   (2) (A) The judge served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other proceeding
involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for any party in the present
proceeding or gave advice to any party in the present proceeding upon any matter
involved in the action or proceeding.
 …
   (3) (A) The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a
party to the proceeding.
…
  (4) The judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is a party to the
proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.
(5) A lawyer or a spouse of a lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former spouse,
child, sibling, or parent of the judge or the judge's spouse or if such a person is
associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.
  (6) (A) For any reason:
   (i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of
justice.
  (ii) The judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity
to be impartial.
 (iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the
judge would be able to be impartial.
(B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for
disqualification.
   (7) By reason of permanent or temporary physical impairment, the judge is unable to
properly perceive the evidence or is unable to properly conduct the proceeding.
(8) (A) The judge has a current arrangement concerning prospective employment or
other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral or is participating in, or,
within the last two years has participated in, discussions regarding prospective
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employment or service as a dispute resolution neutral, or has been engaged in such
employment or service …
170.2.  It shall not be grounds for disqualification that the judge:
   (a) Is or is not a member of a racial, ethnic, religious, sexual or similar group and the
proceeding involves the rights of such a group.
   (b) Has in any capacity expressed a view on a legal or factual issue presented in the
proceeding, [exceptions omitted] …
   (c) Has as a lawyer or public official participated in the drafting of laws or in the effort to
pass or defeat laws, the meaning, effect or application of which is in issue in the proceeding
unless the judge believes that his or her prior involvement was so well known as to raise a
reasonable doubt in the public mind as to his or her capacity to be impartial.
170.3.  (a) (1) If a judge determines himself or herself to be disqualified, the judge shall
notify the presiding judge of the court of his or her recusal and shall not further participate in
the
proceeding, except as provided in Section 170.4, unless his or her disqualification is waived
by the parties as provided in subdivision (b).
   …
   (b) (1) A judge who determines himself or herself to be disqualified after disclosing the
basis for his or her disqualification on the record may ask the parties and their attorneys
whether they wish to waive the disqualification, …  A waiver of disqualification shall
recite the basis for the disqualification, and is effective only when signed by all parties and
their attorneys and filed in the record.
   (2) There shall be no waiver of disqualification if the basis therefor is either of the
following:
   (A) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
   (B) The judge served as an attorney in the matter in controversy, or the judge has
been    a material witness concerning that matter.
   (3) The judge shall not seek to induce a waiver and shall avoid any effort to discover which
lawyers or parties favored or opposed a waiver of disqualification.
   (4) If grounds for disqualification are first learned of or arise after the judge has made one
or more rulings in a proceeding, but before the judge has completed judicial action in a
proceeding, the judge shall, unless the disqualification be waived, disqualify himself or
herself, but in the absence of good cause the rulings he or she has made up to that time shall
not be set aside by the judge who replaces the disqualified judge.
   (c) (1) If a judge who should disqualify himself or herself refuses or fails to do so, any
party may file with the clerk a written verified statement objecting to the hearing or
trial before the judge and setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for
disqualification of the judge. The statement shall be presented at the earliest practicable
opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification. Copies of
the statement shall be served on each party or his or her attorney who has appeared and shall
be personally served on the judge alleged to be disqualified, or on his or her clerk, provided
that the judge is present in the courthouse or in chambers.
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…
   (d) The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable
order …
170.4.  (a) A disqualified judge, notwithstanding his or her disqualification may do any of the
following:
   (1) Take any action or issue any order necessary to maintain the jurisdiction of the court
pending the assignment of a judge not disqualified.
   (2) Request any other judge agreed upon by the parties to sit and act in his or her place.
   (3) Hear and determine purely default matters.
   (4) Issue an order for possession prior to judgment in eminent domain proceedings.
   (5) Set proceedings for trial or hearing.
   (6) Conduct settlement conferences.
   …
 (3) A party may file no more than one statement of disqualification against a judge
unless facts suggesting new grounds for disqualification are first learned of or arise after the
first statement of disqualification was filed.  Repetitive statements of disqualification not
alleging facts suggesting new grounds for disqualification shall be stricken by the judge
against whom they are filed.
   (d) Except as provided in this section, a disqualified judge shall have no power to act in any
proceeding after his or her disqualification or after the filing of a statement of disqualification
until the question of his or her disqualification has been determined.
…
170.6.  (a) (1) No judge, court commissioner, or referee of any superior court of the State of
California shall try any civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character
nor
hear any matter therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact when it shall be
established as hereinafter provided that the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against
any party or attorney or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in the action or
proceeding.
(2) Any party to or any attorney appearing in any action or proceeding may
establish this prejudice by an oral or written motion without notice supported by
affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury or an oral statement under oath that
the judge, court commissioner, or referee before whom the action or proceeding is
pending or to whom it is assigned is prejudiced against any party or attorney or the
interest of the party or attorney so that the party or attorney cannot or believes that he
or she cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge, court
commissioner, or referee.  …
(3) If the motion is duly presented and the affidavit or declaration under penalty of
perjury is duly filed or an oral statement under oath is duly made…, the judge supervising the
master calendar, if any, shall assign some other judge, court commissioner, or referee to try
the cause or hear the matter.  …
Except as provided in this section, no party or attorney shall be permitted to make more
than one such motion in any one action or special proceeding pursuant to this section;
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and in actions or special proceedings where there may be more than one plaintiff or similar
party or more than one defendant or similar party appearing in the action or special
proceeding, only one motion for each side may be made in any one action or special
proceeding.
…
(5) Any affidavit filed pursuant to this section shall be in substantially the following
form:
(Here set forth court and cause)
     State of California, )          PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
     County of __________ )  ss.
        _______, being duly sworn, deposes and says:  That he or she is a party (or
attorney for a party) to the within action (or special proceeding).  That _____ the
judge, court commissioner, or referee before whom the trial of the (or a hearing in
the) aforesaid action (or special proceeding) is pending (or to whom it is assigned) is
prejudiced against the party (or his or her attorney) or the interest of the party
(or his or her attorney) so that affiant cannot or believes that he or she cannot
have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge, court commissioner,
or referee.
       Subscribed and sworn to before me this  ____ day of ____, 20__.
       (Clerk or notary public or other officer administering oath)
…
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FACT SHEET ON JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN THE STATES
State High Courts:
For state high courts (which are called supreme courts in 48 states) a total of 38 states have some 
type of judicial elections.  The breakdown of selection systems for state high courts is as follows:
• Seven (7) states have partisan elections  (AL, IL, LA, NC, PA, TX, WV; All judges in 
both Illinois and Pennsylvania run in uncontested retention elections for additional terms 
after winning a first term through a contested partisan election)
• Fourteen (14) states have nonpartisan elections  (AR, GA, ID, KY, MI, MN, MS, MT, 
NV, ND, OH, OR, WA, WI; Ohio and Michigan have nonpartisan general elections, but 
political parties are involved with the nomination of candidates, who frequently run with
party endorsements)
• Seventeen (17) states have uncontested retention elections after initial appointment 
(AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, IN, IA, KS, MD, MO, NE, NM, OK, SD, TN, UT, WY; All 
judges in New Mexico are initially appointed, face a contested partisan election for a full 
term, and then run in uncontested retention elections for additional terms)
• The remaining 12 states grant life tenure or use reappointment of some type for 
their highest courts (CT, DE, HI, MA, ME, NH, NJ, NY, RI, VT, VA, SC)
Intermediate Appellate Courts:
Thirty-nine (39) states have intermediate appellate courts.  The breakdown of selection systems for 
intermediate appellate courts is as follows:
• Six (6) states have partisan elections  (AL, IL, LA, NC, PA, TX; see note above on IL 
and PA)
• Eleven (11) states have nonpartisan elections  (AR, GA, ID, KY, MI, MN, MS, OH, 
OR, WA, WI; see note above on MI and OH)
• Fourteen (14) states have uncontested retention elections after initial appointment
(AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, IN, IA, KS, MO, NE, NM, OK, TN, UT; see note above on NM) 
• Eight (8) states grant life tenure or use reappointment of some type for their 
intermediate appellate courts (CT, HI, MD, MA, NJ, NY, SC, VA)
• Eleven (11) states do not have intermediate appellate courts (DE, ME, MT, NV, NH, 
ND, RI, SD, VT, WV, WY)
Trial Courts:
A total of 39 states hold elections—whether partisan, nonpartisan, or uncontested retention 
elections—for trial courts of general jurisdiction.  The breakdown of selection systems for trial 
courts of general jurisdiction is as follows:
• Eight (8) states have partisan elections for all general jurisdiction trial court judges
(AL, IL, LA, NY, PA, TN, TX, WV; see note above on IL and PA)
• Twenty (20) states have nonpartisan elections for all general jurisdiction trial court 
judges (AR, CA, FL, GA, ID, KY, MD, MI, MN, MS, MT, NV, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, 
SD, WA, WI)
• Seven (7) states have uncontested retention elections for all general jurisdiction 
trial courts (AK, CO, IA, NE, NM, UT, WY; see note above on NM)
• Four (4) states use different types of elections—partisan, nonpartisan, or 
retention—for general jurisdiction trial courts in different counties or judicial 
districts (AZ, IN, KS, MO)
• Eleven (11) states grant life tenure or use reappointment of some type for all
general jurisdiction trial courts (CT, DE, HI, ME, MA, NH, NJ, RI, SC, VT, VA)
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Money in Judicial Elections:
Candidate fundraising:  State supreme court candidates raised a total of $45.6 million during the 
2000 judicial elections, a 61 percent increase over the amount raised by candidates in 1998.
Lawyers and business interests account for 49 percent of all contributions to supreme court 
candidates.  Partisan judicial elections are by far the most expensive, with candidates raising an 
average of $380,724 in 2000 (as opposed to an average of $107,388 raised by supreme court 
candidates in nonpartisan elections).  (Source:  “The New Politics of Judicial Elections,” Brennan 
Center for Justice at NYU and National Institute on Money in State Politics, published by the 
Justice at Stake Campaign, February 2002.)
Interest group activity:  Trial lawyers and business groups are spending more on unregulated “issue 
advertisements” in judicial elections.  The Litigation Fairness Campaign, sponsored by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, hopes to raise $25 million, primarily for 
television advertisements, in at least eight states holding supreme court elections in 2002.  Trial 
lawyer organizations and unions in “battleground” judicial election states are expected to spend 
significant amounts, as well.  Because expenditures by groups that do not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate are not subject to disclosure, precise figures on interest group 
spending are not available.  (Source:  Peter H. Stone, “The Blitz to Elect Business-Friendly Judges,” 
National Journal, February 16, 2002.)
Public Confidence in the System:
• Seventy-six percent (76%) of voters, and 26 percent of state judges, believe that campaign 
contributions made to judges have at least some influence on their decisions.
• Sixty-two percent (62%) of voters—including nearly 90 percent of African-American voters—
feel that “there are two systems of justice in the U.S.—one for the rich and powerful and one for 
everyone else.”
• Nine in 10 voters, and 8 in 10 state judges, say they are quite concerned about special interest 
groups buying advertising to influence the outcomes of judicial elections.
      (Source:  Justice at Stake Campaign, National Surveys of American Voters and State Judges,
      October 2001 – January 2002.  Available at www.justiceatstake.org)
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Protections urged for judges
By Nancy McCarthy
Staff Writer
Judicial elections have become so partisan that a constitutional amendment is needed to spare
judges from answering political questionnaires during a campaign, former Gov. Pete Wilson said
last month. He proposed an amendment that would encourage candidates to not respond to
political questions from interest groups that seek answers to hot-button issues.
Such questionnaires would be required to include a box urging candidates to “forbear from
exercising their right of free speech” as “wholly inappropriate” to the role of a judge who may
have to some day rule on the issues he or she is asked about. “The administration of justice is
undermined by the airing of positions,” Wilson told a panel studying threats to the judiciary.
His successor, former Gov. Gray Davis, said most voters “don’t have a clue” about the
qualifications of candidates running for judge and recommended that they be subjected to the
same rigorous background check by the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation that the
governor’s nominees undergo. Rankings should be included in the voter guide and on the sample
ballot, he said.
Wilson and Davis testified in Sacramento last month before the Commission for Impartial Courts,
appointed in 2007 by Chief Justice Ronald George to study ways to ensure judicial impartiality,
particularly in the face of increasingly partisan — and costly — elections for judgeships.
In 2004, $46.8 million was spent in state Supreme Court races throughout the country. In a
single race in Illinois that year, two candidates for the Supreme Court raised $9.3 million. The
race was not even state-wide, but covered a geographic area.
Last year in Wisconsin, candidates for the Supreme Court nearly doubled the state record for
campaign contributions, raising more than $2.6 million. But outside groups spent some $3 million
more on television advertisements.
According to Justice at Stake, a nonpartisan group that monitors judicial campaigns, outside
groups — not the candidates or their campaigns — spent $27.3 million on television
advertisements in four midwestern states between 1999 and 2006.
Although such high-profile elections have not yet come to California,
commission chair Justice Ming Chin said the state cannot afford to become
complacent. The commission will consider both proposals by the former
governors, he said, as well as other strategies to protect the courts.
“Judges face these questionnaires on a regular basis,” but if an issue they
have expressed an opinion about arises before them, they must recuse
themselves, Chin said.
Several speakers at the hearing last month cited a 2002 ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court that a Minnesota judicial canon that prohibited judges from discussing political
issues in elections was unconstitutional.
Loyola law professor Laurie Levenson said she opposes Wilson’s proposed amendment
because “I don’t like going around and constantly changing the constitution. But I don’t like that
every judge is being asked to fill out these special interest questionnaires. I think we need to
support judges when they say, ‘I would love to but I can’t.’”
In Sacramento, a superior court judge was targeted in 2005 for a ruling in which he upheld the
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state’s domestic partnership law.
And the state Supreme Court’s recent ruling legalizing same-sex marriages already has
provoked criticism of the four justices in the majority. The decision “should prompt outrage from
the majority of California’s citizens,” said Ron Prentice, chairman of the Protect Marriage.com
coalition backing Proposition 8 on the November ballot. “The will of the people has been
completely undermined by four individuals.”
Several speakers said a well-informed public that understands the proper role of judges is key to
protecting the judiciary.
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September 24, 2010
Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over 
Decisions
By A.G. SULZBERGER
DES MOINES — After the State Supreme Court here stunned the nation by 
making this the first state in the heartland to allow same-sex marriage, Iowa 
braced for its sleepy judicial elections to turn into referendums on gay marriage. 
The three Supreme Court justices on the ballot this year are indeed the targets of a 
well-financed campaign to oust them. But the effort has less to do with undoing 
same-sex marriage — which will remain even if the judges do not — than sending 
a broader message far beyond this state’s borders: voters can remove judges 
whose opinions they dislike. 
Around the country, judicial elections that were designed to be as apolitical as 
possible are suddenly as contentious as any another race. 
In Kansas, anti-abortion activists are seeking to recall a justice. In Illinois, 
business interests are campaigning against the chief justice after a case that 
removed a cap on malpractice liability, prompting him to run a television ad that 
opens with the declaration, “I am not a politician.” And a conservative group 
called Clear the Bench Colorado is citing a host of decisions in seeking to oust the 
full slate of justices on the ballot there, urging voters, “Be a citizen, not a subject.” 
The merit selection system, which is used to pick supreme court justices in 16 
states, including Colorado, Iowa and Kansas, was established to reduce politics’ 
influence on the composition of the judiciary, in part by avoiding the expensive 
and bitter campaigns seen in states where two candidates compete. (For each 
vacant post in Iowa, a committee nominates three candidates, one of whom is 
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named by the governor. Judges stand unopposed for retention after their first year 
and then every eight years.) 
“The system was not designed so that people could reject one vote or one case,” 
said Rachel P. Caufield, a Drake University professor who studies judicial 
selection. “It was designed so that people could get rid of unfit judges. It was 
meant as an extreme measure.” She added, “The system has worked well — until 
now.” 
Candidate spending for competitive state supreme court races nationwide 
increased to more than $200 million over the last decade — more than double the 
figure for the previous decade — but just $2 million of that was spent in states that 
used merit selection, according to a recently released report on spending in 
judicial elections. 
Because of the contests being waged from Colorado to Illinois, the amount of 
money spent on retention elections this year is likely to approach or surpass the 
figure for the entire previous decade, said Adam Skaggs, a lawyer with the 
Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University Law School and one of the 
co-authors of the report. “These cases suggest that the same type of arms-race 
spending in other contested elections is now beginning to impact previously quiet 
judicial elections,” Mr. Skaggs said. “These retention elections were sort of the last 
frontier that was free from this highly political, very expensive campaigning in the 
judiciary.” 
Not that organized campaigns to remove judges through retention elections are 
without precedent. In 1986, Rose E. Bird, the chief justice of the California 
Supreme Court, was voted out along with two other justices after a contentious 
campaign that focused on her opposition to the death penalty. The current chief 
justice in California, Ronald M. George, who wrote the opinion that briefly 
legalized same-sex marriage (and later the opinion that upheld the voter-approved 
ban, Proposition 8), would face a similar campaign but he decided to retire rather 
than stand for re-election. 
In Iowa, the campaign has taken a national flavor with visiting Republican 
presidential hopefuls endorsing the removal effort and Sandra Day O’Connor, the 
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former United States Supreme Court justice, urging the state to resist the national 
tug toward partisanship. 
A half-century of judicial elections in Iowa could be cumulatively read either as a 
popular endorsement of a well-functioning judiciary or as a testament to voter 
apathy. Typically in Iowa, more than a third of people who go to the polls do not 
even cast votes in the judicial races. No sitting State Supreme Court justice has 
ever been defeated, and only four lower court judges were removed in nearly 50 
years. 
Conservatives and liberals believe that insulation from voters has allowed judges 
to rule independently of popular opinion. That belief is why national organizations 
have poured money into the ouster campaign in Iowa and why the effort is causing 
worry among advocates for same-sex marriage and for an independent judiciary. 
Same-sex marriage has been initially approved in four states by supreme courts 
and in three (and the District of Columbia) by legislatures. 
Troy Price, political director for One Iowa, a gay rights group, said Iowans would 
not have voted for same-sex marriage and would likely reject it today. “Our 
concern is the message it sends to judges around the country that if you have a 
case like ours come before you, you could very well lose your jobs over it,” Mr. 
Price said. “This is an effort to intimidate the courts in Iowa and intimidate courts 
all across the country.” 
Brian S. Brown, executive director of the National Organization for Marriage, 
which has spent $230,000 on television ads criticizing the Iowa judges, said he 
understood that removing the three judges would not change the same-sex 
marriage ruling. (It was a unanimous ruling by the state’s seven justices.) But Mr. 
Brown said he hoped the judges’ ouster would help prevent similar rulings 
elsewhere by making judges around the nation aware that their jobs are on the 
line. 
“It sends a powerful message,” he said, “That if justices go outside the bounds of 
their oaths, if the justices go outside the bounds of the U.S. and state constitutions 
they’re going to be held accountable.” 
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Bob Vander Plaats, who made opposition to same-sex marriage a centerpiece of 
his unsuccessful run for governor in Iowa, is leading the ouster campaign on 
behalf of the political arm of the American Family Association, a conservative 
Christian organization based in Tupelo, Miss. 
“My bigger fear isn’t about injecting politics into judicial retention elections. The 
bigger fear is that we don’t hold them in check,” he said, warning that gun and 
property rights could be at risk. 
The embattled justices — Marsha K. Ternus, the chief justice; Michael J. Streit; 
and David L. Baker — have decided not to campaign. Two were initially appointed 
by former Gov. Terry Branstad, the Republican nominee for governor this year, 
who has declined to weigh in on the effort. One was appointed by Gov. Chet 
Culver, a Democrat who opposes the campaign. 
Supporters of the judges, including most of the legal community here as well as a 
number of prominent Republicans, describe the campaign as punitive and 
suggested that if voters want to abolish same-sex marriage they should call a 
constitutional convention, a matter that is also on the ballot, or pressure the 
legislature to amend the constitution. 
And then there is Jeffrey Neary, a district judge in northwestern Iowa who eight 
years ago survived what he believes was the state’s first campaign aimed at 
removing a judge (for granting a divorce to a same-sex couple). Judge Neary said 
the experience made him more cautious about how he approached controversial 
cases. He is up for retention this year. “I don’t want judicial positions to be 
political positions,” he said. “If that happens I don’t want to be a judge.” 
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2Background for appeals
Trial courts: 
• find facts
• apply law
Appellate courts: 
• review the trial court’s application of law to facts of case
• often write opinions explaining the reasoning for their decision
Appellate decisions articulate a principled basis for their 
decision
• rely on counsel for parties involved to help them analyze precedent 
and come up with best decision
• refer to other decisions as precedent
• explain reasoning so future decisions may rely on reasoning in case
Issue (from Jurisdiction unit)
The role of precedent
Courts follow relevant previous decisions 
= precedent 
stare decisis = already decided
Why follow precedent?
Among reasons:
Stability
Consistency
Predictability
Fairness
Respect for law
Economy of decision‐making
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3Appeals are based on trial court record
The record is created at trial  
Record includes materials specifically pertaining to case:
• exhibits 
• testimony given
court stenographer records all witness statements that are “on the 
record”
conversations at the bench or in chambers are not “on the record”
• decision (bench trial) or verdict (jury trial)
Appellant (party that is appealing) submits “the record” with the 
appeal
Appeals are based on trial court record
New information can be introduced at appellate level only if it 
could not have been produced at time of trial, and which the 
court agrees to admit
e.g.,  evidence that the victim died of her injuries
evidence that the doctor performing the operation had 
her license revoked after the time of trial
Note: the appeals court can refer to general articles, 
studies, research findings, etc. that do not specifically 
pertain to the individual case.  These do not need to be 
part of the “record”
372
4Appeals are based on trial court record
When a party objects to a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling and 
argues that
• evidence that was excluded should have been admitted 
or
• evidence that was admitted should have been excluded, 
the party “preserves the objection for the record” 
By preserving the objection on the record, the party can bring 
up the issue on appeal, arguing the law was not properly 
applied
If party does not object to an evidentiary ruling at trial, it’s too 
late to do so on appeal
Appeals are based on trial court record
Written decisions at trial level are unusual
Trial judge typically does not issue a written decision
e.g., Santa Clara County courts use “minute orders” (a snap‐out 
form in criminal courts) to record a judge’s decision, as judge 
states the decision in court.  Courtroom clerks note this in 
the court files
When trial judges issue written decisions, is usually in cases 
where new issue, important for other cases
e.g., In the Prop 8 gay marriage case, Judge Walker wrote a lengthy 
decision following the trial, in anticipation of appeal
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5Sample Santa 
Clara County 
criminal court 
“minute order” 
recording the 
judge’s approval 
of a nolo 
contendere plea 
at a pretrial 
conference
Appeals procedure: time limits
After the trial court decision, the losing party may appeal the 
trial court’s decision
Appellant or petitioner = party who is appealing
Respondent = party who is opposing appeal (who won at 
trial)
Appellant files “Notice of Appeal”
Time limits apply (e.g., 60 days in most California cases)
If no appeal, the trial court decision becomes final
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6Appeals procedure: 
intermediate appellate courts
Appeal from trial court goes to intermediate court of appeal
One level of appeal – to intermediate court – is guaranteed
i.e., intermediate court of appeal will “consider” every 
case appealed
Appeals procedure: 
intermediate appellate courts
Courts of Appeal arranged geographically
One appeals court handles appeals from many trial courts
E.g., Sixth District Court of Appeal (333 W. Santa Clara Street, Suite 1060, San Jose) 
hears appeals from trials in Santa Clara, San Benito, Santa Cruz, and 
Monterey Counties
Some federal appeals courts are by subject matter (usually 
located in DC)
E.g., US Patent Court, US Court of Claims
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8Appeals procedure: 3‐judge panels
Intermediate appeals court panels are made up of 3 judges
both federal and state courts
Panels serve together for a limited number of cases, and are 
drawn from the pool of all appellate judges in the court
Federal: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals:  28 judges + 1 
opening
State:  6th District Court of Appeal: 7 judges (called 
“Associate Justices”)
Appeals procedure: deference
The appeals court will defer to the trial court, particularly when 
• the law gives a trial judge discretion
e.g., The Penal Code gives sentencing judges discretion to decide 
between the three levels of punishment for a crime
• when witness credibility or other factual determinations are 
at issue
trial judge has had opportunity to observe witnesses
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9Appeals procedure: briefs
Briefs = written arguments prepared by each side
Appellant submits opening brief or appellant’s brief
Respondent files opposition brief
Appellant files reply brief
(1) Start with summary of facts from the record in the trial court
(2) Then identify the relevant law (called “legal authorities”) and argue why
• favorable authorities are relevant to current case
• unfavorable authorities are irrelevant or inapplicable 
(“distinguishable”)
(3) Then apply the law to the facts of the case, and reach the conclusion the 
party desires
Appeals procedure: briefs
Amicus curiae briefs = “friends of the court” briefs
• filed by groups who are interested in an issue 
involved, but do not represent one of the parties
• intended to assist the court in making its decision, 
generally by showing its effect on others and / or 
bringing in additional, relevant information
• often attorneys for parties will solicit amicus briefs
• amicus briefs can be filed only with the permission 
of the court
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Appeals procedure: oral argument
Court sets date of oral argument
In some cases, court does not allow oral argument
Generally, each side gets 20 ‐ 30 minutes to argue its side
Judges have clerks do research 
Clerks prepare “bench memos” 
Judges discuss cases between judges before argument and 
after
Appeals procedure: oral argument
Purpose of oral argument is to benefit judges
Judges frequently interrupt attorneys with their 
questions.
Listen to recordings on www.oyez.org of various 
Supreme Court cases 
Judges often ask questions to convince other 
judges, who they know are likely to disagree
379
11
Appeals procedure: decision
Majority decision
called “opinion of the court” or “decision”
If judge disagrees, he/she may write a dissent
explains basis for disagreement
other judges can sign dissent, or write their own
If a judge agrees with the result, but not the reasoning in an 
opinion, he/she may write a concurrence
other judges can sign or write their own
Usually an appellate case ends with intermediate court  
appellate court often remands to the trial court for 
action in accordance with the decision
Appeals procedure: en banc rehearing
En banc = still at the intermediate appeals level, a large panel of 
judges re‐hear an appeal
In Ninth Circuit, en banc panels generally are made up of 11 
judges
Majority of judges must agree to a rehearing en banc.  En banc
rehearing most often granted when:
• Case involves an issue of major importance 
• Similar decisions in same circuit differ 
e.g., federal district court in San Francisco comes to 
different result as federal district court in Hawaii
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Appeals procedure: success rates
In civil cases from 33 state’s courts
• Plaintiffs appealed in 11% of cases
• Defendants appealed in 12% of cases
• Of appeals with a decision:
– 70 % affirmed trial court decision
– 30 % reversed
(National Center for State Courts; Nicole L. Waters, Civil Trials on Appeal,  vol. 14, No. 1 March 2007) 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/Vol14Num1CivilTrialsonAppeal1.ashx
Appeals procedure: 
appeal to highest court
Appellate review at the Supreme Court level is discretionary
Requires 4 justices to vote to hear case (same number for 
both US and California Supreme Courts)
Exception:  Death penalty cases in California are  automatically 
appealed to the California Supreme Court
Grant of petition for review most likely when there is a split 
among the Circuits (federal court) or Districts (California court)
Resolving issue at the Supreme Court level creates 
uniformity in lower courts
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Appeals procedure: 
appeal to highest court
US Supreme Court receives about 8,000 petitions for 
certiorari each term
decides only about 80 cases a year 
California Supreme Court receives about 8,500 
petitions for certification each year
decides about 105 – 115 cases a year, including review of all 
death penalty cases
Appeals procedure: 
appeal to highest court
The US Supreme Court will not review a matter of purely 
state law
e.g., The US Supreme Court will not interpret for a 
state what its own state Constitution or state 
statutes mean
10th Amend., US Constitution:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
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If an issue of federal law is involved in a state Supreme Court 
decision, that state decision can be appealed to US Supreme Court
Appeals procedure: 
appeal to highest court
A losing party can appeal a decision by a state Supreme Court 
to the US Supreme Court only if a federal issue is involved
otherwise the US Supreme Court does not have 
jurisdiction
The US Constitution’s supremacy clause means that 
federal law overrules contrary state law
US Constitution, Art. 4, cl. 2
Often a party seeking US Supreme Court review will argue 
that a state Supreme Court decision violates federal rights 
to due process or equal protection of the laws.
US Constitution, 14th Amendment 
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Appeals procedure: other issues
Interlocutory appeals = appeals of an issue while a case 
is in progress
e.g., admissibility of discovery request for plaintiff’s Social 
Security Number in a wage & hour case
Interlocutory appeals are unusual; typical path is to wait 
until the full trial is done, and then appeal as needed
Appeals procedure: other issues
“Harmless” vs. “reversible” error: when the appeals court finds 
that the trial court has committed an error, it may be:
• Harmless error: trial court would have reached same result 
even without error, based on other information in the 
record –> trial decision stands
• Reversible error: the error may have made a difference in 
the outcome –> trial court’s decision is “reversed” = 
overturned  
– Appeals court sends the case back to trial court to correct the error
– If clear from the record that there is no option but to dismiss a 
case, then the appeals court may order dismissal
384
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Issue: stare decisis v. activism
Keeping in mind the role of precedent:
Impact litigation: Attempt to establish favorable law
US Supreme Court follows precedent, but as highest 
court, it can determine when precedent is no longer 
good law and should be overturned
31
385
Margaret Stevenson 
JS 103 Courts and Society 
 
APPEALS  
 
The judges, in writing their decisions, try to articulate a principled basis for the decision, 
so that the effect on future cases is most clear. 
 
Appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are concerned with how each decision 
they make will affect other cases.  This is because when a court establishes precedent, 
other courts rely on it, and extrapolate its ruling to apply to other situations beyond the 
case decided.   
 
Judges want to understand how their ruling might be extended.  They rely on the parties 
bringing the issue before the court to help them analyze and determine a principled basis 
for decision.  Amicus briefs are particularly helpful in showing what possible application 
or extension of their reasoning might be.   The following covers the process of an appeal. 
 
 
I. Appeals are based on what happens at trial  
 
A. Create the record 
At trial, the parties create a record.  The record includes evidence:  
Exhibits submitted 
Testimony given – court stenographer takes down all material that is “on 
the record” 
 
 
B. Finder of fact determines the facts  
Finder (or “trier”) of facts (judge or jury) determines facts, based on the evidence 
that the parties submit 
 
 Most often at trial level the judge does not issue a written decision  
     
e.g., Santa Clara County courts use “minute orders” (a snap-out form in 
criminal courts) to record a judge’s decision, as judge states the decision 
in court.  Clerks note this and file in the court files. 
 
Trial judges issue written decisions in cases where new issue, important for other 
cases 
e.g., Judge Walker in the Prop 8 gay marriage case wrote a lengthy 
decision following the trial, in anticipation of an all-but-certain appeal 
 
C. Judges apply facts to law to decide how the case should come out 
 
Judges must rely on evidence in the record to support their decisions. 
386
 
If there is no evidence in the record to support a decision, the trial judge 
knows that the likely result on appeal is that the appeals court would send 
the case back to the trial court for a decision based on admitted evidence. 
 
After the trial court decision, the losing party may appeal the trial court’s decision.  The 
following describes the appeals procedure and principles.   
 
II. Appeals procedure 
 
A. Appellant files “Notice of Appeal” 
 
1. Identifying the parties:   
Party who is appealing is called “appellant” or “petitioner,” depending on 
type of case 
    
2. Time limits apply (e.g., 60 days in most California cases) 
  If no appeal, the trial court decision becomes final 
 
B.  Appeal from trial court goes to intermediate court of appeal 
 
1. Courts of Appeal arranged geographically 
One appeals court handles appeals from many trial courts 
 
E.g., the Sixth District Court of Appeal (located at 333 W. Santa 
Clara Street, Suite 1060 in San Jose) hears appeals from trials in 
the counties of Santa Clara, San Benito, Santa Cruz, and Monterey 
 
 2. Some federal appeals courts are by subject matter (usually located in DC) 
E.g., US Patent Court, US Court of Claims 
 
C. Numbers of judges  
 
Intermediate appeals court panels are made up of 3 judges in both federal and state 
courts.  The three-judge panels serve together for a limited number of cases, and are 
drawn from the pool of all appellate judges in the court. 
     
 Federal: Circuit Court of Appeals – 28 judges 
 
 State: Court of Appeal – 7 judges (called “Associate Justices”) 
 
D. Appeals are based on the record below.   
 
1. No new facts can be introduced on appeal unless they were not available 
at the time of the trial.  They can only be introduced by permission of the 
court. 
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e.g., It is permissible to introduce evidence that the victim died 
after the conclusion of the trial. 
 
It is not permissible to bring in a new witness to testify who was 
available previously. 
 
2. Appeals courts pay deference when the trial judge uses discretion  
 
Where the law gives a trial judge discretion, the appeals court generally 
will defer to the trial judge’s decision 
 
e.g., The Penal Code gives sentencing judges discretion to decide 
between the three levels of punishment for a crime 
 
E. Briefs  
 
1. Parties submit briefs to court.  Briefs are written arguments prepared by each side. 
  
Names of briefs: 
Appellant files opening brief or appellant’s brief 
 Respondent files opposition brief 
 Appellant files reply brief 
 
2. Briefs start by summarizing the facts from the record in the trial court. 
 
3. Then briefs identify the relevant law (called “legal authorities”). 
 
Briefs urge appeals court to follow relevant authorities 
 
Briefs explain why authorities they want to distinguish are irrelevant or 
inapplicable. 
   
4. Then briefs apply the law to the facts of the case, and reach the conclusion the 
party desires.  
 
5. Amicus curiae briefs = “friends of the court” briefs 
Filed by groups who are interested in an issue involved, but do not represent 
one of the parties 
 
Amicus briefs are intended to assist the court in making its decision, generally 
by showing its effect on others and / or bringing in additional, relevant 
information 
    
Often attorneys for parties will solicit amicus briefs 
 
Amicus briefs can be filed only with the permission of the court 
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F. Oral argument 
 
Court sets date of oral argument 
  In some cases, the court states that no oral argument is permitted 
 Generally, each side gets 20 or 30 minutes to argue its side 
 
Judges have clerks do research  
 Clerks prepare “bench memos”  
 
Judges discuss cases between judges before argument and after 
 
Purpose of oral argument to benefit of judges.  Judges frequently interrupt 
attorneys with their questions. 
 Listen to recordings on www.oyez.org of various Supreme Court cases  
 
Judges often ask questions to convince other judges, who they know are likely to 
disagree 
 
G. Court issues decision in “opinion of the court” 
 
Frequently appellate decisions have some written explanation for the outcome, 
though routine cases not analyzed or explained in depth – “opinion of the court” 
or “decision” 
 
Written decisions explain reasoning so other courts can apply same principles in 
similar (or different) cases. 
 
e.g.,  Anderson v. Hermosa Beach tattoo case was an appeals case.  The 
judges reviewed the trial judge’s decision. 
 
  If one judge disagrees, he/she may write a dissent  
 
If a judge agrees with the result, but not the reasoning in an opinion, 
he/she may write a concurrence 
 
Note:  Usually an appellate case ends here.   Sometimes it is remanded to the trial 
court for action in accordance with the decision.   
 
H. [This step is optional]  Petition for rehearing en banc 
 
1. En banc = still at the intermediate appeals level, a large panel of judges re-hear an 
appeal 
 In Ninth Circuit, en banc panels generally are made up of 11 judges 
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2. Majority of judges must agree to a rehearing en banc.  En banc rehearing most 
often granted when: 
a. Case involves an issue of major importance  
 
b. Similar decisions in same circuit differ  
e.g., San Benito County calculates damages one way, Santa Clara 
County another 
 
I. Appeal to Supreme Court : US or California 
 
1. Appellate review at the Supreme Court level is discretionary 
 
Requires 4 justices to vote to hear case (same number for both US and 
California Supreme Courts) 
 
Except:  Death penalty cases in California are automatically 
appealed to the California Supreme Court  
 
2. Names of petitions seeking Supreme Court grant: 
a. Petition for certiorari to US Supreme Court 
b. Petition for certification to California Supreme Court 
 
3. Grant of petition for review most likely when there is a split among the Circuits 
(in federal court) or Districts (in California court) 
  
Resolving issue at the Supreme Court level creates uniformity between 
federal circuits and state districts. 
 
4. Supreme Court reviews limited number of cases 
 
a. The US Supreme Court decides only about 80 cases a year  
 
US Supreme Court receives about 8,000 petitions for certiorari 
each term 
    
b. The California Supreme Court decides about 105 – 115 cases a year, 
including review of all death penalty cases. 
 
The California Supreme Court receives about 8,500 petitions for 
certification each year. 
 
J.      [In some cases] Appeals from state Supreme Court to US Supreme Court 
 
A losing party can appeal a decision by a state Supreme Court to the US Supreme 
Court only if a federal issue is involved 
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  The US Supreme Court will not review a matter of purely state law 
 
e.g., The US Supreme Court will not interpret for a state what its 
own state Constitution or state statutes mean 
 
III. Other issues in appeals  
 
A. Interlocutory appeals  
Appeals of an issue while a case is going on are called “interlocutory appeals.” 
 
Interlocutory appeals are unusual; typical path is to wait until the full trial is done, 
and then appeal as needed 
  
Sometimes, need to have a decision in course of case, and can ask for an 
appeal 
 
B. Trial de novo 
 Some appeals are trials de novo, or “from the beginning” 
 
 Statutes will state when an appeal causes a trial de novo 
E.g.,  Small Claims Court appeals 
 Labor Commissioner (wage claims) appeals  
 
In a trial de novo, the appeals judge starts over, wiping out the decision of the trial 
level, and acting as a trial judge 
 
De novo review is not as efficient as regular appellate review based on the 
facts as established at the trial level – trial de novo puts on the evidence 
twice 
 
C. “Harmless” vs. “reversible” error 
 
In some cases where the appeals court finds that the trial court has committed an 
error, it may not remand (send back) the case if the error is “harmless” error. 
 
Appeals court states that the trial court would have reached same result 
even without error, based on other information in the record. 
 
If the error may have made a difference in the outcome, then it is “reversible 
error.”  The appeals court sends the case back to trial court to correct the error. 
 
E.g.,  a defendant challenges a search of her car that found marijuana as 
violating her rights.  The appeals court may decide that the search was 
indeed unconstitutional.   
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However, if the defendant had other marijuana in plain view and properly 
obtained, the then the error of the improper search may be “harmless” 
since the jury would have reached the same result without it.   
 
If however, there was no other evidence except that from an 
unconstitutional search, then the error would be “reversible error” and the 
case would be remanded for further proceedings. 
If it’s clear from the record that there is no option but to dismiss a 
case, then the appeals court may order that.   
 
IV. Considerations in what cases get appealed 
 
What do parties / advocates look at in deciding whether to appeal an adverse ruling? 
 
- chances of winning 
 
- resources available since appeals are very expensive 
  ideological parties: interest groups 
e.g., Sierra Club, ACLU, District Attorneys Association, American 
Association of Retired Persons, California Teachers Association … 
 
- good facts presenting an issue clearly 
 “bad facts make bad law” 
 
- potential harm if a decision comes out “wrong”  
possibility of setting bad precedent  
 
When stakes are high and important issues involved, appeal to the Supreme Court is most likely. 
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Footnotes
1 Throughout most of this opinion, we use “tattooing” as shorthand to refer not only to the process of tattooing but also to
the business of tattooing—that is, the procedure under which the tattooist injects a tattoo into a person's skin in exchange
for money. In Part III.A, however, we break down tattooing into each of its component parts: the tattoo itself, the physical
process of tattooing, and the business of tattooing.
2 “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly
applied the relevant substantive law.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).
3 In O'Brien, the Court held that a regulation of protected expressive conduct is constitutional:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673.
4 Anderson does not contend that the City's regulation is a content-based restriction on speech. And with good reason,
as the City bans all tattoo parlors, not just those that convey a particular kind of message or subject matter. Thus, we
do not subject the regulation to strict scrutiny.
5 The City does not actually ban tattooing as such but simply does not permit tattoo parlors in its zoning regulations. In
other words, so far as we can tell, the Code contains no provision that would prevent a person from performing a tattoo
on a family member in his house for free. And the City's restrictions may not apply to cosmetic tattooing that may be
performed in a doctor's office, clinic, or beauty parlor.
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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1Applying Precedent: 
The Anderson Tattoo Case
Johnny Anderson v. 
City of Hermosa Beach,  
621 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2010)
JS 103 Courts and Society
Margaret Stevenson
10.27.15
Following precedent decisions
Rule of law: similarly situated people should 
be treated similarly.  
Therefore, considering the question the 
parties are asking the court to decide, they 
argue the court should:
• follow similar precedent and    ,   
• distinguish (= don’t follow) precedent 
that differs in significant ways
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2Following precedent decisions
“Stare decisis” = follow previous decisions
When presented with new questions of law, or a 
statute or regulation that the courts are asked to 
interpret and apply, 
courts look at other cases where facts and legal 
principles are similar to the case at hand
Parties argue that the rationales offered in 
previous written decisions either apply – or don’t 
– to the case at hand
Following precedent decisions
Sometimes it’s not clear what aspects of case to 
highlight what are the key factors that make cases,                 
similar or distinguishable
The Anderson case presents examples of using 
precedent, advocacy and judicial perspectives in 
decision‐making
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3Question presented 
Whether a city’s total ban on tattoo parlors 
violates the First Amendment
Congress shall make no law … abridging 
the freedom of speech…
First Amendment, US Constitution
Procedural history: background
City of Hermosa Beach (“City”) passed a zoning               
ordinance banning all tattoo parlors within city 
limits
Anderson, a tattoo parlor owner elsewhere, sued 
City
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4Procedural history: trial court decision
At first:
District court (trial level court in federal system) 
dismissed case
Suit was not “ripe” (ready for court decision) since 
Anderson had not applied for permit and been 
denied
• Anderson applied for permit to open tattoo parlor             
• City denied permit application
• Anderson sued in court again
Parties each file motions for summary
Procedural history: summary judgment 
motions in trial court
           
judgment (“SJ”) 
Recall that in SJ motions:
Court decides legal issue based on undisputed 
facts
Facts presented in Declarations
Stipulations = agreements between the parties
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5Trial court’s decision
• Trial court first examined whether any 
constitutional interests at stake:        
The “act of tattooing is not protected 
expression under the First Amendment 
because, although it is non‐verbal 
conduct expressive of an idea, it is not 
‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of 
communication’” to receive First 
Amendment protection.
Trial court’s decision
Trial court decided (cont’d):
• Since no constitutionally protected interest at stake, 
evaluate whether the City had a “rational basis” for its                    
ban on tattoo parlors
Note:  Courts use varying standards of scrutiny , depending 
on the importance of the right at stake
• The City has a rational reason to prohibit tattoo 
parlors because of health risks inherent in operating 
tattoo parlors
• City’s  SJ motion granted; Anderson’s SJ motion denied
Anderson appealed
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6Appeals court opinion
Appeals court starts with factual background
• Describes the process of tattooing
• Quotes from Johnny Anderson’s declaration 
describing tattoos as “individual and unique 
creative works of visual art” that he and 
person to receive the tattoo design together           
Note: this is in evidence, part of the record as a 
declaration (written statement under penalty of 
perjury).  
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7Appeals court opinion: legal backdrop
Court describes legal regulation of tattooing
• California has laws governing tattooing 
parlors must register with state
are subject to inspection
against law to tattoo person under 18 years old
Appeals court opinion: legal backdrop
• First Amendment prohibits laws abridging the 
f d f hree om o  speec
• US Supreme Court has set up analytical 
framework for limits of protected speech 
(legal precedent)
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8First Amendment precedent
Precedent decisions distinguish between
( )1  purely expressive activity = speech
‐ limited only by time, place and manner restrictions 
(2) conduct that contains expressive content
‐ protected if “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication” 
Government can restrict (2) expressive conduct
intended to express views more than it can 
restrict (1) pure speech
Applying precedent to facts in case
Court must decide which category tattooing           
falls in:
Our first task is to determine whether 
tattooing is (1) purely expressive activity or 
(2) conduct that merely contains an 
expressive component.  
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9Applying precedent to facts in case
• In other words, we must determine whether 
tattooing is more akin to writing (an example of 
purely expressive activity) or burning a draft card 
(an example of conduct that can be used to 
express an idea but does not necessarily do so). 
• If tattooing is purely expressive activity, then it is 
entitled to full First Amendment protection and             
the City’s regulation is constitutional only if it is a 
reasonable “time, place, or manner” restriction
of protected speech.  
Applying precedent to facts in case
• If, on the other hand, tattooing is merely 
conduct with an expressive component, then 
it is entitled to constitutional protection only 
if it is “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication” to fall within the scope of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments        .   
(page 13750; paragraphs added)
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What is protected?
Other courts have separated 
a) the tattoo itself        
b)  the tattooing process 
c)  the tattooing business 
(Hold Fast Tattoo v. City of North Chicago)
Note:  Advocates for City will argue that the least 
d d lprotective stan ar s app y to tattoo, process & 
business so City is freer to regulate
Remember: (1) pure expressive activity (= speech) 
is most protected; (2) conduct with an expressive 
element is less protected
a)  The tattoo itself 
Precedent decisions have found various forms of 
entertainment and visual expression are purely 
expressive activities
Precedent protects against restriction of expression in:
• Music without words (Ward v. Rock Against Racism)
• Dance (Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim)
• Topless dancing (Doran v. Salem Inn)
• Movies (Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson) 
• Parades with or without banners or written messages 
(Hurley v. Irish‐American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston) 
• Paintings and their sale (White v. City of Sparks)
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Precedent cases
• Music without words Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism US Supreme Court (1989),       
After quoting Plato “Our poets must sing in 
another and a nobler strain,” states: 
“Music, as a form of expression and 
communication, is protected under the First 
Amendment.”  
Nonetheless, the Court allowed NY City to 
regulate the volume of music in Central Park.
Precedent cases
• Dance Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, US 
Supreme Court (1981)   
When an adult bookstore added nude, live 
dancing, the store was convicted of violating a 
city zoning ordinance.  
US Supreme Court held that convictions 
violated the First Amendment protected pure 
expressive activity; Borough did not identify a 
reasonable time, place or manner restriction.
415
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Precedent cases
• Topless dancing Doran v. Salem Inn, US Supreme 
Court (1975)
Bar owners providing topless dancing filed for 
a TRO against law enforcement officer Doran, 
stating that a Hempstead, NY ordinance 
prohibiting topless dancing was 
unconstitutional.  
USSC held the ordinance banning all topless 
dancing was overbroad violation of First 
Amendment rights of bars to offer topless 
dancing.
Precedent cases
• Movies Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, US Supreme Court (1952)
NY law that censored a film determined to be 
“sacrilegious” was unconstitutional.  In “The 
Miracle,” “St. Joseph” impregnates a woman who 
believes she is the Virgin Mary.  
The Commission of Education rescinded license to 
show movie.  The Court found that the First 
Amendment does not permit banning a film as 
“sacrilegious.”
416
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Precedent cases
• Paintings and their sale White v. City of Sparks, Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal (2007)
Artist White sets up easels on City sidewalks and                 
parks to sell his paintings to passersby.  City prohibits 
sales in parks and limits sales to one area for people 
with permits.  White’s paintings are generally of 
nature and do not express a “religious, ideological, 
political or philosophical message.”
Ninth Circuit (citing precedent): It is clear that 
White’s self‐expression through painting constitutes 
expression protected by the First Amendment.”
Commercial speech is protected too.
b)  The tattooing process 
Precedent decisions have found some symbolic 
conduct imbued with expressive elements       
• Burning a flag (Texas v. Johnson )
• Burning a draft card (US v. O’Brien)
• Wearing a black armband (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Comty. Sch. Dist)
Above activities can be done without any expressive 
content and so require an interpretive step to 
determine expressive elements in this conduct
417
14
b)  The tattooing process (cont’d)
• No precedent distinguishes between the 
process of creating a form of pure speech and               
the product of the process
• Tattooing is like process of writing words down 
or drawing a picture
• Tattooing is more like writing (highly protected)             
than it is like parades (which the court has 
found to be a form of expression, “not just 
motion”)
c)  The business of tattooing
Fact that tattoo is for sale does not deprive it of 
Fi t A d t t tirs   men men  pro ec on
• Precedent holds the sale of art is protected by 
First Amendment: 
The sale of a painting is intertwined with 
the process of producing the painting          .  
Therefore, the sale is entitled to full 
constitutional protection. 
(City of Sparks and Bery)
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Concluding that tattooing is 
expressive activity …
… and not conduct with an expressive element,
• Next question:
–What time, place, manner restrictions are 
allowed?
P d t t t th t t• rece en  se s ou   ese  es s
Reasonable “Time, Place and Manner“ 
restrictions are allowed
• Since the tattoo itself, the process of tattooing 
and the business of sale of tattoos are all pure 
speech:
• Next question: are any reasonable “time, 
place and manner” restrictions involved?
• Supreme Court precedent holds complete 
bans of speech are almost never reasonable 
“time, place, or manner” restrictions 
419
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Precedent involving complete bans of 
speech‐like activities
• Complete ban on display of signs on private 
property struck down (Cit f L d Gill )      y o   a ue v.  eo
• Complete ban on all live entertainment struck 
down (Schad)
• Complete ban on door‐to‐door distribution of 
literature struck down (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio)
• Complete ban on distributing handbills on 
public streets struck down (Jamison v. Texas)
• Complete ban on distribution of pamphlets in 
town struck down (Lovell v. City of Griffin) 
Distinguishes adverse precedent
City argues that banning tattoo parlors is like 
banning sound trucks.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the complete ban of sound trucks
(Kovacs v. Cooper)
• Trenton NJ banned all sound trucks from public 
streets so would not be a nuisance and 
dangerous to traffic and to preserve quiet of 
residential areas.   
• Supreme Court upheld the complete ban, saying 
that the same message might be transmitted by 
other, quieter means
420
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Distinguishes adverse precedent
• Tattoos carry a message distinct from other media.  It 
is not a question of the most effective or other 
f i i hmeans o  transm tt ng t e message.  
• A tattoo does not force ‘unwilling listener[s]’ to heed 
its message any more than the expletive‐laden jacket 
at issue in Cohen.   … 
[In Cohen v. California (1971) the US Supreme Court 
d i i (5 4) f di bi h hoverturne  a conv ct on  ‐   or  stur ng t e peace w en 
19‐year‐old man wore a jacket saying “Fuck the Draft” in a LA 
Courthouse.  The Court held speech, not conduct, was 
involved.]
(p. 13766, paragraphs added)
Distinguishes adverse precedent
• Thus the City’s tattoo regulation is subject to 
the principle in Martin, Schad, and City of 
Ladue, which, read alongside Kovacs, indicate 
that if a unique and important mode of 
expression does not force unwilling listeners 
to heed its message in an intrusive manner, 
the government may not ban it regardless of 
the availability of alternative (and less 
distinctive) means of communicating a similar 
message. 
(p. 13766, paragraphs added)
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Appeals court’s conclusion
• The tattoo itself, the process of tattooing and 
th b i f t tt i lle  us ness o   a oo ng are a  pure 
protected speech.   
• City’s total ban is unconstitutional restriction 
of speech.  
• Decision below reversed   
Johnny 
Anderson (left)
d hiopene   s 
shop in 
Hermosa 
Beach in 
December 
2011
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A couple notes
What can City do if doesn’t want tattoo 
parlors in City?
Consider importance of record
• statements from Johnny Anderson to persuade 
judges that tattooing process is artistic 
expression
• attorneys consider what info is on record, 
looking toward appeal   
Concurring opinion:
• agrees with result in this case but wants to 
clarify: “context is everything”
• tattooing can be expressive activity, not always
A side note:
Use of “judicial notice” and judicial 
experience
We do not profess to understand the 
work of tattoo artists to the same 
degree as we know the finely wrought 
sketches of Leonardo da Vinci or 
Albrecht Dürer, but we can take judicial 
notice of the skill, artistry and care that 
modern tattooists have demonstrated.” 
p. 13754
423
20
Self‐portraits by Leonardo da Vinci, Albrecht Dürer
Considering precedent…
Distinguish or follow the foregoing precedent in 
th f ll i it ti ?e  o ow ng s ua ons
‐ A police force bans visible tattoos for on‐duty 
officers
‐ A police force bans tattoos for officers that have 
racist or sexist content
‐ An employer fires the manager of a sports team 
who makes racist comments
424
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Precedent cases
• Parades with or without banners or written 
messages Hurley v. Irish‐American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB), US Supreme Court (1995)
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (Council) 
got permit to march in a St. Patrick’s Day and 
Evacuation Day parade.  When GLIB got a permit for 
the parade, they were subjected to taunts, smoke 
b b ll l k d bom s.  Fo owing year, Counci  as e  to  ar GLIB.  
Court said First Amendment means a group could 
not be forced to endorse a message against its will.
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1JS 103
Courts & Society
US Supreme Court
JS 103 Courts and Society
Margaret Stevenson7.21.16
Considerations as to cases the Court 
accepts
• Baseline requirements:
– Federal issue involved, or
– Diversity jurisdiction (individuals from 2 states with more than $75,000 
in controversy)
• Conflict between jurisdictions
– Where lower courts disagree, more likely for US SC to accept appeal 
(grant certiorari)
• Important issues 
• More than half cases involve interpreting federal statutes
– Most others interpret US Constitution
2
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2Effect of precedent
Supreme Court can overturn precedent
• Reluctant to do so frequently
• US Supreme Court considers how each decision will affect 
future cases  
o Each case establishes precedent for other courts
o Try to extrapolate its ruling to apply to other situations 
beyond the case decided
– Amicus briefs help show the effect of cases on 
others than the parties directly
3
Effect of precedent
Intermediate appellate courts cannot overturn precedent
If disagree with precedent, either
• Distinguish case from precedent
or
• Write a dissent outlining why precedent leads to 
unjust result
4
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3Effect of precedent
Advocacy groups use precedent to benefit their positions
– Some want to preserve precedent under attack
• E.g., pro‐choice groups want to preserve Roe v. Wade
– Some want to change what they view as outmoded 
precedent
• E.g., integration groups wanted to overturn Plessy v. 
Ferguson (“separate but equal” doctrine)
5
Effect of precedent
• Strategize how and when to try to bring issue before Supreme 
Court
• E.g., challenges to criminalization of sodomy cases Hardwick and 
Lawrence
• Because Supreme Court can overturn precedent, the steps in 
front of the courthouse often serve as a political stage  
Q:  Who is the audience?
6
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4Every January 22 in front of the 
Supreme Court
7
8
Also before the US 
Supreme Court
429
5April 28, 2015
9
US Supreme Court jurisdiction
US Supreme Court hears:
• Appealed cases from 
o federal courts, and
o state courts raising federal issues
• Any other cases set out by Constitution 
o Issues involving ambassadors, ministers, consuls
o Issues in which a state is a party
Court sets a special master to hear evidence in such cases
Emergency appeals go to a Justice assigned to each Circuit 
executions, TROs, cases where immediate decision needed
10
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6What cases get appealed
Resources needed: appeals to USSC are expensive
Ideological parties: interest groups
e.g., Sierra Club, ACLU, District Attorneys Association, 
American Association of Retired Persons, California 
Teachers Association
Strategize how to achieve reform:
legislative vs. executive vs. courts
some issues best addressed in courts
11
What cases get appealed
Risks:
potential harm if a decision comes out “wrong”; 
possibility of setting bad precedent 
Benefits:  
potential reform of important issue
good facts presenting an issue clearly (“bad facts 
make bad law”)
12
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7What appeals get accepted
US Supreme Court session begins the first Monday 
in October each year
We will discuss highlights of the upcoming 2016‐
2017 cases in class
Some interesting cases from recent terms are 
summarized at the end of this powerpoint
13
US Supreme Court historically
Supreme Court established in US Constitution’s Article III
• Judiciary Act of 1789
– Set up organization of Supreme Court and “inferior” courts
• Since 1789, 108 men and 4 women have been US Supreme 
Court Justices
• Approximately 10 percent of “humble origin”; rest from 
“socially prestigious and politically active families”
– Less so today than in past
• 90 % are from President’s same political party
14
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8Becoming a Justice
• Nominated by President, confirmed by Senate
– Before nomination, vetted to assure confirmation likely, no 
lurking problems
• Most have served on US courts of appeals
– Have a record of decisions that can be guide regarding how 
Justice is likely to vote
15
Becoming a Justice
• Confirmation hearings in Senate Judiciary Committee
– Senators question nominee on views
• Vote by Judiciary Committee, if successful: refer to Senate
• Takes majority vote of Senate to confirm new justice
• Nominee can be derailed in confirmation process if 
appears controversial, extreme, too different from 
philosophy of justice whom they replace (thereby 
changing balance of court)
16
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9US Supreme Court historically
Chief Justice John Marshall (1801‐1835)
• Established precedent regarding power of US Supreme Court 
to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress
If a statute is unconstitutional, it is struck down & has no effect.  
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
• Established precedent of US Supreme Court to overrule state 
laws that violate federal law.  McCullough v. Maryland (1819)
“New Deal” court – President Roosevelt’s court‐packing plan
• When the US Supreme Court was striking down provisions 
of the New Deal, President Roosevelt threatened to add 
new members to the Court to dilute the conservative 
members’ votes
17
Becoming a Justice
Considerations to ethnicity, 
gender
– Geography and religion have 
become less important
– First Jewish Justice Louis 
Brandeis was appointed in 
1916 
o 127 years after Court 
established
Religion of current Justices: 
4 Catholic, 3 Jewish
18
b. Nov. 13, 1856 
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Becoming a Justice
• First African‐American Justice 
Thurgood Marshall was 
appointed in 1967
o 178 years after first justice appointed
19
• First woman Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor was appointed in 1981
o 192 years after first justice appointed
Becoming a Justice
• First Latino Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor was 
appointed in 2009
o 220 years after first justice 
appointed
20
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Case‐processing
• Law clerks read petitions for certiorari
– Clerks are recent law school graduates
• Justices vote whether to accept (grant cert) case
– Briefs asking for grant of cert try to convince 4 justices 
to accept case
• If case accepted, attorneys file briefs
– Appellant / Petitioner
– Respondent
– Reply
– Amici
21
Case‐processing
• Oral argument
– not granted in all cases
– 30 minutes side is standard
– active questioning by justices
• Sometimes questions are to convince other justices
• Try to articulate a principled way to decide case
– What other, similar situations may the current case affect in 
future?
– “slippery slope” / line‐drawing
– attorneys calculate arguments by “vote counting”
22
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Case‐processing
Conferences
• Chief Justice presides
• 9 justices discuss cases – alone (no law clerks)
• Discuss cases before argued (based on briefs)
• Discuss cases after argument
• Take vote; most senior justice on winning side 
assigns opinion to justice to write
• Strive for unanimity when possible   Q: why?
E.g., Brown v. Board of Education
23
Written decisions
Opinion‐writing
• Assignments distributed among justices to even workload
• Consideration of legal approach in assigning
Need to have other justices sign opinion
• Chief Justice may assign himself major opinions to write
Circulating drafts, “lobbying” of other justices
24
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Written decisions
Decision of the Court (majority)
Plurality decisions
– When don’t have 5 justices who agree to sign one opinion
– 4‐4 split when one justice recuses self
– Have little precedential value
Per curiam decision
– Unsigned by individual, generally brief & limited
Concurrence
– Agree (“concur”) with majority outcome, but for a different 
reason
Dissents
– Justices write to persuade, also sometimes believe their 
dissents will become majority decisions in future
– Reading opinion from bench
• Uncommon but makes a point
25
The current US Supreme Court
26
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Chief Justice John Roberts
• B. 1955, New York, grew up in Indiana
• AB Harvard, JD Harvard
• Appointed by President G W Bush 2005
• Attorney for White House (Reagan), Dept of 
Justice, law practice in DC, US Court of Appeals 
Judge
• Notes: votes with conservative wing, was deciding 
vote and author upholding Affordable Health Care 
Act case, went to Catholic school, was captain of 
h.s. football team, regional wrestling champ, net 
worth of $ 6 million
27
Justice Anthony Kennedy
• B. 1936, Sacramento, CA 
• AB Stanford & London School of Economics, LLB Harvard 
Law School
• Appointed by President Reagan in 1988
• Law school teacher, private practice, government 
commissions (e.g., ethics), 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
judge
• Notes: centrist vote, writing key gay rights decisions 
(Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell),  teaches 
international and American law every summer in Austria
28
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Justice Clarence Thomas
• B. 1948 in Pin Point (near Savannah), Georgia
• AB Holy Cross College, JD Yale Law School
• Nominated by President Bush in 1991
• Assistant Attorney General of Missouri (3 years), Monsanto 
Company (2 years), Legislative Assistant (3 years), government 
attorney, chair of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(8 years)
• Notes: father was farm worker, mother was domestic worker, 
first in his family to attend college, grew up speaking Gullah 
(Creole‐related language), viewed as most conservative 
member of court, contentious confirmation hearings with 
Anita Hill raising sexual harassment claims, hasn’t spoken in 
court since February 2006, wife is a lobbyist for Tea Party and 
other conservative political causes
29
Justices O’Connor (retired), Sotomayor, 
Ginsburg and Kagan (2010)
30
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
• B. 1933, New York
• BA Cornell University, JD Harvard Law School, LL.B. from 
Columbia Law School
• Nominated by President Clinton in 1993
• Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, from 1959–1961. law school teacher (17 
years), helped start  Women’s Rights Project of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, and served as the ACLU’s General 
Counsel from 1973–1980, and on the National Board of 
Directors from 1974–1980, DC Circuit Court of Appeals
• Notes: second woman on Supreme Court, liberal views, 
women’s issues, cancer survivor, wrote law school textbook 
on sex discrimination, law review editor (prestigious) but 
rejected for clerkship because of gender
31
Justice Stephen Breyer
• B. 1938, San Francisco
• AB Stanford University, Magdalen College, Oxford (Marshall 
Scholar), LL.B. from Harvard Law School
• Nominated by President Clinton, 1994
• Government attorney, including Assistant Special Prosecutor 
of the Watergate  (1973),  Counsel to U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee (4 years), law and government professor, First 
Circuit Court of Appeals judge, and as its Chief Judge (14 
years), United States Sentencing (4 years) Commission, 1985–
1989
• Notes: active questioning, liberal views, wrote law school 
textbooks, married daughter of British viscount, Jewish 
though daughter is Episcopal priest, former Eagle Scout, 
brother is federal judge in San Francisco
32
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Justice Samuel Alito
• B. 1950, New Jersey
• BA Princeton, JD Yale Law School
• Nominated by President GW Bush in 2006
• U.S. Attorney, New Jersey (8 years), Assistant 
Solicitor General, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Third Circuit Court of Appeals (16 years)
• Notes: father was Italian immigrant then civil 
servant, mother school teacher, studied in Italy in 
college, Army captain (reserves), conservative on 
Court
33
Justice Sonia Sotomayor
• B. 1954 in New York
• BA Princeton University, J.D. from Yale Law School
• Nominated by President Obama in 2009
• Assistant District Attorney in the NY (5 years), law firm (8 
years), district court and court of appeals judge (17 years), 
law school teacher
• Notes: first Latino/a justice, Puerto Rican parents (father 
spoke only Spanish), grew up living in tenement and 
housing project (now named after her), alcoholic father 
died when she was 9, filed complaint when Princeton did 
not have a Latino faculty member, has promoted diversity 
and affirmative action throughout career
34
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Justice Elena Kagan
• B. 1960 in New York
• A.B. Princeton, M. Phil. Oxford, J.D. Harvard Law 
School
• Nominated by President Obama in 2010
• Briefly practiced law, then became law professor, 
Clinton Administration attorney (4 years), Dean of 
Harvard Law School (6 years), Solicitor General of 
US (1 year)
• Notes: father an attorney, mother a teacher, two 
brothers both teachers, never married, no prior 
judicial experience
35
2015‐2016 docket: juveniles sentence
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14‐280
Facts: Montgomery was 17 when he killed a sheriff in 1963.  He seeks to have his 
sentence reconsidered in light of 2012 US Supreme Court case.  Louisiana denied him 
opportunity for reconsideration.
Issue(s): (1) Whether Miller v. Alabama (2012, which held that requiring life without 
possibility of parole for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment) applies retroactively 
to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison; and (2) whether the Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly 
refused to give retroactive effect in this case to this Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Alabama. 
Decided (6‐3): Montgomery can seek to have his life without possibility of parole 
sentence reconsidered.
36
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2015‐2016 docket: judicial neutrality
Williams v. Pennsylvania, No. 15‐5040
Facts: State supreme court justice declined to recuse himself in a 
capital case in which he had personally approved the decision to 
pursue capital punishment against the defendant when he was an 
elected prosecutor and publicly expressed strong support for capital 
punishment during his judicial election campaign by referencing the 
number of defendants he had “sent” to death row, including the 
defendant in the case now before the court.  
Issue(s): (1) Whether justice‘s participation violated the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Decided (5‐3): Justice’s participation violated defendant’s right to 
due process
37
2015‐2016 docket: standing
Spokeo v. Robins, No. 13‐1339
Facts:  Spokeo gathers information on individuals and posts it on‐line, stating 
that it does not independently verify the information it posts and that it 
should not be used to evaluate people for employment or credit.  Plaintiff 
alleges that Spokeo violates the Fair Credit Reporting Act by posting 
unverified information about him.  He did not ask Spokeo to correct the 
information or allege any specific harm.
Issue(s): Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff 
who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action 
based on a bare violation of a federal statute. 
Decided (5‐2):  Sent back to appeals court regarding analysis of standing.
38
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2015‐2016 docket: 
race in jury selection
Foster v. Chatman, No. 14‐8349
Facts: Prosecutor’s notes indicated which jurors were black in a case 
where a black defendant was charged with killing a white victim. 
Prosecutor gave race‐neutral reasons for excluding all black jurors on 
voir dire.
Issue(s): Whether the Georgia courts erred in failing to recognize race 
discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky (racially motivated use of 
peremptory challenges in voir dire violates the Equal Protection clause) 
in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty case.  Georgia 
court denied habeus corpus appeal
Decided (7‐1): Reversed and remanded; finding of lack of 
discrimination unfounded.
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2015‐2016 docket: Indian courts and 
jurisdiction
Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians, No. 13‐1496
Facts:  Store on an Indian reservation employed a supervisor 
who was found by a tribal court to have sexually molested a 
member of the tribe in a job training program.  
Issue(s): Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a 
means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into 
consensual relationships with a tribe or its members. 
Decided: (per curiam): Complete decision issued: “The 
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”
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2015‐2016 docket: affirmative action
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, No. 14‐981 [Arg: 12.9.2015]
Issue(s): Whether the Fifth Circuit’s re‐endorsement of the University of Texas 
at Austin’s use of “qualitative diversity rationale” preferences in 
undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s 
decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.  This case 
originally arose when a white student was denied admission to the University 
of Texas.
Decided (4‐3):  Race‐conscious admissions process in place at time of Fisher’s 
application did not violate Equal Protection clause 
41
2015‐2016 docket: executive power
Texas v. US
Issue: did President Obama exceed his executive powers in 
deferring deportations of two groups of people (childhood 
arrivals and their parents) and granting them temporary work 
authorization?
Decided (per curiam): Complete decision issued: “The judgment 
is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”
42
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2015‐2016 docket: access to abortions
Whole Women’s Health v. Cole
Issue(s):  Texas law enacted in 2013 would force about 75 
percent of the state’s abortion services to close.  Law requires 
doctors at clinics have hospital admitting privileges within 30 
miles of the clinics, and that clinics have facilities equal to 
those of an outpatient surgical center. 
(1) Did the appeals court properly question regarding whether 
this would protect the health of women. The appeals court 
said it needed to defer to the Texas state legislature on that 
issue.
(2) Does law place undue burden on women who seek 
abortions.  
Decided (5‐3): Texas law unduly restricts women who seek 
abortions.
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2015‐2016 docket: 
one person, one vote
Evenwel v. Abbott
Facts: In 2013 Texas legislature drew new districts based on actual 
population, not the number of people eligible to vote in each district. 
Issue: What is the basis for drawing voting districts: eligible voting population 
or total population
Decided (8‐0):  Texas can determine its voting districts based on total 
population numbers, and isn’t required to use a system based on numbers 
related to registered voters
44
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2015‐2016 docket: 
religious objection and Obamacare
Zubik vs. Burwell (seven consolidated cases)
Facts: religious‐sponsored non‐profit corporations object to birth control as 
part of required health coverage, even though the organizations do not 
provide the birth control themselves
Decided (unsigned opinion):  Cases are remanded back to various districts to 
find a compromise to allow for accommodation of religious views in light of 
additional information
45
2014‐2015 docket: Fourth Amendment
Facts:  Officer stopped defendant for having a brake light 
out.  NC law requires only one functioning brake light.
Issue:  Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can 
provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth 
Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop
Decided: (8‐1) A police officer’s reasonable mistake of law 
gives rise to reasonable suspicion that justifies a traffic 
stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Heien v. North Carolina
46
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2014‐2015 docket: destroying evidence
Facts: Yates was charged with catching undersize 
fish and ordered to report to port.  He threw some 
undersized fish overboard coming into port.
Issue:  Whether throwing out a fish is destroying a 
“tangible object” under the terms of a statute 
forbidding destruction of evidence in a federal 
investigation.
Decided: (5‐4) A fish is not a “tangible object” as 
contemplated by the statute.
Yates v. US
47
2014‐2015 docket: freedom of religion 
Facts:  Muslim inmate Holt wants to grow a half‐inch 
beard in accordance with his religious beliefs
Issue: Whether the Arkansas Department of 
Corrections grooming policy violates the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 in that it 
prohibits Muslim petitioner from growing a beard. 
Decided: (unanimous) Dept of Corrections must allow Holt 
to grow a half‐inch beard
Holt v. Hobbs (8th Cir. allowed Dept of Corrections to limit beards)
48
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2014‐2015 docket: freedom of religion
Facts: Woman applies for job at Abercrombie & Fitch wearing a 
headscarf.  She doesn’t get hired.
A worker asks a manager why she isn’t hired.  Manager says it’s 
because of her headscarf.
Issues: Does not hiring a Muslim woman because her headscarf 
did not fit Abercrombie & Fitch’s “look policy” constitute 
unlawful employment discrimination based on religion?  
Do employees have to explicitly request a religious exemption 
from dress code?
Decided: (8‐1) Workers do not need to explicitly ask for religious 
accommodation.
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch (10th Cir.  ruled in favor of A & F)
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2014‐2015 docket: Fourth Amendment
Fact: Officer pulled Rodriguez over for driving on the 
shoulder.  Officer issued a written warning and asked if 
his dog could check the car.  Rodriguez said no.  No 
reasonable suspicion justified the prolonged stop.  After 
7‐8 minutes for back‐up, dog sniffed drugs.
Issue: Whether an officer may extend an already 
completed traffic stop for a canine sniff without 
reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification
Decided: (5‐4) absent a reasonable suspicion, prolonging a 
traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment
Rodriguez v. US
50
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2014‐2015 docket: Fourth Amendment
51
Facts:  LA ordinance allows police to inspect hotel records any 
time without a search warrant.  Hotel owner Patel sued.
Issues: Do hotel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry?
If so, is the ordinance unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment unless it expressly provides for judicial review 
before the police can inspect the registry?
Decided: (5‐4)  Ordinance violates the Fourth Amendment by not 
allowing the hotel owner an opportunity to challenge the police 
officer’s demand to inspect hotel records.
City of LA v. Patel (previous split between the 9th Cir. and Massachusetts  
Supreme Court)
2014‐2015 docket: immigration 
Facts: Mellouli an immigrant from Tunisia was arrested for drugs 
and accepted a plea bargain resulting in a conviction for 
possessing  drug paraphernalia.  Law provides that immigrants 
convicted under any law “relating to a controlled substance” as 
defined by the Controlled Substances Act are deportable.
Issue: Does a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia 
makes someone deportable?
Decided: (7‐2)  Reversed.  Statutory analysis shows that 
concealing pills in his sock did not make the defendant 
deportable.
Mellouli v. Holder.  Decision below: immigration judge found him deportable 
since “relating to a controlled substance” is general language.  Board of 
Immigration Appeals upheld conviction; 8th Circuit affirmed. 
52
451
27
2014‐2015 docket: free speech
Facts: Lanell Williams‐Yulee sent out form letters asking for 
contributions to her campaign to be a trial judge in Florida.  She was 
found in violation of a court rule and received a ‘public reprimand.’
Issue:
Does a judicial conduct rule that prohibits candidates for judicial office 
from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the First 
Amendment?
Decided: (5‐4)  To maintain public confidence in the judiciary, 
states may bar direct solicitation by judges and judicial 
candidates.  
Williams‐Yulee v. The Florida Bar.  Florida Supreme Court upheld discipline.
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Facts: Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed a specialty license 
plate showing the confederate flag and the words  ‘Sons of 
Confederate Veterans.”  Under its authority to reject proposed 
vanity plate designs that “might be offensive to any member of 
the public,” the Texas DMV rejected the design.
Issue(s): Did Texas engage in “viewpoint discrimination” contrary 
to the First Amendment by rejecting the proposed license‐plate 
design?
Decided: (5‐4)  License plates are government speech immune 
from First Amendment challenges.  Groups cannot force a state 
to adopt speech, such as on its license plates.
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans. Fifth Cir. held that 
Texas engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
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2014‐2015 docket: free speech
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Facts: Rap artist “Tone Dougie” Elonis posted threats to his 
estranged wife, an FBI agent, and a kindergarten class on 
Facebook.  Threats were to smother wife, slit her throat, dump 
her body.  He ended his post with "Art is about pushing limits. 
I'm willing to go to jail for my constitutional rights. Are you?“  He 
was sentenced to 44 months in prison. 
Issue:  Whether conviction for threatening another person 
requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten.  
Or is it sufficient to convict based on the test whether a 
“reasonable person” would find the language threatening.
Decided: (8‐1)  Mens rea is required for a crime, mere negligence is 
insufficient for guilt.
Elonis v. US.  3rd Circuit upheld the conviction saying that it protected public from fear.  
9th Circuit, Mass., RI, Vermont require proof that person meant what he/she 
threatened. 
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2014‐2015 docket: free speech
Facts:  After fleeing a botched bank robbery, Whitfield 
entered 79‐year‐old woman’s home, moved her from the 
hallway to a room a few feet away where she suffered a fatal 
heart attack.  His sentence was enhanced for “forcing any 
person to accompany him” in the course of fleeing from a 
bank robbery.
Issue: Was moving woman a few feet sufficient to warrant the 
enhanced sentence?
Decided: (unanimous) Even if the movement occurs entirely 
within a single building or over a short distance, the 
enhancement still applies.
Whitfield v. U.S
2014‐2015 docket: sentencing
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2014‐2015 docket: sentencing
Facts:  Brumfield was sentenced to death for killing an officer.  
In 2002 US Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that 
execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the 8th
Amendment.  Although he had not raised his mental 
competence originally, Brumfield asked for resentencing in 
light of Atkins.
Issue:  Whether a state court that denies funding to an 
indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining 
evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his 
“opportunity to be heard,” and his constitutional right to be 
provided with the “basic tools” for an adequate defense.
Decided: (5‐4)  Defendant was entitled to have a hearing on his 
mental capacity.  
Brumfield v. Cain. Decision below held Brumfield not entitled to 
resentencing or funding to demonstrate lack of mental competence
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Facts: Plaintiffs are on death row in Oklahoma for first degree murder.  They 
sought an injunction to prevent the state from using a three‐drug lethal 
injection protocol to execute them.
Issue(s):  Is it constitutionally permissible for a state to execute people using a 
three‐drug protocol where (a) there is scientific agreement that the first drug 
has no pain relieving properties and cannot reliably produce deep, coma‐like 
unconsciousness, and (b) it is undisputed that there is a substantial, 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and suffering from the 
administration of the second and third drugs when a prisoner is conscious.
Decided: (5‐4)  Three‐drug protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment
Glossip v. Gross.  Court earlier refused to stay (=stop) pending execution, and 
one inmate was executed. 
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2014‐2015 docket: death penalty
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Facts: Several states defined marriage as between a man and 
a woman. 
Issues: May a state ban same‐sex couples from marrying?  
Specifically: 
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license 
a marriage between two people of the same sex? 
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to 
recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex 
when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out‐
of‐state?
Decided: (5‐4) Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
guarantee same‐sex couples the fundamental right to marry.
Obergefell v. Hodges and three companion cases
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2014‐2015 docket: marriage equality
2013‐2014 docket:
Town hall prayer/Establishment clause
Town of Greece v. Galloway
• Town in NY opens town hall meetings with a prayer from a 
‘chaplain of the month’; theoretically open to all faiths, 
practice is the chaplains are predominantly Christian.
• Two residents sued, arguing that the Town’s practice violates 
First Amendment’s prohibition of government establishment 
of religion (“Establishment Clause”) and coerces people 
present to participate in prayer
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Establishment clause 
(portion of the First Amendment)
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; …
Precedent says Establishment Clause forbids the 
government from 
• establishing an official religion
• taking action that favors one religion over another
• preferring religion over non‐religion
• preferring non‐religion over religion
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2013‐2014 docket:
Town hall prayer/Establishment clause
Town of Greece v. Galloway 
• Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town.  
Appeals court reversed, saying that a reasonable person 
could believe that the prayer aligned the town with 
Christianity
• 1983 USSC precedent: starting state legislative sessions with 
sectarian, non‐coercive prayer is not unconstitutional 
because it is "deeply embedded in the history and tradition 
of this country.”
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2013‐2014 docket:
Town hall prayer/Establishment clause
Town of Greece v. Galloway 
Decided (5‐4):   Reversed.  Follow precedent allowing prayer 
before legislative session. Distinguish precedent disallowing 
forced prayer at events like public high school graduation as 
unconstitutional coercion.
“Legislative bodies do not engage in impermissible coercion 
merely by exposing constituents to prayer they would rather 
not hear and in which they need not participate.”
‐‐Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority
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2013‐2014 docket:
Federal requirements re birth control v. 
employer religious beliefs 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Regulations promulgated under the Affordable Care Act 
require employers to provide birth control options as 
part of health plans.
Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
prohibits government from substantially burdening the 
exercise of religion “unless that action constitutes the 
least restrictive means of serving a compelling 
government interest.”
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2013‐2014 docket:
Federal requirements re birth control v. 
employer religious beliefs 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Believing that life starts at conception, Hobby Lobby 
and 2 companies owned by religious Christian families 
objected on religious grounds to being required to 
“facilitate access” to four specified types of birth 
control.
Decided (5‐4): Forcing family‐owned corporations to pay 
for contraception violates federal statute.  Therefore 
regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act are 
invalid.
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2013‐2014 docket: 
campaign spending/First Amendment
McCutcheon & Republican Party v. Federal Election 
Commission
• Congress set limit of $123,200 / year in campaign 
contributions set by Congress
• Precedent from 1976 says Congress can limit spending 
by candidates to avoid potential for corruption
• Wealthy Alabama businessman challenged on First 
Amendment grounds saying he wanted to donate 
more; Republican National Party said it wanted to 
accept more.
Decided: Congressional limits on spending in campaigns 
violates First Amendment guarantees of free speech
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2013‐2014 docket:
Affirmative action
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action … By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN) 
• In 2006 a majority of Michigan voters approved a 
ballot measure to amend the Michigan Constitution 
to prohibit “all sex‐ and race‐based preferences” in 
public education. 
• A coalition challenged the proposition, arguing it 
violated the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
… deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.
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2013‐2014 docket:
Affirmative action
Schuette v. BAMN
Decided: (6‐2, in five opinions) where there is no 
intentional discrimination, then issue should be 
decided by voters.
Plurality opinion said it was a decision about the 
ability of voters to decide issues of public higher 
education, not about race discrimination.
(Recall Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, following, 
that her colleagues did not address the issue in 
the case)
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2013‐2014 docket: other civil cases
• The way Massachusetts law drew buffer zones 
around abortion clinics violates the First 
Amendment
McCullen v. Coakley (9‐0)
• Internet company Aero cannot re‐broadcast 
television signals to subscribers.  
ABC v. Aereo (6‐3)
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2013‐2014 docket: other criminal cases
• Using IQ score alone is too rigid a means to 
determine limit for death penalty of mentally 
disabled defendants.
Hall v. Florida (5‐4) 
• Police need a warrant to search the cell phone 
of the people they arrest
Riley v. California (9‐0)
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Supreme Court of the US  -- from US Courts:  
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/supreme-court/about-supreme-
court.aspx 
Background 
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution establishes the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Currently, there are nine Justices on the Court. Before taking office, each Justice must be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Justices hold office during good 
behavior, typically, for life. 
The Constitution states that the Supreme Court has both original and appellate jurisdiction. 
Original jurisdiction means that the Supreme Court is the first, and only, Court to hear a case. 
The Constitution limits original jurisdiction cases to those involving disputes between the states 
or disputes arising among ambassadors and other high-ranking ministers. Appellate jurisdiction 
means that the Court has the authority to review the decisions of lower courts. Most of the cases 
the Supreme Court hears are appeals from lower courts. 
Supreme Court Background 
Article III of the Constitution establishes the federal judiciary. Article III, Section I states that 
"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Although the 
Constitution establishes the Supreme Court, it permits Congress to decide how to organize it. 
Congress first exercised this power in the Judiciary Act of 1789. This Act created a Supreme 
Court with six justices. It also established the lower federal court system. 
The Justices 
Over the years, various Acts of Congress have altered the number of seats on the Supreme Court, 
from a low of five to a high of 10. Shortly after the Civil War, the number of seats on the Court 
was fixed at nine. Today, there is one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices of the United 
States Supreme Court. Like all federal judges, justices are appointed by the President and are 
confirmed by the Senate. They, typically, hold office for life. The salaries of the justices cannot 
be decreased during their term of office. These restrictions are meant to protect the independence 
of the judiciary from the political branches of government. 
The Court's Jurisdiction 
Article III, Section II of the Constitution establishes the jurisdiction (legal ability to hear a case) 
of the Supreme Court. The Court has original jurisdiction (a case is tried before the Court) over 
certain cases, e.g., suits between two or more states and/or cases involving ambassadors and 
other public ministers. The Court has appellate jurisdiction (the Court can hear the case on 
appeal) on almost any other case that involves a point of constitutional and/or federal law. Some 
examples include cases to which the United States is a party, cases involving Treaties, and cases 
involving ships on the high seas and navigable waterways (admiralty cases).  
Cases 
When exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the Court, with a few exceptions, does not have to 
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hear a case. The Certiorari Act of 1925 gives the Court the discretion to decide whether or not to 
do so. In a petition for a writ of certiorari, a party asks the Court to review its case. The Supreme 
Court agrees to hear about 100-150 of the more than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each 
year. 
Judicial Review 
The best-known power of the Supreme Court is judicial review, or the ability of the Court to 
declare a Legislative or Executive act in violation of the Constitution, is not found within the text 
of the Constitution itself. The Court established this doctrine in the case of Marbury v. Madison 
(1803). 
In this case, the Court had to decide whether an Act of Congress or the Constitution was the 
supreme law of the land. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
to issue writs of mandamus (legal orders compelling government officials to act in accordance 
with the law). A suit was brought under this Act, but the Supreme Court noted that the 
Constitution did not permit the Court to have original jurisdiction in this matter. Since Article VI 
of the Constitution establishes the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land, the Court held 
that an Act of Congress that is contrary to the Constitution could not stand. In subsequent cases, 
the Court also established its authority to strike down state laws found to be in violation of the 
Constitution. 
Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (1869), the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
were only applicable to the federal government. After the Amendment's passage, the Supreme 
Court began ruling that most of its provisions were applicable to the states as well. Therefore, the 
Court has the final say over when a right is protected by the Constitution or when a 
Constitutional right is violated. 
Role 
The Supreme Court plays a very important role in our constitutional system of government. First, 
as the highest court in the land, it is the court of last resort for those looking for justice. Second, 
due to its power of judicial review, it plays an essential role in ensuring that each branch of 
government recognizes the limits of its own power. Third, it protects civil rights and liberties by 
striking down laws that violate the Constitution. Finally, it sets appropriate limits on democratic 
government by ensuring that popular majorities cannot pass laws that harm and/or take undue 
advantage of unpopular minorities. In essence, it serves to ensure that the changing views of a 
majority do not undermine the fundamental values common to all Americans, i.e., freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, and due process of law. 
Impact 
The decisions of the Supreme Court have an important impact on society at large, not just on 
lawyers and judges. The decisions of the Court have a profound impact on high school students. 
In fact, several landmark cases decided by the Court have involved students, e.g., Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent School District (1969) held that students could not be punished for wearing 
black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War. In the Tinker case, the Court held that 
"students do not shed their rights at the schoolhouse gate." 
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Landmark Supreme Court Cases 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
Holding: Established the doctrine of judicial review. 
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave the Supreme Court the authority to issue certain 
judicial writs. The Constitution did not give the Court this power. Because the Constitution is the 
Supreme Law of the Land, the Court held that any contradictory congressional Act is without 
force. The ability of federal courts to declare legislative and executive actions unconstitutional is 
known as judicial review.  
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 
Holding: The Constitution gives the federal government certain implied powers. 
Maryland imposed a tax on the Bank of the United States and questioned the federal 
government's ability to grant charters without explicit constitutional sanction. The Supreme 
Court held that the tax unconstitutionally interfered with federal supremacy and ruled that the 
Constitution gives the federal government certain implied powers. 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
Holding: Separate schools are not equal. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court sanctioned segregation by upholding the 
doctrine of "separate but equal." The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People disagreed with this ruling, challenging the constitutionality of segregation in the Topeka, 
Kansas, school system. In 1954, the Court reversed its Plessy decision, declaring that "separate 
schools are inherently unequal." 
Cooper v. Aaron (1958) 
Holding: States cannot nullify decisions of the federal courts. 
Several government officials in southern states, including the governor and legislature of 
Alabama, refused to follow the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision. They 
argued that the states could nullify federal court decisions if they felt that the federal courts were 
violating the Constitution. The Court unanimously rejected this argument and held that only the 
federal courts can decide when the Constitution is violated. 
Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 
Holding: Illegally obtained material cannot be used in a criminal trial. 
While searching Dollree Mapp's house, police officers discovered obscene materials and arrested 
her. Because the police officers never produced a search warrant, she argued that the materials 
should be suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. The Supreme Court agreed 
and applied to the states the exclusionary rule from Weeks v. United States (1914). 
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 
Holding: Indigent defendants must be provided representation without charge. 
Gideon was accused of committing a felony. Being indigent, he petitioned the judge to provide 
him with an attorney free of charge. The judge denied his request. The Supreme Court ruled for 
Gideon, saying that the Sixth Amendment requires indigent criminal defendants to be provided 
an attorney free of charge.  
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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
Holding: Police must inform suspects of their rights before questioning. 
After hours of police interrogations, Ernesto Miranda confessed to rape and kidnapping. At trial, 
he sought to suppress his confession, stating that he was not advised of his rights to counsel and 
to remain silent. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that police must inform suspects of their 
rights before questioning. 
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
Holding: Stop and frisks do not violate the Constitution under certain circumstances. 
Observing Terry and others acting suspiciously in front of a store, a police officer concluded that 
they might rob it. The officer stopped and frisked the men. A weapon was found on Terry and he 
was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The Supreme Court ruled that this search was 
reasonable. 
U.S. v. Nixon (1974) 
Holding: The President is not above the law. 
The special prosecutor in the Watergate affair subpoenaed audio tapes of Oval Office 
conversations. President Nixon refused to turn over the tapes, asserting executive privilege. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the defendants' right to potentially exculpating evidence outweighed 
the President's right to executive privilege if national security was not compromised.  
Texas v. Johnson (1989) 
Holding: Even offensive speech such as flag burning is protected by the First Amendment. 
To protest the policies of the Reagan administration, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American 
flag outside of the Dallas City Hall. He was arrested for this act, but argued that it was symbolic 
speech. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that symbolic speech is constitutionally protected 
even when it is offensive. 
  
Landmark Supreme Court Cases About Students 
Engel v. Vitale (1962) 
Holding: School initiated-prayer in the public school system violates the First Amendment. 
In the New York school system, each day began with a nondenominational prayer 
acknowledging dependence upon God. This action was challenged in Court as an 
unconstitutional state establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment. The 
Supreme Court agreed, stating that the government could not sponsor such religious activities. 
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) 
Holding: Students do not leave their rights at the schoolhouse door. 
To protest the Vietnam War, Mary Beth Tinker and her brother wore black armbands to school. 
Fearing a disruption, the administration prohibited wearing such armbands. The Tinkers were 
removed from school when they failed to comply, but the Supreme Court ruled that their actions 
were protected by the First Amendment. 
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Goss v. Lopez (1975) 
Holding: Students are entitled to certain due process rights. 
Nine students at an Ohio public school received 10-day suspensions for disruptive behavior 
without due process protections. The Supreme Court ruled for the students, saying that once the 
state provides an education for all of its citizens, it cannot deprive them of it without ensuring 
due process protections. 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) 
Holding: Administrators may edit the content of school newspapers. 
The principal of Hazelwood East High School edited two articles in the school paper The 
Spectrum that he deemed inappropriate. The student authors argued that this violated their First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that 
administrators can edit materials that reflect school values. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 
Holding: Students have a reduced expectation of privacy in school. 
A teacher accused T.L.O. of smoking in the bathroom. When she denied the allegation, the 
principal searched her purse and found cigarettes and marijuana paraphernalia. A family court 
declared T.L.O. a delinquent. The Supreme Court ruled that her rights were not violated since 
students have reduced expectations of privacy in school. 
Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser (1987) 
Holding: Students do not have a First Amendment right to make obscene speeches in school. 
Matthew N. Fraser, a student at Bethel High School, was suspended for three days for delivering 
an obscene and provocative speech to the student body. In this speech, he nominated his fellow 
classmate for an elected school office. The Supreme Court held that his free speech rights were 
not violated. 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000) 
Holding: Students may not use a school's loudspeaker system to offer student-led, student-
initiated prayer.  
Before football games, members of the student body of a Texas high school elected one of their 
classmates to address the players and spectators. These addresses were conducted over the 
school's loudspeakers and usually involved a prayer. Attendance at these events was voluntary. 
Three students sued the school arguing that the prayers violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. A majority of the Court rejected the school's argument that since the prayer 
was student initiated and student led, as opposed to officially sponsored by the school, it did not 
violate the First Amendment. The Court held that this action did constitute school-sponsored 
prayer because the loudspeakers that the students used for their invocations were owned by the 
school. 
Board of Education of Independent School District #92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls 
(2002) 
Holding: Random drug tests of students involved in extracurricular activities do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. 
In Veronia School District v. Acton (1995), the Supreme Court held that random drug tests of 
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student athletes do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Some schools then began to require drug tests of all students in extracurricular 
activities. The Supreme Court in Earls upheld this practice. 
Zelma v. Simmons-Harris (2002) 
Holding: Certain school voucher programs are constitutional. 
The Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program allowed certain Ohio families to receive tuition aid from the 
state. This would help offset the cost of tuition at private, including parochial (religiously 
affiliated), schools. The Supreme Court rejected First Amendment challenges to the program and 
stated that such aid does not violate the Establishment Clause. 
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 
Holding: Colleges and universities have a legitimate interest in promoting diversity. 
Barbara Grutter alleged that her Equal Protection rights were violated when the University of 
Michigan Law School's attempt to gain a diverse student body resulted in the denial of her 
admission's application. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that institutions of higher 
education have a legitimate interest in promoting diversity.  
Roper v. Simmons (2005) 
Holding: It is cruel and unusual punishment to execute persons for crimes they committed before 
age 18.  
Matthew Simmons was sentenced to death for the murder of a woman when he was 17 years of 
age. In the 1988 case Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled that executing persons 
for crimes committed at age 15 or younger constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. Roper argued that "evolving standards of decency" prevented the 
execution of an individual for crimes committed before the age of 18. A majority of the Supreme 
Court agreed with Roper, and held that to execute him for his crime would violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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1Courts and Protection of 
Constitutional Rights
Prof. Margaret Stevenson
JS 103 Courts and Society7.21.16
Background 
US Supreme Court is the final authority on interpreting 
the US Constitution and laws
US Supreme Court defers to precedent, but – unlike 
other courts ‐‐ has the power to overturn precedent
Q:  What considerations lead the Court to reverse 
precedent and identify new rights?  
Q:  How does the Court view other branches’ actions?
Q:  How does public opinion matter, if at all?
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2When does the US Supreme Court 
recognize a “new” right?
Judicial activism: willingness to go beyond literal “strict 
construction” of law or Constitution 
Activism is not a liberal or conservative philosophy
Examples of courts identifying “new” rights, overruling / 
diminishing precedent
“Separate but equal,” “flag salute cases,” “interracial 
marriage”
Then will look at marriage equality cases, beginning with 
precedent in sodomy prosecution cases
“Laws once thought necessary and proper…”
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As 
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation 
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom. 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003) Justice Kennedy
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3Courts as ‘havens of refuge’
Under our constitutional system, courts stand 
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge 
for those who might otherwise suffer because they 
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they 
are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public 
excitement. 
Due process of law, preserved for all by our 
Constitution, commands that no such practice as 
that disclosed by this record [of prolonged 
interrogation of African‐Americans arrested in the 
South for murder of a white man] shall send any 
accused to his death. 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 US 227, 241 (1940), Justice Hugo Black
Courts as ‘havens of refuge’
No higher duty, no more solemn responsibility, 
rests upon this Court than that of translating 
into living law and maintaining this 
constitutional shield deliberately planned and 
inscribed for the benefit of every human being 
subject to our Constitution‐‐of whatever race, 
creed or persuasion.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 US 227, 241 (1940), Justice Hugo Black
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4Courts policing the process of self‐
government
We are fortunate to live in a democratic society. But 
without checks, democratically approved legislation 
can oppress minority groups. For that reason, our 
Constitution places limits on what a majority of the 
people may do.  …
I firmly believe that our role as judges includes 
policing the process of self‐government and 
stepping in when necessary to secure the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Schuette v. BAMN (2014), J. Sotomayor dissenting
“Separate but equal”
1890 Louisiana passed “The Separate Car Act” 
• required railroads to provide “separate but equal” 
train cars for blacks and whites, with a fine or jail 
for people who violate it
• Louisiana community group believed law violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the US Constitution
No State shall... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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5“Separate but equal”
Howard Plessy
• 7/8 white, 1/8 African descent
• sat in whites‐only train car
• refused to move when asked
• railroad knew ahead of time, 
deputy arrested him 
Trial court fined Plessy under Separate Car Act
Appealed to Louisiana Supreme Court: conviction 
upheld
Appealed to US Supreme Court
“Separate but equal”
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was 
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two 
races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could 
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based 
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from 
political, equality, or a commingling of the two races 
upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in 
places where they are liable to be brought into contact 
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to 
the other, and have been generally, if not universally, 
recognized as within the competency of the state 
legislatures in the exercise of their police power.  
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537, 544 (paragraphs added)
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[Establishing separate schools by race] has been held to be 
a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of 
States where the political rights of the colored race have 
been longest and most earnestly enforced.
[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even 
requires the separation of the two races in public 
conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the 
Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress 
requiring separate schools for colored children in the 
District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does 
not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding 
acts of state legislatures.
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537, 544
“Separate but equal”
We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races 
stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the 
colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537, 550‐51
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7“Separate but equal”
For years: children in going to segregated public schools
In 1950s, NAACP in Topeka, Kansas organized group of 13 
plaintiffs to challenge Plessy
Topeka School Board said it was providing “separate but equal” 
education, in accordance with Plessy
US District Court upheld segregated schools, following Plessy
Oliver Brown and 12 other plaintiffs appealed to US Supreme 
Court
joined with cases from DC, Delaware, South Carolina and 
Virginia  (all brought by the NAACP in coordinated litigation)
“Separate but equal”: 
backdrop to Brown
• When no “black” law school existed in Missouri, state 
was required to admit black student to “white” law 
school.  Gaines v. Canada (1938)
• When student applied to law school in Texas, University 
set up a “black” law school so would not have to admit 
him to “white” law school.  Court ruled this separate 
school was not “equal” to white school.  Sweatt v. Painter 
(1950)
• In doctoral program at University of Oklahoma, school 
required black student to sit apart from his class, eat at 
separate time and place from white students.  Court 
ordered this stopped.  McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
(1950)
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8US Supreme Court 1954
Front Row.(LTR): Felix Frankfurter; Hugo Black; Chief Justice Earl 
Warren; Stanley Reed and William O. Douglas. Back row (LTR)Tom Clark; 
Robert H. Jackson; Harold Burton; and Sherman Minton
“Separate but equal”
Case first argued in 1953, scheduled for reargument in 1954 
because new Chief Justice Earl Warren and others wanted US 
Supreme Court decision overturning Plessy to be unanimous.
On May 14, 1954 the Court  overruled Plessy
We conclude that, in the field of public education, 
the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place.  
Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal. 
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated … are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Brown v. Bd of Education (1954) 347 US 483, 495.
Q:   What had changed since Plessy?
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9U.S. Troops escort African American students from Central 
High School, Little Rock, Arkansas, October 3, 1957
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown‐aftermath.html
A note re Schuette v. BAMN
Michigan intermediate appeals court held that Proposal 2 
violated the federal Constitution’s equal protection clause 
in an 8‐7 decision
No State shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
14th Amendment, US Constitution
Held Proposal 2 restructured the state’s political process to 
make it harder for political minorities to ensure protection 
of their rights 
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A note re Schuette v. BAMN
In Schuette (April 2014), the US Supreme Court decided 
that where there is no intentional discrimination, then 
issues should be decided by voters
Plurality opinion said Schuette was a case about the 
ability of voters to decide issues of public higher 
education, not about race discrimination
We examine this issue further in the Balance of Power 
discussions.  However, first consider some of Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent:
A note re Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor in dissent:
We are fortunate to live in a democratic society. But 
without checks, democratically approved legislation can 
oppress minority groups. For that reason, our 
Constitution places limits on what a majority of the 
people may do.  … 
A majority of the Michigan electorate changed the basic 
rules of the political process in that State in a manner 
that uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.  …
I firmly believe that our role as judges includes policing 
the process of self‐government and stepping in when 
necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection.  Because I would do so here, I 
respectfully dissent.
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A note re Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
The plurality's decision fundamentally 
misunderstands the nature of the injustice worked 
by [the voters]. This case is not, as the plurality 
imagines, about "who may resolve" the debate 
over the use of race in higher education 
admissions.  …
Rather, this case is about how the debate over the 
use of race‐sensitive admissions policies may be 
resolved— that is, it must be resolved in 
constitutionally permissible ways. 
A note re Schuette v. BAMN
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting:
[noting historical discrimination against minority groups in 
voting]
While our Constitution does not guarantee minority 
groups victory in the political process, it does guarantee 
them meaningful and equal access to that process. 
It guarantees that the majority may not win by stacking 
the political process against minority groups 
permanently, forcing the minority alone to surmount 
unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals — here, 
educational diversity that cannot reasonably be 
accomplished through race‐neutral measures.  …
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Flag salute cases
In the late 1930s, public schools around US required 
students to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag at 
beginning of each public school day.  
• Many Jehovah’s Witnesses objected to flag salute, believing
– saluting an earthly emblem and ascribing salvation to it, 
was unfaithful to God 
– saluting flag violated the Bible’s commandment “Thou 
shalt have no other gods before me” and prohibition 
against worshipping “graven images”
• Minersville, PA was predominately Catholic town
Flag salute cases
• World War II in Europe, patriotism high
• Around country at time strong sentiment against 
Jehovah’s witnesses
• The children of Walter Gobitis, a Jehovah’s Witness, 
decided not to salute the flag in public school in 
Minersville, PA 
• School expelled Gobitis’ children and other 
Jehovah’s Witness students for not saluting the flag
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Flag salute cases
Gobitis sued, arguing the forced flag salute violated 
First Amendment’s protection of free exercise of 
religion
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion , or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof…
Federal trial court held that mandatory flag salute 
violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
Flag salute cases
Appeals court upheld trial court decision, finding 
requiring children to salute the flag unconstitutional
School appealed to US Supreme Court
In 8‐1 decision, US Supreme Court reversed trial and 
appellate court decisions, finding mandatory flag salute 
was secular, not religious 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) 310 US 586, Justice Frankfurter
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Flag salute cases
Court decision in Gobitis stated:
• Schools have the right to require students to 
participate in rituals designed to “secur[e] effective 
loyalty to the traditional ideals of democracy.”  
• “The ultimate foundation of a free society is the 
binding tie of cohesive sentiment.”
• Any concern regarding coerced recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance should be resolved “at the 
ballot box.”
Flag salute cases
In 1942, after Gobitis: 
West Virginia legislature enacted law requiring public 
schools to have children pledge allegiance to the flag
If children did not salute, school was required to expel 
them
• parents could face criminal proceedings
• officials threatened to send children to juvenile 
hall
Backdrop: US now entered World War II
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Saluting the flag in 1940
Photo from Wikipedia
Flag salute cases
US Supreme Court accepted case against West 
Virginia Board of Education
3 new Justices on Court
We are dealing with a compulsion of 
students to declare a belief. … There is no 
doubt that, in connection with the pledges, 
the flag salute is a form of utterance. 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 US 624
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Flag salute cases
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in 
support of some end thought essential to their 
time and country have been waged by many 
good, as well as by evil, men. 
Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
but, at other times and places, the ends have 
been racial or territorial security, support of a 
dynasty or regime, and particular plans for 
saving souls. 
Flag salute cases
[When] first and moderate methods to attain 
unity have failed, those bent on its 
accomplishment must resort to an ever‐
increasing severity. 
[T]hose who begin coercive elimination of 
dissent soon find themselves exterminating 
dissenters. 
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves 
only the unanimity of the graveyard.
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Flag salute cases
Regarding the wisdom of requiring a salute to show loyalty: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein. 
If there are any circumstances which permit 
an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Flag salute cases
Regarding referring mandatory flag salutes to the “ballot box,” the 
Court in Gobitis in 1940 stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. 
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not 
be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections. 
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 US 624, 639 (emphasis added)
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Resurgence of pressured pledges
• Hutto, a student in high school in Alabama, refused to 
say Pledge of Allegiance.  He was told to apologize to 
class or the principal would report his action to his 
college where he got a military scholarship.
• Holloman raised his fist next day in support of Hutto
not saying Pledge.  He was told he could either do 
detention (which would delay graduation) or be 
paddled by principal. 
• Holloman sued.  Trial court sustained punishment for 
Holloman’s “unorthodox and deliberately provocative 
and disruptive gesture” 
(District Court, 2001) Holloman v. Harland; overturned (11th Cir. 2004)
Interracial marriage
In the 1880s Alabama laws criminalized interracial 
sexual relations between unmarried people 
(adultery)  
• interracial sexual relations  ‐ a felony: 
– punishable between 2‐7 years hard labor 
(was unlawful for interracial couples to marry)
• same‐race adultery – a misdemeanor: 
– fine of at least $100 and/or no more than 6 
months hard labor
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Interracial marriage
An interracial couple Tony Pace (black) and Mary 
Cox (white) lived together in Alabama, where it 
was against the law for an interracial couple to 
marry.
In 1881 they were convicted in Alabama of living 
together in “a state of adultery or fornication.”
Each was sentenced to two years hard labor
Pace challenged the Alabama law as violating the 
constitutional right to equal protection of the 
laws
Interracial marriage
In 1883, US Supreme Court upheld Alabama 
laws.  Reasoning: 
Since same‐race black couples and same‐race 
white couples are punished equally for adultery 
/ fornication, 
it is not discriminatory to punish interracial 
couples, even if they are barred from marrying 
Pace v. Alabama (1883) 106 US 583
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Interracial marriage
Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act of 1924” made it a 
felony for a white person and non‐white person to 
marry
Violation carried 1‐5 year prison sentence 
• Mildred and Richard Loving, an interracial couple, 
married in 1958 in DC, moved to Virginia
• Arrested, plead guilty, sentenced to 1 year in 
prison
• Sentence suspended if they left the state  
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Interracial marriage
The Lovings left the state
The Lovings (represented by ACLU) filed a class 
action in Virginia to challenge the Racial Integrity 
Act
• Trial court held, following Pace, that since both 
white and non‐white spouses were punished 
equally, convictions were upheld
• Virginia Supreme Court upheld the conviction on 
appeal
Interracial marriage
In 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren, for a unanimous 
Supreme Court:
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights…," 
fundamental to our very existence and survival. ... 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes ‐‐ classifications so 
directly subversive of the principle of equality at 
the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment ‐‐ is 
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty 
without due process of law. 
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Interracial marriage
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the 
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discrimination.  Under our 
Constitution, the freedom to marry ‐‐ or not marry 
‐‐ a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
Loving v. VA (1967) 388 US 1
Q:  What had changed since Pace?  
Criminalizing gay sex
• In 1980s, sodomy is a crime in Georgia (and other states)
• In 1982 Michael Hardwick is arrested for consensual gay sex 
(sodomy) in privacy of his home
• DA doesn’t prosecute, Hardwick sues since could be arrested 
again
• Appeals Court holds Georgia sodomy statute is 
unconstitutional
• US Supreme Court grants Georgia’s writ of certiorari
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Criminalizing gay sex
Hardwick argues he has a right to personal private 
decisions without government involvement, relying on 
the Fourteenth Amendment:
[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.
Court describes the issue presented in Hardwick v. 
Bowers:
Whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy, and hence invalidates the laws of the many 
States that still make such conduct illegal.
Criminalizing gay sex
Court reviews and distinguishes precedent
Court reviews precedent finding a right to be free from 
government intrusion in personal, private decisions such as 
marriage (Loving v. VA), procreation, possessing obscene 
material
Distinguishes the substantive areas from this case which is 
said to be about whether homosexuals have a constitutional 
right to engage in sodomy
Overturns appellate court decision and finds Georgia sodomy 
statute is not unconstitutional
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Criminalizing gay sex
In 2003, Supreme Court accepts the appeal in Lawrence v. Texas
• Texas law criminalizes homosexual (but not marital) sodomy
• Plaintiff men were engaged in consensual, adult sex
• Pleaded no contest charges
• Convicted of misdemeanor and fined
John Lawrence, left, and 
Tyron Garner, plaintiffs in 
Lawrence v. Texas
Criminalizing gay sex
In Lawrence, the Court identifies the issues for decision as:
1. Does treating same sex couples differently from 
heterosexual couples violate the equal protection 
clause?
2. Does criminalizing adult consensual sexual intimacy in 
the home violate liberty and privacy interests 
protected by the due process clause?
3. Should the Court overrule Bowers v Hardwick?
Court reviews much of same precedent as in Bowers, plus 
new cases.
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Criminalizing gay sex
Discussing Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the role of past conduct and 
the power of political majorities:
… [T]he Court in Bowers was making the broader 
point that for centuries there have been powerful 
voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. 
The condemnation has been shaped by religious 
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, 
and respect for the traditional family. 
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but 
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical 
and moral principles to which they aspire and which 
thus determine the course of their lives. 
Criminalizing gay sex
These considerations do not answer the question 
before us, however. 
The issue is whether the majority may use the 
power of the State to enforce these views on the 
whole society through operation of the criminal 
law. 
“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.”  
Quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
850 (1992)
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Criminalizing gay sex
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly 
clear. 
First, the fact that the governing majority in a State 
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor 
tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack. 
Second, individual decisions by married persons, 
concerning the intimacies of their physical 
relationship, even when not intended to produce 
offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Moreover, this protection extends to intimate 
choices by unmarried as well as married persons. 
Criminalizing gay sex
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have this insight.
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. 
As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.
The Court in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) overruled Bowers 
v. Hardwick.  It held Texas law criminalizing gay sex 
violated the due process clause of the US Constitution.
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Marriage equality cases 2015
In January 2015, same‐sex marriage was unlawful in 13 states
In Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee trial courts ruled 
in favor of the freedom to marry when same‐sex couples 
challenged the marriage ban
In November 2014, the 6th Circuit reversed each decision, 
finding that states could indeed ban same‐sex marriage.
The US Supreme Court accepted the four consolidated 
cases (Obergefell v. Hodges) to determine whether the US 
Constitution protected same‐sex couples’ right to marry.  
The Court considered precedent, including Lawrence v. 
Texas and Loving v. VA.
Mildred Loving (1939‐2008)
In 2007, on the 40th anniversary of the US Supreme Court 
decision in Loving v. Virginia, Mildred Loving made a rare 
public statement.  
Specifically she spoke of gay marriage, but generally her 
comment speaks to the role of courts in enabling her – of 
African and Rappahannock Native American descent – and 
her white husband Richard Loving (1933‐1975) to avoid a 
felony conviction and prison sentence, when the Virginia 
legislature did not want them to live as a married couple in 
Virginia.
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Mildred Loving (1939‐2008)
Mildred Loving, plaintiff in Loving v. Virginia, in 2007:
My generation was bitterly divided over something that 
should have been so clear and right. 
The majority believed what the [Virginia] judge said, that 
it was God's plan to keep people apart, and that 
government should discriminate against people in love.   
But I have lived long enough now to see big changes. …
Mildred Loving (1939‐2008)
Surrounded as I am now by wonderful children and 
grandchildren, not a day goes by that I don’t think of 
Richard and our love, our right to marry, and how 
much it meant to me to have that freedom to marry 
the person precious to me, even if others thought he 
was the 'wrong kind of person' for me to marry.
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Mildred Loving (1939‐2008)
I believe all Americans, no matter their race, no 
matter their sex, no matter their sexual orientation, 
should have that same freedom to marry. 
Government has no business imposing some 
people’s religious beliefs over others, especially if it 
denies people's civil rights.
Mildred Loving (1939‐2008)
I am still not a political person, but I am proud that 
Richard's and my name is on a court case that can help 
reinforce the love, the commitment, the fairness, and 
the family that so many people, black or white, young 
or old, gay or straight, seek in life. 
I support the freedom to marry for all. That’s what 
Loving, and loving, are all about.
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Marriage equality cases 2015
In June 2015 the US Supreme Court (5‐4) announced in 
Obergefell v. Hodges that the Equal Protection Clause and 
the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution guaranteed 
same‐sex couples the fundamental right to marry.
Justice Kennedy (author of Lawrence v. Texas):
An individual can invoke a right to constitutional 
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the 
broader public disagrees and even if the legislature 
refuses to act. 
Fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Courts and the protection of rights
[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary 
and proper in fact serve only to oppress. 
Lawrence v. Texas
How do the courts recognize those laws that serve only to 
oppress?
What truths are we blind to now?  What laws now 
improperly oppress?  
What role and obligation do the courts have in making us a 
more fair, more just society?
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What changed?
What kinds of things can lead the Court to recognize a 
“new” right that requires overturning precedent?
• public opinion?
• social, political scene?
• composition of the Court?
• new scientific information?
• Justices’ own world views?
?
What factors SHOULD influence the US Supreme 
Court’s views as to whether to overturn precedent?
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Full text is available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html 
Opinion of the Court 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 02—102 
JOHN GEDDES LAWRENCE and TYRON GARNER, 
PETITIONERS v. TEXAS 
[June 26, 2003] 
    Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. 
    Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into 
a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions. 
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 To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers 
have been rejected elsewhere. … The right the petitioners seek in this case 
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental 
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent. 
    The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to 
the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, 
however, an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 
(1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a 
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest 
decision’ ”) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))). In 
Casey we noted that when a Court is asked to overrule a precedent 
recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance 
on the existence of that liberty cautions with particular strength against 
reversing course. 505 U.S., at 855—856; see also id., at 844 (“Liberty finds 
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt”). The holding in Bowers, however, 
has not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where 
recognized individual rights are involved. Indeed, there has been no 
individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel 
against overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so. 
Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its 
issuance contradict its central holding. 
    The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis. In his 
dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens came to these conclusions: 
“Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a 
law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, 
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of 
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce 
offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to 
intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.” 478 U.S., at 
216 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in 
Bowers and should control here. 
[pages deleted]
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    Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick 
should be and now is overruled. 
    The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who 
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The 
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The 
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot 
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause 
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of 
the government. “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter.” Casey, supra, at 
847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.
    Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. 
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us 
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom. 
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Not all Justices 
share the view that 
the rights protected 
by the Constitution 
are evolving 
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1Judicial Review and 
the Balance of Power
Prof. Margaret Stevenson
JS 103 Courts and Society7.21.16
Judicial review
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and 
equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties  …
Article III, US Constitution 
In 1803, the US Supreme Court determined that “judicial 
power” in Article III meant that courts – as interpreters of 
the law ‐‐ can declare the actions of the other branches to 
be invalid  
Constitution set up a balance of power, including 
courts’ power to declare statutes unconstitutional
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
2
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Branches of 
government 
each have 
ways to keep 
the other 
branches in 
check
Legislatures:
keeping the other branches in check
Legislature can pass a statute  to change an executive 
branch action 
Legislature can override a President’s veto 
Requires a two‐thirds vote of both houses
Legislature can pass a statute responding to what judicial 
branch decides in its interpretation of the law
Harder to address US Constitutional decisions by 
writing a statute
Difficult to amend the US Constitution
Easier to amend California State Constitution
4
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3Executive branch: 
keeping the other branches in check
Executive branch can write regulations to construe a statute
Chief Executive can veto legislation 
legislature generally needs two‐thirds vote to override veto
US Constitution, Article 1, section 7
Chief Executive can issue an Executive Order
Though consider limits to Chief Executive’s authority – see 
Texas v. US (extended DACA/DAPA case 2016)
Chief Executive can nominate judges who have similar views to 
Executive
5
Judicial review:
keeping the legislature in check
Courts can decide that a statute is unconstitutional 
US Supreme Court has struck down over 140 federal statutes and 
over 1100 state statutes as unconstitutional
Courts can interpret (“construe”) a statute narrowly
reading the meaning to be limited ‐‐ is less confrontational 
than invalidating a full statute outright
Courts can decide that the legislature did not have the power
to legislate regarding an issue
6
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4Judicial review:
keeping the executive branch in check
Courts can decide a regulation or Executive Order is 
unconstitutional
Courts can interpret a regulation narrowly
Courts can decide a regulation is inconsistent with the statute it 
is supposed to enforce or execute
Courts can invalidate an executive’s action as exceeding his/her 
authority
7
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
In general, courts defer to political branches unless
there are important rights involved where the 
political process needs greater oversight
Courts elevate scrutiny of legislation (statutes) and 
executive decisions (Executive Orders, regulations) 
when important rights are at stake
8
504
5Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Three levels of scrutiny in reviewing other branches’ 
actions:
• Rational basis = does the political branch have a 
rational basis (reason) for doing what it’s doing?
• Intermediate scrutiny
• Strict scrutiny 
10
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6Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Rational basis
Courts will uphold the political branch’s action if there is a 
rational basis for it: if it is “rationally related” to a legitimate 
government purpose
The Justices are not supposed to substitute their own 
decisions for the legislature’s
Court generally applies the rational basis standard  when 
Congress is carrying out its Constitutionally described duties 
(Article I, § 8)
11
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Rational basis
Courts do not rule on the wisdom of action but its lawfulness
Justice Stewart’s comment in Connecticut contraceptive law as 
“uncommonly silly”: 
We are not asked … to say whether we think this law is 
unwise, or even asinine.  We are asked to hold that it 
violates the United States Constitution.  And that I cannot 
do. 
Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from 
enacting stupid laws.
Justice Thurgood Marshall
12
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7Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny
The law is unconstitutional unless it is “substantially 
related” to an “important” government interest 
Legislature must have an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for its action
Intermediate scrutiny applied generally in gender 
classifications
13
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Strict scrutiny
When the Court applies strict scrutiny, it almost always strikes 
down the law it is reviewing
Applying  strict scrutiny, a court will find a law unconstitutional 
unless the law is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling” 
government interest, and is the “least restrictive means” of 
achieving that government interest
The court elevates (heightens) scrutiny and becomes more 
thorough in its review when issues presented involve:
(a) fundamental rights or
(b) suspect classifications 
14
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8Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
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Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Strict scrutiny: fundamental rights
Fundamental rights are central to self‐government 
and human dignity; they relate closely to human 
personality and are regarded as the constituents 
of freedom
The origins of “fundamental rights” are in due 
process clause: government cannot take away 
people’s fundamental rights without due process 
of law
16
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9Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Examples of some fundamental rights courts have identified:
• right to marry
Loving v. Virginia (1967): anti‐miscegenation law (prohibiting interracial 
marriage) is unconstitutional because not justified by "legitimate overriding 
purpose“
• freedom of speech
Bates v. Little Rock (1960) Arkansas municipal ordinance requiring disclosure of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's membership 
lists.  Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed NAACP convictions  for failing to 
provide membership lists.  US Supreme Court reversed, finding the ordinances 
to be an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of association
• freedom of religion
Question 755 (2010) Oklahoma prohibition of application of Shariac and 
international law is unconstitutional
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Amish are exempt from compulsory school 
attendance laws for religious reasons
17
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Examples of some fundamental rights (cont’d)
• right to vote
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) careful and meticulous” scrutiny of alleged 
infringement of voting rights required
• right to privacy 
see many of the cases cited in Bowers and Lawrence
18
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Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
The Court did not find a fundamental right to:
education
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973)  Parents 
challenged Texas funding of school districts based on local property taxes as 
depriving children in low‐income neighborhoods of a fundamental right to 
education.  The US Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental 
right.
safe housing
Lindsey v. Normet (1972)  Tenants who withheld rent because of landlord’s 
substandard housing could not challenge Oregon’s eviction law since safe 
housing is not a constitutional right:  “We do not denigrate the importance of 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide 
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. …  Absent constitutional 
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord‐
tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”
In other words, legislative or executive actions that involve education, housing or 
employment are not: central to self‐government and human dignity; closely 
related to human personality, or regarded as the constituents of freedom
19
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Strict scrutiny: suspect classifications
Political branches cannot use suspect classifications in laws to 
treat one group of similarly situated people differently from 
another
Political branches not permitted to create a disfavored or 
“second‐class” group
The origins of “suspect classification” language are in the 
equal protection clause
20
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Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Strict scrutiny: suspect classifications (cont’d)
What makes a classification “suspect”?
If the proposed classification for differential treatment affects a 
group that:
• has characteristics that are “immutable” 
(unchangeable)
• has a history of discrimination
• lacks political power
• is a “discrete and insular minority”
21
Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Examples of some suspect classifications:
• Race  
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) racial classifications are suspect in a school 
desegregation challenge in Washington DC
• National origin / alienage (lawful immigrants)
Graham v. Richardson (1971) Arizona limiting welfare benefits to US citizens 
and to lawful immigrants who had lived in state for 15 years was 
unconstitutional
Classifications using undocumented immigrants generally are analyzed with rational 
basis review unless the topic is K‐12 education of children, in which case 
classifications are analyzed under intermediate scrutiny, based on Plyler v. Doe
(1982) (Texas law allowing public school districts to charge undocumented children 
for education is unconstitutional)
• Children of unmarried parents / “illegitimacy” (almost a 
suspect classification)
Trimble v. Gordon (1977) Illinois law disallowing illegitimate children to 
inherent from their fathers who died without a will is unconstitutional
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.  (1972) Louisiana laws allocating 
workers’ compensation benefits to legitimate and illegitimate children 
differently are unconstitutional 22
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Judicial review: levels of scrutiny
Examples of some suspect classifications (cont’d):
What has the Court found are not suspect classifications?  
Note: if not suspect classification, then legislatures need only a rational 
basis for passing laws affecting different classifications of people
• Undocumented immigrants
Especially when federal government acts (as opposed to states)
• Developmentally disabled 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) (city denied 
permit to group home for developmentally disabled; plaintiffs 
asked Court to apply strict scrutiny.  The Court invalidated the 
denial of the permit without elevating scrutiny, finding no 
rational basis for the city’s decision
• Low‐income people
23
Courts and Society
We complete our examination of how we govern 
ourselves in the US
• Functions of branches of government
• Focus on judicial branch and its application of 
principled decision‐making
How well does the model of equally matched 
adversaries presenting their cases before an impartial 
decision‐maker actually work?
24
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Courts and Society
In Republics, the great danger is, that the majority 
may not sufficiently respect the rights of the 
minority.
James Madison 
How  to keep the majority from unlawful and 
improper attempts to disregard the rights of 
political minorities?  
One possible way: go to court.
25
Courts and Society
For every wrong there is a remedy.
Cal. Civil Code § 3523
We have examined shortcomings in society and in the 
courts, and how we have tried to provide a remedy
26
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Courts and Society
Steps court has taken toward ‘equal justice under law’
• Train cars, schools and other public accommodations could be 
segregated until 1954
• Bans on interracial marriage existed until 1967
• The first African‐American Justice was appointed to the US 
Supreme Court in 1967, the first woman Justice in 1981, the 
first Latina in 2009
• Children of unmarried parents could be treated differently 
from children of married parents until 1977
• Gays could be jailed for having consensual sexual relations in 
the privacy of their home until 2003
• States could ban same‐sex marriage until 2015
27
Courts and Society
Issues remain for further work:
• Access to justice has become prohibitively expensive for many
– Increased pro bono requirements
– Some funding for legal services
• Attorneys need adequate training, resources under the 
adversary system
• Ethical rules govern limits of advocacy; enhanced discipline 
when attorneys and judges falter
• Grand jury system needs examination and reform 
28
514
15
Courts and Society
• Jury system needs competent jurors with a basic understanding 
of the purpose of the fact‐finding process 
– Plain‐language jury instructions
– Service by “peers”: non‐discrimination in jury selection
• Fact determinations need to be improved, better understood
– Improved understanding through science, resulting in better procedures 
• Forensics
• Credibility determinations
• Excluding lie‐detector testimony
• Improving eye‐witness identification procedures
– Enhancing integrity of law enforcement interviews
– Educating fact‐finders regarding limits of credibility determinations
29
Courts and Society
• Diversity of the bench and bar needs to be extended
– Significant steps over last several decades in enhancing 
diversity of bar, leading to diversity of bench
– Organized bar associations active in promoting diversity, 
outreach from sitting judges, legislation
30
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Courts and Society
• Education and oversight of judges needs to be further 
enhanced
– Judges have access to more perspectives now than in past
– Judicial Canons enforced
– Commission on Judicial Performance better known and staffed
• Appeals process can be more accessible and rapid
– What cases do not make it to US Supreme Court
– Cost of appealing cases 
31
Courts and Society
• Limitations of courts are expanded by collaborative, problem‐
solving courts
– collaborative courts are aimed at root issues of problems
– ADR is growing, especially mediation
– science helping to demonstrate what works – and what doesn’t
– other opportunities for expanding reach of courts to solve problems 
are open
• Lawmakers who inflame the public can be criticized
– recognize the political branches appeal to the majority of voters
– courts – to some extent – can limit some of the harm inflicted 
32
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Courts and Society
Challenge to you:
• Keep in mind the powerless and voiceless 
– Through your involvement, give them power and voice
• Remember Justice Kennedy’s admonition that “laws we 
once thought necessary and proper may serve only to 
oppress”
– Question what some consider ‘necessary and proper’ if 
it seems unfair
• use reason, explanation, precedent
• The Constitution and laws are intended to apply 
similarly to similarly situated people
33
Courts and Society
Challenge to you:
• Use your education, insight and experience to make the world 
a better place
– Actively critique what you see and hear
– Consider ways to increase fairness and justice 
– Propose improvements to those who will listen
– Look for ways you can implement those improvements 
yourself
• Don’t give up
34
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Courts and Society 
BALANCE OF POWER: 
WAYS ONE BRANCH CAN KEEP THE OTHERS IN CHECK 
 
What legislatures can do to keep the other branches in check: 
 How legislatures can keep the executive branch in check: 
• Pass a statute to address a regulation 
• Pass a statute to address the terms of an Executive Order (direct challenges to an 
Executive Order are rare) 
• Override a President’s veto (requires a two-thirds vote of both houses) 
 
 How legislatures can keep the judicial branch in check: 
• Pass a statute changing what court has decided in its interpretation of the law 
This happens in cases where the court interpreted a statute in a decision, and the 
legislature then says that the court’s interpretation was wrong. 
o Note: If the court decision is based on the Constitution, then there is a limit 
to what the legislature can do:  the legislature cannot write an 
unconstitutional statute, so if it rewrites the statute, it needs to assure that the 
statute is consistent with what the court has said that the Constitution 
requires. 
 Amend the federal Constitution (rare) 
It is difficult to amend the federal Constitution; not as hard to amend state 
Constitutions.   
 
What the executive branch can do to keep other branches in check: 
 How the executive branch can keep the legislature in check: 
• Promulgate regulations to construe a statute 
• Veto legislation (need two-thirds vote of legislature to override veto) 
• Issue an Executive Order 
 
 How the executive branch can keep the judicial branch in check: 
• Issue regulations or Executive Orders regarding court functions 
• Nominate judges who have similar views to executive 
 
What courts can do to keep other branches in check (called “judicial review”) 
 How the courts can keep the legislature in check: 
• Decide that a statute is unconstitutional  
• Decide that the legislature did not have the power to legislate regarding an issue 
• Construe a statute narrowly 
 
 How courts can keep the executive branch in check: 
• Decide a regulation is inconsistent with the statute it is supposed to enforce or 
execute. 
• Decide a regulation is unconstitutional 
• Interpret a regulation narrowly 
• Invalidate an Executive Order as unconstitutional 
• Decide the executive did not have the power to act regarding an issue 
BRANCH Legislative Executive Judicial 
FORM OF LAW Statutes 
Regulations,  
Executive Orders, 
Administrative decisions 
Precedent decisions 
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LEVELS OF SCRUTINY 
 
When courts review the actions of the other branches of to determine if those actions are 
Constitutional, courts scrutinize the other branches’ actions more closely in certain types of 
cases.  The types of cases and levels of scrutiny applied are summarized below. 
 
Level of scrutiny 
 
When used 
 
Test: 
 
Rational basis Regular standard of review 
 
The law is constitutional if 
government action was 
“rationally related” to a 
legitimate government 
purpose 
 
Intermediate scrutiny Gender classifications involved 
 
The law is unconstitutional 
unless it is “substantially 
related” to an “important” 
government interest (and 
possibly requires an 
“exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”) 
 
Strict scrutiny 
Fundamental rights or 
suspect classifications 
involved 
 
The law is unconstitutional 
unless it is “narrowly tailored” 
to serve a “compelling” 
government interest and is the 
“least restrictive means” of 
achieving the governmental 
interest. 
 
 
 
The government cannot deprive people of fundamental rights without due process of law. That is 
because the Constitution says that the government cannot deprive people of “life, liberty and 
property” without due process of law. 
 
Examples of what the courts have found to be fundamental rights:   
right to marry, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, right to vote, right to privacy 
 
The Constitution protects people from the government classifying them based on suspect criteria.  
That is because the Constitution guarantees people equal protection of the law. 
 
Some examples of what the courts have found to be suspect classifications:  
race, national origin, alienage (of lawful immigrants), children of unmarried parents 
(illegitimacy) 
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KATHERINE VARNUM et seq. vs. TIMOTHY J. BRIEN 
 
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
April 3, 2009, Filed 
 
CADY, Justice. 
In this case, we must decide if our state statute limiting civil marriage to a union 
between a man and a woman violates the Iowa Constitution, as the district court 
ruled. On our review we hold the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the Iowa Constitution. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the dis-
trict court. 
 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 
This lawsuit is a civil rights action by twelve individuals who reside in six com-
munities across Iowa. They include a nurse, business manager, insurance analyst, 
bank agent, stay-at-home parent, church organist and piano teacher, museum di-
rector, federal employee, social worker, teacher, and two retired teachers. Like 
many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children. Some are fos-
ter parents. Despite the commonality shared with other Iowans, the twelve plain-
tiffs are different from most in one way. They are sexually and romantically at-
tracted to members of their own sex. Unlike opposite-sex couples in Iowa, same-
sex couples are not permitted to marry in Iowa. The Iowa legislature amended the 
marriage statute in 1998 to define marriage as a union between only a man and a 
woman.2 Despite this law, the six same-sex couples in this litigation asked the 
Polk County recorder to issue marriage licenses to them. The recorder, following 
the law, refused to issue the licenses, and the six couples have been unable to be 
married in this state.  
In turning to the courts, the twelve plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Polk County 
District Court. They claimed the statutory same-sex marriage ban violates certain 
liberty and equality rights under the Iowa Constitution. The case was presented to 
the district court by means of a summary judgment motion. The record was de-
veloped through witness affidavits and depositions.  The district court concluded 
the statute was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection claus-
es of the Iowa Constitution and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.  
 
II. Standard of Review. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
[Citations.] We review the legal issues necessary for resolution of the constitu-
tional claims presented within the context of the summary judgment proceeding 
de novo. [Citation] 
 
III. Constitutional Separation of Powers. 
We approach the resolution of this case with a keen and respectful understanding 
of our Iowa Constitution and the vital roles of the three branches of government, 
Summary judgment is a 
means of deciding a case 
on legal issues only, 
when the facts are not in 
dispute 
I have made significant 
deletions to this much‐
longer opinion. I have 
not changed any text, 
but have taken out cita‐
tions and whole sections 
without so noting.  A 
longer version with the 
deletions noted is post‐
ed on the website.  The 
full opinion is available 
on LexisNexis and at 
http://www.judicial.stat
e.ia.us/Supreme_Court/
Recent _Opinions/ 
20090403/07‐1499.pdf 
 
‐ Peggy Stevenson 
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as well as the role of the people. It is important for these roles to be identified and 
expressed from time to time when individuals seek recognition of rights… 
Like the United States Constitution, the Iowa Constitution establishes three sepa-
rate, but equal, branches of government and delineates the limited roles and pow-
ers of each branch. [citation]  Among other basic principles essential to our form 
of government, the constitution defines certain individual rights upon which the 
government may not infringe. See Iowa Const. art. I ("Bill of Rights"). Equal pro-
tection of the law is one of the guaranteed rights. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. All 
these rights and principles are declared and undeniably accepted as the supreme 
law of this state, against which no contrary law can stand. See Iowa Const. art. 
XII, § 1. 
The legislature, in carrying out its constitutional role to make public policy deci-
sions, enacted a law that effectively excludes gay and lesbian people from the in-
stitution of civil marriage. The executive branch of government, in carrying out its 
role to execute the law, enforced this statute through a county official who refused 
to issue marriage licenses to six same-sex couples. These Iowans, believing that 
the law is inconsistent with certain constitutional mandates, exercised their consti-
tutional right to petition the courts for redress of their grievance. This court, con-
sistent with its role to interpret the law and resolve disputes, now has the respon-
sibility to determine if the law enacted by the legislative branch and enforced by 
the executive branch violates the Iowa Constitution. 
A statute inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution must be declared void, even 
though it may be supported by strong and deep-seated traditional beliefs and pop-
ular opinion. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
“[T]he very purpose of limiting the power of the elected branches of government 
by constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause is "to withdraw cer-
tain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts." W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 
(1943). 
The same principle applies to the provisions of the Iowa Constitution that limit 
government power. The idea that courts, free from the political influences in the 
other two branches of government, are better suited to protect individual rights 
was recognized at the time our Iowa Constitution was formed. See Koehler v. Hill, 
60 Iowa 543, 667 (1883) (Beck, J., dissenting) ("Judges ought not to be partisans, 
and be influenced by partisan control. Their duty is to interpret and apply the law, 
to the end that the liberty, and the rights and property, of the people may be se-
cured."); 1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention; of the State of Iowa 453 
(containing expression of one delegate's desire "to have one department of our 
State government in regard to which we can say, there is no political taint or bias, 
there is no partisan complexion to it; it is of such a character that when we go be-
fore it to have our dearest rights decided, we may rest assured that they will be 
decided upon principles of law and equity, and not upon political or party prin-
ciples"). 
Barnett is the Jeho‐
vah’s Witness flag 
salute case we dis‐
cussed 
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In fulfilling this mandate under the Iowa Constitution, we look to the past and to 
precedent. We look backwards, not because citizens' rights are constrained to 
those previously recognized, but because historical constitutional principles pro-
vide the framework to define our future as we confront the challenges of today. 
Our responsibility, however, is to protect constitutional rights of individuals from 
legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even when the rights have 
not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time unimagined, or challenge a deep-
ly ingrained practice or law viewed to be impervious to the passage of time. The 
framers of the Iowa Constitution knew, as did the drafters of the United States 
Constitution, that "times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can 
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress," 
and as our constitution "endures, persons in every generation can invoke its prin-
ciples in their own search for greater freedom" and equality. See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
 
IV. Equal Protection. 
A. Background Principles. The primary constitutional principle at the heart of 
this case is the doctrine of equal protection. The process of defining equal protec-
tion, as shown by our history as captured and told in court decisions, begins by 
classifying people into groups. A classification persists until a new understanding 
of equal protection is achieved.  
[T]oday, this court again faces an important issue that hinges on our definition of 
equal protection. This issue comes to us with the same importance as our land-
mark cases of the past. The same-sex-marriage debate waged in this case is part of 
a strong national dialogue centered on a fundamental, deep-seated, traditional in-
stitution that has excluded, by state action, a particular class of Iowans. This class 
of people asks a simple and direct question: How can a state premised on the con-
stitutional principle of equal protection justify exclusion of a class of Iowans from 
civil marriage? 
B. Legal Tests to Gauge Equal Protection.  …  Like the Federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Iowa's constitutional promise of equal protection " 'is essentially a direction that 
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.'" [citations]  [W]hen eva-
luating challenges based on the equal protection clause, our deference to legisla-
tive policy-making is primarily manifested in the level of scrutiny we apply to 
review legislative action. 
In most cases, we apply a very deferential standard known as the "rational basis 
test." Id. Under the rational basis test, "[t]he plaintiff has the heavy burden of 
showing the statute unconstitutional and must negate every reasonable basis upon 
which the classification may be sustained." [Citation]. In deference to the legisla-
ture, a statute will satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause 
 
"so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the 
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based ra-
tionally may have been considered to be true by the governmental 
Note the quotation 
from this case we 
read and discussed 
Beginning the dis‐
cussion to determine 
how deferentially 
the court will review 
the legislature’s ac‐
tions.   
 
Using a “rational 
basis” test of the 
statute would give 
the most deference 
to the legislature. 
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decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is 
not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational." 
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection, however, demands certain types 
of statutory classifications must be subjected to closer scrutiny by courts. Thus, 
courts apply a heightened level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis when 
reasons exist to suspect "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinari-
ly to be relied upon to protect minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
Under this approach, classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin and 
those affecting fundamental rights are evaluated according to a standard known as 
"strict scrutiny." [citation]. Classifications subject to strict scrutiny are presum-
pinterest. [citation] 
A middle tier of analysis exists between rational basis and strict scrutiny. This in-
termediate tier has been applied to statutes classifying on the basis of gender or 
illegitimacy and requires the party seeking to uphold the statute to demonstrate 
the challenged classification is substantially related to the achievement of an im-
portant governmental objective. [citation]. It is known as "intermediate scrutiny" 
or "heightened scrutiny," and groups entitled to this tier of review are often called 
termediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental in-
terest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the clas-
sification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).   
F. Framework for Determining Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny. Most 
statutes, one way or the other, create classifications. To determine if this particu-
lar classification violates constitutional principles of equal protection, we must 
next ask what level of scrutiny applies to classifications of this type. The County 
argues the more deferential rational basis test should apply, while plaintiffs argue 
closer scrutiny is appropriate. 
Although neither we nor the United States Supreme Court has decided which lev-
el of scrutiny applies to legislative classifications based on sexual orientation, 
numerous Supreme Court equal protection cases provide a general framework to 
guide our analysis under the Iowa Constitution. … 
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative classi-
fications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court has 
looked to four factors. 11 [citation] The Supreme Court has considered:  
(1) the history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by 
the legislation;  
class member's ability to contribute to society;   
(3) whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond the 
class members' control; and  
(4) the political power of the subject class. … 
 
“Footnote 4” is the 
most famous footnote 
in a Supreme Court 
case.  The Court’s pro‐
tection of “discrete and 
insular minorities” from 
political prejudice is 
quoted in equal protec‐
tion cases to this day – 
as evidenced in this 
case. 
“Strict scrutiny” is the 
most severe, least defe‐
rential standard of 
courts’ review of other 
branches’ actions 
“Intermediate scrutiny” 
is the middle of the three 
levels of judicial review 
of other branches’ ac‐
tions 
The four factors that 
the Court considers in 
deciding what level of 
judicial review is ap‐
propriate 
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[W]e analyze each of the four factors and assess how each bears on the question 
of whether the Iowa Constitution requires a more searching scrutiny be applied to 
the specific classification at issue.  
G. Determination of Appropriate Level of Scrutiny. Guided by the established 
framework, we next consider each of the four traditional factors and assess how 
each bears on the question of whether the constitution demands a more searching 
scrutiny be applied to the sexual-orientation-based classification in Iowa's mar-
riage statute. 
1. History of discrimination against gay and lesbian people. The County does not, 
and could not in good faith, dispute the historical reality that gay and lesbian 
people as a group have long been the victim of purposeful and invidious discrimi-
nation because of their sexual orientation. [T]his history of discrimination sug-
gests any legislative burdens placed on lesbian and gay people as a class "are 
more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative ra-
tionality in pursuit of some legitimate objective." [citation] This observation fa-
vors an elevated scrutiny to uncover any such prejudice. 
2. Sexual orientation and the ability to contribute to society. Heightened scrutiny 
is applied when the classification bears no relationship to a person's ability to con-
tribute to society. Based on Iowa statutes and regulations, it is clear sexual orien-
tation is no longer viewed in Iowa as an impediment to the ability of a person to 
contribute to society. 
3. Immutability of sexual orientation. To evaluate this argument, we must first 
consider the rationale for using immutability as a factor. [W]hen a characteristic is 
immutable, different treatment based on this characteristic seems "all the more 
invidious and unfair." [citation] [B]ecause sexual orientation is central to personal 
identity and " 'may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage 
to the individual's sense of self,'" classifications based on sexual orientation "are 
no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other 
group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic." [citations]  
4. Political powerlessness of lesbian and gay people. [W]e are satisfied for the 
purpose of analyzing the Iowa Constitution, the political powerlessness factor of 
the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political po-
werlessness. We are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically po-
werful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests pro-
duces discrimination based on sexual orientation. … 
5. Classifications based on sexual orientation demand closer scrutiny. In summa-
rizing the rationale supporting heightened scrutiny of legislation classifying on the 
basis of sexual orientation, it would be difficult to improve upon the words of the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut: 
 
Gay persons have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long history 
of purposeful and invidious discrimination that continues to manifest 
itself in society. The characteristic that defines the members of this 
group--attraction to persons of the same sex--bears no logical rela-
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tionship to their ability to perform in society, either in familial rela-
tions or otherwise as productive citizens. Because sexual orientation 
is such an essential component of personhood, even if there is some 
possibility that a person's sexual preference can be altered, it would 
be wholly unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so. Gay 
persons also represent a distinct minority of the population. It is true, 
of course, that gay persons recently have made significant advances 
in obtaining equal treatment under the law. Nonetheless, we conclude 
that, as a minority group that continues to suffer the enduring effects 
of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination, laws singling them 
out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny 
to ensure that those laws are not the product of such historical preju-
dice and stereotyping. 
 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432.  We agree with the observations of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court. The factors established to guide our determination of the level of 
scrutiny to utilize in our examination of the equal protection claim in this case all 
point to an elevated level of scrutiny. Accordingly, we hold that legislative classi-
fications based on sexual orientation must be examined under a heightened level 
of scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution. 
H. Application of Heightened Scrutiny. [W]e turn to a discussion of the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard.  
[C]lassification must be substantially related to an important governmental objec-
tive." In applying an intermediate standard to review gender-based classifications, 
the Supreme Court has stated: "Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of 
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine wheth-
er the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' " [citation]  To this end, 
courts evaluate whether the proffered governmental objectives are important and 
whether the statutory classification is " 'substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.'" [citation]   
2. Statutory classification: exclusion of gay and lesbian people from civil mar-
riage. …[T]he question we must answer is whether excluding gay and lesbian 
people from civil marriage is substantially related to any important governmental 
objective. 
3. Governmental objectives. The County has proffered a number of objectives 
supporting the marriage statute. These objectives include support for the "tradi-
tional" institution of marriage, the optimal procreation and rearing of children, 
and financial considerations.  
The first step in scrutinizing a statutory classification can be to determine whether 
the objectives purportedly advanced by the classification are important.  
marriage ban promotes the "integrity of traditional marriage" by "main-
taining the historical and traditional marriage norm ([as] one between a 
man and a woman)." This approach … permits a classification to be main-
tained " 'for its own sake.'" [citations]  Because the County offers no par-
Having decided to use 
the intermediate level 
of scrutiny, the Court 
begins its analysis of 
the legislature’s action 
in passing a statute 
that does not allow 
gay marriage 
The first step is to look 
at the legislature’s goals 
in passing the statute.  
The Court next goes 
through all the goals the 
government suggests 
support the rule. 
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ticular governmental reason underlying the tradition of limiting civil mar-
riage to heterosexual couples, we press forward to consider other plausible 
reasons for the legislative classification. 
b. Promotion of optimal environment to raise children. Another govern-
mental objective proffered by the County is the promotion of "child rear-
ing by a father and a mother in a marital relationship which social scien-
tists say with confidence is the optimal milieu for child rearing."  
Plaintiffs presented an abundance of evidence and research, confirmed by 
our independent research, supporting the proposition that the interests of 
children are served equally by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents. 
On the other hand, we acknowledge the existence of reasoned opinions 
that dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment for children. These 
opinions, while thoughtful and sincere, were largely unsupported by relia-
ble scientific studies. 
Even assuming there may be a rational basis at this time to believe the leg-
islative classification advances a legitimate government interest, this as-
sumed fact would not be sufficient to survive the equal protection analysis 
applicable in this case. In order to ensure this classification based on sex-
ual orientation is not borne of prejudice and stereotype, intermediate scru-
tiny demands a closer relationship between the legislative classification 
and the purpose of the classification than mere rationality. Under interme-
diate scrutiny, the relationship between the government's goal and the 
classification employed to further that goal must be "substantial." [cita-
tion]   
If the statute was truly about the best interest of children, some benefit to 
children derived from the ban on same-sex civil marriages would be ob-
servable. Yet, the germane analysis does not show how the best interests 
of children of gay and lesbian parents, who are denied an environment 
supported by the benefits of marriage under the statute, are served by the 
ban. Likewise, the exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage does not 
benefit the interests of those children of heterosexual parents, who are able 
to enjoy the environment supported by marriage with or without the inclu-
sion of same-sex couples. 
… Consequently, a classification that limits civil marriage to opposite-sex 
couples is simply not substantially related to the objective of promoting 
the optimal environment to raise children. This conclusion suggests stereo-
type and prejudice, or some other unarticulated reason, could be present to 
explain the real objectives of the statute. 
c. Promotion of procreation. The County also proposes that government 
endorsement of traditional civil marriage will result in more procreation. 
While heterosexual marriage does lead to procreation, the argument by the 
County fails to address the real issue in our required analysis of the objec-
tive: whether exclusion of gay and lesbian individuals from the institution 
of civil marriage will result in more procreation? If procreation is the true 
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objective, then the proffered classification must work to achieve that ob-
jective.  The briefs, the record, our research, and common sense do not 
suggest such an outcome. … 
d. Promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships. … The stability of 
opposite-sex relationships is an important governmental interest, but the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is not substantially related to 
that objective. 
4. Conclusion. Having examined each proffered governmental objective through 
the appropriate lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude the sexual-orientation-
based classification under the marriage statute does not substantially further any 
of the objectives. While the objectives asserted may be important (and many un-
doubtedly are important), none are furthered in a substantial way by the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from civil marriage. Our equal protection clause requires 
more than has been offered to justify the continued existence of the same-sex 
marriage ban under the statute. 
I. Religious Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage. Now that we have addressed 
and rejected each specific interest advanced by the County to justify the classifi-
cation drawn under the statute, we consider the reason for the exclusion of gay 
and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by the County: religious 
opposition to same-sex marriage.  Religious objections to same-sex marriage are 
supported by thousands of years of tradition and biblical interpretation. Yet, such 
views are not the only religious views of marriage. As demonstrated by amicus 
groups, other equally sincere groups and people in Iowa and around the nation 
have strong religious views that yield the opposite conclusion.  
[Constitutional] principles require that the state recognize both opposite-sex and 
same-sex civil marriage. Religious doctrine and views contrary to this principle of 
law are unaffected, and people can continue to associate with the religion that best 
reflects their views. A religious denomination can still define marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman, and a marriage ceremony performed by a minister, 
priest, rabbi, or other person ordained or designated as a leader of the person's re-
ligious faith does not lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious institution. 
The sanctity of all religious marriages celebrated in the future will have the same 
meaning as those celebrated in the past. The only difference is civil marriage will 
now take on a new meaning that reflects a more complete understanding of equal 
protection of the law. This result is what our constitution requires. 
J. Constitutional Infirmity. We are firmly convinced the exclusion of gay and 
lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further 
any important governmental objective. The legislature has excluded a historically 
disfavored class of persons from a supremely important civil institution without a 
constitutionally sufficient justification.  
We have a constitutional duty to ensure equal protection of the law. Faithfulness 
to that duty requires us to hold Iowa's marriage statute, Iowa Code section 595.2, 
violates the Iowa Constitution. To decide otherwise would be an abdication of our 
constitutional duty. If gay and lesbian people must submit to different treatment 
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without an exceedingly persuasive justification, they are deprived of the benefits 
of the principle of equal protection upon which the rule of law is founded. Iowa 
Code section 595.2 denies gay and lesbian people the equal protection of the law 
promised by the Iowa Constitution.  
 
V. Remedy. 
Because our civil marriage statute fails to provide equal protection of the law un-
der the Iowa Constitution, we must decide how to best remedy the constitutional 
violation. The sole remedy requested by plaintiffs is admission into the institution 
of civil marriage.  
Consequently, the language in Iowa Code section 595.2 limiting civil marriage to 
a man and a woman must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining statutory 
language must be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian 
people full access to the institution of civil marriage. 
 
VI. Conclusion. 
The district court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. Iowa Code 
section 595.2 violates the equal protection provision of the Iowa Constitution.  
 
AFFIRMED. 
All justices concur.
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